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Islam and the
Secular State
in Indonesia

Luthfi Assyaukanie



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Secular State
in Indonesia

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Islam and the *Secular State* in Indonesia

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INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
Singapore

First published in Singapore in 2009 by
ISEAS Publications
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 119614

E-mail: publish@iseas.edu.sg
Website: bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

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ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Assyaukanie, Luthfi, 1967–.

Islam and the secular state in Indonesia.

1. Islam and secularism—Indonesia.
2. Islam and state—Indonesia.

I. Title.

BF190.5 S35A85

2009

ISBN 978-981-230-889-4 (hard cover)

ISBN 978-981-230-890-0 (PDF)

Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd
Printed in Singapore by Mainland Press Pte Ltd

To

Titi, Gabriel, Melika, and Amadea



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PREFACE

For the last ten years, popular and academic books on Islam revolve around various aspects of Islamic radicalism. There seems to be no analysis of Islam unless it is rendered with the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism. Books on Indonesian Islam are no exception. The outbreak of religious conflicts since 1998 and a series of atrocious bombings in Bali and other places, only ensure that writers have nothing more relevant to speak about Islam other than its violent aspects. This book is different. It confronts the current media hype over the phenomenon of radical Islam in Indonesia. It presents a very fundamental inquiry about Indonesian Islam — once described as tolerant, peaceful, and “different from the Middle East” — as to whether it has been absorbed by the global wave of religious fundamentalism.

One argument that I make in this book is that throughout the last fifty years, Indonesian Islam has undergone tremendous development and made progress towards a more pluralist and democratic system of polity. To put it in a comparative historical perspective, Indonesian Muslims are politically more pragmatic and rational. This assumption obviously needs ground on which one can hold its validity. In this book, I argue that there is no better measurement to judge the religio-political attitude of Indonesian Muslims than the general election. Since independence, Indonesian people have gone through several elections, of which three were democratically held: in 1955, 1999, and 2004. Comparing these three general elections, we get a different picture of Indonesian Islam. Instead of becoming more ideological, the religio-political attitude of Indonesian Muslims is increasingly pragmatic. The last two general elections (1999 and 2004) distinctly showed that Islamic political parties have failed to improve on the record that they achieved in 1955 (43 per cent). Together, Islamic parties only obtained 14 per cent (in 1999) and 17 per cent (2004) of the total votes.

The failure of Islamic parties in the 1999 and 2004 general elections left a big question mark as to why there was such a change and so dramatic at that? This Indonesian case is even more fascinating when we compare it with other Muslim countries, where there is, contrastingly, a tendency for Islamic triumph in electoral democracy. In Jordan, for instance, the Islamic Action Front, a Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) based party, won the 1989 election by obtaining 28.7 per cent of the total vote. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Front Islamique du Salut) won the

1990 general election for local council by obtaining 55 per cent of the total vote. In Turkey, the Refah Party, surprisingly won the 1995 general election by obtaining 21.3 per cent of the total vote. Finally, interesting to add also, in the 2005 parliamentary election in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, obtained eighty-seven seats (20 per cent of the vote), making it the second most powerful party after the incumbent party, the National Democratic Party, which obtained 314 seats (69 per cent).

The question is why Islamic parties in Indonesia lost their battle to win democracy. Why does the Islamic agenda at the state level often fail to be implemented? Also, in spite of all those achievements, why is there a growing number of Islamic radical groups? This book is designed to answer this very question by giving a quite different perspective and taking a different approach. Most books on Indonesian Islam emphasize the role of the state in changing the religio-political attitude of Indonesian Muslims. While acknowledging the crucial role played by the Soeharto's regime in the last three decades, this book offers a new analysis. The change in the religio-political attitude of Indonesian Muslims is not only due to the Soeharto government, which ruled the country repressively, but also due to the long and passionate role played by Muslim intellectuals, particularly the *santri* intellectuals, who, believing in the doctrine of change and progress, silently support the regime's agenda of modernization. As the precursors of the Islamic reform movement, these intellectuals believed that only by developing Islamic arguments could the ongoing changes in Muslim societies be religiously and rationally justified.

Then from the early 1970s, a new generation of *santri* Muslims emerged in the public arena, pitting their reformist ideas primarily against their *santri* seniors (mostly affiliated with Masyumi). Fundamental concepts such as the "Islamic state", "Islamic party", "*shari'ah*", and "the basis of state", were ceaselessly examined. This intellectual exercise often generated a strong reaction and immediately challenged the integration of the Muslim community. Better educated and trained in both religious and secular sciences, this new generation of *santri* Muslims was quite successful in rebutting their seniors' arguments on such fundamental issues.

Certainly, argument is only one dimension of the contestation of ideas in contemporary discourse of Islam and politics in Indonesia. There are other dimensions that alter such an argument that have taken effect in society. Mass media were accustomed to playing a significant role. Indonesian leading media such as *Tempo* and *Kompas* knowingly took sides with — and directly or indirectly promoted — the religious reform project led by the new *santri* generation. The result was quite clear: given the pressure of the

unfriendly regime to political Islam and the attack of Muslim intellectuals at the central core of Islamic political doctrines, Indonesian Muslims had not much choice except to welcome the situation. The role of argument has long been studied by various branches of social sciences, but none relating its role specifically to Indonesian Islam, or even the Islamic world in general, has been done.

This book tries to fill this gap. Existing studies on Islam in Indonesia are dominated by an anthropological approach, partly influenced by Clifford Geertz and other first generation Western Indonesianists. The emerging categorizations were thus reflecting such anthropological analysis, such as *santri-abangan* and traditionalist-modernist dichotomies. This book comes with a new perspective that borrows from the framework of sociology of knowledge. Apart from the role of arguments, people's projection of an ordered polity, which Karl Mannheim called "utopia", is very much connected with ideology. It is nearly impossible to imagine people's utopian projections without acknowledging the role of ideologies. In the last fifty years, Indonesian Muslims have been interacting and dealing with world ideologies (for example, secularism, communism, Marxism, liberalism, etc.), which have directly or indirectly shaped their utopian views of an ideal polity.

This book grew out of my Ph.D. thesis, which I submitted to the University of Melbourne, Australia. I needed four years to write and complete it. Many people had been helpful in completing this book. First and foremost, I would like to thank Professors Merle C. Ricklefs, Abdullah Saeed, and Arief Budiman, who supervised me while I did my Ph.D. programme at the University of Melbourne. I was lucky to have such great supervisors. They gave such intense critiques and comments on the drafts of my thesis that I sometimes felt hurt. I now realize that without their constructive criticisms the thesis would not have been as good. In late July 2007, I received a letter from the University of Melbourne advising that my thesis, this book, had won the Chancellor's Prize for the best Ph.D. thesis in Humanities. I feel that the role played by my supervisors had not been small. After this achievement, Professor Ricklefs kept requesting me to turn the thesis into a book and have it published. Every time we met in Singapore or Jakarta, the first question he raised was "when is the book coming?" is I hope he would now stop asking me that question!

During my studies in Melbourne, I was helped by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). This institute had generously given me a good scholarship that allowed me and my family to live comfortably. The Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Society

(MIALS) and the Melbourne Abroad Travelling Scholarship (MATS) also kindly helped me financially to do my fieldwork research in Indonesia.

Several experts on Indonesia contributed to the process of writing this book: Professors Virginia Hooker, Daniel S. Lev (the late), R. William Liddle, Robert E. Elson, and Robert W. Hefner, Dr Lance Castles, and Dr Greg Barton. I would like to thank them for their kindness in helping me directly or indirectly. I would also like to convey my appreciation and thanks to my friends in Australia: M. Syafi'i Anwar, Fatimah Husein, Andy Fuller, Ludi Madu, Yayah Khisbiyah, Arskal Salim, Suadi Asyari, Masdar Hilmy, Khalid Al-Azri, Dewi Anggraini, Stephen and Indah Morgan.

My colleagues in Indonesia were also helpful: Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Hamid Basyaib, Ahmad Sahal, Nong Darol Mahmada, Anick HT, Burhanuddin, Abd. Moqsi Ghazali, Novriantoni, Lanny Octavia, M. Guntur Romli, Maljaul Abror, Saidiman, Ade Juniarti, and other friends in Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), who are too many to mention here by name. My friends at the Freedom Institute, Rizal Mallarangeng, Saiful Mujani, Sugianto Tandra, Hidayaturohman, Sarah Santi, and Zaim Rofiqi also supported me in their own ways. I must also mention my colleagues at Paramadina University: Ahmad Rivai Hasan, Abdul Hadi W.M., Nanang Tahqiq, Nasruddin Latief, Abdul Muis Naharong, and Suratno.

The process of transforming the thesis into this book would not have been possible without the help of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, which granted me a post-doctoral fellowship for one year (1997). There are many people who had been so kind to me during my stay at RSIS. First of all, I would like to thank Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of RSIS, Professor Amitav Acharya, Deputy Dean, and Dr Leonard Sebastian, Head of Indonesian Programme. My gratitude also goes to Dr Joseph Liow, Yang Razali, and Mohamed Nawab, and Dr Vedi R. Hadiz of the NUS.

Lastly, I owe my deep gratitude to my family who supported me throughout the writing of this book. My wife, Titi Sukriyah, is a most pleasant companion and the one with whom I share my joys and agonies. My kids, Gabriel, Melika, and Amadea often fill our home with delight and laughter. I dedicate this book to them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An earlier version of Chapter 5, “Model 3: Liberal Democratic State” was first published in Luthfi Assyaukanie, Robert Hefner and Azyumardi Azra, *Muslim Politics and Democratisation in Indonesia*, Annual Indonesian Lecture Series 28 (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute Press, 2008). Reproduced by permission of the publisher.

An earlier version of Chapter 6, “Continuity and Discontinuity of the Models” was first published as “Trajectories of Islamic Liberalism in Contemporary Indonesia”, *Australian Religion Studies Review*, vol. 21, no. 2 (2008), pp. 145–74. Reproduced by permission of the copyright-holder, Equinox Publishing.

ABBREVIATIONS

AD/ART	Constitution and Bylaws (Anggaran Dasar, Anggaran Rumah Tangga)
BKAM	Coordinating Institution of Muslim Groups (Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin)
BMI	Islamic Bank of Indonesia (Bank Muamalat Indonesia)
BPUPKI	Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan Usaha Penyelidik Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia)
BUMN	State-owned Companies (Badan Usaha Milik Negara)
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DDII	Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia)
Depag	Department of Religion (Departemen Agama)
DGI	Indonesian Council of Churches (Dewan Gereja Indonesia)
DI	House of Islam (Darul Islam)
DPR	People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)
FPI	Defenders of Islam Front (Front Pembela Islam)
GBHN	Broad Outlines of the State Policy (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara)
Golkar	Functional Group (Golongan Karya)
HMI	Muslim Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam)
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
HUSAMI	Indonesian Association of Muslim Businessmen (Himpunan Usahawan Muslimin Indonesia)
IAIN	State Institute of Islamic Religion (Institut Agama Islam Negeri)
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICMI	Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia)
IDS	Islamic Democratic Model

IKIP	Teacher Training Institute (Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan)
Inpres	Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden)
ISDV	Indies Social-Democratic Association (the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging)
ITB	Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung)
JIB	Young Islamic Association (Jong Islamieten Bond)
JIL	Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal)
KISDI	Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam)
KPPSI	Committee for the Preparation of the Implementation of Shari'ah (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam)
KPU	General Election Committee (Komite Pemilihan Umum)
KSI	Committee of Islamic Solidarity (Komite Solidaritas Islam)
KTP	Resident Identity Card (Kartu Tanda Penduduk)
KWI	Indonesian Catholic Bishops' Conference (Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia)
LDS	Liberal Democratic State
LIPIA	College of Arabic and Islamic Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab)
LJ	Jihad Troopers (Laskar Jihad)
LKiS	Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial)
LP3ES	Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial)
LSAF	Foundation of Study of Philosophy and Religion (Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat)
Masyumi	Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia)
MAWI	Indonesian Council of Bishops (Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia)
MAI	Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia (Majelis Islam A'laa Indonesia)
MMI	Indonesian Council of Mujahidin (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia)

MPR	People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat)
MUI	Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia)
NII	Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia)
NKRI	United State of Indonesian Republic (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia)
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
ORI	Currency of the Republic of Indonesia (Oeang Republik Indonesia)
PAN	National Mandatory Party (Partai Amanat Nasional)
Parmusi	Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia)
PBB	Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang)
PBN	National Labour Party (Partai Buruh Nasional)
PDI	Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia)
PDI-P	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)
PDRI	Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indonesia)
Pelita	Five-Year Plan (Pembangunan Lima Tahun)
Penpres	Presidential Decision (Penetapan Presiden)
Permi	Indonesian Muslim Unity (Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia)
Persis	Islamic Unity (Persatuan Islam)
PGI	Communion of Churches in Indonesia (Persatuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia)
PHDI	Association of Indonesian Hindu Dharma (Persatuan Hindu Dharma Indonesia)
PII	Indonesian Islamic Students (Pelajar Islam Indonesia)
PK	Justice Party (Partai Keadilan)
PKB	National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
PKS	Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)
PMB	New Masyumi Party (Partai Masyumi Baru)
PMKRI	Indonesian Catholic Student Association (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia)
PNI	Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia)

PPIM	Indonesian Islamic Political Party of Masyumi (Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi)
PPKI	Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia)
PPPKI	Federation of Political Association of Indonesian Nationalism (Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia)
PPP	United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
PRD	Democratic People's Party (Partai Rakyat Demoratik)
PRRI	Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia)
PSI	Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia)
PSII	Islamic Political Association of Indonesia (Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia)
PSP	Worker Solidarity Party (Partai Solidaritas Pekerja)
PSPSI	All Indonesia Worker Solidarity Party (Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia)
PTIQ	Institute of Qur'anic Science (Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu al-Qur'an)
PUI	Islamic Community Party (Partai Umat Islam)
PUSTEP	Centre for Study of Pancasila Economy (Pusat Studi Ekonomi Pancasila)
RDS	Religious Democratic State
Repelita	Five-Year Plan for Development (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun)
Resist	Centre for Religious and Social Studies
RUU	Bill or Legal Draft (Rancangan Undang-Undang)
RUU-KUB	Bill of Religious Tolerance (Rancangan Undang-Undang Kerukunan Umat Beragama)
RUU-P	Marriage Bill (Rancangan Undang-Undang Perkawinan)
RUU-PA	Religious Judicature Act (Rancangan Undang-Undang Peradilan Agama)
SATV	Sidik Amanat Tableg Vatonah
SEI	Islamic Economic System (Sistem Ekonomi Islam)
SEP	Pancasila Economic System (Sistem Ekonomi Pancasila)

SI	Islamic Association (Sarekat Islam)
Sisdiknas	National Educational System (Sistem Pendidikan Nasional)
SIUPP	Press Publication Enterprise Permit (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers)
SME	Social Market Economy
SPI	Indonesian Economic System (Sistem Perekonomian Indonesia)
STAIN	Advanced School of State Islamic Religion (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri)
STF	Advanced School of Philosophy (Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat)
TII	Indonesian Islamic Army (Tentara Islam Indonesia)
TUK	Utan Kayu Theater (Teater Utan Kayu)
UGM	Gajah Mada University (Universitas Gajah Mada)
UIN	State Islamic University (Universitas Islam Negeri)
UM	State University of Malang (Universitas Negeri Malang)
UMM	Muhammadiyah University of Malang (Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang)
UUD	Indonesian Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar)
Walubi	Council of Indonesian Buddhist (Perwalian Umat Buddha Indonesia)
WAY	World Assembly of Youth
WNA	Foreign Citizen (Warga Negara Asing)
WNI	Indonesian Citizen (Warga Negara Indonesia)

ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIAS

This book is about political thought, particularly about Islamic political thought as demonstrated by Indonesian Muslims since independence. It deals mainly with political change and how Muslims develop their arguments in facing it. The main questions I am concerned with in this study are: Why, for example, did many Muslims in Indonesia in the 1930s reject the idea of nationalism and ten years later accept it? Why did many Muslims in the 1950s demand an Islamic state, but twenty years later refuse it? Why did they in the 1970s strongly reject the idea of secularism, but thirty years later begin to accept it?

The same questions can be asked regarding the growing acceptance by Muslims of various political concepts such as democracy, pluralism, and human rights. One of the basic hypotheses that I propose in this study is that Islamic arguments that are developed in intellectual forums, publications, and academic circles play a significant role. An Islamic argument on certain political issues would be cast away when a viable new argument appeared. Muslim acceptance or rejection of certain concepts depends highly on whether or not an argument is theologically and logically justifiable. Argument, as Neta Crawford has stated, is a real component in social and political change. Its role is as important as military force.¹

To examine the above hypothesis, this study focuses on Indonesian Muslims' conception on the ideal model of polity. I will examine three generations of Muslim intellectuals since independence. My main aim is to

demonstrate that there has been a development of arguments among Muslim intellectuals. A model of polity is the most universal political thought that can embrace political concepts. By studying models of polity, we are not only identifying the variety of religious-political groups among Indonesian Muslims, but also discovering the dynamics of Islamic political thinking. As I will demonstrate, the history of Islamic political thought in Indonesia is the history of progress and transformation towards moderation. My reference is the history of political thought during the last three generations of Indonesian Muslims. Islamic political thought during the first generation, that is, between 1945 and 1970, was strongly dominated by the issue of the Islamic state in such a way that it was envisioned as a perfect model of polity. However, during the later periods, such a notion began to lose ground.

It is important to note that the development taking place in that history line does not apply to the Muslim community in general, but specifically within the *santri* Muslim communities. This distinction is important if we are to see the consistency of the arguments I develop in this study. As is widely known, Indonesian Muslims are broadly divided into two groups, defined by Clifford Geertz as *santri* and *abangan*. *Santri* are those Muslims who come from a religious background, while *abangan* are those who practise Islam nominally.² During the 1950s and until the mid-1960s, most *santri* Muslims were affiliated to Islamic political parties and generally supported the idea of an Islamic state. It was uncommon to find a Muslim with *santri* background refusing the idea of an Islamic state or supporting the idea of a secular state. However, since the 1970s and particularly in the early 1980s, a critical attitude towards the Islamic state has not only come from the *abangan*; *santri* Muslims have been as critical as — and to some extent even more critical than — the *abangan* group in discussing the idea of an Islamic state.

The tendency to become politically moderate among Indonesian Muslims is interesting to observe, particularly if we compare this fact with other tendencies in the current global Islamic resurgence. In other Muslim countries, Islamic resurgence is often marked with the rise of puritanism and the radicalization of religious-political attitudes. As I have said, Islamic political parties in Muslim countries such as Jordan, Algeria, and Turkey have all obtained significant victories in recent general elections. In addition, Islamic sentiment in each of these countries is increasingly receiving greater public attention. This is quite different from the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. If we consider the general election as a valid measurement, we can see a dramatic decline in voting for Islamic parties. In the first democratically held general election in 1955, Islamic parties

obtained quite a significant number of votes, namely 43 per cent. However, in the last two general elections all Islamic political parties combined obtained no more than 14 per cent (in 1999) and 17 per cent (in 2004). In addition, Islamic agendas such as the Jakarta Charter, which implies the implementation of *shari'ah* at the state level, have been soundly rejected.

There are, of course, many reasons the *santri* political attitude has changed. A great number of writings emphasize the role of the state, particularly during Soeharto's New Order era. As often explained, Soeharto, during his rule, employed a repressive policy against Islam, which gradually affected the political attitudes and mentality of Indonesian Muslims.³ I fully agree with this explanation. But, of course, this is not the only factor explaining why there has been a radical change, particularly since Soeharto has been removed from his political power. I would argue that apart from Soeharto's role and contribution in what I call "secularization from without", there has also been a process of "secularization from within". It was not only Soeharto who was responsible for secularization in the *santri* Muslim political mind, but also *santri* Muslims themselves, particularly their leaders. As stated above, the most severe criticisms of the Islamic state, a widely supported concept among *santri* Muslims during the 1950s, did not come from the *abangan*, among whom Soeharto was its chief representative, but rather from the *santri* group itself.

Secularization from within can be clearly seen in the changing models of polity I study in this book. Throughout the three models I examine, there is a tendency among *santri* leaders and intellectuals to express a moderate and inclusive attitude. What I mean by "model" is a theoretical conception of a political community in an ideal state. It may refer to a particular political experience, but it may also refer to a set of religious-political constructions made by an epistemic community. The models of polity which this study will deal with emerge from these two realities.

FROM TYPOLOGY TO MODELS OF POLITY

Most of the important works on the relationship between Islam and politics or Islam and the state use a typological approach to explain the different attitudes of Indonesian Muslims in dealing with religious-political issues. This is mainly due to the fact that Indonesian Islam is a complex mix of diverse groups and cannot be described in one generalization. Clifford Geertz's famous study discovered three distinct variants of Javanese Muslims. This trichotomy, known as *santri*, *priyayi*, and *abangan*, not only reflects the religious-cultural structure, but also explains the political and

economic composition. *Santri* is a group of people who strictly maintain religious teachings. According to Geertz, *santri* culture is anti-bureaucratic, independent, and egalitarian. They live mostly in urban areas, where they conduct their economic activities as traders. Geertz found congruence between *santri* economic values and the Weberian Protestant ethic.⁴ In politics, *santri* Muslims tend to vote for religious parties such as Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama. *Abangan* is a group of people who are not concerned with the formal practice of religion. As opposed to *santris*, *abangan* Muslims mostly live in rural areas where they live as peasants and villagers. In politics, they tend to support the “secular” or non-religious parties such as the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI, Partai Nasionalis Indonesia), the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI, Partai Sosialis Indonesia), and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia). Meanwhile, *priyayi* is a group of syncretic people who believe more in Hindu-Javanese values than in Islamic ones.⁵ *Priyayi* are the elite Javanese who live around the Javanese *kraton* (palaces). In politics, like *abangan*, *priyayi* mostly support the secular-nationalist parties.

Many scholars have criticized Geertz’s classification, not only because he used an unparallel categorization,⁶ but also because his description of each categorization is untenable. Harsja W. Bachtiar, for example, criticizes Geertz for considering *abangan* as peasants who are not very religious (in an Islamic sense). Many *abangan* peasants, Bachtiar argues, build at least one prayer house in every village, attend Friday prayers, and perform the *hajj*. He writes that, “there are many peasants who endeavour through all possible means to obtain enough funds to be able to make the pilgrimage to Mecca”.⁷ Likewise, to associate *santri* with the merchant class is not entirely accurate, since they “are found in every major social category, nobility and commoners, traders and peasants, young and old, the traditional and the modern, the educated and the uneducated”.⁸ Bachtiar also faults Geertz for associating *priyayi* with Hindu-Javanese values. Instead, Bachtiar argues that “prominent *priyayi*, including ruling princes, had been *santri*, to mention only Sultan Agung and Prince Diponegoro”.⁹ Nevertheless, as far as political affiliation is concerned, Geertz’s association of each classification with various political parties is historically accurate. During the time he conducted his research, most *abangans* and *priyayis* were affiliated to non-religious parties, while *santris* supported religious parties. However, as I will demonstrate in this study, these associations have changed significantly.

Geertz’s classification is based entirely on the local tradition of an Indonesian community, that is the Javanese village called Mojokuto. This classification unlikely becomes the standard for the Indonesian

religious-political setting in general, since Indonesia's Muslims cannot be characterized simply by this single Javanese community. Thus, Deliar Noer, in his work *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, makes a broader classification.¹⁰ Inspired by the global religious-political typology, Noer classifies religious-political attitudes of Indonesian Muslims into "modernist" and "traditionalist". The modernists are those Muslims who argue that modernity can be adopted as a new instrument for Islamic prosperity. Meanwhile, the traditionalists are those Muslims who believe that the traditional values are still feasible for contemporary life. Both modernists and traditionalists believe in the fundamental values of Islamic political doctrine, such as the need for the state to have a religious basis, the application of Islamic laws (*shari'ah*), and a commitment to core Islamic principles. Thus, in politics, both modernists and traditionalists founded a single Islamic party — Masyumi. However, due to their different points of view and pragmatic political interests, the party split up in 1952. The traditionalists established their own party, the Nahdlatul Ulama Party.

The modernist-traditionalist division is mainly based on the *santri* categorization — if we are to use Geertz's term. It does not include the wider scope of Indonesian Muslims. Nationally, regardless of their religious backgrounds, Noer classifies the political attitudes of Indonesian Muslims into what he calls "the religiously neutral nationalists" and "the Muslim nationalists".¹¹ In dealing with issues such as nationalism, the state, and government, the religiously neutral nationalists reject the Islamic basis that is supported by the Muslim nationalists. Noer's classification is widely accepted. Endang Saifuddin Anshary, for instance, uses the typology and modified it into "Islamic nationalist" and "secular nationalist".¹²

Another well-known classification is used by Allan Samson, an American political scientist, in his dissertation and some of his articles.¹³ He seems to agree with Noer's classifications of modernism and traditionalism as well as Islamic nationalism and secular nationalism. However, with regard to *santri's* political attitude towards Indonesian politics in general, Samson found three major groups. The first is what he calls "the fundamentalist", that is, a group of Muslims who want to implement Islamic doctrines strictly in both private and public spheres. They have often rejected cooperation with secular groups. Among the leaders of this group were Isa Anshary and E.Z. Muttaqien of Masyumi.¹⁴ The second is "the accommodationist", who "contend that politics must be autonomous from strict religious supervision, that Ummat Islam must acknowledge the legitimate interests of secular groups and be willing to cooperate with them on a sustained basis".¹⁵ The third is "the reformist", who seeks the middle ground between

the two existing groups, and is willing to cooperate critically with secular groups. In his dissertation on Indonesian Islam, Muhammad Kamal Hassan, a Malaysian scholar, adopted Samson's classification and modified the term "fundamentalist" to "idealist".¹⁶

Typology is used to help us understand complex and highly diverse religious phenomena. However, typology is not a permanently fixed reality. Its utility depends very much on its socio-historical context. A study by Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy addresses this issue. Both authors criticize the existing religious-political typologies, particularly the modernist-traditionalist typology, arguing instead that the current religious-political attitude of Indonesian Muslims can no longer be seen from a dichotomous perspective.¹⁷ Since the beginning of the New Order era, the religious-political map of Indonesian Muslims has radically changed. Indonesian Islam, Ali and Effendy argue, can be categorized into at least four groups. First, the neo-modernists, that is, a group of Muslims who want to mix tradition and modernity. For this group, modernity is not something that Muslims should reject, but its existence does not mean the negation of traditional values. Neo-modernists are intellectuals who wish "to keep the good of the old, and to take the best of the new" (*al-muhafazah 'ala al-qadim al-salih wa al-akhdh bi al-jadid al-aslah*).¹⁸ Second, the social-democrats, that is, a group of Muslims who view Islam as an inspiration for social and economic justice. Third, the internationalists or Islamic universalists who believe Islam to be a universal religion, and as such, Islam must become a leader in every aspect of human life. Fourth, the modernists, who are equivalent to the old typology's Islamic modernists. Concluding their study, Ali and Effendy write:

The categorization into four distinct patterns of thought as discussed above — with which other people may disagree — resulted in a new map of Indonesian Islamic thought. This categorization is inferred from the dynamics of recent development and is an attempt at reconciling the dichotomy of traditionalist and modernist thought.¹⁹

The typological approach has been quite dominant among students of Indonesian studies. There is also a trend for typology to become increasingly complicated. This at least can be seen in Mark R. Woodward's article, where he classifies Indonesian Islam into five distinct groups. First, "indigenized Muslims", which is embraced exclusively by — using Geertz's term — *abangan* Muslims. Politically, this group supports Megawati Sukarnoputri and her party, the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan). Second, "traditional Muslims", which mainly include members of the Nahdlatul Ulama. Politically, they

support the National Awakening Party (PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), a reincarnation of the old NU Party. Third, “the Islamic modernists”, who are politically affiliated with the Crescent and Star Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang), the Justice Party (PK, Partai Keadilan),²⁰ and the National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional). The last two groups that Woodward classifies are intellectual movements that do not have a specific affiliation to any political party. These are “the Islamists”, often called fundamentalists; and “the neo-modernists”, a group that supports a liberal, inclusive, and tolerant interpretation of Islam.²¹

The most recent typological approach has been made by Robert W. Hefner, an American political anthropologist, in his book *Civil Islam*.²² Focusing on how Islam interacts with the state and how Muslims behave towards modern issues such as democracy and civil society, Hefner classifies current Indonesian Muslims into two main political blocs. The first embraces what he calls “civil Islam” and the other, “regimist Islam”. While followers of civil Islam are Muslims who favour the modern values of democracy, freedom, pluralism, and civil rights, followers of regimist Islam are the group of Muslims “created” by the Soeharto regime.²³ As Soeharto was anti-democratic, repressive and authoritarian, so is regimist Islam.

Hefner’s classification has been criticized by many scholars. Greg Fealy strongly criticizes him for his “partisanship with the civil Islam cause”²⁴ and for historical inaccuracies and errors.²⁵ Saiful Mujani, on the other hand, points out Hefner’s confusion in advocating civil Islam’s role, particularly with regards to its role in Muslim democratization. “It is not clear,” Mujani writes, “whether it is ‘civil Islam’ or the characteristics of the authoritarian New Order government that ruled the country for more than three decades that best explains Indonesian democratization”.²⁶

As stated above, typology is an attempt to understand the phenomena in our surroundings, whether related to religion, economy, or politics. Typologies are often so complicated that we cannot easily live with them, although, as Shepard argues, we also cannot live without them.²⁷ Typologies are often problematic, for they convey an implicit bias or judgment. This is why some people avoid using them. However, we cannot actually avoid them, particularly if we face a complex phenomenon of political society such as that of Indonesia’s Muslims. The question, therefore, is not whether we should use typologies, but how we should use them.²⁸ And, one of the correct ways is to put them into the socio-historical contexts in which they are used.

My objection to the typologies made by the above mentioned scholars is not because they are too general (as we can see from Geertz, Samson,

Noer, and Hefner). Neither is it because they are too specific (as we can see from Fachry Ali, Effendy, and Woodward), which makes them inflexible; but rather because they are too concentrated on ideological tendencies, and thus fail to give us a clear picture of how Muslims, particularly *santri* Muslims,²⁹ have idealized their political model. I believe that political ideas or political ideologies, as Karl Mannheim says, cannot be properly understood without an appreciation of the fundamental role of utopia.³⁰ Understanding utopia in this context is understanding the models of polity. It is quite disappointing that many studies on political thought in Indonesia put too much emphasis on political ideology, but without due consideration of the Muslims' vision of utopia.

MODEL OF POLITY DEFINED

I will now explain what I mean by "model" and how it is employed in this study. Model has been used by social scientists to explain the development of political thinking in the West. The first scholar to classify the models of democracy systematically was, perhaps, C.B. Macpherson, an eminent Canadian political scientist. In his well-acclaimed book *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, Macpherson distinguishes four models of liberal democracy: Protective, Developmental, Equilibrium, and Participatory democracy. Protective democracy is characterized by the will to make democracy a means to remove state oppression. Developmental democracy is characterized by the will to make democracy "a means of individual self-development".³¹ Equilibrium democracy is characterized by the will to give a wider space for elites to participate in the democratic process. Finally, participatory democracy is characterized by the will to give more opportunity to people rather than just the elites.

By dividing the development of liberal democracy into models, Macpherson makes a new argument on the history of liberal democracy. He contends that liberal democracy in theory and practice only began in the early nineteenth century. This view is contrary to the widely held assumption that liberal democracy began in the eighteenth century or even earlier, when political philosophers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau (eighteenth century) and John Locke (seventeenth century) wrote their works. His argument is that it is only in the nineteenth century that political theorists "found reasons for believing that "one man, one vote" would not be dangerous to property, or to the continuance of class-divided societies." Prior to the nineteenth century, the liberals believed that freedom would threaten the capitalists' interests. The first thinkers to change this set of mind, according

to Macpherson, were Jeremy Bentham and James Mill.³² Hence, liberal democracy only began with Bentham and Mill.

Macpherson defines model as “a theoretical construction intended to exhibit and explain the real relations, underlying the appearances, between or within the phenomena under study”.³³ He admits that the model in the social sciences is different from that in the natural sciences in that the latter is more consistent and sustainable than the former. This is mostly due to the nature of social sciences, whose phenomena depend largely on constantly changing variables, namely, humans and society. In the natural sciences, the case is different. One might speak of scientific models in a paradigmatic way, such as Ptolemaic, Copernican, Newtonian, or Einsteinian paradigms.³⁴

The uniqueness of model in social sciences, according to Macpherson, has to be seen as a pattern that distinguishes itself from other models in a certain period of time. Therefore, to become a model, there are two requirements which need to be fulfilled. First, it must “be concerned to explain not only the underlying reality of the prevailing or past relations between willful [sic] and historically influenced human beings, but also the probability or possibility of future changes in those relations”.³⁵ Second, it has to be explanatory as well as justificatory. “Explanatory” means something that can explain a political system or society and how it functions; “justificatory” means that such a model can judge how good a political system is and why this is so. With these two requirements, Macpherson does not consider a model only as a standard of reference based merely on the political experience, but also the imagination of political theorists and politicians about an ideal political system. He concludes:

So, in looking at models of democracy — past, present, and prospective — we should keep a sharp look-out for two things: their assumptions about the whole society in which the democratic political system is to operate, and their assumptions about the essential nature of the people who are to make the system work... To examine models of liberal democracy is to examine what the people who want it, or want more of it, or want some variant of the present form of it, believe it is, and also what they believe it might be or should be.³⁶

Macpherson's framework of models of democracy is fully used by David Held, a British-born political scientist, whose book *Models of Democracy* has now become a classic.³⁷ He adds another five models of democracy: Classical, Marxist, Elitist, Pluralist, and Legal Democracy. Held does not confine democracy to the liberal sense as it is understood by Macpherson, but also considers other models that have prevailed throughout the ages. Hence, he also includes Marxism as a variant of the democratic model. The

Marxist model of democracy, he argues, was born as an immediate response to Western liberal democracy. In fact this model was established as a refutation of the foundation of liberal democracy, viz., capitalism. The Marxist model of democracy believes that “democratic government was essentially unviable in a capitalist society; the democratic regulation of life could not be realized under the constraints imposed by the capitalist relations of production”.³⁸ For Marx, real democracy is a democracy built upon the abolition of class and the rejection of capitalism.

Held’s consideration of Marxism as a successive variant of democratic models is based on what he means by “model”. Inspired by Macpherson, he defines model as “a theoretical construction designed to reveal and explain the chief elements of a democratic form and its underlying structure or relations”.³⁹ Any theoretical construction that can explain the main elements of democratic forms and relational structures can be considered a model of democracy. What one should be concerned with in creating any model — whether in the past, the present, or the future — is the “key features, recommendations, assumptions about the nature of the society in which democracy is or might be embedded, their fundamental conceptions of the political capabilities of human beings, and how they justify their views and preferences”.⁴⁰

The model approach to studying democracy is also adopted by Wayne Gabardi, an American political scientist.⁴¹ Analysing current democratic discourse, Gabardi found three other models not mentioned by either Macpherson or Held, namely: Communitarian, Deliberative, and Agonistic democracy. These models have just emerged in the last two decades as a result of interdisciplinary connections, particularly between political science, sociology, and postmodern philosophy.

The communitarian model of democracy is a theoretical abstraction of a political system that emphasizes the participation of communities as the core of democratic principles. Communitarians such as Robert Bellah criticize the liberals for their overestimation of individuality and for being ignorant of community. Justice will not be fulfilled by neglecting communitarian participation.⁴² The deliberative model suggests that “collective public deliberation is the definitive democratic experience”. What concerns the deliberative theorists is not just a community, but also the socio-political discourses within communities. Juergen Habermas, one of the eminent theorists of this model, locates the heart of democracy in the “public sphere”, which consists of social organizations, civic associations, interest groups, and social movements.⁴³ Meanwhile, the agonistic model claims that democracy will not be attained unless it can embrace many different, pluralist societies. Agonistic theorists such as Michael Foucault “call for a radically pluralistic

public sphere of contestive identities, moralities, and discourses".⁴⁴ Reviewing the three predominant models, Gabardi concludes:

The heart of the democratic experience for communitarians is 'the community' understood as a group of people who share the same framework of values. For deliberative democrats it is 'the public sphere' understood as a public space of rational collective deliberation. For agonistic democrats it is 'identity/difference' understood as the egalitarian reconstitution of cultural life within a radically pluralized, postmodern political culture.⁴⁵

While, in the Western political tradition, model has been applied to analyse various political concepts, in Islamic political tradition, it is rarely used. Among the few scholars who use this approach is Ishtiaq Ahmed, a Pakistani scholar.⁴⁶ In his analysis of Pakistani politics, he located four models of polity imagined by Pakistani Muslims:

First, what he calls "the sacred state excluding human will". This model is based on an assumption that "God has not left the matter of worldly life to the discretion of human beings, but has prescribed a clearly defined path, with detailed instructions about how to tread along it".⁴⁷ The supporters of this model believe that everything has been regulated by Islam, and "no area of human life has been left vacant by God's commands".⁴⁸ Ahmed considers people such as Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–79) as staunch exponents of this model.

Second, "the sacred state admitting human will". The exponents of this model such as Muhammad Asad (formerly Leopold Weiss), Ghulam Ahmad Perwez (1903–85), Khalifa Abdul Hakim (d. 1959), and Javid Iqbal (the son of the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal), assume that Islamic political government is neither wholly theocratic nor secular, but a balance between the two. This model, however, has many variants, stretching from the autocratic, such as Perwez, to the liberal, such as Iqbal.⁴⁹

Third, "the secular state admitting divine will". This model is actually a deviant model, since the secular state has always been regarded as contradictory to the *raison d'être* for the establishment of Pakistan. However, Ahmed argues that the model of the secular state did exist in the Pakistani Muslim community. This model is based on the conviction that "Islam has not sanctioned any particular concept of the state".⁵⁰ The proponents of this model — such as S.M. Zafar and Muhammad Usman — believe that democracy, and not a classical Islamic political system, can provide a better political life for Muslims.

Fourth, "the secular state excluding divine will". What distinguishes this model from the previous is that it is based on the assumption that Pakistan could be a purely secular state. Religion, that is, Islam, thus, has

to be detached from any political or governmental discourse. This model has had few supporters. Among them was Muhammad Munir (d. 1981), a former Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court.⁵¹

Most studies on political thought apply models in the Western political context. Only a small number have been employed in the context of Muslim society. Ahmed's study of models of polity in Pakistan is perhaps the only comprehensive study as far as the Islamic context is concerned. There is no single account that deals with the Indonesian context. My study is an attempt to fill this gap. It aims to make use of the framework of model to explain the development of Islamic political thought in Indonesia, and how Indonesian Muslims imagine their ideal state and government.

THREE MUSLIM MODELS OF POLITY

Broadly speaking, there are three models of polity imagined and endorsed by three generations of Indonesian Muslims: the first is the Islamic Democratic State (IDS), that is a model that aims at making Islam the basis of the state and advocating Muslims to have their central role in Indonesian social and political life. The second is the Religious Democratic State (RDS), that is a model that emphasizes the significance of religious pluralist life in Indonesia and aims at making the state the guardian of all religions. The third is the Liberal Democratic State (LDS), which can also be called the Secular Democratic State.⁵² This model aims at freeing religions from the domination of the state (as is proposed in the second model) and advocating secularization as the basis of the state.

As can be seen, the three models of polity I discuss in this study use the word "democracy" or more specifically "democratic state". My first assumption is that Muslim intellectuals and leaders who have been involved in the modern political discourse consider democracy the best available political system, in spite of the fact that their conceptions of democracy are not the same. Some of them accept democracy as long as it is Islamized, others accept it as long as it is not conflicting with religious values, while yet some others accept it as it is, since they believe that democracy contains in itself fundamental values in line with the basic principles of Islam. The three models of polity that I study here are based broadly on these various attitudes towards democracy.

Democracy is indeed a new concept in Islamic political discourse. Muslims have only been acquainted with democracy since early last century. In the beginning, many of them rejected it, mainly because of their suspicion of anything coming from the West. However, since the concept

has become increasingly popular, it seems that there are not many choices for Muslims other than to accept it. Thus, since the second half of the last century, democracy has been widely accepted. Muslims from both liberal and conservative camps acknowledge its value and consider it an ideal system that can be implemented in Muslim political life. Only a few Islamic groups reject the concept, and they are usually the radical minorities, which basically not only reject democracy, but also refuse constitutional methods.⁵³

Like many Muslims in other countries, Indonesian Muslims accept democracy with qualifications or, to borrow David Collier's and Steven Levitsky's words, "with adjectives".⁵⁴ Hence, there emerges the concepts "Islamic democracy", "theo-democracy", "religious democracy", and so on. In practice, the use of these adjectives is not a mere attributive identity. Rather it contains certain missions implied in the adjectives. Thus, a model of Islamic democracy, for instance, has a unique character that differs from other models of democracy. Interestingly, those adjectives play a greater role in determining the nature of democracy than the "democracy" itself. No wonder many scholars point out that democracy with adjectives is actually not democracy.⁵⁵

Discourse on democracy in Islam is essentially a religious-political construct and not merely a political issue. Thus the categories of "Islam", "religious", and "liberal" sharply reflect such a discourse. In any case, democratic discourse in Islam has a different point of departure, which subsequently leads to a different conceptualization. In the Western political tradition, democracy is an answer to the question whether political authority has to be given to one person, a few, or many, which subsequently creates types of political government such as autocracy (government by one person), oligarchy (government by a few people), and polyarchy (government by many people).⁵⁶ It is purely a political question. Meanwhile in modern Islamic political discourse, democracy is a theological problem. It is an answer to the question of whether political authority should be given to God or to man, which then leads to the creation of models fundamentally different from that of the Western discourse.

Model 1: Islamic Democratic State (IDS)

The term "Islamic Democratic State" was initially coined by Mohammad Natsir (1908–93),⁵⁷ in the following phrase: "the state based on Islam is not a theocracy. It is a democratic state. Neither is it a secular state. It is an Islamic Democratic State".⁵⁸ He contrasts this model of state with theocracy, the government of God, and the secular state, a godless government. Model 1

is a middle path between two extreme models. As is obvious from the above quote, Natsir considers democratic state essentially good, but not good enough to be compared with Islamic political system. What he means by “Islamic political system” is a system which comprises all aspects of Muslim life. Islam as regarded by most of its followers is comprehensive (*kamil*), all-inclusive (*shamil*), and suitable for all times and conditions (*salih li kulli zaman wa makan*). In short, it is a complete system of life. With this superior character, Islam cannot be subordinated by any other systems. All ideologies and concepts coming from outside Islam must, therefore, be refuted, or else be modified so that they can comply with it.

Many supporters of Model 1 consider democracy first of all as an alien product. Some of them argue that democracy, whose meaning is the government of the people (“people” is commonly understood as the opposition to “God”), is against the very doctrine of Islam in that government (*hukumah*) belongs solely to God.⁵⁹ In one of his early writings, Natsir very cautiously accepts democracy. He argues that there are several things in Islam considered to be final, thus giving no room for people to discuss them. For him, issues such as the banning of gambling and pornography cannot be discussed or be voted on in the parliament. Parliament has no right to discuss any of these things.⁶⁰

Model 1 proponents’ understanding of democracy plays a crucial role in shaping their attitudes towards religious-political issues. By understanding democracy as a concept limited to the divine order, they actually give more space to religious authority. This can be seen, for example, in how they sacrifice some principles of democracy (such as political equality) for the sake of a religious doctrine which, they argue, “cannot be discussed in the parliament”. For example, the problem of citizenship. Classical Islamic political doctrine acknowledges the division of the political community into Muslims and *dhimmi* (protected non-Muslims). This distinction is not merely of political identity, but has consequences for political rights and obligations. Hence, the *dhimmis* are obliged to pay tax (known as *jizyah*) more than the Muslims do (known as *zakah*). In addition to this, they also do not have equal political rights, since they are prevented from holding strategic political positions, such as the head of state. The exponents of Model 1 such as Natsir and Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1911–83) believe in the validity of such a division, particularly in the case of non-Muslim political rights. For them, such a doctrine is final and, therefore, cannot be democratically debated in the parliament.

Another example can be seen in their attitude towards the issue of freedom of thought or freedom of expression. Certainly, the exponents of

Model 1 acknowledge freedom as an essential part of democracy. But again such freedom must be subjected to religious doctrines.⁶¹ Freedom which violates a religious doctrine, must therefore, be rejected. This happened in 1973 when a famous Egyptian film director, Moustapha Akkad, announced that he would make a film on Prophet Muhammad. Many Muslim clerics (*ulama*) all over the world objected to his plan. In Indonesia, the Muslim response was covered by the mass media, including *Tempo* and *Panji Masyarakat*. Their objection was primarily based on the classical Islamic teaching that Prophet Muhammad cannot be visualized, either in pictures or in motion pictures. In an interview with *Tempo* magazine, Natsir said, "I will organize a mob if the film would actually be made." In the same magazine, Hamka (1908–81), another ideologue of Model 1, stated that "I will certainly attack it."⁶²

Another interesting case related to freedom of expression involves the reactions of some of the exponents of Model 1 against a short story (*cerpen*) written by Ki Panjikusmin titled *Langit Makin Mendung* (*The Darkening Sky*). This short story was published by *Sastra* magazine in August 1968, and it triggered a long and heated controversy among Indonesian Muslims. Several Muslim leaders considered the short story to be blasphemous and an insult to God, Islam, and Prophet Muhammad. Ki Panjikusmin is actually the pseudonym of a man who originally came from Malang, East Java. The publication of the story and the concealment of the author's identity was due entirely to Hans Begue Jassin, the editor-in-chief of the magazine. Jassin was not only responsible for the publication of the story, but he also defended its author on the ground of freedom of expression. Hamka, who was himself a novelist, took a moderate stance, although he regretted that Jassin had let it be published. He considered the story to have "failed miserably as a work of art, because it consists of nothing but insults, cynicism and wickedness to God, Muhammad, Gabriel, the *ulama*, and the *kiyais*."⁶³ *Langit Makin Mendung* became a symbol of the dissonant relationship between Islam and the problem of freedom of expression.

However, not all the religious-political views of the exponents of Model 1 are in favour of classical Islamic doctrines (which are against the principles of democracy). In some other cases, they follow "liberal" views. Regarding the issue of female leadership, for example, most of them agree that women can become political leaders in any position, including head of state. This view is clearly against the classical Islamic doctrine followed by many Muslim clerics.⁶⁴ Hamka issued a *fatwa* in his article that a woman can become a political leader, either as prime minister, president or monarch.

His argument is, however, historical rather than theological, stating that there were many female leaders (queens) in the past who successfully ruled Islamic kingdoms.⁶⁵

To conclude, Model 1 attempts to adopt modern political values without ignoring classical Islamic doctrines. This compromise is not always easy. As can be seen from the above examples, the endeavor to harmonize Islam with modernity is sometimes inconsistent, and most often it contravenes the principles of liberal democracy.

Model 2: Religious Democratic State (RDS)

The model of the Religious Democratic State is a response to the religious-political attitudes of the exponents of Model 1. It is basically built on the foundation that Indonesia is (and always will be) a pluralistic country. Any understanding regarding the religious-political issues, consequently, must be maintained on that basis. Model 2 emerged at the dawn of the Soeharto era when the political ideologies were gradually losing their role in the national political context. Its emergence was strongly determined by the political climate towards the end of the 1960s and the first two decades of Soeharto's leadership. The failure of Islamic ideology to dominate the state led the new generation of Muslims to rethink their political strategy.

Soeharto played a pivotal role in spurring the emergence of Model 2. His strict policy to remove all political ideologies and to adopt the pluralistic principle of Pancasila as the only ideological basis pushed Muslims to find the appropriate way to deal with the new situation. The exponents of Model 2 attempt to provide a theological justification for the Pancasila state. First of all, they hold the view that the five principles of Pancasila are not contradictory to the basic principles of Islam. In fact, if properly understood, they are accommodating of Islam. If Pancasila is not contradictory to Islam, there is thus no reason for Muslims not to accept it. For Amien Rais (b. 1944), one of the exponents of Model 2, Pancasila is like a "ticket" by which the Muslims could get onto the "bus" of Indonesia. Without the ticket, Muslims could not ride the bus and would go nowhere.⁶⁶ The justification of Pancasila by the exponents of Model 2 was not entirely a forced acceptance of the political repression of the New Order regime. To some extent, such an acceptance was a result of deep consideration of the fundamental doctrines of Islam. The exponents of Model 2 believe that Islam does not specifically order Muslims to establish a certain type of political institution. What is accentuated by Islam is to establish a society entirely committed to basic religious principles such as justice, equality, and

freedom. All these principles could be contained in a political system that does not specifically and formally make Islam its basis.

The basic foundation of Model 2 is that a political society must be religious. Religion is a vital element of communal life. Without religion, a state will be destroyed in anger by God. The exponents of Model 2 accepted Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution on the ground that it must both explicitly support the existence of a religious community and oppose irreligiosity (or atheism). Committed strongly to the value of religions, Model 2 rules out the kind of political community that is based on moral relativities reflected in the Western model of secularization.

The exponents of Model 2 define secularization as the strict separation of religion and the state. The state has no responsibility for religious matters, and religion on the other hand has no right to engage in the state's affairs. The exponents of Model 2 reject secularization and instead endorse the concept of the state establishment of religion. They specifically support the existence of religious institutions such as the Department of Religion and the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia). Similarly, they endorse the existence of a religious judiciary, religious institutionalization of marriage, and religious teaching at schools. Ahmad Syafii Maarif (b. 1935), another exponent of Model 2, for instance, argues that religious teaching at schools is the responsibility of the state, since it is part of the constitution. Therefore, "if the government does not involve itself in education, it deserves to be blamed".⁶⁷ Maarif considers the controversial Bill of National Education (RUU Sisdiknas, promulgated in 2003), which deals with religious teaching at schools, a positive draft, since it has fulfilled the obligation of the state.

Model 3: Liberal Democratic State (LDS)

The model of the Liberal Democratic State suggests that political matters should be discussed and performed outside the realm of religion. The argument is that Islam is first of all a religion of morality. The *raison d'être* for Muhammad's prophecy was for the sake of moral betterment.⁶⁸ The exponents of Model 3 consider the Prophetic saying "*antum a'lamu bi umuri dunyakum*" (you know better than me in worldly matters) as a very fundamental source for an Islamic project of secularization. They believe that the *hadith* explicitly advises Muslims to distinguish — and hence to separate — the worldly from the unworldly matters.

It should be noted here that the proponents of Model 3 are generally the religious leaders who firmly believe in religion being the source of

transcendental ethical values for human life. They are somehow not secular men such as Soekarno, the first President of the republic, or Soepomo, the cofounder of the republic. The secular attitude here refers mainly to religious-political issues. It should not be understood that religiosity and secularity are completely separate entities. Instead, the two elements — which *seem* to be contradictory — can be combined in the life of a religious man. As stated by Roberto Cipriani, “between religiosity and secularization there seems to reign almost a tacit compromise. They are reinforced and weaken virtually in unison”.⁶⁹ In an era in which a minister of religion prefers to have a “secular city” rather than a “city of God”, endorsing a secular political system for a religious community is not so much a real problem.⁷⁰

The exponents of Model 3, such as Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940),⁷¹ are religious leaders whose commitment both to religion and to democracy is unquestionably strong. Since the 1970s, Madjid had advocated the significance of secularization for Muslim political life in Indonesia. He argued that political secularization does not threaten Islam, but rather saves the religion from temporal and mundane political interests.⁷² Like Madjid, Wahid, a former president and former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), has been a long-standing advocate of a liberal democratic state in the country. He believes that the government should be managed rationally and secularly. The main function of religion, according to him, is “to enlighten people’s lives by providing social ethics”. He appeals to Muslims to adopt the Western experience of democracy, since by adopting and learning from the West, “Indonesia can build a more solid governance system that lets the country’s political process take its course”.⁷³

To some extent, several political standpoints of Model 3 are similar to those of Model 2. Both, for instance, reject the idea of the Islamic state and the application of *shari’ah*. However, they differ in how far religion should be involved in matters of politics and state governance. While the exponents of Model 2 still recognize the significance of state establishment of religion, the proponents of Model 3 consider it insignificant. Similarly, both have different views on the issue of religious freedom. While the former consider religiosity to be the chief prerequisite for the embodiment of a virtuous community and, therefore, that the state can intervene in religious matters, the latter consider it entirely a private matter, in which the state has no right to intervene. The concrete example of this is, again, the Bill of National Education, where the state is obliged to manage religious teaching at schools. While the exponents of Model 2 generally support the bill, the proponents of Model 3 reject it and call for its refinement.⁷⁴

In short, Model 3 considers that the best application of democracy is when the state and society are given total freedom to perform their respective roles independently. While the function of the state is to manage public matters, the function of religion should be limited solely to the private realm.

METHODOLOGY AND SELECTION OF TEXTS

I have used various sources to explore the models of polity I employ in this study. To analyse the first model (IDS), I consulted the primary works of Muslim intellectuals, which were mostly published in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these works are articles in Indonesian journals, and some other are books and transcripts of speeches. To analyse the second model (RDS) and the third (LDS), I have used the works of the exponents of these two models, mostly written during the 1980s and 1990s. Most of their books and articles are readily available in public libraries and online sources.

Apart from this, I have also used interviews and conversations with some of them. I have been fortunate to have met and talked with most of the leaders I discuss in this book. My conversations with them and other leaders who are not directly discussed in this book have enriched my analysis. Finally, I have also consulted several brochures, pamphlets and clippings, in addition to several transcripts of interviews conducted by Merle C. Ricklefs in 1977. Media reports, particularly the major newspapers in Indonesia, are also used and frequently quoted throughout the book.

I have divided this book into seven chapters. The first chapter consists of the introduction, literature review, theoretical framework, and methodology. The second chapter is set to discuss the global and local context of Muslim responses to political change. The main aim of this chapter is to find the historical and sociological backdrop of Islamic political thought in Indonesia.

The third, fourth, and fifth chapters are dedicated respectively to discussing the models of polity I have suggested. In these chapters I discuss the characteristics, trends, and main political issues that the *santri* Muslims have been dealing with. The classification of the models is based primarily in chronological order, in such a way that the first model refers to a certain historical setting earlier than the second and the third. Consequently, this study will draw on the historical approach to highlight the discussion of every model.

The sixth chapter is designed to discuss the continuity and discontinuity of the models I have discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. This chapter deals primarily with Islamic political thinking in the post-Soeharto era. The study is summarized in the final chapter, the conclusion.

Notes

1. Neta C. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
2. I am fully aware that the terms *santri* and *abangan* are contentious. As I will discuss below, there are many criticisms and objections to the terms. However, in this book, I use them as general religio-political terms, which have been strongly related to the socio-political context of Indonesian Muslims in the early periods of independence and beyond. The usage of these two terms is mainly aimed at qualifying a broad spectrum of Indonesian Islam.
3. See, for instance, Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation", *Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 3 (August 1996): 613–34; Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
4. Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Phoenix edition) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 125.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
6. He mixes the religious categories, *santri* and *abangan*, with the social category of *priyayi*.
7. Harsja W. Bachtiar, "The Religion of Java: A Commentary", in *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, Social Issues in Southeast Asia*, edited by Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 279.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
10. Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942* (Singapore, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
11. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
12. Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta, 22 Juni 1945 dan Sejarah Konsensus Nasional Antara Nasionalis Islami dan Nasionalis Sekular Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia, 1945–1959*, (Bandung: Pustaka Perpustakaan Salman ITB, 1981).
13. Allan Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1972); see also his articles, particularly "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism", in *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, edited by R. William Liddle and Donald K. Emmerson (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1973); and "Islam in Indonesian Politics", *Asian Survey* 8, no. 12 (December 1968): 1001–17.
14. Samson, "Religious Belief", p. 118.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
16. Mohammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1980).

17. Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekontruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986).
18. Ibid., p. 170.
19. Ibid., p. 174.
20. This party has now become the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera).
21. R. Mark Woodward, "Indonesia, Islam, and the Prospect for Democracy", *SAIS Review* 21, no. 2 (2001).
22. Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
23. Ibid., p. 19.
24. Greg Fealy, "Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23, no. 2 (August 2001), p. 365.
25. Ibid., p. 367.
26. Saiful Mujani, "Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2003), p. 34.
27. William E. Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 3 (August 1987), p. 307.
28. Ibid.
29. As for the *abangan* group, there is no need for the question, since all *abangan* will support the model of the secular state or, at least, Pancasila state. Likewise, they will also reject the idea of the Islamic state or state based on a religious platform.
30. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1991). This book was originally published in 1936.
31. C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 22.
32. Ibid., p. 10.
33. Ibid., p. 3.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
37. David Held, *Models of Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).
38. Ibid., pp. 113–14.
39. Ibid., p. 6.
40. Ibid., p. 7.
41. Wayne Gabardi, "Contemporary Models of Democracy", *Polity* 33, no. 4 (Summer 2001): 547–59.
42. Ibid., p. 549.
43. Ibid., p. 550.

44. Ibid., p. 552.
45. Ibid., p. 554.
46. Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan* (London: Pinter, 1987).
47. Ibid., p. 31.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., pp. 34–35.
50. Ibid., p. 36.
51. Ibid., p. 37.
52. I prefer to use the word “liberal” as it is less controversial than the word “secular”.
53. In the Indonesian context, a group that rejected the concept of democracy was Darul Islam (DI), which during 1947–48 raised a rebellion against the republic. Recently, several radical groups such as the Defenders of Islam Front (FPI, Front Pembela Islam) and the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin (MMI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) show great disdain for the concept.
54. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research”, *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997): 430–51.
55. Ibid., p. 437.
56. Obviously, Western models of democracy have developed into a complex set of theories. As we have seen, the Western discourse of democracy has gone far beyond the classical Athenian model of democracy.
57. Mohammad Natsir is an important figure both in the intellectual discourse of Islam as well as in the political history of Indonesia in general. He has contributed to the debates on Islamic issues since pre-independence times, when he and Soekarno debated the issue of Islam and nationalism. After independence, he became Minister and subsequently Prime Minister. I will discuss Natsir’s thoughts in Chapter 3.
58. Mohammad Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Jakarta: DDII, 2000), p. 89.
59. The political doctrine that says government belongs only to God is actually a Kharijite stance. However, revivalist Muslims use the same jargon to defend their political standpoint that religion and politics should be unified. The basic standpoint of Model 1 is actually similar to the Kharijite and revivalist Muslim stance. However, in their further formulation, they slightly “rationalize” this political standpoint by modifying both their basic standpoint and the new concepts they encounter. Hamid Enayat has eloquently discussed the ideological relation between the Kharijites and the Islamic revivalist movements. See his book, Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 6–7.
60. Mohammad Natsir, *Persatuan Agama dengan Negara* (Padang: Jajasan Pendidikan Islam, 1968), p. 27; see also Mohammad Natsir, *Agama dan Negara dalam Perspektif Islam* (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 2001), p. 89.

61. In a debate with Soekarno in the early 1940s, Natsir condemned Soekarno's liberal tendency in interpreting Islamic classical texts. For him, freedom of thought cannot be applied in reading classical Islamic texts. There are, according to Natsir, limits, in which our rationality cannot be used as a measure. See his article, "Sikap Islam terhadap Kemerdekaan Berpikir: Kemerdekaan Berpikir, Tradisi, dan Disiplin", in Mohammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta* (Bandung: W. van Hoeve), 1954.
62. "Nabi Muhammad: Imajinasi dan Visualisasi", *Tempo*, 25 August 1973, p. 46. Despite many criticisms by Muslim leaders around the world, the film was finally made and released. Akkad had successfully obtained al-Azhar's assurance that his film would not infringe any Islamic doctrines. The film, entitled "The Message" (English version), or "al-Risalah" (Arabic version), featured Hollywood stars such as Anthony Quinn and Irene Papas.
63. Nanang Tahqiq, "Freedom of Speech and Literary Expression: A Case Study of 'Langit Makin Mendung by Kipandjikusmin'" (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, Canada, 1995), p. 55.
64. The argument for this view is mainly based on a popular *hadith* (Prophet's saying) narrated by Bukhari: "Never will a nation succeed that makes a woman their ruler." (*Sahih al-Bukhari* 9, no. 220).
65. Hamka, "Radja Perempuan", published first in *Gema Islam*, no. 29. th. II, (1 April 1963), collected in Hamka, *Tanja Djawab* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1967), p. 63.
66. M. Syafii Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), p. 204.
67. A. Syafii Maarif, "Harapan pada RUU Sisdiknas", *Republika*, 4 June 2003.
68. The most quoted *hadith* is *innama bu'ithu li utammima makarim al-akhlaq* (I was only sent for perfecting morality), narrated by Ahmad, Baihaqi and Hakim.
69. Roberto Cipriani, "Religiosity, Religious Secularism and Secular Religions", *International Social Science Journal* 46, no. 2 (June 1994), p. 277; cf. Martin E. Marty, "Our Religio-Secular World, *Daedalus* 132, no. 3 (22 June 2003): 42–48.
70. I am referring to Harvey Cox, the author of the best-selling book, *The Secular City*. Cox was an American Baptist minister, a Protestant chaplain at Temple University, and a director of religious activities at Oberlin College.
71. Further discussion on the thinking of Madjid and Wahid is given in Chapter 5.
72. Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), p. 207.
73. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Indonesia's Mild Secularism", *SAIS Review* XXI, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2001), p. 28.
74. Abdurrahman Wahid has opposed the Bill many times. His party, PKB, although finally accepting it, suggested to the MPR that the crucial chapter of the Bill (Chapter 13) should be postponed. See "PKB Minta Pasal 13 RUU Sisdiknas Dicabut", *Sinar Harapan*, 29 May 2003.

2

MUSLIM RESPONSES TO POLITICAL CHANGE

In its September 2004 edition, the *New Statesman* addressed a provocative question: Can Islam change? The article, which was written by renowned Muslim scholar Ziauddin Sardar, gave a clear answer: Islam is indeed able to change. What Sardar meant by “Islam” was primarily *shari‘ah* or Islamic law. It is *shari‘ah* that regulates Muslims’ heavenly and worldly matters. For several decades and particularly since September 11, Sardar argues, Muslim reformists have persistently questioned the conservative Islamic doctrines rooted in *shari‘ah*. From Morocco to Indonesia, Muslim reformists “are acknowledging the need for fundamental change in their perception of Islam. They are making conscious efforts to move away from medieval notions of Islamic law and to implement the vision of justice, equality and beauty that is rooted in the Koran”.¹ Sardar and many “non-essentialist” scholars would argue that Islam is really able to change.² Like many other religions, Islam is a product of history and civilization. It was created and developed within the dialectical events of human history. Therefore, change is unavoidable.

Since the early nineteenth century, Muslim reformists have been arguing for the compatibility of Islam and modernity. They believed that Islam is a dynamic religion which can go through the challenges of human history. Islam is a universal religion whose claim of being “valid for all times and places” (*salih li kulli zaman wa makan*) attests that it is amenable to both change and reform. Reform (*islah*) is believed to be an integral part of Islam,

partly because there is a Prophetic tradition that says “at the beginning of every century, God will send to this community someone who will renew religion”.³ Various rational concepts in Islamic jurisprudence, such as *ijtihad* (reasoning) and *maslahah* (public interest), attest to Islam’s readiness for change. Unlike the “essentialists”, Muslim reformists firmly believe that “Islam reformed is still Islam.”⁴

The history of reform in Islam actually began long before the nineteenth century. Muslim scholars in the classical times such as Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–1111) and Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) were often considered Muslim reformists. However, the nineteenth century reform movement is radically different from the one found in classical times. First of all, the nineteenth century reform movement emerged at a time of a Muslim slumber and under the dominance of colonial power. That reform also took place under the shadow of the spread of Western civilization, the hegemony of modern science, and the birth of the new world order. Thus, we can see that the reform agenda addressed by the nineteenth century reformists was quite different from the classical agenda in that they were not only concerned with how to revive the religious sciences (*ihya’ ulum al-din*) as al-Ghazali had done, or how to revive Islamic authenticity, as Ibn Taymiyyah had done. The real problem they faced, besides those persistent problems, was how to face the intrusion of Western civilization, in all its forms, and the rapid changes of human history. In other words, their main concern was how to become modern without abandoning their faith.

The nineteenth century Muslim reformists were generally positive in dealing with the modern world in general, and with Western culture in particular. In Egypt, the father of the *nahdah* movement, Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi (1801–73), was an admirer of the West. Although raised with a strong Islamic background and later educated at al-Azhar University, al-Tahtawi turned to Western civilization as his role model for cultural progress. This is particularly due to his direct encounter with Western modernity. He learned modern sciences in France, when he was sent by the Egyptian government as an *imam* (prayer leader) of a student delegation. Al-Tahtawi regarded change and religious reform as inevitable for modern Muslims since they are the conditions of human progress. He highly valued modern science and technology, and believed that religious scholars (*ulama*) should study the modern sciences if they wanted to interpret the *shari‘ah*.⁵ In his magnum opus, *Takhlish al-Ibriz ila Talkhis Bariz*, al-Tahtawi implores Muslims to study and acquire modern political concepts such as nationalism, democracy, and equality, arguing that all these concepts are good for Muslim advancement.⁶

Al-Tahtawi's campaign for modern science and for positive attitudes towards the West was enthusiastically welcomed by the next generation of Arab intellectuals, one of whom was Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905). Raised and educated in the same background as al-Tahtawi, 'Abduh used Islam to justify aspects of modernity. Like al-Tahtawi, 'Abduh's positive attitude towards modernity was mainly stimulated by his personal encounter with the West. During his exile in Beirut, 'Abduh was invited by his mentor and friend, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837–97), to stay in Paris. He also visited London and other European cities. It was during his stay in this continent that he uttered his well-known statement, "I found Islam in Europe but not Muslims, and I found Muslims in Egypt, but not Islam". 'Abduh believed in change and specifically called upon Muslims to use reason in dealing with it. It is reason, he argued, that tells us who the Prophet is and what his real message is.⁷ 'Abduh's rationalistic approach to religion is clearly seen in his *fatwas* (legal opinion) during his service as Mufti of Egypt. Among his controversial *fatwas* were, his legalization of bank interest, his stance on female dress code (which was later understood by his followers as permitting the non-compulsory wearing of the *hijab*), and the legality of eating meat slaughtered by non-Muslims.⁸

Change and reform also became the focal point of religious reform in nineteenth century Indian Islam. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–98) is often regarded as the pioneer of the reform movement in India. His position for Indian Muslims is similar to that of al-Tahtawi for Egyptians. Like 'Abduh, Khan was a rationalist and never hesitant to associate himself with modern culture. He considered himself a *netceri* or the follower of naturalism, a positivist school of thought. It was because of this tendency that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, in his widely read book, *al-Radd 'ala al-Dahriyyin* (Refutation of the Materialists), condemned Khan as an "atheist". Throughout his tumultuous life, Khan fought against what he called "mistaken ideas" about Islam. He criticized Western Orientalists who, in his eyes, intentionally spread a distorted image of Islam. Likewise, he severely criticized Muslim conservatives for their misrepresentation of Islam. In one of his books, Khan condemned the practice of *taqlid* (imitation), which is widely practised by the conservatives:

I state it unambiguously: if people do not break with *taqlid* and [do] not seek (especially) that light which is gained from [the] Qur'an and [the] Hadith and if they are going to prove unable to confront religion with present-day scholarship and science, then Islam will disappear from India.⁹

Khan was (and remains) an influential thinker among the younger generation of Indian Muslims. Among his students who painstakingly called for religious reform was Chiragh Ali (1844–95), who specifically called for the reformation of Islamic laws (*shari'ah*). For him, Islamic law is a product of jurists (*fuqaha*) and it is, therefore, subject to change. The core of the reform agenda in Islam, he argued, is to reform *shari'ah*, which is made by Muslim jurists:

Islam is capable of progress, and possesses sufficient elasticity to enable it to adapt itself to the social and political changes going on around it. The Islam, by which I mean the pure Islam as taught by Muhammad in the Qur'an, and not that Islam as taught by the Muhammadan Common Law, was itself a progress and a change for the better. It has the vital principles of rapid development, of progress, of rationalism, and of adaptability to new circumstances.¹⁰

Ali firmly believed in progress and argued that there is nothing final in a Muslim's search for truth. He considered various schools of thought in Islam (*madhhab*) to be only "halting stages in the march of Muhammadan legislation".¹¹ And each of these schools is "progressive, incomplete, changeable, and undergoing alterations and improvements".¹² Thus, since there is no final answer in *fiqh* (jurisprudence), every Muslim can be *mujtahid* and the gate of *ijtihad* should never be closed.

The greatest Indian Muslim reformist was undoubtedly Muhammad Iqbal (1875–1938), who addressed his reform agenda in a systematic and philosophical manner. His most influential work, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, contains many references to Western philosophers such as George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant, William James, Alfred North Whitehead, and Bertrand Russell. Iqbal not only legitimized the use of Western knowledge by Muslims, but also recommended that they learn and benefit from it. In the aforementioned book, he devoted one chapter to the principle of movement in Islam, in which he philosophically elaborated on the nature of change in Islam. He argued that Islam is a religion that was created out of gradual interaction, harmony, and the mutual deepening of various forces and cultures. These cultural elements are very influential to the Muslim mind. "The Muslim", he wrote, "has always adjusted his religious outlook to the elements of culture which he assimilated from the people that surrounded him".¹³ If Islam itself is a product of interaction of many cultures, then the doctrines within Islam embodied in Islamic law (*fiqh*), are themselves a product of the same process and thus subject to change and reform. He wrote:

I have no doubt that a deeper study of the enormous legal literature of Islam is sure to rid the modern critic of the superficial opinion that the Law of Islam is stationary and incapable of development. Unfortunately, the conservative Muslim public of this country is not yet quite ready for a critical discussion of *fiqh*, which, if undertaken, is likely to displease most people, and raise sectarian controversies.¹⁴

As far as the development of Islamic thought is concerned, Iqbal's explanation of the nature of change is perhaps the most convincing argument. It is no wonder that his reform agenda has inspired many Muslims all over the world.

One of Iqbal's admirers, Fazlur Rahman (1919–88), was even more radical in his approach in dealing with the issue of Islam and social change. Like many Muslim reformists, Rahman was raised and educated first in Islamic institutions and then in Western universities. He wrote several books mostly dealing with Islamic thought and philosophy. He believed in the idea that the Qur'an is first and foremost an ethical book and that it was sent down by God as the moral guide for human beings. In fact, for him, the essence of the Qur'an is its ethics.¹⁵ There are indeed several verses dealing with legal and political issues, but these have to be seen also as an ethico-moral postulation. The legal aspect of the Qur'an, Rahman argued, must not be interpreted literally, as it is a reflection of the spacio-temporal condition of early Muslim life. Thus, it is deplorable to see Muslims who fail to understand this spacio-temporal aspect of the Qur'an. Their emphasis on the legal aspect of this holy book has led them to form what he calls "negative or punitive Islam". That is, the Islam which primarily aims at upholding punishments and sanctions.¹⁶ The idea of an Islamic state in Pakistan, according to him, is a result of the obsessive desire to enforce that kind of punitive Islam.

In general, Muslims' positive attitude towards change is mainly based on the conviction that change is part of the basic principle of Islam. Muslim reformists consider *ijtihad* as a viable argument for change. Literally, *ijtihad* means "to work very hard", and in the Islamic jurisprudence, it refers to any attempt to solve legal problems. Modern Muslim reformists believe that the problems that are to be solved by *ijtihad* are not limited to legal issues, but extended to general issues faced by modern Muslims.¹⁷ Hence, since general issues never end, the practice of *ijtihad* also has no end. Most of the Muslim reformists do not believe in the doctrine that "the gate of *ijtihad* has been closed". In fact, for them, the closing of the gate of *ijtihad* is the main reason for Muslim backwardness.

In the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, *ijtihad* is not the main source (*masadir al-ula*) like the Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijma', or Qiyas. It is rather a method of legal induction (*istinbat al-hukm*). *Ijtihad* is a rational tool for Muslims to understand religious texts and also things that are not in the texts. In the past, some Muslim jurists drafted *ijtihad* with certain requirements. For example, a *mujtahid* is required to memorize 100,000 *hadiths*, to memorize the Qur'an, and to master the opinions of the Muslim jurists, particularly the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. So difficult are those requirements and so few are the people who can meet them that there is a common opinion among Muslims that *ijtihad* is an impossible task.¹⁸ However, modern Muslim reformists have a different conception of *ijtihad*. They consider it simply as rational thinking, that is, the use of our reason in dealing with religious texts. The many requirements mentioned above are, therefore, secondary, mainly because times have changed and the Qur'an and *hadith* are so accessible that one does not need to memorize them.

Mohammed Arkoun, a leading contemporary Muslim intellectual, radically transformed the meaning of *ijtihad* to what he calls "the critique of Islamic reason" (*naqd al-'aql al-islami*). He argues that what is needed by modern Muslims is not a mere reinterpretation of the classical legal issues mostly written in *fiqh* books, but rather a radical deconstruction of the whole corpus of Islamic epistemology. *Ijtihad* alone, according to Arkoun, is not able to reveal what is unthinkable among the Muslim community. Only by criticizing the Islamic epistemic system can Muslims reveal what is their real problem.¹⁹ Like Iqbal and Rahman, Arkoun calls for the employment of a historical perspective in reading religious texts in order to reveal the difference between myth and reality. The language of the Qur'an, he argues, is significantly characterized by mythical expressions (*usturah*) and only with historical knowledge can we differentiate between what is real and what is unreal. Here again, critical thinking — and not mere knowledge of classical *ijtihad* — is needed by Muslims.²⁰

As we can see, *ijtihad* has become the building block of modern Islamic reformation. From al-Tahtawi to Arkoun, *ijtihad* has been used as a tool and a justification for the adaptability of Islam. Needless to say, the result of *ijtihad* achieved by those reformists is not the same. This is fully justifiable as they have different methodologies and disciplines. What is important here is that those reformists broadly believe in rationality as a chief requirement to engage with change. Even when they are required to go back to Islamic tradition, it is the rational traditions (such as *usul al-fiqh* and *falsafah*) that should be taken into consideration.

ISLAM AND POLITICAL CHANGE

Among the themes of reform and change in contemporary Islamic discourse, political change takes a crucial position. This is mainly because the issue deals directly with a Muslim's life order and touches the cardinal doctrine of Islam, that is the unification of religion and the state, and the supremacy of religion over the state. Although it is debatable, many Muslims believe that the separation of religion and the state is foreign to Islam. Hence, any attempt to change this doctrine will face a strong challenge. Since Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey, shut down the caliphate (as the symbol of unification of religion and the state) and declared secularism as a viable alternative system, the issue of separation of religion and the state has caused great controversy. Generally, Muslims' reaction towards the issue of the caliphate was reactive rather than contemplative. The reason is not only that the closing down of the caliphate was against the religious-political doctrine they believed in, but also that the alternative — that is, secularism — is a product of the West, a nation which Muslims had been fighting.

During the mid-1920s, the issue of the caliphate truly shattered Muslims. In Egypt, the controversy over the caliphate was coloured by the debate between two 'Abduh's disciples, Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966). While Rida considered the caliphate an obligation for Muslims, 'Abd al-Raziq considered it merely one among many alternatives of government system. 'Abd al-Raziq's argument was mainly based on his conviction that the Prophet Muhammad was sent down by God not as a political leader, but as a messenger. Politics was not really an intention of the Prophetic mission. What Islam was concerned with is not a form of polity — whether it is a republic, kingdom, or caliphate — but how a government can bring Islamic universal values, such as justice and welfare, into practice.²¹

'Abd al-Raziq's idea is crucial for the development of Islamic political thought not only in Egypt, but also in all other Muslim countries in the world. His position as a religious scholar has inspired many Muslim reformists to believe strongly in his argument. He became the pioneer as well as the breaker of the common misconception that secularism is only possible for — and, therefore, only comes out of — secular minds, such as Mustafa Kamal Atatürk in Turkey, or Soekarno in Indonesia. As Fauzi M. Najjar stated, 'Abd al-Raziq's contribution has greatly paved the way for modern Muslims, particularly those who are religious, to find a theological basis for secularism.²²

‘Abd al-Raziq himself did not specifically use the word “secularism” (in Arabic; *‘ilmaniyyah*) in his book. However, his arguments, derived from the Qur’an and *hadith*, are explicitly employed to justify the idea of the separation of religion and the state.²³ He also referred to Prophet Isa’s (Jesus) popular saying “give to Caesar what belongs to him and to God what belongs to him” as a justification of the distinction of functions. Thus, he argued, every prophet was supposed to be a messenger (*rasul*) and not a political leader.²⁴

Secularism is indeed a difficult concept for Muslims to accept, not only because it is a foreign concept, but also because of the fact that from the very outset, it has been perceived as antithetical to religion and God.²⁵

However, it was only a matter of time. One generation after ‘Abd al-Raziq published his book, a growing number of Muslim intellectuals enthusiastically defend secularism. Mohammed Arkoun, for example, considers secularism as part of historical determinism which Muslims must accept. He believes that secularism as a political norm is not new in Islamic history, but had already been there since the time of the Prophet. The separation of roles as indicated by the Prophet’s saying “*antum a‘lamu bi umuri dunyakum*” (you know better than me in worldly matters) was an essential argument for secularization in early Islam. Arkoun also argues that political secularization has been widely practised since Umayyad times, when Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, the founder of the Umayyad, moved the capital city of the Islamic kingdom from Madinah (which was made the capital by the Prophet) to Damascus.²⁶ Modern secularism as was then reverberated by Mustafa Kamal Atatürk and other Muslim rulers, according to Arkoun, is nothing but the continuation of the same idea.

Ali Asghar Engineer, another Muslim intellectual, takes a positive attitude towards secularism. He calls on Muslims to take benefit from secularism, arguing that it has enabled modern men to live in a freer and more equal world. He goes on to say that Muslims should be open minded in understanding political concepts coming from the West. Without open-mindedness, one cannot appreciate the positive aspects of any concept produced by the modern world. He writes:

If religion is interpreted in keeping with very conservative traditions, it may be difficult for it to go along with secularism, which demands more liberal disposition and not only tolerance but also promotion of pluralism. On the other hand, if secularism is interpreted too rigidly, i.e. if it is equated with atheism, as many rationalists do, then also the two [that is, religion and secularism] will find it difficult to go together... If both Islam and secularism are interpreted liberally there should not be

any problem with Islam in a secular set up. In fact, if one studies the Qur'an holistically, one can find strong support for 'liberal or non-atheistic secularism'. No religion will support atheistic secularism for that matter. If we talk of liberal secularism what do we mean by it? We must clearly define it. Liberal secularism does not insist on belief in atheism. Secondly, it promotes pluralism and respect for all faiths and thirdly it guarantees full freedom of religion for all citizens. Also, secularism guarantees equal rights for all citizens irrespective of one's caste, creed, race, language or faith.²⁷

Engineer not only sees the compatibility of Islam and secularism, but also appreciates the latter's benevolence in providing freedom and equality. As an Indian Muslim living in a country ruled by a non-Muslim majority, Engineer considers secularism to be a blessing. Only under the secular system can the Indian people, Hindus and non-Hindus, be treated equally. Thus, Engineer concludes, a secular government is a better alternative for the modern political system.

The argument that secularism is fundamental for freedom and equality is also echoed by Abdolkarim Soroush, an Iranian intellectual who has been dubbed the "Muslim Luther".²⁸ For him, secularism not only enables freedom and equality to take root, but also lays the foundation for democracy. The neutral character of secularism allows every citizen to have equal responsibility and rights. Secularism is important for the religious community in the modern world mainly because it now plays a role that was once played by religion. He writes:

Secularism has been understood as a deliberate effort to exclude religion from worldly affairs. But the truth is that secular governments are not opposed to religion. They accept it, but not as a basis for their legitimacy, or as a foundation for their actions. Every government, in order to survive and endure, needs two things: a source of legitimation and a normative framework. There was a time when governments borrowed these requirements from religion. However, in our era (roughly the last three hundred years) this practice has become obsolete. Nowadays, governments derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed. The norms of governance too are determined, in theory at least, by laws established by institutions representing the people.²⁹

The significance of secularism, according to Soroush, is that it can provide a source of legitimation by way of democracy. This is something religion can no longer do. In other words, with the presence of secularism and all its instruments, the role of religion in politics has come to an end.

Democracy is certainly the most popular Western concept discussed in contemporary Islamic political discourse. As a concept, it is more neutral

and less controversial than secularism, although it does not necessarily mean that all Muslims easily accept it. During the first half of the twentieth century, democracy was as controversial as other political concepts such as nationalism, socialism, and communism. Muslims who rejected it argued that democracy (in the sense of “people’s sovereignty”) is against the concept of God’s sovereignty. They often emphasized the word “people” as “human”, in contrast to God. Thus, “people’s sovereignty” is contrasted with “God’s sovereignty”. For them, sovereignty must in any way belong to God.³⁰ Abul A’la Mawdudi, a prominent Muslim intellectual, considered democracy to be an antithesis of Islam. He argued that “Islam has no trace of Western democracy. Islam... altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God”.³¹ In the same vein, Muhammad Qutb, a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, believed that democracy is a pagan system (*nizam jahili*) that is founded on the spirit against God’s laws (*shari’ah*).³²

Liberal Muslim reformists are generally more positive in dealing with democracy, not only because they believe that democracy does not harm Islam, but also because a democratic political system may be more conducive to Islamic teachings than other systems. They point out that a democratic system run by Western countries is more “Islamic” than that of an “Islamic monarchy” implemented by Muslim rulers. Democracy enables basic Islamic doctrines such as justice, equality, and freedom to be implemented, something that “Islamic” countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia fail to provide. For them, the argument that democracy will take over the sovereignty of God is unsound, simply because democracy does not deal with theological issues, but rather with worldly matters. Muqtedar Khan, a Muslim scholar who wrote various articles on the relationship between Islam and democracy, argues that sovereignty is a complex notion, which cannot be answered by “either or” logic. He refers to a Qur’anic verse which states that God’s sovereignty has actually been delegated to mankind in the form of human agency.³³ In turn, human agency is the guarantor of human freedom, without which “Muslims as individuals and as an Ummah cannot be held accountable for what they do”.³⁴

Khan and many liberal reformists criticize the revivalist scholars such as Abul A’la Mawdudi, who sharply distinguishes between the sovereignty of God and the sovereignty of man. As Fathi Osman argues, there is no such clear-cut distinction between the two sovereignties, since the “sovereignty of God can only be secured through humans”.³⁵ Osman deplores Muslims who are engaged in semantic debates, which do not produce anything but tension among the *ummah*. He writes:

“sovereignty of God” and “sovereignty of the people” are not contradictory, just as “*shura*” [deliberation] and democracy are not contradictory. If believers cannot guard the “sovereignty of God” and their faith and values through a government based on “sovereignty of the people,” it should not be imposed upon them by force, which would only be a pretext for arbitrariness and despotism! It is time for Muslims to devote their energy to dealing with the concrete realities of life, rather than continuously engaging in semantic arguments.³⁶

In a way, unlike their revivalist counterparts, liberal reformists try to take a positive stance in every debate on Islam and modernity. For them, what should be sought by modern Muslims is similarities among Islam and other civilizations — particularly the West — and not differences. Only by finding similarities can they establish a positive dialogue.

Ali A. Mazrui, a Kenyan-born Muslim intellectual, specifically addresses this issue. He argues that similarities between Islam and the West are actually much stronger than their differences. In a paper he delivered at a conference held in Washington, D.C. in 2003, Mazrui suggests that it is not the time for Muslims to argue the compatibility of Islam and democracy. As Islam has similar theoretical concepts to democracy such as *shura* (deliberation), *‘adl* (justice), and *musawa* (equality), it is more productive to establish a synergy of the two cultures based on commonality. He writes:

Indeed, we are not starting from scratch. Some democratic principles have been part of Islam from the beginning — concepts like *idjihad* and the *shura*. The earliest Caliphs after the Prophet Muhammad were chosen through an ancient electoral college. Earlier Muslim kingdoms devised systems of pluralism, such as the millet system under the Ottoman Empire guaranteeing autonomy for minorities. What is the difference between Islamocracy and Islamic theocracy? We view the concept of “Islamocracy” as a synthesis between Islam and democracy. The segment “Isla” is from Islam. The segment of “ocracy” is from democracy. The letter “m” is shared by the words Islam and demos. The phenomenon of *islamocracy* has been evolving for centuries.³⁷

The positive attitude of Muslim reformists towards secularism and other modern concepts such as democracy, pluralism, civil rights, and freedom, indicate their high reception to the change. What is important here is that the acceptance of secularism is not necessarily followed by a negative attitude towards their religion, by, for instance, considering it irrelevant. Conversely, they would rather use religious sources and give new interpretations to them, which are more compatible with the spirit of the age. They believe that Islam is a universal religion compatible with any time and condition,

and as conditions and times continue to change there is no better choice than to give a new perspective to religious teachings.

CHANGE AND REFORM IN INDONESIA

As in many other Muslim countries, religious reformism in Indonesia took place in the nineteenth century. The history goes back to 1804 in Sumatra when the three *hajis* came back from their pilgrimage to Mecca.³⁸ At that time, Mecca had just been conquered by the Wahabis, ideological puritans who campaigned for the “purification” by, among other things, eradicating heretical practices such as tomb reverence and mystical exercises. As Dobbin says, the three *hajis* were impressed with what they saw in Mecca and suddenly compared it with life in their home town.³⁹ Like the Wahabis, they began to attack religious practices which they considered *bid'ah* (innovation) and *khurafat* (myths).⁴⁰

The history of Islamic reformism in Indonesia was indeed puritanical. Wahabism — or rather Salafism — was quite influential among the early Muslim reformists in Sumatra.⁴¹ In Pandai Sikat, for example, Haji Miskin, one of the three *hajis*, gathered seven charismatic religious leaders (*tuanku*) and inculcated them with Salafi teachings. These leaders together with Haji Miskin himself were later known as “Harimau Nan Salapan” (eight lions). They adopted the Wahabi method of campaigning for purified Islam by attacking local traditions and practices, which they saw as “un-Islamic”. They attacked the practices of tomb veneration, gambling, cock fighting, and the use of opium and alcohol, while exhorting people to perform the formal obligations of Islam.⁴² Their rigid attitude was strongly challenged by *adat* chiefs or *penghulus* (secular leaders). Clashes and bloody conflicts were thus unavoidable. While the *tuankus* fought for Islamic teachings, the *penghulus* defended local customary law.

The *tuanku* movement, politically better known as the Paderi movement, gained successive victories. They conquered the entire land of the Minangkabau (West Sumatra). During their march towards South Tapanuli (in North Sumatra) to Islamize the Bataks, the Dutch stopped their progress. Hence, the *penghulu* and other anti-Paderi groups turned to support the Dutch, hoping that they would get revenge on the Paderi. The Dutch attack on the Paderi marked the ending of the Paderi War (1821–38). However, with the capture in 1837 of Tuanku Imam Bonjol, the leader and hero, the Paderi movement started to decline. The Minangkabau region was thus taken over and ruled by the colonial government, while local leaders were treated merely as regents (*bupati*) who only had limited power. However,

although defeated militarily, the Paderi movement remained influential among Minangkabau Muslims. As Ricklefs puts it:

Despite their military defeat, the Padris had left a deep and lasting mark upon Minangkabau society. A strong commitment to Islamic orthodoxy remained. In the fluid balance between *adat* and Islam, the role of Islam as a part of the whole set of rules which governed Minangkabau society had been greatly increased.⁴³

The Paderi were still respected, not only for their contribution in disseminating Islamic reformism, but also because of their progenies who continued their struggle. Shaikh Ahmad Khatib (1852–1915) and Shaikh Tahir Jalaluddin (1869–1957), for instance, were famous Muslim reformists whose fathers were respected Paderi leaders.⁴⁴ For Minangkabau people, the charisma of the Paderi leaders was passed down to their sons who now became new leaders.

Unlike their fathers, the new generation of Paderi followed a new path by focusing more on education and intellectual activities than on physical war. The two reformists mentioned above were educators. Ahmad Khatib was born in Bukittinggi in a religious family. He spent his early education in his hometown, but at the age of twenty-one, went to Mecca for the *hajj* and to pursue a higher education. In Mecca, he studied with several *ulama* until he was recognized as an expert on the Shafi'i school of jurisprudential thought (*madhhab*). He did not return to his hometown, but rather chose Mecca as his intellectual base, where he became an *imam* and a teacher of religious sciences. Khatib taught Indonesian students and pilgrims who went annually to the city. Although he was occupied by traditional Islamic sciences, he did not forbid his students from reading modernist writings (such as 'Abduh's and al-Afghani's works).⁴⁵ In fact, he was very impressed with the modernist Muslim movement in Egypt, so much so that he sent his two sons, Abd al-Karim (d. 1947) and Abd al-Hamid (d. 1962) to Cairo for study.⁴⁶

Ahmad Khatib played a crucial role in disseminating Islamic reformist ideas to Indonesian students. He was very critical of Sufism, particularly the Naqhsabandiyyah order, and also towards Minangkabau *adat*. His attitude towards these two issues greatly influenced his students, who later became leading reformists in Sumatra. In fact, it can be said that the central theme of religious reformism in West Sumatra was against these two issues. Khatib's students such as Abdullah Ahmad (1878–1933), Muhammad Djamil Djambek (1860–1947), and Hadji Rasul (1879–1945), spent their life fighting the practices of *bid'ah* (innovation) and *khurafat* (myths).

These reformists were known as Kaum Muda (Younger Generation), as opposed to Kaum Tua (Older Generation), who were mostly the *adat* leaders. The position of Kaum Muda vis-à-vis Kaum Tua was comparable to the position of the Paderi vis-à-vis the *penghulu*; only the conflict between the two groups was now intellectual rather than military. As the Kaum Muda reformists were not interested in physical confrontation with the *adat* leaders, they concentrated more on intellectual development by establishing schools and learning institutions. They seemed to be aware that there is no better way to change people than through education and intellectual persuasion. They believed a too hasty attack on the *adat* leaders would lead to tension and physical conflict.

Thus, towards the twentieth century, several modern Islamic schools were founded. In Padang, Abdullah Ahmad founded Adabiyah, an Islamic school built on the modern system. When it started in 1909, about twenty pupils attended the school, mostly children of local traders. Adabiyah adopted the Dutch elementary school system (HIS, Hollands Inlandse School), except that religious subjects such as the Qur'an and Arabic were also given taught. Six years after its foundation, the school received a subsidy from the government, something that made it no longer fully independent in developing its curriculum. In general, there was nothing remarkable about the school except the fact that it was the first school to break with the traditional system in Minangkabau.⁴⁷ After Adabiyah, there was Surau Jembatan Besi, a school that grew out of the traditional *surau*. In terms of its physical building, this school was simple. As told by Hamka, although it had adopted the modern system of classes, the students still sat on the floor.⁴⁸ However, in terms of curriculum, it was richer than Adabiyah and more independent in developing religious subjects in the spirit of Kaum Muda.

Among the earliest schools, the Sumatra Thawalib was perhaps the most modern, both in terms of physical structure as well as educational content. Built by the teachers of Surau Jembatan Besi, Thawalib became the first school that applied the modern system fully: adopting the system of classes, using school desks, implementing an organized curriculum, and obliging students to pay tuition fees. Unlike Adabiyah, the school was fully independent of government intervention, mainly because it could generate money and fund itself. Being financially autonomous and economically viable, Thawalib developed its own curriculum according to the ideals of Kaum Muda. It imported some books from Egypt and taught the works of some modernist Muslims. Muhammad 'Abduh's book, *Tafsir al-Manar*, was part of the list.⁴⁹ To expand its influence, the founders of the school also established several branches in cities outside Padang Panjang.

Apart from establishing schools, Kaum Muda also founded publications and journals. Two journals should be mentioned here, namely *al-Imam* and *al-Munir*. *Al-Imam* was founded in Singapore in 1906 by Tahir Jalaluddin, a Minangkabau reformist who had studied under Muhammad 'Abduh, the renowned Egyptian thinker. Perhaps because of his closeness with 'Abduh, Jalaluddin made the format and content of his journal similar to 'Abduh's *al-Manar*.⁵⁰ In fact, the name *al-Imam* itself was inspired by the popular epithet of Muhammad 'Abduh.⁵¹ According to Roff, during its first issues, *al-Imam* covered issues of the Muslim condition throughout the world, 'Abduh's opinions, and other writings which attacked Sufism and *adat* practices.⁵² It also republished several articles previously published in al-Afghani's *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*.⁵³ Although published in Singapore, the journal was distributed widely in Sumatra, Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, and other major cities in Java.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, *al-Munir* was the first Islamic journal published in West Sumatra. Its founder, Abdullah Ahmad, used Jalaluddin's *al-Imam* and al-Afghani's *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa* as models. This explains why many articles in both journals can also be found in *al-Munir*. The journal was launched in 1911, covering various issues such as the importance of Islamic brotherhood, modern knowledge, and Islamic legal issues.⁵⁵ As the mouthpiece of Islamic modernism, *al-Munir* tried to discuss Islamic issues in a progressive tone. As Mahmud Yunus said, the magazine was set up by Kaum Muda to propagate their reformist agenda. Theological and jurisprudential issues (*fiqh*) often dominate its pages. The issues of *taqlid* (religious imitation), reading the Qur'an on the dead, and reading *usalli* (intention) before prayer⁵⁶ were enthusiastically discussed.⁵⁷

It was through the medium of education and publication that Kaum Muda underwent religious reformism. They believed that the keystone of Islamic advancement lay in how far Muslims were able to anticipate rapid social and political change.⁵⁸ Unlike Kaum Tua, who considered modernity a threat for Islam, Kaum Muda considered it a necessity that modern Muslims should embrace. Seen from today's perspective, what they did was actually insignificant, but seen from the perspective of the age, their action was a breakthrough that shocked the social and cultural system of belief. In his book, Hamka tells us a story of how Abdullah Ahmad tried to assure Kaum Tua that adopting the modern system of learning by using school chairs and by adopting the class system, as the Dutch did, was not against Islam.⁵⁹ Similarly, Muhammad Thaib Umar, another reformist, tried to assure Kaum Tua that to appear modern by wearing tie and a neat suit was not against Islam.⁶⁰ All these simple things were the first step to

break the taboos and to bridge traditional Muslims in Minangkabau to the modern world.

Outside Sumatra, the early religious reformist movements took place in three cities: Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Solo. Jakarta was the home of two modernist learning centres: Jami'at Khayr (founded in 1905) and al-Irsyad (founded in 1913). Founded by members of the Arab community, these institutions were crucial in importing modernist ideas from the Middle East to Indonesia. Yogyakarta is the birthplace of Muhammadiyah (1912), the largest modernist Islamic organization in the country. Ideologically, Muhammadiyah is not very different from the modernist movement in West Sumatra. In fact, the founder of this organization, Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1923), was a disciple of Shaikh Ahmad Khatib, the teacher of many Minangkabau reformists. So close was Muhammadiyah with the Kaum Muda movement in West Sumatra that it was warmly welcomed when it came to the region. In fact, until now, West Sumatra has provided the strongest support to Muhammadiyah outside Java. Meanwhile, Solo is the city where Sarekat Islam (1912), the first Islamic political organization, was founded.

All of the above movements and organizations shared the same vision that change is unavoidable and that only by anticipating change could Muslims cope with their life in modern times. As we have seen, the religious reform movement, at the beginning, was doctrinal and normative. The reformists were much concerned with such issues as *bid'ah* (innovation), *shirk* (polytheism), *qunut* (prayer in prayer), tomb veneration, correct attire, and the use of certain modern products made by non-Muslims. But, as the encounter with the modern world, and particularly with the political situation was growing, Muslim reformists began to discuss broader issues. Sarekat Islam was the first Islamic political organization whose function and role were not only to accommodate Muslim political aspirations, but also to develop Islamic arguments for the rapidly changing political situation.

Islam and Communism

At the outset, Sarekat Islam was a trade union organization founded in Solo in 1911. Its establishment, as Deliar Noer explains, had two reasons: the rising competition in the *batik* trade, particularly from the Chinese merchants; and the oppression by the nobility of Solo.⁶¹ Its founder, Haji Samanhudi (1868–1956), had never thought that the organization would become a political organization. But, a leader of one of its branches (Surabaya) turned

it into a political movement. That leader, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934), was a charismatic man and a skilled orator, and was likely more interested in politics than in trading. In 1912, Tjokroaminoto cast away the word “trade” and changed it into Sarekat Islam (SI).

In its early development, Sarekat Islam was concerned with the character of the organization. Raden Mas Tirtoadisurjo, one of the cofounders, drew up a constitution and formulated the rules for organizational matters. Tirtoadisurjo was a committed Muslim from a *priyayi* family. He wanted SI to be a modern Islamic organization and believed that only through modernization would the Muslim condition be improved. He stated:

Everybody knows that the present is regarded as the age of progress. We should have guidance [in seeking progress]; do not seek progress merely by words. Upon us Muslims, the efforts to pursue this progress is incumbent and therefore, we have resolved to found the association Sarekat Islam.⁶²

Generally, SI was a progressive organization. Its chief leaders were Muslim intellectuals who had mostly graduated from Western educational institutions. Two leaders were very influential at the beginning of SI's establishment: Agus Salim (1884–1954) and Abdul Muis (1890–1959). Coming from a strong religious background, Salim and Muis gave a strong Islamic character to the organization.

One of the main challenges SI faced in its early years was to take a political stance vis-à-vis the non-Muslim colonial government. The question haunting Indonesian Muslims at the time was how to deal with this issue. Some of them were cautious as to whether it was religiously legitimate to be loyal to the Dutch whom they saw as the infidel (*kafir*). Tjokroaminoto understood the Muslims' anxiety, and in one of his speeches he made this statement: “According to the *Syariah* of Islam, we must obey the command of the Dutch government, we must strictly and loyally follow the laws and regulations of the Dutch...”⁶³ It is not clear how far this speech influenced the SI members. But the fact that most SI members did not oppose the non-Muslim government was an indication of their agreement with the leader. Even if there were anti-government attitudes (which were expressed in the non-cooperation movement), it was not based on religion, but merely on their disappointment with the government's performance.⁶⁴

Another challenge that SI had to face was the problem of the platform of the organization — whether to be strictly Islamic or to keep it open. If they were to use Islam, how should they deal with their communist members? Could Islam tolerate communism? This problem greatly occupied SI leaders in the first decade of its establishment. Ideas related to communism

had been in the country since 1913, when Hendricus Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, a Dutchman, came to Indonesia. Together with another Dutchman, Adolf Baars, Sneevliet set up ISDV (the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging), a political organization that initially propagated socialist ideas, but later turned completely to communism.⁶⁵ ISDV greatly influenced the SI members, mainly the workers and the lower class Muslims. In Semarang, the members of ISDV were, in fact, quite successful in turning the SI branch into a communist organization later known as "Red SI" (SI Merah). The leaders of the Semarang branch such as Semaun, Darsono, and Alimin, considered the platform of CSI (Central Sarekat Islam) to be incapable of embracing the diversity of Indonesian society. They suggested that the SI's platform of Islam be changed into communism, since communism can embrace all elements of people, Muslims as well as non-Muslims. In an open letter entitled "Let Us Purify Ourselves", Alimin openly stated:

Now that Sarekat Islam has become great and strong it is not anymore Sarekat Islam, it has become Sarekat India. The best method to obtain a new degree of growth is to open its ranks to all willing to fight, without distinction of race or religion.⁶⁶

Accordingly, the agitation of communist members was challenged by Muslim leaders such as Agus Salim and Abdul Muis. They regarded the members of Semarang branch as having gone too far and having violated the basic foundation of the organization. In any case, from 1917, they attempted to nullify their membership in the central SI. It was only because of Tjokroaminoto's intervention that their endeavor failed. However, at the sixth SI congress in Surabaya in 1921, Salim's and Muis's plan was finally successful. They proposed the idea of party discipline, which meant that anybody holding more than one membership should be dismissed.⁶⁷ The target was obviously the members of Semarang branch who concurrently held membership of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia), a party which had grown out of the ISDV. It is important to note here that when the decision was made, Tjokroaminoto did not attend the congress.⁶⁸

With the exception of Tjokroaminoto, the central SI leaders were generally against the communist members and communism in general. They could tolerate socialism, but not communism. This condition was largely due to the communist members themselves, particularly those of the Semarang branch, who scoffed at Islam and its leaders. In Solo, the relationship between SI and communism was relatively harmonious, particularly

because many of the religious leaders were members of the communist party. One of the most influential leaders in the city was Haji Misbach (d. 1926), a *kyai* (cleric) who had been active in SI since 1914. Misbach considered Islam and communism equally important and that they could, therefore, not be separated.⁶⁹ He wanted SI to be an organization that fought for communist ideas. Misbach's struggle for communism was not only carried out by joining the Solo branch of SI. He himself founded a missionary organization called SATV, an abbreviation of Sidik Amanat Tableg Vatonah, four significant traits of the Prophet. In this organization, Misbach trained hundreds of *muballigh* (religious missionaries) using Islamic as well as communist teachings.

Misbach was not the only religious leader who supported communism. In West Sumatra, the birthplace of Islamic reformism, a religious leader by the name of Datuk Batuah (1895–1948) became a communist activist. He was a graduate of Sumatra Thawalib and was one of its most brilliant students. He was quite close to the Minangkabau reformist figures, particularly to Abdul Karim Amrullah, Hamka's father. In his book, *Ajahku*, Hamka explains that Batuah was responsible for introducing communism to West Sumatra. It was due to him that communism spread rapidly in that region. He was both a militant communist as well as a committed Muslim. One day he told Hamka that his involvement in communism was because of his responsibility as a Muslim. His commitment to communism had never ceased, in spite of his long detention by the government and the people's abhorrence of him. Hamka related his encounter with Batuah after independence, admitting that he was quite amazed that the man was still committed to communism while remaining committed to his religion.⁷⁰

Misbach and Batuah are perhaps the radical examples of how Indonesian Muslims were enthusiastic in welcoming political change in their country. They did not see communism, despite its strong association with atheism, as against their belief. In fact, they saw communist ideas as being congruous with Islam. What is important is not whether Misbach or Batuah were successful, but rather how they were determined to synthesize Islam with new ideas coming from outside of their tradition.

Islam and Nationalism

At the beginning of the second quarter of the twentieth century, the issue of nationalism was as challenging as communism. Muslims were split into two main groups, which were broadly dubbed as "the nationalists" and "the

Islamists". There were at least three debates about Islam and nationalism, which took place in 1925, 1930, and 1939–40. The nationalists were represented by Soekarno, while the Islamists were represented by three charismatic leaders: Agus Salim, A. Hassan, and Mohammad Natsir. The three Islamists had different arguments for rejecting the idea of nationalism.

In 1925, the debate was sparked by Soekarno's statements in his Study Club in Bandung that the basic foundation of Indonesian unity should be *kebangsaan* (nationalism) and not anything else. On several occasions, he emphasized the importance of "love of the fatherland" as the basis of the Indonesian struggle. Soekarno argued that *kebangsaan* is the most universal principle in that it embraces all ideologies and political parties. Agus Salim, however, was dissatisfied with Soekarno's explanation of *kebangsaan*, which he believed could endanger the Muslims' creed. Salim accepted the importance of unity and love of the fatherland, but rejected elevating *kebangsaan* to a position above all else, as he believed it might dilute the idea of *tauhid* (divine unity).⁷¹ Salim also argued that Soekarno's version of *kebangsaan* could endanger the people in general as it could be used as a weapon to fight other countries. This chauvinistic kind of nationalism, Salim argued, had become a religion that finally "enslaves man to the fatherland-idol, leads to competition and rivalry for the acquisition of wealth, honour and pride, to the suppression, enslavement and danger of the fatherland of others without regard to rights and justice".⁷²

In 1930, the debate was triggered by a letter written by Tjipto Mangunkusumo to Soekarno, stating that SI leaders must be prevented from taking over the PPPKI's leadership. Mangunkusumo specifically mentioned the names Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim. PPPKI (Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia, or the Federation of Political Association of Indonesian Nationalism) was a federative body of Indonesian political parties led by Soekarno. Mangunkusumo also expressed his concern that SI leaders would turn Indonesia into a pan-Islamic state. This letter suddenly fuelled the anger of the Muslims who felt agitated by the nationalist leaders. In the same year, the Muslims were irritated by the publication of articles questioning the benefit of the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the practice of polygamy, and disparaging the Prophetic sayings (*hadith*).⁷³ A. Hassan was one of the Muslim leaders who stood up against the secular nationalists. He not only attacked their hostile attitude towards Islam, but also criticized their concept of *kebangsaan*. Hassan compared *kebangsaan* with *'asabiyyah*, a concept of tribal partisanship known before Islam. By doing this, he wanted to say that nationalism is a concept of *jahiliyyah*, that is, the chaotic period

in pre-Islamic Arabia. Hassan expressed his view that to “set up a *kebangsaan* organization, to invite and persuade people to join *kebangsaan*, to assist a *kebangsaan* party, is forbidden in Islam”.⁷⁴

In 1939, Natsir wrote a series of articles in *Pandji Islam*.⁷⁵ Apart from this magazine, his columns also appeared in *Pedoman Masyarakat*, also a widely circulated magazine.⁷⁶ The article in *Pandji Islam* was originally a series of columns he wrote regularly. But the topic he took up was certainly contentious. In retrospect, Natsir was also involved in 1930 in the debate on nationalism, siding with his teacher, A. Hassan, against Soekarno. The new article was thus a kind of rejuvenation of old arguments set in the previous debate. Influenced by his teacher, Natsir repeated the argument of *‘asabiyyah*, only that he underlined that nationalism was acceptable as long as it was not embraced with *ta‘assub* (fanaticism). Quoting a Prophetic saying, he argues that the love of the fatherland should be related to *niat* (intention). Compared with that in 1930, Natsir’s new argument had greatly developed. In 1930, he stated that the only acceptable *kebangsaan* was *kebangsaan Muslimin* (Muslim nationalism); that is to say, the *kebangsaan* that was accommodated by Sarekat Islam. Now, he did not confine nationalism to a specific Islamic organization, but rather to one’s intention. In other words, what was important was not one’s political affiliation, but rather one’s intention in embracing nationalism.

Soekarno was a skilled leader and an articulate writer and speaker. He replied to every criticism addressed to him, both in writings and in speeches. In reply to Agus Salim, he explained that he did not mean what Salim said about nationalism. In fact, he denounced chauvinist nationalism, that is, “a nationalism that is intrusive, that only attains its own interest, and that only thinks in the logic of trader”.⁷⁷ He clarified that his nationalism was much more inspired by Eastern leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi of India, Mustafa Kamil of Egypt, and Sun Yat Sen of China. He disagreed with the view that nationalism would violate anyone’s creed. He believed, instead, that religion and nationalism were two complementary concepts. He pointed out several Muslim leaders such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mustafa Kamil, and Muhammad ‘Ali as true Muslims who struggled for their nation. The genuine Islam, he concluded, is the Islam which supports nationalism, and the true Muslims are those who struggle for their nation.⁷⁸

In reply to A. Hassan and Mohammad Natsir, Soekarno wrote several articles in *Pandji Islam*. This time, he not only answered the issue of nationalism, but also the issue of Islamic thinking in general. It seems as if Soekarno wanted to give an answer in a more basic way, that is, by stressing

the importance of having a critical mind in dealing with religious thought. He argued that the acceptance of modern concepts such as nationalism needed an inclusive attitude, since without it, Muslims would lag behind and have difficulty catching up with the challenges of modernity. Of the articles he wrote in *Pandji Islam* in 1940, four of them addressed this issue.⁷⁹ In all of these articles, he emphasized the importance of using *ijtihad* (reasoning) and the need to abandon *taqlid* (imitation). He argued that the reason Muslims lagged behind was that they blindly followed established old views. Instead of practising *ijtihad*, they simply stuck with what the classical Muslim legalists (*fuqaha*) had said.⁸⁰

Soekarno suggested that it was time for Muslims to rethink their religion. Borrowing from a Western scholar, he specifically used the term “rethinking Islam” in English.⁸¹ He regarded “rethinking Islam”, as a crucial notion, as it was the tool for Muslims to embark on modern progress. He wrote:

We must not ignore the fact that outside Indonesia, in all Eastern countries, people are actively involved in “rethinking of Islam” (to use [Ruth] Frances Woodsmall’s term); that is to rethink what Islam really means. “Rethinking of Islam” has been in progress in Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, India, and in other Muslim countries. Can the conservatives in all honesty say, for instance, that there are no problems in the wearing of *hijab*, in education for adult women, in the issues of “woman” in general, in the religion-state relationship, in the issue of coeducation, in the issue of rationalism?... Alas, we must not be so hardheaded. Let us open our minds and accept that such a rethinking is necessary. As for where this rethinking leads us, let the future tell.⁸²

Soekarno pointed out the Turkish people as an example of Muslims who were courageously able to think critically of the classical Islamic tradition. It was not only that they accepted nationalism and the idea of the nation-state, but also that they accepted the values of secularism. Soekarno praised Turkish secularism as a good model for Muslim countries all over the world. He disagreed with the view that Turkish secularism has cast religion away. He wrote:

It has been said that they [the Young Turk] have dispensed with religion. This is certainly not true. It has been said that Islam in Turkey is dead, yet several objective observers such as Captain Armstrong believes that Islam in Turkey is now showing its fresh face ... It has been said that Turkey is now anti-Islam; yet experts such as [Ruth] Frances Woo[d]small, who has done research on Turkey, says: “The attitude of modern Turkey toward Islam has been anti-Orthodox, or anti-ecclesiastical, rather than anti-religions”.⁸³

Soekarno was indeed a staunch admirer of Mustafa Kamal Atatürk. For him, Atatürk was a great hero who successfully brought Turkey from authoritarian theocratic rule to the modern democratic state. He wanted Indonesian Muslims to be like the Young Turks, promoting “the fire of Islam, and not its ashes”.⁸⁴

There is a common view among scholars that nationalism was mainly supported by such secular figures as Soekarno, while religious figures were generally opposed to it. As a matter of fact, not all Muslim leaders were against nationalism. In West Sumatra, Muchtar Luthfi (1900–50) and Iljas Jacob (b. 1903), two prominent leaders, highly appreciated Soekarno’s idea of *kebangsaan*. They founded an Islamic party called the Indonesian Muslim Unity (Permi, or Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia) and put Islam and *kebangsaan* as its philosophical basis. Unlike most of the Muslim leaders in Jakarta, Luthfi and Jacob believed that nationalism was an important tool for the Indonesian people to gain their independence. Many members of Permi were graduates of Sumatra Thawalib and some of them graduated from the Middle East. Luthfi and Jacob themselves received training in Egypt. Although they were not taking up formal studies, both men attended various lectures at al-Azhar, and were actively involved in a political movement as well. Both joined Hizb al-Watan, a nationalist party founded by Mustafa Kamil.⁸⁵ It was perhaps because of this association that Luthfi and Jacob, as soon as they came back to Indonesia, felt closer to the nationalist party (Soekarno’s PNI) than to Sarekat Islam or other Islamic political parties.

Although, the nationalist leaders cordially welcomed Permi’s leaders, the Muslim leaders generally looked down on them. Natsir and other opponents of Soekarno from Persis derisively called Permi “*Islam yang pakai dan*” (literally: Islam with and), referring to its slogan “*Islam dan kebangsaan*”. Persis believed that true Islam is “*Islam yang tak pakai dan*” (literally: Islam without and).⁸⁶ This cynical attitude reflects a situation where different ideas within the Islamic community were not acceptable. The common view at the time was that Islam rejected nationalism, and whoever was in favour of it would be considered less Islamic — if not entirely un-Islamic.⁸⁷

The Issue of the Caliphate

It is important to address the issue of the caliphate here to see how Indonesian Muslims before independence dealt with it. In Egypt, as I have briefly pointed out, the issue of the caliphate had sparked great controversy. Similar reactions also took place in India. It was embodied in a political campaign called the “Khilafat Movement” (1919–24). Although there

was some influence of pan-Islamic discourse from Egypt, the issue of the caliphate in Indonesia was not as heated as it was in those two countries. Studies on pan-Islamic influence in pre-independence Indonesia reveal that Indonesian Muslims were generally disorientated in facing the issue. As Kees van Dijk explains, pan-Islamism was an issue created by European colonialists rather than a concept that grew out of Indonesian Muslim political awareness. It was a European reaction against the emergence of Islam and the influence of Ottoman Turkey in the region.⁸⁸ The word “pan-Islamism” itself was coined by a British colonial officer and was inspired by similar concepts in Europe such as pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism. Many Indonesian Muslims did not like the term and, in fact, considered it “a nest of lies” (*sarang kebohongan*).⁸⁹

The Dutch also believed that pan-Islamism was a threat against themselves and other European colonialists because of the potency of Islamic resurgence and the influence of the Middle East in the region. As far as the latter is concerned, the Dutch were worried about the Ottoman influence. Since the Turkey-Russia war in 1877, the Ottoman rulers had appeared to Muslims throughout the world as being involved in a “holy war”. The Dutch were also concerned with the Arab descendants in Indonesia who were suspected as propagators of pan-Islamism to the region. Van Dijk, in this case, argues that Indonesian Muslims were confused by the idea of pan-Islamism. As I mentioned above, although there were some Muslims who criticized the Dutch, they generally accepted them as their rulers. Tjokroaminoto’s statement quoted above, and generally, the accommodative attitude of Sarekat Islam’s members indicate that political leadership was not an urgent issue for Indonesian Muslims.

According to van Dijk, by flagging the issue of pan-Islamism, the Dutch were aiming at two targets: “In times of war, this could be used to create anxiety amongst Muslims who were citizens of the Turkish enemy and of their colonies; in times of peace, the threat of chaos such as this could be used to prevent foreign powers with large Muslim populations from demanding too much.”⁹⁰ There is no evidence on whether Indonesian Muslims felt insecure as a result of the Dutch’s exploitation of the pan-Islamic issue, but it is certainly true that Indonesian Muslims were generally unenthusiastic about the idea. A story told by Hamka and the way he told it may perhaps give us a clear picture of how Indonesian Muslims faced this issue. In a book on the biography of his father, Hamka recounted his father’s participation in the caliphate congress held in the Middle East. To begin, he explained the political condition of Ottoman Turkey on the eve of the fall of the caliphate. He praised Mustafa Kamal Atatürk for his bravery

and victory in defending the country from foreign intruders. He also paid respect to what Atatürk had done in dethroning Muhammad VI (who was considered corrupt) and replacing him with Abdul Madjid. But, due to the latter's conspiracy, secret contact with foreign countries, and relationship with the conservatives (*kaum kolot*), Atatürk decided to oust him and then terminated the institution of the caliphate.⁹¹

Hamka told the story in a cool-headed manner; despite being a religious person, he did not lament the loss of the caliphate. This is totally different from most of the other Arab writers, who often dramatized the fall of the caliph by condemning Atatürk and lamenting the loss of the caliphate.⁹² In the same vein, Hamka cynically pointed out the Arab rulers who ambitiously wanted to reclaim the position of caliph, following the termination of Ottoman rule. There were at least two Arab kings fighting for this status: Sharif Hussein, the ruler of the Hijaz, and King Fuad, the ruler of Egypt. Between these two leaders, there was King 'Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud who tried to conquer the Hijaz. It was against this political background that the caliphate congress was to be held. After several delays, the congress was finally held in 1926, in Cairo and Jeddah. Both were to accommodate the king of Egypt and the new ruler of the Hijaz respectively.⁹³ Indonesian Muslims were invited to attend these two congresses and were pleased to receive the invitation, not because of the issue of the caliphate, but for the opportunity to go to the holy land and gain support from Muslims all over the world regarding their struggle for independence. The Cairo delegation was led by Tjokroaminoto, the leader of Sarekat Islam; Mas Mansur, the leader of Muhammadiyah; and H.M. Sudjak, the leader of the Organisasi Hadji Hindia. Meanwhile, the Hijaz delegation was led by Abdullah Ahmad and Abdul Karim Amrullah, Hamka's father.

The two congresses turned out to be unsuccessful as neither was able to gain a consensus. As Hamka explained, the Cairo congress failed because none of the political leaders attended it. The only politician who attended the congress was 'Abd al-Aziz al-Shalabi, a political exile from Tunisia. The Hijaz congress, on the other hand, also failed since the new ruler was more interested in the status of the Hijaz than the issue of caliphate.⁹⁴ Thus, while the Hijaz congress failed because it lacked support from the host country, the Cairo congress failed because it lacked political support. In fact, its failure was also due to the poor quality of its venue, as Hamka's father told his son in the following story:

When Shaikh Bakhit^[95] came to the congress, he came in pomp and ceremony, his long flowing robe reaching and sweeping the floor. Everybody stood up to greet him, and many of them kissed his hand.

I was unimpressed with what I saw. At that congress, he delivered a speech! He explained the concept of caliphate according to Muslim jurists. He explained it to the audience in a manner of someone teaching an elementary religious class. I then whispered to my friend, Abdullah Ahmad, that I wanted to interrupt him, but my friend stopped me from doing it. Finally, I could not stand it any longer; I had to sit up straight in my chair, because these chairs were big for my physical size. While Shaikh Bakhit was still speaking I asked the chairman of the ceremony to let me speak. Everyone stared at me. Robes, turbans, and fezz, swished around to face me at the back... My friend, Abdullah Ahmad, was stunned to silence at what I was doing. Shaikh Bakhit interrupted his speech. After the chairman gave me the permission, I spoke: 'I appreciate that what the Shaikh was just saying is important, but this is not the right forum for that. This is not the forum of *fiqh*. All of us present here are delegation members who would not have been sent here if we knew nothing. Therefore, I suggest the Shaikh discontinue his speech, and let us return to our original topic of whether it is the right time for us to revive the rule of the caliphate.'⁹⁶

It is clear that Hamka and his father were unenthusiastic, if not indifferent, to the issue of the caliphate. While Hamka considered the caliphate a mere political game of the Arab rulers to gain power and influence, his father saw it as a demonstration of Muslim stupidity and ignorance of modern problems as shown by Shaikh Bakhit.

Indeed, Hamka and his father were not alone. Other Muslim leaders such as Agus Salim and Mohammad Natsir were also unenthusiastic about the issue of the caliphate. Natsir even stated that the caliphate was no longer a Muslim concern.⁹⁷ The fact that Muslim countries had been fragmented, and that there was no single powerful Islamic state to bear the burden of the caliphate, had led Indonesian Muslims to a conclusion that the caliphate was an ideal notion with an empty reality. This partly explains why when approaching independence, the Indonesian Muslims were so ready to cooperate with their secular counterparts to build a nation-state, a concept that has no precedence in the classical Islamic political tradition. For them, the nation-state is the ultimate notion of the human search for a political model. What Muslims must do, they argued, is how to make such a nation-state congenial with Islamic political ideals.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Change and reform have become the most important issues debated in modern Islamic intellectual discourse. Since the early nineteenth century,

Muslim intellectuals have been trying to respond to this issue by publishing books and articles, as well as conducting seminars and public debates. The main inquiry is still the same: Can Islam really change? Or, in other words, can Islam accommodate change? The answer seems to be simple, but the explanation is certainly not. As we have seen throughout this chapter, Muslim intellectuals all over the Islamic world faced a common problem when they had to address the issue of change and reform. The issue of change is, of course, multifaceted. During the early time of *nahdah*, the main problem was of progress and backwardness. It was a time when many Muslims felt that they lagged behind compared with other civilizations, precisely as Shakib Arslan (1871–1946), a Syrian reformist, put it in his classical book: “Why do Muslims Lag Behind While the Others Progress”.⁹⁸ The “others”, in this case, refers to the West.

The history of modern Islamic reformism is a series of Muslim responses to the ideas and notions coming from the West. As soon as the problem of progress and backwardness no longer occupied them, Muslim intellectuals were forced to deal with other issues, which were by no means easier. Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, various political issues such as nationalism, socialism, and secularism, began to absorb their attention and energy. While secularism (represented in the issue of the caliphate) dominated Islamic intellectual discourse in Egypt and India, Indonesian Muslims were much occupied with the issue of nationalism. Both secularism and nationalism were foreign to the Islamic political tradition. Muslims were debating whether accepting secularism was against Islam, and whether embracing nationalism would water down their creed (*aqidah*). Intellectual debates and public discussions were the best way to reconcile ideological differences and to discover a proper understanding of the problem. This, to a great extent, was fruitful. In Egypt, Muslims gradually ascertained that the caliphate was not an ideal choice for a modern political system. In the same vein, Indonesian Muslims were increasingly adopting nationalism as an effective concept for writing a pluralist country like their own. All this progress indicates that change is not anathema; nor is it an impossible concept for Muslims to deal with. By developing arguments, change can finally be Islamically justified.

Notes

1. Ziauddin Sardar, “Can Islam Change?”, *New Statesman*, 13 September 2004.
2. “Essentialist” and “non-essentialist” scholars can be found both in Muslim and non-Muslim intellectual traditions. What I mean by “essentialists” are those

- who view Islam as a stable and unchanging religion. Every change that takes place in Islam is considered to be non-Islamic or unIslamic. Several Orientalists and Western scholars hold this view. Their attitude can be best represented by Lord Cromer, a former British Commissioner in Egypt (1883–1907), who once said that “Islam reformed is Islam no longer”. Some Muslim scholars also subscribe to this essentialist view. They consider Islam an immutable religion and that any change that takes place in Islam is, therefore, “un-Islamic”. They call it “*bid‘ah*” or innovation. Meanwhile, the non-essentialists are those who view Islam as a dynamic religion. Like many other religions, Islam is subject to change. Several Western scholars, such as John L. Esposito and Leonard Binder, believe in the changeability of Islam. Many Muslim reformists also believe in this non-essentialist character of Islam.
3. Narrated by Abu Dawud and al-Hakim. The original text is as follows: *Inna Allaha yab‘ath li hadhihi al-ummah ‘ala ra’s kulli mi‘ah sanah man yujaddidu laha amr diniha*.
 4. This is the modification of Lord Cromer’s saying that “Islam reformed is Islam no longer”. See note 2 above.
 5. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 75.
 6. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
 8. P.J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, 4th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 197.
 9. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, *Maktubati Sir Sayyid* (Lahore: Majlisi Taraqqi Adab, 1959), p. 86; in Christian W. Troll, *Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology* (New Delhi: Vikas Publ. House, 1978), p. 128.
 10. Chiragh Ali, “Islam and Change”, in *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 47.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
 12. *Ibid.*
 13. Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: K. Bazar, 1958), p. 164.
 14. *Ibid.*, pp. 164–65.
 15. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 154.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
 17. Abdullah Saeed, “*Ijtihad* and Innovation in Neo-Modernist Islamic Thought in Indonesia”, *Journal of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 8, no. 3 (1997), p. 282.
 18. For further elaboration on *ijtihad*, see M. Sayyid Tantawi, *Al-Ijtihad fi al-Ahkam al-Shar‘iyyah* (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr, 1997); Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman, *Al-Ijtihad: Dawabituhu wa Ahkamuhu* (Cairo: Dar al-Tiba‘ah al-Hadithah,

- 1986); Taha Jabir al-'Alwani, *Al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid fi al-Islam*. 1st ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Ansar, 1979).
19. Mohammed Arkoun, *Al-Fikr al-Islami: Naqd wa Ijtihad*, 2nd ed. (London: Dar al-Saqi, 1992).
 20. Mohammed Arkoun, *Min al-Ijtihad ila Naqd al-'Aql al-Islami* (London: Dar al-Saqi, 1991).
 21. Muhammad 'Imarah, *Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm: Li 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq*, 2nd ed. (Beirut: al-Mu'assasah al-'Arabiyyah li al-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 1988), p. 160.
 22. Fauzi M Najjar, "The Debate on Islam and Secularism in Egypt", *Arab Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (Spring 1996)
 23. Imarah, *Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm*, pp. 171–73. 'Abd al-Raziq quoted many verses. These are among them: al-Nahl:64; al-Isra:105; al-Nur:54; al-'Ankabut:18; al-Ahzab:45; Fatir:23; Yasin:17; and Sad:65.
 24. Ibid, p. 155.
 25. The earliest response of Muslims towards the issue of secularism is perhaps Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who wrote a book titled *Al-Radd 'ala al-Dahriyyin*. The word "*dahri*" used by al-Afghani refers to two things: first to the naturalists whom he considered atheists; and the secularists whom he considered only to believe in the temporal life. The word "*dahri*" literally means "time".
 26. Mohammed Arkoun, *al-'Almanah wa al-Din: al-Islam, al-Masihyyah, al-Gharb*, 2nd ed. (London: Dar al-Saqi, 1993), pp. 89–90.
 27. Asghar Ali Engineer, "Islam and Secularism", *Secular Perspective*, 1–15 June 1999. The electronic version can be read at <<http://www.dawoodi-bohras.com>>, (accessed 16 July 2005).
 28. Robin Wright, "An Iranian Luther Shakes the Foundations of Islam", *The Guardian*, 1 February 1995 (first published in *Los Angeles Times*, January 1995).
 29. Abdolkarim Soroush, *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 56–57.
 30. This view is very common among revivalist scholars such as Abul A'la Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and Muhammad Qutb.
 31. Syed Abul-Ala Mawdudi, "Political Theory of Islam", in *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 254.
 32. Muhammad Qutb, *Jahiliyyat al-Qarn al-'Ishtiraki* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1964).
 33. Muqtedar Khan, "Sovereignty in Islam as Human Agency", *Ijtihad* 1, no. 10 (30 December 1999) <<http://www.ijthad.org/sovt.htm>> (accessed 11 May 2005). The Qur'anic verse he refers to is al-Baqarah (2):30 that says: Recall that your Lord said to the angels, "I am placing a representative (a temporary god) on Earth." They said, "Will You place therein one who will spread evil therein and shed blood, while we sing Your praises, glorify You, and uphold Your absolute authority?" He said, "I know what you do not know."
 34. Ibid.

35. M. Fathi Osman, "Sovereignty of God or Sovereignty of the People?", *Muslim Democrat* 2, no. 1 (February 2000), p. 5.
36. Ibid.
37. Ali A. Mazrui, "Islamocracy: In Search of a Muslim Path to Democracy", paper delivered at the 4th Annual CSID Conference, Washington, D.C., 16 May 2003. The digital version of this paper can be read at <<http://www.islam-democracy.org>> (accessed 14 September 2005).
38. The three *hajis* were known as Haji Miskin of Pandai Sikat, Haji Abdul Rahman of Piabang, and Haji Muhammad Arif of Sumanik.
39. Christine Dobbin, "Islamic Revivalism in Minangkabau at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century", *Modern Asian Studies* 8, no. 3 (July 1974): 330–31.
40. Hamka, *Ajahku: Riwayat Hidup Dr. H. Abd. Karim Amrullah dan Perjuangan Kaum Agama di Sumatera*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Widjaya, 1958), p. 28.
41. Wahabism is part of the Salafi Movement that arose in the Middle East during the eighteenth century. The Wahabis often refuse the term "Wahabism" attributed to them, and they prefer to be called "Salafis" than "Wahabis". In this sense, Salafi is much a broader term than Wahabi.
42. Merle C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 183.
43. Ibid., p. 184.
44. Both of them were illustrious judges in their time. See Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 31–33.
45. Ibid., p. 32.
46. Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 129.
47. Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, p. 44.
48. Hamka, *Kenang-Kenangan Hidup, I* (Jakarta: Gapura, 1951), p. 41, in Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, p. 45.
49. Mahmud Yunus, *Sejarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Hidakarya Agung, 1983), p. 75.
50. For more details on *al-Imam*, see William R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1967), particularly Chapter 3, pp. 56–90.
51. In Egypt, 'Abduh's disciples were often dubbed as the members of "*madrasah al-imam*" (the school of the *imam*) and in the early twentieth century, several 'Abduh's students founded a party called "*hizb al-imam*" (the Imam's Party), which was later transformed into "*hizb al-ummah*" (People's Party).
52. Roff, *The Origins*, p. 57.
53. Hamka, *Pengaruh Muhammad 'Abduh di Indonesia; Pidato Diutjapkan Sewaktu akan Menerima Gelar Doctor Honoris Causa dari Universitas al-Azhar di Mesir Pada Tgl. 21 Djanuari 1958* (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1961), p. 17.
54. Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, p. 35.

55. Yunus, *Sejarah Pendidikan Islam*, p. 79.
56. The word “*usalli*” is taken from the first word of the standard recitation before performing the prayer. The complete words usually go like this: *usalli fard al-maghribi* (“I pray the obligatory evening prayer”) for the evening prayer, or *usalli fard al-subhi* (“I pray the obligatory dawn prayer”) for the dawn prayer.
57. Yunus, *Sejarah Pendidikan Islam*, p. 81.
58. Taufik Abdullah, *Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927–1933)* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Cornell University, 1971), p. 12.
59. Hamka, *Ajahku: Riwayat Hidup Dr. H. Abd. Karim Amrullah dan Perjuangan Kaum Agama di Sumatera*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Widjaya, 1958), p. 80.
60. At the time, wearing Western clothes such as tie and coat and taking photographs was considered *haram* or forbidden by religion. (Yunus, *Sejarah Pendidikan Islam*, p. 144.)
61. Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, p. 102.
62. Ibid., p. 103.
63. Ibid., pp. 111–12.
64. Ibid., p. 129.
65. Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 46.
66. Fred R. von der Mehden, “Marxism and Early Indonesian Islamic Nationalism”, *Political Science Quarterly* 73, no. 3 (September 1958), p. 344.
67. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 76.
68. At this time, Tjokroaminoto was arrested by the government on the allegation of involvement in the Afdeeling B affair, that is, a secret revolutionary branch of Sarekat Islam based in West Java. Afdeeling B was also called “Sarekat Islam B”. It was set up by Sosrokardono, a CSI member, in 1917.
69. Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926, Asia, East by South* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 285.
70. To accentuate Batuah’s religious commitment, Hamka wrote this: “he died suddenly in his hometown, Kota Lawas, in Ramadhan 1367, after performing the *tarawih* prayer”. Hamka, *Ajahku*, p. 236.
71. Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, p. 254.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., p. 257.
74. Ibid., p. 259.
75. The articles were respectively published in vol. 6, no. 4 (23 January); vol. 6, no. 5 (30 January); and vol. 6, no. 6 (6, 13, 20, February). The title of the article was “Tjinta Agama dan Tanah Air, Bersimpang Dua dan Berpahit-pahit” (Love of Religion and Fatherland, Crossroads and Acrimony).
76. Most of his writings in these two magazines can now be read in his book: *Capita Selecta* (Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1954).

77. Panitia Peringatan 100 Tahun Bung Karno. *Bung Karno dan Wacana Islam: Kenangan 100 Tahun Bung Karno* (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 2001), p. 6.
78. Ibid., p. 11.
79. Those articles are as follows: "Masyarakat Onta dan Masyarakat Kapal Udara" (The Society of the Camel and the Society of the Aeroplane); "Memudakan Pengertian Islam" (Rejuvenating Islamic Understanding); "Apa Sebab Turki Memisah Agama dari Negara?" (Why Turkey Separates Religion from the State?); and "Islam Sontoloyo" (Reckless Islam).
80. Soekarno, *Bung Karno dan Wacana Islam*, p. 73.
81. Forty years later, the phrase "rethinking Islam" was very popular among Muslim intellectuals. Mohammed Arkoun, for instance, often used this phrase to delineate his reformist ideas. See his book, *Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).
82. Soekarno, *Bung Karno dan Wacana Islam*, pp. 74–75.
83. Ibid., p. 109; cf. Ibid., p. 81.
84. These are Soekarno's most famous words regarding his view on Islam. They were first stated in his correspondence with A. Hassan when he was exiled in Flores (Endeh).
85. Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia*, p. 153.
86. Ibid., p. 264.
87. This kind of view was later criticized by Nurcholish Madjid. During the 1970s, Muslim leaders, who were mostly affiliated to Islamic political parties, took this position. They claimed that those who were not supporting Islamic parties were not Islamic or were less Islamic. Madjid came to refute this view by saying that Islamic parties did not necessarily represent the true Islam. He proposed a slogan of "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No", which then triggered a long debate among Muslims. I will discuss Madjid's views in Chapter 5.
88. Kees van Dijk, "Ketakutan Penjajah, 1890–1918: Pan-Islamisme dan Persekongkolan Jerman-India", in N.J.G. Kaptein, *Kekacauan dan Kerusuhan: Tiga Tulisan Tentang Pan-Islamisme di Hindia-Belanda Timur pada Akhir Abad Kesembilan Belas dan Awal Abad Kedua Puluh* (Jakarta: INIS, 2003), p. 33.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Hamka, *Ajahku*, p. 122.
92. See, for instance, the writings of Rashid Ridha, particularly his book: *Al-Khilafah al-Imamah al-Uzma* (Cairo: al-Zahra li al-a'lam al-Arabi, 1988); see also the following books: Hashim Sai'di 'Abd al-Muta'al, *Al-Islam wa al-Khilafah fi al-Asr al-Hadith* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Adab wa Matba'atuha, 1985); Mahmud Khalidi 'Abd al-Majid, *Ma'alim al-Khilafah fi al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-Islami* (Beirut: Dar al-Jil; Maktabat al-Muhtasib, 1984); Idris Husayni, *Al-Khilafah al-Mughatasabah: Azmah Tarikh 'am Azmah Mu'arrikh?* (Beirut: Dar al-Nakhil, 1995); As'ad Qasim, *Azmah al-Khilafah wa al-Imamah wa*

- Atharuha al-Mu'asirah: 'Ard wa Dirasah* (Beirut: Markaz al-Ghadir li Dirasat al-Islamiyyah, 1997).
93. As for King Hussein, he had been deposed one year earlier (1925) and the Hijaz had fallen under Saudi control.
 94. In the same year the congress was held, 'Abd al-'Aziz was proclaimed King Najd and Hijaz. He deliberately used the term "*malik*" (king) rather than "*khalifah*" (caliph).
 95. Muhammad Bakhit al-Muti'i (1854–1935) was the grand *mufti* of Egypt and one of the leading Hanafi scholars of his time. He was educated at al-Azhar and was teaching in this university for several years. In 1914 he was appointed *mufti*, a title he held for seven years. He was known as the bitterest foe of the Islamic Reform movement led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh. He was also known as a devout scholar who chose to lose his position as *mufti* rather than bow to government pressure to issue a particular *fatwa*.
 96. Hamka, *Ajabku*, p. 128.
 97. Mohammad Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia* (Bandung: Peladjar dan Bulan Sabit, 1969), p. 123.
 98. Amir Shakib Arslan, *Limadha Ta'akhhkharu al-Muslimun wa Limadha Taqaddama Ghayruhum* (Beirut: Maktabat al-Hayah, 1975).

3

MODEL 1 Islamic Democratic State

The will to establish an independent nation-state based on Islam and democracy had resonated since pre-independence times. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the idea of “nation-state” was broadly accepted by Indonesian Muslims as an ideal political system, despite the fact that they were under non-Muslim colonial rulers on the one hand, and under the influence of the pan-Islamic movement in the Middle East on the other. During the first quarter of the twentieth century the idea of independence had already been stated by many nationalist leaders. Various social and political movements which emerged during this time were aiming primarily at gaining independence from the Dutch. Two approaches were taken by those nationalist movements: the cooperative basis and the non-cooperative one. While the former sought for independence through diplomatic methods, by appealing to the Dutch government from within (represented by their participation in Volksraad), the latter pursued it from without by fighting the colonialist domination and seeking international support. Indonesian Muslim leaders were confident that they would obtain an independent nation-state, sooner or later.

However, after the mid-1930s, the struggle for independence on the non-cooperative basis had already reached its demise.¹ The Dutch colonial government arrested all radical political activists who opposed cooperation. In 1933, Soekarno (1901–70) was arrested and exiled to Flores. In the same

year, two non-cooperative Muslim leaders, Muchtar Luthfi (1900–50) and Iljas Jacob (b. 1903), were also arrested and expelled to Boven Digul.² The only way to realize Indonesian independence was through cooperation, which the Greater Indonesian Party (Parindra, Partai Indonesia Raya) aspired to achieve. But the leaders of this party were mostly secularists and some of them were, in fact, anti-Islam. Muslim leaders were consequently not interested in joining this party. Nevertheless, in 1936, Agus Salim (1884–1954) began to set up a cooperative faction called the Awareness Front (Barisan Penyardar) within the non-cooperative PSII (Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, or Islamic Political Association of Indonesia). However, his efforts were soon proven to have failed as he was ousted from the party a year later.

In May 1937, a political party called the Indonesian People's Movement (Gerindo, Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia) was formed. Following in Parindra's footsteps, Gerindo supported cooperation. Four months later, a broad base Islamic body called the Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia (MIAI, Majelis Islam A'laa Indonesia) was created. Although this was not a political organization, its influence was often political. When the Indonesian Political Federation (GAPI, Gabungan Politik Indonesia), a political body which called for a full parliament for Indonesians, was formed, MIAI fully supported it. Similarly, when GAPI called for a fair electoral system for the members of Volksraad, MIAI again backed the action. In fact, they even more aggressively suggested the idea that Islam should be a part of the agenda.³

However, towards 1940, the effort of the cooperative basis faced a major challenge. The increase in Japanese military power in Asia and the ascendancy of Hitler in Germany altered the political situation of the country radically. When Hitler invaded the Netherlands in the spring of 1940, the colonial regime in Indonesia issued a full alert. Martial law was declared, all public meetings were banned, and suspicious activities were broken up. Political concessions that Indonesian leaders asked from the colonial government were left unresolved. The government in turn only replied that everything would be decided after the war. At that time, Indonesian leaders felt both anxious and confused, particularly after they heard that the Japanese would free the country. Some of them considered cooperation with the Japanese against the Dutch as a necessary political step. However, the Dutch soon reacted. They arrested many national leaders, including important Islamic figures such as Hadji Rasul.

The arrival of the Japanese on 10 January 1942 marked the end of Dutch colonialism. However, it did not mean that colonialism *per se* had ended. The Japanese came to the country not to free it, but, like the Dutch, wanted

to colonize it. Once more, Indonesians were divided into those who held a cooperative standpoint and those who did not in their quest for independence. The Muslim leaders at that time were more ready to support cooperation with the Japanese, mainly because the new colonial regime offered them a great number of concessions, such as the establishment of Shumubu, an office for religious affairs, in 1942, the creation of the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Masyumi, Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) in 1943, and the formation of the paramilitary organization Hizbullah in 1944. In addition to this, the Japanese also carried out religious and educational reforms by restructuring Islamic administration on matters concerning *wakaf*, *zakat*, and personal affairs (for example, marriage), and by encouraging the establishment of Islamic educational institutions (that is, *pesantren* and *madrasah*).⁴

However, in the lead-up to 1945, Japanese military power was gradually overwhelmed by the Allies. The paramilitary organizations that they created, including Hizbullah, did little to help them. In fact, some of them deserted and attacked the Japanese interests.⁵ Considering the worsening situation, the Japanese authorities began to take serious steps towards Indonesian independence. The first one was to dissolve paramilitary organizations and then establish an administrative body for independence. In March 1945, they announced the formation of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI, Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia), a committee to prepare for the country's independence.

Muslim leaders played a crucial role in this committee. Together with the secular nationalists, they discussed the platform of the intended state. BPUPKI meetings, which went on for two weeks,⁶ produced two major political factions, each of which tried to determine the platform of the intended state with its political ideology. The first was a group called "Islamic nationalists", who wanted a state based on Islam and the other was "secular nationalists", who wanted a state based on Pancasila.⁷ Islamic demands in this committee were not entirely new. As mentioned earlier, they had been attempted by the MIAI through GAPI in the Dutch days. However, the demands of the Islamic faction in the BPUPKI committee were important, since what they proposed would become the foundational basis of the independent nation state. After long debates, the committee finally agreed to adopt all Islamic formulae, including the Jakarta Charter.

The history of Islam in particular, and Indonesia in general, would perhaps not be the same if the decision in the BPUPKI committee had not been thwarted. Another committee, the Preparatory Committee for

Indonesian Independence (PPKI, Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia), which was formed three months later, abrogated all articles containing Islamic formulae.⁸ This decision had a crucial impact on the history of Islam in Indonesia. The emergence of Model 1 was chiefly due to the controversial decision of the PPKI. The Muslims now felt that they had a good reason to substantiate an Islamic political model, not only because it was a lofty idea, but also because it was necessary to bring about historical truth.⁹

THE EXPONENTS OF THE MODEL

The real exponents of Model 1 were those who affiliated with Islamic political parties.¹⁰ The post-independence Masyumi was the party most genuinely committed to this model. It is not so surprising then if the theoretical formulation of the model was predominantly conceptualized by the leaders of this party.

Mohammad Natsir (1908–93) was the most important theorist of the model. He was not only the one who introduced the term “Islamic Democratic State”, but also the most consistent leader supporting the idea. Natsir was a thinker as well as a politician. He had been writing on political issues since he was a student in Bandung. He gained his formal education at an Algemeene Middelbare School (AMS), a Dutch high school, but studied Islam informally with Ahmad Hassan (1887–1962), a charismatic leader of Persatuan Islam (Persis). Although he only graduated from AMS, Natsir was a brilliant autodidact. He mastered six foreign languages: Latin, Dutch, German, French, English, and Arabic.¹¹ Natsir never wrote a book. However, his articles, which he had been writing since his youth, have been collected into several books. The two-volume collection, *Capita Selecta*, is unquestionably the most important work attributed to him. From 1949 to 1958, Natsir chaired Masyumi and was elected Prime Minister in 1950.

Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1911–83) was another theorist of this model. Like Natsir, he was politically affiliated with Masyumi. He was born in Minangkabau and studied with Hamka’s father, Hadji Rasul, in Padang Pandjang. In 1935, he edited a magazine called *Pandji Islam*. It was under his editorship that the intellectual debates between Soekarno and Natsir took place. Ahmad was more an academician than a politician. He wrote several books and was deeply involved in numerous educational institutions. In his later years, he held the position of President of the Institute of Qur’anic Science (PTIQ, Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu al-Qur’an), a prestigious college of Qur’anic studies in Jakarta. It was perhaps because of his deep association

with academic life that he was among the few Masyumi leaders who were not sentenced to prison by Soekarno. Ahmad was deeply interested in political philosophy and mainly wrote on political thought. His most influential work, *Membentuk Negara Islam* (Building an Islamic State), is a conceptual blueprint of the Islamic model of democratic state.

Another theorist was Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911–89). He was born in Serang, Banten, from an aristocratic *santri* family. His father was a colonial *ambtenaar* (*pangreh praja* officer) and was somewhat Westernized. Like Natsir, Prawiranegara studied in AMS in Bandung and went on to RHS (Rechts Hoge School), a Dutch school of law, in Jakarta. Although he graduated in Law — and was more interested in literature — Prawiranegara was asked to work in the Departement van Financien (Financial Department) and held a position in the tax office. Prawiranegara's knowledge of finance and economics most likely came from his experience in this office. After independence, he was assigned as Minister of Finance in Sjahrir's third cabinet (1946). He was known as the initiator of the first national currency (ORI, Oeang Republik Indonesia). After some other ministerial posts, Prawiranegara was appointed the founding director of the Indonesian Bank. His other important political roles were: head of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI, Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indonesia) in 1948, and head of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI, Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) in 1958. In addition to his intense political activities, Prawiranegara was a prolific writer. He wrote a number of books and various articles on Islam and economic issues.

Prominent Masyumi leaders such as Mohamad Roem (1908–83), Abu Hanifah (1906–81), Hamka (1908–81), and Mohammad Rasjidi (1915–2001) also contributed to the formation of Model 1. Roem was known as an adept diplomat who enhanced Masyumi's profile. He held various positions in several cabinet and wrote on social and political issues in the national media. His writings have been partially collected into four volumes entitled *Bunga Rampai dari Sejarah*. Abu Hanifah was a religious socialist and was known also as a medical practitioner. He served as Minister for Education and Culture in the Hatta Cabinet (1949), and wrote several books on politics and religious issues. Hamka was one of Masyumi's main ideologues. He was known both as a novelist and a religious scholar. Over a period of fifty years he wrote more than fifty books. His *magnum opus* is *Tafsir al-Azhar*, a thirty-volume commentary of the Qur'an. Rasjidi who was the first Minister of Religious Affairs, graduated from universities in Egypt and France. Like Hamka, he was known primarily as an ideologue

of Masyumi, and also as a staunch critic of the Islamic renewal movement (*gerakan pembaruan keagamaan*) in Indonesia.

A small number of exponents of Model 1 came from the Nahdlatul Ulama faction. They are, to mention a few, Wachid Hasjim (1914–53), Idham Chalid (b. 1921), Imron Rosjadi (b. 1916), and Mohammad Dahlan (1909–77). Hasjim was a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the son of Hasjim Ash'ari, the founder of NU. He was a member of BPUPKI and one of the “gentlemen” who signed the Jakarta Charter. He served as Minister of Religious Affairs in the Hatta Cabinet (1949–50). Chalid was the head of NU from 1955 to 1984 and was known as a brilliant politician. He held various strategic positions in the Soekarno era and was the first head of the People's Representative Council (DPR/MPR) in the Soeharto era (1971–77). Rosjadi was a graduate of MULO and the Faculty of Law in Baghdad. He was the head of Pemuda Ansor (Ansor Youth) and was among the few leaders of NU who disagreed with Soekarno. Because of his opposition to Soekarno, he was jailed from 1962 to 1966. Dahlan was a member of MIAI (1941) in pre-independence days. When Masyumi was founded, he became a member of the executive board of the party until 1952. In 1954, he was elected general chairman of NU, and in 1967, he served as Minister of Religion.

Several “secular” nationalist leaders were actually close to, and supportive of Model 1. Mohammad Hatta (1902–80), for instance, was often regarded as a member of the secular faction, although subtly he bolstered Islamic support for a democratic state. He himself had established a religious party under the name of the Indonesian Islamic Democratic Party (PDII, Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia). However, the New Order regime did not grant it legal status.¹² Some socialist leaders such as Soedjatmoko (1922–89) and Hamid Algadri (1910–98) were sympathetic to Masyumi's political struggle, although they were not explicitly supportive of the model. Both leaders had positive views on the Islamic role in Indonesia.¹³ However, neither Hatta nor the socialist leaders were genuine exponents of Model 1 which I am dealing with in this chapter.

FOUNDATION OF THE MODEL

The basic foundation of Model 1 can be found in the theories of the Islamic state formulated by Muslim writers during the first three decades of independence. Muslim writers discussed democracy in one package with the concept of the Islamic state, since, for them, Islam means democracy, and it would be redundant to speak of Islam *and* democracy. As a concept,

the Islamic state is vague. It has been adopted by both progressive and radical Muslims. In Indonesia, the progressive version of the Islamic state was commonly associated with Masyumi, whose political agenda was to “Islamize” the country by democratic means. The radicalist version, on the other hand, used to be associated with the Darul Islam movement, an armed organization striving for the establishment of the Islamic state.¹⁴

The exponents of Model 1 supported the progressive version of the Islamic state. However, not all of them agreed with the nomenclature. Since the term is extremely vague, some of them avoided using it while approving its main content. Natsir and Ahmad were among those who preferred to use it.¹⁵ On the other hand, Prawiranegara and Roem abandoned its usage. Natsir and Ahmad argued that since the term signified Islamic identity, it was important to use it. Natsir considered that the opposition to the term as being strongly due to Western Islamophobia. In a speech he delivered before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs in 1952, he explained why this term was so pejorative:

Most Americans, and I mean those of the U.S.A., think of their country and their people as Christian. Their late lamented president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was very outspokenly Christian and during the last world war seldom failed to mention Christianity in his appeals to the peoples of the world.... But no sooner do we, following the achievement of our independence, proclaim ourselves as an Islamic nation than concern is expressed about our “going theocratic.” By some it is taken for granted, as for example by James A. Michener. In his book *Voice of Asia* he quotes his conversation with the honorable Miss Jinnah. Mr. Michener had remarked that “it was curious that Mr. Jinnah, who was not essentially a religious man, should have founded a theocracy.” The worthy lady, worthy sister of the great Qa’id-a-Adzam (God’s mercy be on him), countered, “what do you mean, a theocracy! We are a Muslim State. That does not mean a religious state. It means a state for Muslims...” and further: “We are not a state run by priests or a hierarchy. We are a state organized according to Muslim principles. And I may say they are fine principles for organizing a state.”¹⁶

Prawiranegara and Roem, on the other hand, argued that the usage of the term “Islamic state” would be counter-productive. Therefore, “it would be better not to use the term at all”.¹⁷

The exponents of Model 1 also differed on the question as to which country the role model of the Islamic state should be attributed. While Natsir and Ahmad were impressed by Pakistan, Prawiranegara harshly criticized it.¹⁸ However, they all agreed that countries such as Saudi Arabia

and Iran were not an ideal model for the Islamic state. Interestingly, they considered some “Christian” Western countries to be the ideal models for an Islamic state. Natsir, for instance, considered the “religious” Britain to be the ideal model of an Islamic state.¹⁹ Abu Hanifah imagined the Netherlands and Switzerland, which clearly recognized the status of religion, to be the feasible model for an Islamic state in Indonesia.²⁰ It seems obvious that their preference for Western countries rather than Islamic ones was driven by their impression that Western countries had successfully combined religious plurality, economic prosperity, and political stability.

Despite the controversy around the term and the role models, Masyumi did not specifically mention the word, either in its Constitution and Bylaws (AD/ART), or in its other official documents. The Basic Planning of the party only mentioned the words “to uphold the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and Islam”,²¹ and “implementing Islamic ideals in government matters”.²² The reason the term was strongly associated with the party was due primarily to the preference of its leaders in using it in their publications and speeches. I suspect that their choice of terms was not only aimed at countering the “secular” version of state supported by the religiously neutral nationalists, but also at countering the illiberal version of the Islamic state espoused by the Darul Islam movement. Before the Darul Islam rebellion broke out in 1948, the term was rarely used by Muslims. Even in the BPUPKI meetings, Muslim leaders seemed to have avoided the term.²³

How did the exponents of Model 1 formulate the concept? How did they conceive democracy in the context of the Islamic state? Basically, there were two cardinal principles on which the progressive version of the Islamic state was grounded: first, the Islamic state is not a theocratic state; and second, the Islamic state is against the secular state. The former means that there is no unification of religion and the state under religious elites, and the latter means that there is no separation of religion and the state under a secular government. Let me explain these two precepts in more detail.

Against Theocracy

The word “theocracy” was introduced by Flavius Josephus (AD. 37–101), a Jewish historian of Jerusalem. He coined the term to explain the system of Jewish polity which he claimed to be distinct from other forms of government prevalent in his time, notably republic, monarchy, and oligarchy. Theocracy, Josephus wrote, is a form of government which ascribes “the power and the authority to God, and by persuading all the people to have a regard to

him as the author of all good things".²⁴ In the medieval Christian world, the term theocracy was, however, taken to mean the political system run by priests.²⁵ In this regard, the Christian meaning of the word was narrower than the Jewish sense explained by Josephus.

Islamic political tradition does not have this concept either in the Jewish or Christian sense of the word. Neither *falasifah* (philosophers) nor *fuqaha* (jurists) discussed the political model of theocracy. While Muslim philosophers were more influenced by the Greek model, particularly Plato's work, *The Republic*, Muslim jurists were more interested in developing their own theory, based either on the Prophetic model of polity, or on the experience of Muslim kingship throughout history. Neither model was the equivalent of the Judeo-Christian concept of theocracy. The concept of caliphate, which used to be claimed as the Islamic version of theocracy, is not based entirely on solid ground, since the caliphs did not come from the priest (*ulama*) class.²⁶ Modern Arabic employs the word "*al-hukumah al-ilahiyyah*", but it is rather a literal translation of the English word. Khomeini's idea of *al-hukumah al-Islamiyyah*²⁷ seems to be inspired more by the Western idea of theocracy than by the Islamic notion of *khilafah*.

Nonetheless, despite the absence of this concept in the Muslim world, many writers liken the "Islamic state" to the "theocratic state". Natsir's objection above is a case in point. In modern political discourse, theocracy has been taken to mean "the unification of religion and state", as the opposite of secularism, which means "the separation of religion and the state". It is most likely in this sense that the Islamic state is equated with the theocratic state. Since many Muslims refuse to adopt the secular state, they are thus simply accused of having welcomed the theocratic state.

The exponents of Model 1 did not, of course, accept such an accusation, since they unite religion and the state in the *democratic manner* and not in the *theocratic manner*. They believed that the unification of religion and the state does not necessarily mean theocracy. It is possible for a state to adopt unification, but at the same time, maintain democracy. Countries such as England and the United States, they argued, are democratic states, but are concurrently assuming some religious activities into their state affairs.²⁸ The exponents of Model 1 considered unification (of religion and the state) to be important not only because the opposite is something unimaginable in the Islamic political tradition, but also because it is the guarantee for the survival of religious doctrines in society. To understand this, we first have to examine how they conceive the nature and character of the state.

Natsir explained that the state is not an ultimate goal for Muslims. It is rather a means — or a tool (*alat*), in Natsir's words — by which Muslims

can maintain both their religious and worldly obligations. As a tool, the state should be flexible and must be able to achieve the highest Islamic goal, which is the application of Islamic Law (*shari'ah*).²⁹ Seen from the viewpoint of classical Islamic political thought, Natsir's conception of the state is very progressive. I will explain why.

In classical Islamic political thought, the theory that the state is a mere worldly instrument and a mere human creation was a controversial one.³⁰ Muslim political theorists used to consider the state an integral part of religion, in the sense that its existence is made possible by the existence of religion. The existence of the state was understood as the extension of man's role as the caliph of God.³¹ In reality, this role is embodied in a political institution called "*khilafah*" (caliphate). Accordingly, the state was understood as the caliphate. So central was the position of the caliphate in Islam, that it almost became the only acceptable political model for Muslims. It was no wonder that many Muslims emerged when the caliphate was abolished. The same reaction emerged when 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, the Egyptian scholar, declared bluntly that the caliphate had nothing to do with religion.

Natsir fully agreed with 'Abd al-Raziq that a political institution (state or caliphate, or other form of governance) is merely a human invention with no connection to religion.³² Natsir's view here is indeed quite surprising since he was known as a sharp critic of Soekarno's secular interpretation of Islam. Soekarno was an ardent admirer of 'Abd al-Raziq on this particular issue. However, it would not be so surprising if we understand the fact that Natsir — and I think also most Indonesian Muslims — has a unique conception of the "state". What I mean is that during the early twentieth century, Indonesian Muslims displayed a different imagination, with regard to the issue of the state, from that of their fellow Muslims in the Arab Middle East. In the Arab Middle East, the concept of the state was entirely absent.³³ The term "*dawlah*" from which the concept of the Islamic state (*dawlah islamiyyah*) derives, has only become known more recently. In classical times, *dawlah* did not mean "state". It was used to mean the succession from one dynasty to another.³⁴ On the other hand, in Indonesia, the concept of state (*negara*) has been used at least since the first half of the fifth century, when the Malay-Javanese kingdoms came into existence.³⁵ The word "*negara*" (and also *nagari* and *negeri*) was already common at that time. In West Java, for example, there was a kingdom called Tarumanegara, founded by Purnawarman in the early fifth century. The word was also widely used by the Javanese kings. In the thirteenth century, Singosari, a kingdom in East Java, was ruled by a king called Kertanegara (r. 1268). In the fourteenth century, Majapahit, a great maritime empire in Java, was

ruled by Jayanegara (r. 1309) and Rajasanegara (r. 1350) successively.³⁶ In all these usages, “*negara*” means state.³⁷ For most Indonesians, to speak about “state” is thus to speak about the “*negara*” of pre-Islamic times. As Natsir pertinently writes:

The state exists with or without Islam; it has existed since before the birth of Islam as a religion, wherever people lived in society. In the times of camels and date trees there is the state. And in the times of aeroplanes, there is the state. The state of the camels has to live in the spirit of the time, just as the state of aeroplanes in the spirit of their time.³⁸

The view that state was a rational product of human beings implies several crucial consequences for the exponents of Model 1’s understanding of the function of the state and the issues of the religion-state relationship:

First, the exponents of Model 1 believed that the state is something to be attained through rational means. They were in agreement with the classical Muslim theorists that the formation of state is an obligation (*wajib*). However, they disagreed with them in that the obligation did not rest on a religious basis (*naqli*), but on a rational one (*‘aqli*). In this regard, they were closer to Mu’tazilah than to any other classical Muslim theorists.³⁹ Since the obligation of state formation is entirely based on reason, the exponents of Model 1 did not rigidly consider the classical Islamic political model, such as *khilafah*, as the only political alternative for Muslims. For them, *khilafah* was only one among other alternative political models prevalent in the world. If there were a better political system, Muslims should adopt it and leave the old one. The important thing about the existence of a political institution (state) is its function and role with regard to religion. Hence, inspired by Ibn Taymiyyah, the exponents of Model 1 argued that the state must be subordinate to religion.

Second, since the state is subordinate to religion, it must serve religion. In this regard, it becomes the tool for implementing Islamic teachings (*shari’ah*). This is the *raison d’être* of the state. Unlike the classical Muslim theorists, the exponents of Model 1 considered the formation of the state to be the guarantee of religion and not the other way around.⁴⁰ As the guarantee, the state should thus be characteristically religious, in the sense that political and religious matters are assumed to be part of the state’s affairs.

Third, although the unification is important, it does not necessarily mean that the state should be run by (men of) religion. The exponents of Model 1 rather argued that since the state is fully a rational product, it must thus be maintained rationally. This should be done by giving as wide a choice and role as possible to people in searching for the best political formula. If they

found that democracy is the best system, it should be accepted objectively. For this reason, the exponents of Model 1 intentionally rejected theocracy on the ground that it is against human rational accomplishment (*ijtihad*). As we will see shortly, the exponents of Model 1 tried to justify the idea that democracy is more congenial than theocracy to the Islamic political spirit.

Against Secularism

Separation as disengagement of religion and politics has never been known in the history of Muslim-governed states. Throughout history, religion has always been integrated with the state. Secularism is simply an unimaginable idea in the political tradition of Islam. Modern Islamic discourse on secularism is entirely inspired by the Western discourse of the term.⁴¹ The words used in the Islamic languages, such as *'ilmaniyyah* (derived from *'ilm*), *'almaniyyah* (derived from *'alam*), *la diniyyah* (literally: non-religious), *dahriyyah* (derived from *dahr*), and *laiklik* (a Turkish word) are all modern translations of the English word "secularism" or the French "laïcité".⁴²

The exponents of Model 1 rejected secularism in the political as well as the philosophical sense. They argued that since Islam does not recognize separation (of religion and the state), the idea of secularism is therefore absurd. Likewise, the philosophical sense of the word (which is usually associated with the idea of rejection of God) is even more absurd. Natsir, for instance, rejected secularism not only because it is "a way of life which contains belief, aim, and attitude only within the worldly limit". but also because it "does not recognize the afterlife and God".⁴³

The exponents of Model 1 understood separation as a form of state's disregard of religion. The function of state is to serve religion. This function can only be attained if the state makes the claim officially. The concept of separation, in fact, comes to disclaim such a function. It rather aims at detaching religious affairs from the state. To separate religious affairs from the state, for the exponents of Model 1, was thus to infringe on the function of the state.

The exponents of Model 1 also understood the concept of religious neutrality as a form of the state's irresponsibility to religion. They did not understand religious neutrality as a concept of having no preference for any side, but as a position to allow religious leaders to care for the religious affairs without any assistance from the state. For them, this is again against the function of the state. Furthermore, they considered the concept of religious neutrality as a justification for the marginalization of religion.

They pointed out the communist countries whose law, according to them, evidently assumes the concept of religious neutrality, although it was *anti*-religion. During the end of the 1950s, Indonesian Muslims largely believed that communism was a great threat for their religion. Their reference to the communist countries must be understood from this political background. Ahmad pointed out the Soviet Union as an example of a state which adopted a neutrality policy, but was actually hostile to religion. He wrote:

We cannot accept the notion of a religious neutrality in terms of freedom of embracing or not embracing a religion, thus allowing a section of the population to undermine the integrity of a religion, or to incite the population to turn their back on divinity. Islam cannot justify the notion of religious neutrality like that in the Russian Soviet [Union] of which Chapter 124 of the Constitution guarantees “freedom of religious worship and [of] anti-religious propaganda”.⁴⁴

Thus, what the Muslims have to do is to make sure the state will not adopt either separation or religious neutrality. The only solid guarantee for this is the constitution.

The exponents of Model 1 considered the Jakarta Charter to be a solid guarantee that Indonesia would not become a secular state. However, this guarantee was thwarted, which meant that the Muslims had to find another guarantee. It is within this context that we can understand the significance of the Ministry of Religious Affairs for Muslims. Although its function was not exclusively for Muslims, its formation was primarily aimed at satisfying their demands. For Muslims themselves, it was temporarily sufficient to cure their disappointment and to provide a provisional guarantee that Indonesia was not going to become secular. Rasjidi, the first Minister of Religious Affairs and the leading proponent of Model 1, once said that:

The Ministry of Religious Affairs was established on the 3rd of January 1946. Before that there was a Ministry of State. It was a compromise among the orthodox Muslims who wanted to establish an Islamic state and the Dutch educated leaders who wanted to make it a secular state.⁴⁵

H.M. Kafrawi, one of the earlier officers in the Ministry, added:

In this connection it has to be pointed out, firstly, that the establishment of a Ministry of Religion in Indonesia has resulted from a compromise between the secular and Christian theory on separation of church and state and the Muslim theory on the alliance of both. Secondly, the Ministry of Religion in no respect interferes with the activities of other ministries, as the competence of each ministry has been clearly delimited by law. Thus the

Ministry of Religion has emanated from an originally Indonesian formula which contains a compromise between two contradictory concepts: the Islamic and the secular state system.⁴⁶

Seen from the government's point of view, the existence of the Ministry was the best compromise. From the Muslims' point of view, it was a guarantee that Indonesia would not become a secular state.

In its course, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has indeed functioned as a guarantee for the unification of religion and the state. As Noer explains, it started as a very simple institution, but developed into a very complex one.⁴⁷ In the beginning, the Ministry had three religious sections: Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism, but later, Hindu-Buddhism was added.⁴⁸ Its main function comprised three areas: information, education, and judicature. In the information area, the Ministry coordinated and published information on religious affairs. The Islamic section had a special department called *dakwah* (*da'wah* in Arabic; call). In the education area, the Ministry was responsible for religious education at schools and higher education. In fact, this section was also responsible for running the religious schools (*madrasah*), which had a different curriculum from the general schools (*sekolah umum*) run by the Ministry of Education. In the judicature area, the Ministry was responsible for administering the Islamic courts. The other religions did not have their own specific courts. The Islamic court deals with personal issues such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The exponents of Model 1 fully supported the three areas of the Ministry's programme, notably religious education. They regarded this area as very important since it was only through the government that religious education at schools would be maintained effectively. Natsir considered it as a kind of protection by the government from the danger of secularism.⁴⁹ They did not consider religious education to be against democratic principles, which require freedom of religion for every person, so the state would have no right to interfere. On the contrary, they argued, those countries which prohibited religious education were against the democratic spirit. Abu Hanifah equated them with communism or fascism.⁵⁰ It is interesting to see here that the exponents of Model 1 again pointed out the Western countries as models. Abu Hanifah said that in European countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and England, religious education was clearly protected. He quoted England's Education Act 1944, No. 7, which states that "religious instruction is an essential element of education".⁵¹

During the revolutionary era (1945–50), not many people questioned the existence of this Ministry. Indonesians, Muslims and non-Muslims, seemed to be much more concerned with defending the country from the

Dutch attempt to recolonize the country. But after the revolution, and particularly after many people criticized the Ministry's performance, the exponents of Model 1 felt insecure.⁵² After 1950, the intention to have a firmer guarantee than the Ministry of Religious Affairs, was increasingly strong. It seemed that people had begun to rethink the need for a more solid guarantee.

With the approach of the 1955 general election, the existence of the Ministry of Religious Affairs as a guarantee was entirely discounted. The target of the exponents of Model 1 was no longer how to improve the performance of the Ministry, or to create another Islamic institution, but how to win the election and repropose their political agenda of the Islamic state. In 1954 and early 1955, Muslim leaders campaigned enthusiastically for the Islamic state. The parties' publications, mostly run by the exponents of Model 1, called for the same message. Mohamad Saleh Suaidy, one of the Muslim columnists, wrote a column on "The Ideals of the Islamic State",⁵³ while *Suara Partai Masyumi*, a Masyumi periodical, published an advertisement with the slogan: "Our Target: An Islamic State" (Tujuan Kita: Negara Islam).⁵⁴ At this time, the exponents of Model 1 were quite sure they would win the election and therefrom realize their target.

However, democracy is never easy. The election that they thought would give them victory turned out differently. Islamic parties failed. In fact, they only obtained less than half of the votes. The exponents of Model 1 were indeed shocked and truly disappointed. The hope of gaining a solid guarantee through election turned out to be futile. They now had to find another way. Attention was thus turned to Konstituante, a political body formed to draft the constitution. However, the political battleground in the Konstituante was more difficult than it was in the BPUPKI. Here, the exponents of Model 1 must confront two fronts of secularism: the secular nationalists who rejected an Islamic basis while proposing Pancasila, and the secular communists who wanted not only separation, but also a complete detachment, of religion from politics. For the exponents of Model 1, the secular Communists were even more dangerous because of their "atheistic" attitude towards religion.

The communist presence in the national political scene put the exponents of Model 1 in a very difficult position. Soon after independence, they had actually accepted Pancasila as the basis of the Indonesian state. They also started to praise the Pancasila philosophy.⁵⁵ But the communist attack on religion, while shielding under Pancasila,⁵⁶ made them think twice of supporting Pancasila. Instead, they soon started to speak of the danger of Pancasila. Natsir dramatically switched from justifying Pancasila

as being congenial with Qur'anic teachings to considering it to be similar to secularism. He argued that "although Pancasila contains a divine principle (*sila Ketuhanan*), its source is secularism, *la diniyyah*, anti-religion".⁵⁷

For the exponents of Model 1, secularism, be it endorsed by secular nationalists or secular communists, was equally dangerous, and must, therefore, be rejected. It is interesting to note that after Soekarno dissolved the Konstituante following the decree he issued on 5 July 1959, the exponents of Model 1 found that the two forms of secularism were united under the system of the Guided Democracy. Soekarno, who had long become the prime supporter of secular nationalism, suddenly became an ardent defender of the communists. For the exponents of Model 1, one form of secularism is burdensome, the other, repellent.

ISLAMIC ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

As we have seen above, supporters of Model 1 prefer democracy to theocracy, and in political practice, its followers were committed to liberal democracy. Masyumi, a party that became their political vehicle, was a progressive party strongly dedicated to modern democratic values. Herbert Feith wrote that in terms of support for liberal democracy, Masyumi was more progressive than other nationalist parties.⁵⁸ If the question were asked to the Masyumi members as to why they supported democracy, the answer would most likely have been Islam, that is, Islam urged them to do so.

Democracy in the modern sense of the word (mass participation, political parties, general elections, and parliament) is, of course, difficult to find in the classical tradition of Islamic political thought. Progressive Muslims were not referring to the Muslim political experience when they spoke of democracy. Although they acknowledged that there was a golden era of Islamic civilization in the seventh and eighth centuries, they did not acknowledge the presence of democracy. The only Muslim political experience that they found to be an authentic Islamic model of democracy was the era of the Prophet and his four rightly guided caliphs (*al-khulafa al-rashidun*), which is precisely the most important example in terms of legitimacy.

Zainal Abidin Ahmad explained that the early caliphate system was democratic since it had sufficiently maintained democratic requirements. Democratic instruments such as a people's assembly, succession, deliberation, and social institutions had all existed during that time.⁵⁹ All of these instruments, Ahmad argued, were not found in the history of the Islamic monarchical system, either in the Umayyad or in the Ottoman

era. The scriptural argument that Islam supports democracy is the most acceptable kind of reasoning among Muslims. The most authoritative source often quoted is the Qur'an, particularly verses in Ali Imran:159 and al-Nisa:59.⁶⁰ In these verses the Qur'an clearly advises Muslims to maintain the deliberative method approved in the decision-making process.

Zainal Abidin Ahmad contended that democracy (*kedaulatan rakyat*) is one of the four basic underpinnings of the Islamic state; the others being duty (*amanah*), justice (*keadilan*), and divinity (*ketuhanan*).⁶¹ Ahmad considered duty and justice to be more important than divinity, and, in turn, valued divinity over democracy. If this indicates something, it most likely means that he, like Natsir and other exponents of Model 1, intentionally made the impression that the Islamic state is not a theocratic state (in which God lies above everything). By placing duty and justice in the first and second place, the Islamic state is aimed at human good and is not merely for God's sake. Nevertheless, in matters related to sovereignty, God is placed above humankind. This is indicated by placing democracy beneath divinity. As we will see soon, the exponents of Model 1 considered democracy not as the absolute sovereignty of the people, but rather as bounded by God's sovereignty. (See "Limits of the Model" below).

The exponents of Model 1 employed various terms such as *shura*, *uli al-amr*, *ahl al-ijma'*, and *ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd* to justify the existence of democracy in Islam. *Shura* is mentioned twice in the Qur'an,⁶² and has been widely discussed by various writers on the relationship between Islam and democracy. It literally means consultation, but in the classical Islamic sources it meant the consultative decision-making process, whether for solving political or other kinds of problems. The Prophet Muhammad is often claimed to have frequently consulted his companions before making a decision on an important problem. Idham Chalid mentioned several examples from the stories of the Prophet and his companions in which *shura* was applied, such as the Prophet's consultation in the war of Badr, Abu Bakr's consultation with Umar, and 'Ali's consultation in the war of Shiffien.⁶³

The exponents of Model 1 often use *uli al-amr* when discussing the democratic values of Islam. It literally means "those charged with affairs", and is mentioned several times in the Qur'an. The classical Islamic texts differ in how to interpret this word. According to Ahmad, there are at least four meanings of the word applied in the classical texts:

1. Sultan or a head of state. This view was held by Jalal al-Din al-Mahalli (d. 1486) and Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1533) in their Qur'anic exegesis, *al-Jalalayn*. Ahmad commented that this view is

weak since obedience to the head of state still requires the absolute condition, that is “as long as they do not issue any instructions against God’s laws”.

2. Military exponent. This refers to the fact that the military is the entity responsible for undertaking political leadership in an atmosphere of war or chaos. This view, according to Ahmad, is also weak since it indicates the absence of the head of state (*sultan/raja*). When there was a head of state, the ultimate authority of the military was automatically removed.
3. Muslim scholar or religious figure. The argument is that they are men of knowledge, and therefore, knowledgeable in managing the state. Ahmad contended that this meaning is unconvincing when it relates to the complex problems of the state. In jurisprudential matters (*fiqh*), *uli al-amr* can mean *ulama*, but in politics, he argued, it is inappropriate to attribute it to them.
4. The infallible *imams*. This view is mostly subscribed to by Shi’ite followers, who believe that *imams* are infallible and, therefore, entitled to decide political affairs. Ahmad strongly criticized this view on the grounds that, first, the question remains as to who the infallible *imams* were. Second, who could guarantee that they were really infallible? Moreover, this view is also untenable because it is only embraced by the Shi’ites and not the whole community of Muslims.

Zainal Abidin Ahmad concluded that since all those classical explanations are not well founded, there must be another more logical definition. In his view, *uli al-amr* means “people” (*rakyat*), since only people are entitled to govern themselves.⁶⁴ “People” here is not universal, but refers to only a few. This is indicated through the Qur’an using the words “among you” (*min kum*). In the modern political language, “among you” refers to the elected representatives of the people. It was the elected representatives, Ahmad argued, who were entitled to govern and manage the state. It is to them that state affairs are delegated. Unlike a sultan or a king, people can do no wrong, as the concept of *ijma’* confirms that the consensus of people, as the Prophet says, would never go astray.⁶⁵ Put in the modern context, there is a system of checks and balances in the mechanism of *ijma’*.

DEMOCRACY AND OPPOSITION

In modern democratic theory, political opposition is an essential element of democratic life. The exponents of Model 1 were highly appreciative of

the idea of political opposition. Although this idea is rarely found in the literature of classical Islamic political thought, Ahmad argued that the early experience of Islam showed a clear example of political opposition, albeit not one as sophisticated as it is today.⁶⁶ He pointed out the election of Abu Bakr as an example. In the election at the Saqifah bani Saidah, the Meccan *émigrés* (*Muhajirun*) were the ruling party supporting Abu Bakr, while the Medinan people (*Ansar*) were the opposition party supporting Sa'd ibn Ubadah for the position of caliph. In most of the political cases, the *Ansar* became opposition to the *Muhajirun*.⁶⁷

Throughout their political involvement in the Soekarno era, the exponents of Model 1 had acted as both the ruling party as well as opposition. Three leaders of Masyumi had served as prime ministers: they were Natsir (September 1950–April 1951), Sukiman (April 1951–April 1952), and Burhanuddin (August 1955–March 1956). Prior to the Guided Democracy, Masyumi had been an active opposition party at least three times, namely during the cabinets of Sjahrir, Amir Sjarifuddin, and Ali Sastroamidjojo. The fall of the first Sjahrir cabinet was a result of strong pressure by Masyumi.⁶⁸ Similarly, the collapse of Sjarifuddin's and Sastroamidjojo's cabinets was caused by Masyumi political pressure.⁶⁹

However, the severest role the exponents of Model 1 played was their opposition to Soekarno and his policy of Guided Democracy. On 28 October 1956, Soekarno declared his infamous plan to bury political parties. This idea was driven by his belief that political parties were no longer favourable to political life in Indonesia. He argued that conflicts among political parties were very intense and had affected the state's stability negatively. Soekarno was not entirely wrong. Since Indonesia adopted parliamentary democracy, the cabinet was changed almost every eight months. This caused a certain amount of political instability.

But the idea of burying political parties, for whatever reason, was unwise. Political parties are the fundamental pillar of democracy. Without political parties, democracy does not work. This is the main reason the exponents of Model 1 opposed Soekarno. They considered his idea of burying the parties to be tantamount to burying democracy.⁷⁰ For the same reason, they criticized the Communists. For them, communism is a threat to democracy since its ultimate political aim was to establish a monolithic society and wipe out all non-communist parties. The exponents of Model 1 argued that democracy cannot allow the growth of anti-democratic elements.⁷¹ They regarded Indonesia under Guided Democracy to be a combination of the twin evils of Soekarno's dictatorship and communist totalitarianism. They believed both to be equally dangerous for the future of democracy in the country.

In the name of saving democracy, on 15 February 1958, some of them took the radical step of creating an alternative government under the name of the Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic (PRRI, Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia). Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Natsir, and Burhanuddin Harahap played a central role in this radical oppositional action against Soekarno. The PRRI rebellion was a complex political action. It cannot simply be compared to the DI rebellion in West Java or the PKI rebellion in Madiun, both of which aimed at creating an independent state separated from the Republic. The PRRI rebellion, as the three involved exponents explained, was never intended to build a separate state. It was simply meant to provoke the Jakarta government into returning to the Constitution and democracy. They took their radical action because of the ineffectiveness of diplomatic methods in arguing their case.⁷² However, not all exponents of Model 1 agreed with their radical move. Sukiman (1898–1971) and Jusuf Wibisono (1912–82), for instance, earnestly criticized the rebellious action. Wibisono considered that, whatever the reason, “opposition with armed violence is undemocratic and against the law”.⁷³

At that moment, NU played rather a strange role. Perhaps driven by competition with Masyumi, many NU leaders took an accommodationist position. However, this position was not entirely without any psychological pressure. They did not basically agree with Soekarno’s dictatorship, but since there was no better alternative, they compromised. Thus, while officially supporting Soekarno, some of them expressed their criticism to the President. Idham Chalid carefully criticized Soekarno’s conception of Guided Democracy. He argued that Soekarno’s notion had violated Islamic principles of democracy. He clarified that Islam also recognizes such a notion as guided democracy, but that it is based on mutual understanding and cooperation between the leader and the people in real political deliberation (*musyawarah*).⁷⁴ He wrote:

Guided democracy in Islam is thus not a democracy guided by someone’s will, by man’s lust for power or by empty slogans, but rather by the truth and the bearers of the truth.⁷⁵

Another criticism came from Mohammad Dahlan and Imron Rosjadi, two eminent leaders of NU. Both of them criticized Soekarno’s authoritarian policies many times, saying that his idea of burying the parties was against Islam.⁷⁶ On 24 March 1960, together with other parties, including Masyumi and PSI, both formed the Democracy League (*Liga Demokrasi*), the biggest association to counter Soekarno’s authoritarianism.

ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE MODEL

Theorists of liberal democracy such as Schumpeter, Downs, and Dahl, consider the economy to be the key element for the success of democracy. They agree that in order to achieve a well-ordered society, an economic democracy is required.⁷⁷ Likewise, the exponents of Model 1 consider economic democracy to be as important as political democracy. “Democracy in politics will be lame if not followed by democracy in economy.”⁷⁸ “Democratic economy” is actually a vague term. But the exponents of Model 1 understood it as a system which can guarantee people freedom of choice, self-determination, civil liberties, and relief from oppression. It runs on the principles of justice whose aim is to actualize welfare for all people.

The exponents of Model 1 recognized that most countries attempt to enforce some degree of people’s welfare, but go about this through different methods. They believed that there were two main ways to achieve the goal: first, by giving economic freedom to every individual. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara said that by providing as many opportunities as possible, “people will compete to gain the highest profit, and this ultimately gives impact to other people”.⁷⁹ Second, by giving authority to the state to regulate, run, and distribute economic wealth to all people justly. The latter is the response to the former in such a way that economic freedom would only be run properly if there is regulation from the state. In economic thought, these two ideas have been identified as capitalist and socialist paradigms respectively.

The exponents of Model 1 regarded each method as having its own strengths and weaknesses. Both have provided solutions to people’s well-being, but at the same time, have serious deficiencies. Therefore, they argued, there should be a third way which can bridge the two extremes. They called it “guided economy” (*ekonomi terpimpin*, or *economie dirige*).⁸⁰ The name reminds us of Soekarno’s idea of Guided Democracy. But actually it has nothing to do with it since it was introduced several years prior to Soekarno launching his own idea.⁸¹

The guided economy is not a mere combination of capitalist and socialist economic systems. The exponents of Model 1 built this idea by grounding it on the economic principles they explored from Islamic sources. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, for instance, argued that the welfare state does not belong solely to capitalism or socialism, but the Qur’an has clearly exhorted Muslims to establish a just and good society.⁸² The principles of individual liberty, respect for property, and mutual cooperation can all be referred to the Qur’an or *hadith*. Prawiranegara’s writings — mostly on economic issues

— are chiefly coloured by Qur’anic verses, the Prophet’s sayings, or stories from classical Islamic tradition.

Nevertheless, Prawiranegara admitted that the Islamic economy is not an independent system which is entirely different from modern economic theories. It is “just like any other economic system based upon the effort to provide for human needs”.⁸³ He often criticized the Islamic economic model currently supported by the revivalists.⁸⁴ For him, Islamic economy is simply “a modern economic system whose principles are influenced and defined by Islamic values”.⁸⁵ By Islamic values he referred to the universal moral guidance extracted from the tradition of Islamic economic activities such as honesty and justice.

Prawiranegara had a deep knowledge of morality in the classical Islamic economic tradition. He liked to quote stories of Yunus ibn Ubaid, an honest gold trader and Muhammad ibn Almunkadir, a respectful bread maker, as role models for Islamic commercial activity. It is unimportant whether the figures he referred to in his stories were historically real, but for Prawiranegara, the Islamic economic model should be established on the moral spirit of those figures.

By giving a loose definition of Islamic economy, Prawiranegara wanted to state that an “Islamic economic system does not exist”.⁸⁶ He criticized the revivalists who were obsessed with establishing an Islamic economy, but founded their beliefs on an incorrect interpretation of the *riba* verse.⁸⁷ He deplored them for their hasty judgement that the modern economy, in which the banking system has become its core business, is based on *riba*. Their mistake, according to Prawiranegara, comes from their misunderstanding and ignorance of the character of *riba* and *bay’* (trading) mentioned in the verse of al-Baqarah:275. This verse should not be understood literally. The mistake of those people (that is, the Muslims revivalists), according to Prawiranegara, is that by converting all economic transactions into *bay’*, they presumed them to become *halal* automatically, yet it is actually taking more profit than, say, the interest system applied by modern banking. This step, Prawiranegara claimed, is tantamount to thinking that “God is stupid”.⁸⁸

Prawiranegara acknowledged that *riba* is a complex issue, since neither the Qur’an nor the *hadith* gives a specific example of what the forbidden *riba* is. The Qur’an has only given a general warning to Muslims that they should not commit multiple *riba*.⁸⁹ Unlike the revivalists, Prawiranegara considered *riba* to be not only “an additional benefit”, but it is “all benefits whose formal appearance is legally right but essentially a hidden *exploitation de l’homme par l’homme*”.⁹⁰ Prawiranegara considered bank interest not as

riba (usury), but in fact, *halal* and a must in a modern economic system. He stated that “to establish an Islamic bank which does not take interest, in my opinion, is only wasting time”, since “bank without interest is a *contradictio in terminis*”.⁹¹

The guided economy can be defined as an economic system based on free-*riba*, that is to say, free from unfairness and injustice. Prawiranegara marked three main principles on which the guided economy should function. First, the economy must be planned and regulated, and the regulation must be on the basis of responsibility and must be able to encourage people’s economic activities. By this point, Prawiranegara rejected the capitalist principle which prohibits a planned economy. Second, economic oppression and exploitation in any form must be forbidden. This point indirectly indicates that private monopoly is not allowed. Third, the regulations made by the government must not be discriminative, whether on racial, religious, or cultural grounds. Discrimination could only be used in helping certain groups which are economically marginalized.

If we take a quick look at the above explanations, the principles of the guided economy seem to be rather socialist. Prawiranegara’s preference for the state as regulator of economic activities is certainly contradictory to the idea of a free market (*laissez faire, laissez aller*), the basic foundation of liberal capitalism. Also, his non-conformist attitude towards monopoly and the exploitation of labour makes his economic vision closer to the spirit of socialism than capitalism. This impression is not entirely wrong. Prawiranegara and most of the exponents of Model 1 were people whom Kahin called “religious socialists”.⁹² But, this socialist tendency did not necessarily make them either anti-capitalism or uncritical of socialism.

When the socialists and nationalists denounced foreign capital and companies in Indonesia during the 1950s, Prawiranegara was the most ardent defender in countering the hysteria. He argued that “rejecting foreign capital is tantamount to digging our own grave”.⁹³ According to him, Indonesia needed foreign capital to support its declining economy. People’s objection to foreign capital on the ground that the owner of the capital was Western capitalists (most of them were Dutch) was unacceptable to Prawiranegara, simply because not *all* Western capitalists are evil. In fact, Prawiranegara argued, local capitalists were often more evil than Western capitalists.⁹⁴ To him, the presence of foreign capital in Indonesia, held more advantages than disadvantages. He wrote:

We have been too preoccupied with the disadvantages foreign capital would bring, and neglected to consider the advantages of having foreign companies here. We have been too preoccupied with the property rights

of those foreign companies, and neglected to see how those companies basically did not function differently from local companies in Indonesia's economy. Having closed down some big companies in Java and Sumatra, people now began to realise that the foreign capital has brought more advantages than disadvantages to us. They have helped increase production and as such, helped improve the economic condition of our people.⁹⁵

Prawiranegara's objection to the idea of terminating foreign capital was not merely based on the pragmatic reason that Indonesia was in need of it. The idea was also against the principles of economic democracy and against the guided economy, which condemned economic discrimination. For the same reason, Prawiranegara criticized the idea of nationalization of foreign companies espoused by the socialists and the nationalists. For him, the idea would damage the national economy, in addition to the concern that it would not lead to people having a better life. In fact what had often happened was that every time a foreign company was nationalized, its performance and production started to decrease.⁹⁶

Prawiranegara's economic view is rather unique. On the one hand, he was known as a genuine proponent of "religious socialism", an economic orientation that requires the clear involvement of the state. The state is positioned not only as a ruler, but also as a leader and a guide to the flow of the economic mechanism. The very idea of a "guided economy" is based on this "socialist" idea. On the other hand, however, his pragmatic steps in dealing with the economic problems in Indonesia during his service as minister and governor of the Indonesian Bank, were rather liberal and capitalistic. His campaign of anti-nationalization and his objection to price intervention, reflected his liberal and pro-market attitude.

LIMITS OF THE MODEL

Generally, the exponents of Model 1 had no problem in dealing with liberal democracy, which had been implemented during the first decade and a half of independence. As mentioned above, three exponents of Model 1 — namely Mohammad Natsir, Sukiman, and Burhanuddin Harahap — had served as prime ministers during this democratic period. They were not only able to demonstrate cooperation with various differing elements of the nation (including the secularists and non-Muslims), but also performed well. Herbert Feith considered Natsir's government to be one of the best performing cabinets during the period of constitutional democracy.⁹⁷ The first general election was successfully held while Burhanuddin Harahap (1917–87) was prime minister.

Nevertheless, such a sketchy illustration cannot alone explain some “illiberal” views and attitudes of the exponents of Model 1 towards certain religious-political issues, such as the rights of minorities, freedom of religion, and freedom of thought. I assume that this problem is strongly related to what I describe as “the limits of Islamic democracy”. It is related to the problem of attitude and understanding of the classical Islamic texts. I will explain two major issues that have contributed to the limits of democracy. The first is the problem of the sovereignty of God, and the second is the rights of non-Muslims. To illustrate that these issues are actually a mere problem of interpretation, I will also present a third issue, namely the problem of women’s rights.

Sovereignty of God

As pointed out in Chapter I, democracy in Islamic political discourse is both a political and theological issue. It is not only related to the problem of whether sovereignty must be given to one person (autocracy), a few persons (oligarchy), or many persons (polyarchy), but also to whether God is still entitled to be given such sovereignty. Unlike in Western political discourse, the problem of God in Islamic political thinking remains crucial. The acknowledgment of God’s sovereignty is part of the doctrine of unification (of religion and the state), without which the doctrine would have no meaning.

The problem, thus, is how to explain the dualism of sovereignty in Model 1. Which one should be prioritized: God’s sovereignty or people’s sovereignty? In his dissertation on Masyumi, Yusril Ihza Mahendra explains that there are two areas in which each sovereignty is taking place, namely the area of politics for people’s sovereignty, and the area of metaphysics or theology for God’s sovereignty. With these two areas, each kind of sovereignty will not conflict with the other, since God is only acting in the area of Muslim metaphysical awareness, while mankind has full sovereignty in the political area. Since God has always given light to Muslim awareness, including political awareness, every political action of mankind is thus “illuminated by the presence of God”.⁹⁸

Mahendra’s analysis explains the political behaviour of the exponents of Model 1, who on the one hand, still believe in people’s sovereignty, but on the other, still involve God in their political activities. Natsir, for instance, argued that a Muslim’s exercise of freedom is determined by the religious values he or she believes in. If democracy harms such values, he or she has thus to redefine its meaning. Natsir argued that there are things regulated

decisively by religion and, therefore, cannot be discussed democratically. He wrote:

If somebody asks: Isn't Islam democratic? We will answer: Islam is democratic in the sense that it is against dictatorship (*istibdad*), against absolutism, and against authoritarianism. [Democracy] does not mean that we need the approval of parliament to outlaw gambling and pornography; and there is no need for parliamentary deliberation on whether myths (*khurafat*), idolatry, and so forth must be eradicated. No! This is not the right of parliament to deliberate.⁹⁹

Although it seems explanatory, Mahendra's analysis fails to explain several contradictions among the thoughts of the exponents of Model 1, particularly regarding the grey areas in which human interest and "God's interest" are mixed. The case that Natsir pointed out above, namely gambling and pornography, is one example. When the government decided to designate a locality for gambling and prostitution, Model 1 would argue that it harms the sovereignty of God. They opposed the idea, not for the reason of "secular" morality (for example, that gambling and prostitution have a negative impact on the family and social structure), but rather for the religious reason that it was simply prohibited by God.

There is indeed a fundamental difference between the two reasons, viz., the "secular" and the "divine" morality. In the case of the former, the parliament could discuss it freely and openly; if it is regarded as contrary to the economic interest of the state, for example, the proposal could be rejected through democratic methods; people will accept it as a democratic and rational decision. In the case of the latter, however, there is no bargaining. As Natsir said, it was the immutable (*qat'i*) regulation of God. "Parliament has no right to discuss." Here, it is obvious that the sovereignty of God outweighs the sovereignty of the people.

Rights of Non-Muslims

The classical Islamic political tradition has strongly influenced modern Islamic political thinking on this particular issue. Although there had been several attempts by Muslim reformists to re-evaluate the issue, the exponents of Model 1 were still unable to come out from the classical Islamic paradigm, according to which Muslims have a better political position than their non-Muslim co-citizens. Certainly, the exponents of Model 1 would quickly deny any accusation of having a discriminative view regarding the issue of Non-Muslim rights. But if we take a look at their writings and their

political attitudes towards non-Muslim rights in general, the discriminative impression cannot be easily eliminated.

I believe that such a discriminative attitude did not come from their lack of understanding of democracy. The exponents of Model 1, to borrow Feith's words, "had drunk deeply on the traditions of European liberalism" and considered Western democracy as "an important article of belief".¹⁰⁰ Their attitude, resulted, rather, from their inflexible understanding of Islamic doctrine regarding the issue. Model 1 theorists such as Mohammad Natsir, Zainal Abidin Ahmad, and Hamka often quoted the verses which literally prohibit Muslims from appointing non-Muslims as leaders.¹⁰¹ Natsir's explanation of this issue is clear:

I hope that people do not misunderstand me if we say that those who are non-Muslims could not be appointed as our leader, that is as *vertrouwens persoon* as *ulil amri* of Muslims in their struggle to establish an Islamic state. If we say so, it does not mean that we indulge in the act of provoking or inflaming, or any such act. We just do this because we follow the teachings of our religion.¹⁰²

The question to be asked here is: why were the exponents of Model 1 so inflexible in understanding the classical texts on this particular issue? It seems that the exponents of Model 1, on this particular issue, were not only influenced by classical reading, but were also strongly influenced by the political circumstances surrounding them.

Since pre-independence times, the relationship between Muslims and Christians was in no way settled. Muslims were suspicious of Christians for their closeness to the Dutch colonialists and their aggressive proselytizing. Apart from this, the contempt of some Western evangelists for Islam was deeply imprinted in the hearts of Muslims.¹⁰³ It should be noted that the exponents of Model 1 had been consistently fighting religious conversion by the Christians. Another reason which seems important to consider is the malicious attitude of Muslim leaders in general towards Christians who were so influential in determining decisions at the BPUPKI meetings. With this backdrop, it seems unlikely that they would make an interpretation which supported or tolerated their "enemy".

The classical intolerant views on the status of non-Muslims have strongly determined the political attitude of the exponents of Model 1. As already noted, the issue of religion for the head of state was a crucial one in the BPUPKI meetings. The issue re-emerged when Amir Sjarifuddin, a Christian leader, was appointed prime minister. The opposition to Sjarifuddin had started since President Soekarno assigned him and three

other leaders — Sukiman (Masyumi), A.K. Gani (PNI), and Setiadjit (Buruh) — to be *formateurs* of the cabinet on 30 June 1947. Masyumi targeted the position of prime minister, which meant that they deliberately blocked Sjarifuddin from holding it. Consequently, the team failed to form a cabinet. Thus, on 2 July, the president assigned the above-mentioned *formateurs*, except Sukiman from Masyumi. Finally, an agreement was reached and Sjarifuddin became prime minister. In the beginning, Masyumi refused to be involved in Sjarifuddin's cabinet. As an alternative, a new Islamic party called the Islamic Political Association of Indonesia (PSII, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) was re-formed and took Masyumi's positions in the cabinet.¹⁰⁴

During his leadership, Sjarifuddin was harshly criticized by Masyumi members. The pro-Masyumi media frequently attacked Sjarifuddin's religious status and his inconsistent political attitudes. He was depicted as a distrusted leader and an apostate (*murtad*). He was often accused of having worked as an ally of the Dutch.¹⁰⁵ When he signed the Renville agreement on 17 January 1948, the Masyumi attack on Sjarifuddin intensified. This opposition was followed by the withdrawal of four Masyumi members from Sjarifuddin's second cabinet,¹⁰⁶ which subsequently led to the collapse of that cabinet. It is important to note that when Sjarifuddin's cabinet collapsed, Masyumi members were happy and loudly chanting "*Allahu akbar Kabinet Amir bubar*" (God is great. Amir [Sjarifuddin]'s cabinet has dissolved).¹⁰⁷

The exponents of Model 1's view of the political rights of non-Muslims (particularly for the status of the head of state or government) however, must be differentiated from their attitude towards the rights of non-Muslims in general.¹⁰⁸ At least theoretically, their views on non-Muslims were very positive. In their writings, Natsir and Ahmad explained the Islamic sympathetic attitudes towards non-Muslim minorities.¹⁰⁹ Seen from the classical Islamic political point of view, their views were even very progressive. Ahmad put more emphasis on equality before the laws for all citizens and did not distinguish the social classes into the classical categories of *dhimmi* and non-*dhimmi*. Fundamentally, he reinterpreted the concept of *dhimmi* as a mere sociological concept for administrative purposes, which can be equated with the political categorization of race and citizenship in modern times.¹¹⁰ Ultimately, all members of non-Muslim society have equal rights as citizens, in politics, in the economy, and even in the military.¹¹¹ "Only one position is not allowed to be held by non-Muslims, that is the position of caliph or head of state."¹¹²

Women's Rights

From the above issues, we can see that the limits of democracy in Islam are strongly determined by an inflexible understanding of the classical texts. It could be said that the “illiberal” interpretation of the texts is the main hindrance for Islam in coping with democracy. As stated in Chapter 1, the more liberal the attitude of Muslims towards their religion, the more favourably disposed they are to democracy. One of the liberal attitudes of the exponents of Model 1, which has extended beyond the classical interpretation and is, therefore, favourable to modern democratic values, is their view on women's political rights. Being fully aware that the subject of women is a crucial issue in modern democracy,¹¹³ they gave their support to women's political rights without reservation.

The seed of their support for women's rights was planted when they were students in the 1920s. At that time, most of them joined the Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), an Islamic youth organization established in 1925. Their views of gender equality were much influenced by Agus Salim, the man who inspired the formation of JIB. A story which has frequently been repeated reveals Salim's radical action at a JIB meeting in Yogyakarta, in which he ripped the curtain that separated the male and female attendees. In the 1920s, that kind of separation was common at Islamic meetings. Women were always located at the back, separated by a partition of some sort. Salim had, however, symbolically stated that the partition was not an Islamic tradition, but, in fact, part of pre-Islamic (*jahiliyyah*) Arab culture.¹¹⁴

This phenomenal event subsequently became a symbol of the JIB students' support for woman issues. To empower its female members, JIB founded a female organization called JIBDA and involved them in all its activities. Salim's students, who later became the key political leaders and exponents of Model 1, went beyond even their mentor. Not only did they regard the veil — in the form of a wall of separation — not to be part of Islamic doctrine, but they also considered the head cover (*jilbab* or *hijab* in Arabic) not to be part of an Islamic tradition. It is understandable then if most of their wives did not cover their heads with the *jilbab*.

The supportive attitude towards women subsequently continued in the political area. The exponents of Model 1 all agreed that women should have equal political rights with men. Unlike the classical Islamic political doctrine, they allowed woman to become a head of state. Hamka, one of the Model 1 ideologues, explained his position on this issue in 1963, when a reader asked this question in a magazine he edited, *Gema Islam*. Hamka

admitted that the early history of Islam did not provide an example of a woman becoming a head of state, in spite of the fact that some of them had been leaders in war, such as A'ishah, the wife of the Prophet. A Muslim woman who became a head of state only occurred in 1249 when Egypt was ruled by Queen Shajarat al-Dur. This tradition was followed by other female rulers in several Islamic kingdoms. In Indonesia, Hamka went on, the female head of state was never a problem. Long before independence, there were four queens in Aceh who ruled the country quite successfully.¹¹⁵

At the time Hamka issued this opinion, Indonesia had certainly not faced a problem of female leadership. The question just emerged as a mere legal issue (*fiqh*) or it was possibly triggered by the increasing growth of the feminist movement in the Muslim world, in which the issue of political leadership for women was also one of the crucial issues. However it is interesting to consider Hamka's opinion, since thirty-five years later, several Muslim leaders claiming to be heirs of Masyumi (such as A.M. Saefuddin and Hamzah Haz) condemned Megawati's presidential candidacy in 1999.

DECLINE OF THE MODEL

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the life of Model 1 strongly depended on Masyumi. Consequently, when Masyumi was disbanded in 1960, the popularity of the model also began to fade out. The NU party was not strong enough to carry out this model, primarily because most of its leaders accepted working with Soekarno under his Guided Democracy. The other parties, particularly PSII and Perti, had limited members and unpopular leaders.

Nevertheless, as a political idea, Model 1 was not really dead. After Masyumi was disbanded, the exponents of Model 1 continued to campaign for the persistence of the model. However, during the first half of the 1960s, they were unable to make much headway, since most of them were detained and sentenced to prison by Soekarno on the charge of a plot against the regime.

An attempt to revive the model was carried out following the political transition from Soekarno to Soeharto. Several modernist leaders and a group of young Masyumi ideologues established contact and looked for the possibility of reviving Masyumi. However, it soon became clear that the effort was disapproved by the new regime. However, the regime allowed them to create a new party under a new name. Thus, the Indonesian Muslims' Party (Parmusi, Partai Muslimin Indonesia) was formed in 1968

and a moderate Muslim leader, Djarnawi Hadikusuma, was installed as its chairman. A final effort was attempted by Mohammad Roem, an exponent of Model 1 who was not involved in the PRRI rebellion. In the first Parmusi congress in Malang, Roem was elected chairman. But the regime did not approve of him and, instead, suggested that the party should not in any way be chaired by Masyumi leaders.

The exponents of Model 1 were, of course, disappointed. However, they seemed to have lost interest in politics. Many of them turned their attention to non-political work. Natsir founded the Indonesian Islamic Mission Council (DDII, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia) in May 1967; Prawiranegara created the Indonesian Association of Muslim Businessmen (Husami, Himpunan Usahawan Muslimin Indonesia) in July 1967; meanwhile several other exponents of Model 1 joined one of these organizations or else took on other non-political activities.

The Soeharto regime was often claimed to be responsible for the demise of political Islam in Indonesia. His policy to bolster Muslim religiosity while suppressing their political power left no room for Model 1 to develop. This is true if we consider the external factors that caused the demise of the model. However, Soeharto's repressive policy was surely not the only factor. The more important factor that caused Model 1 to lose ground came rather from within the Islamic community itself. The new generation of Islam which emerged on the eve of the political transition from Soekarno to Soeharto was the most important factor that demoralized Model 1.

The criticisms launched by the new Muslim generation caused the model to slowly decay. It is true that Soeharto's repressive policy had closed the door tightly for political Islam, but his role would not have been so functional if there had been no positive response from the new Muslim intellectuals. These new Muslim intellectuals not only took an accommodative attitude towards the new regime, but also took a critical position towards the political Islam espoused by their seniors. At the beginning, there was a storm of rejection, indeed. However, this changed gradually. Surprisingly enough, some of the Model 1 exponents had even begun to share ideas with the new Muslim generation. This can be seen clearly in Mohammad Roem, who, in the early 1980s, corresponded with Nurcholish Madjid, the new intellectual exponent who was at the time studying in the United States.¹¹⁶ In the correspondence, Roem clearly expressed his support for Madjid's renewal movement and rejected the idea of an Islamic state, for which he and his colleagues in Masyumi were struggling.¹¹⁷

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Throughout this chapter, I have drawn a rough portrait of the founding model of the Muslim polity in Indonesia. This model is different from the dominant model of the religiously neutral state endorsed by the secularists. The model is also different from the one imagined and formulated by the new generation of Muslims which we are going to discuss in the next two chapters. Model 1 is based on two cardinal principles: the rejection of theocracy and the rejection of secularism. By the first principle, this model rejects government by religious elites. By the second principle, the model rejects the separation of religion and the state. Based on the conviction that the function of the state is to serve religion, the model considers secularism to be contradictory to the Islamic political idea.

By rejecting theocracy and secularism, Model 1 became a unique model. On the one hand, its exponents wanted to revive the Islamic political spirit as reflected by their demand for *shari'ah*, but on the other hand, they were committed to democratic values. They considered that democracy was not only congenial with Islam, but also important for the upholding of Islamic laws. Here, the exponents of Model 1 understood democracy as majoritarianism in which quantity is regarded as the significant factor. They favoured democracy because through it they might win the election and thereafter take over the state. But, as Dahl argues, democracy which only emphasizes majoritarianism often ignores minority rights and civil liberty.¹¹⁸ As we have seen, the exponents of Model 1 have indeed ignored minority political rights. Nonetheless, I consider that such a “discriminative” attitude towards minorities was not really caused by their lack of understanding of democracy, but was strongly due to “the limits of Islamic democracy”. which is strongly determined by Muslim inflexible understanding of the classical texts. It is these limits that differentiate their model from the political model espoused by the secularists. It is also these limits that became the target of criticism launched by the new Muslim intellectuals whom we are going to discuss in the next two chapters.

Notes

1. Merle C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200*, 3rd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 239.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 243. The MIAI, for instance, demanded that the head of parliament must be Muslim and that two-thirds of the cabinet must also be Muslims. More importantly, there must be a Ministry of Islamic Affairs. As we will see

shortly, this demand was the blueprint for the Islamic formula proposed more seriously by the BPUPKI committee.

4. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1963), pp. 226–29.
5. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, pp. 257–58.
6. The meetings were divided into two sessions. The first was held from 29 May to 1 June 1945 and the second was held from 10 to 17 July 1945. Attendants numbered sixty-two in the first session and an extra six in the second session.
7. The terms “Islamic nationalists” and “secular nationalists” were initially used by Endang Saifuddin Anshari in his book, *Piagam Jakarta, 22 Juni 1945 dan Sejarah Konsensus Nasional antara Nasionalis Islami dan Nasionalis Sekular tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia, 1945–1959* (Bandung: Pustaka Perpustakaan Salman ITB, 1981). Deliar Noer used other terms, namely “religiously neutral nationalists” and “Islamic nationalists”. See his book, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
8. The story behind the abrogation of the Islamic agenda (particularly the seven words of the Jakarta Charter) has been told by many writers. I do not want to repeat it here. Please consult B. J. Boland’s work, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).
9. Muslims considered the BPUPKI more legitimate than the PPKI. The recurring demands to put back the Jakarta Charter were mostly based on this conviction. For more details on Muslims’ views and attitude towards both committees, see Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta*, particularly Chapter III (pp. 49–68).
10. In the first general election in 1955, there were four big Islamic parties: Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama, PSII, and Perti. All Islamic parties at this time demanded an Islamic basis for the state.
11. Ridwan Saidi once told me that among the Muslim modernists, Natsir was perhaps the most eloquent leader in mastering foreign languages. Ridwan said that Natsir always got the highest mark in Latin, the most difficult language taught at AMS. His Dutch was perfect. He delivered his speeches at international forums in fine English. Conversation with Ridwan Saidi on 12 December 2001.
12. Sulastomo, “Islam, Demokrasi, dan Bung Hatta”, *Kompas*, 9 August 2002. For Hatta’s account on Islam and Democracy, see his books, *Islam, Masyarakat Demokrasi dan Perdamaian* (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1957) and *Rentjana Dasar, Program dan Struktur Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia* (Bandung: Angkasa, 1967).
13. For Soedjatmoko’s account on Islam, see his book, *Etika Pembebasan: Pilihan Karangan tentang Agama Kebudayaan Sejarah dan Ilmu Pengetahuan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1984); for Algdri’s account, see his book, *Politik Belanda Terhadap*

- Islam dan Keturunan Arab di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1988); see also its English version, *Dutch Policy against Islam and Indonesians of Arab Descent in Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994).
14. For further information on Darul Islam, see C. van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1981); Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, *Pemberontakan Kaum Republik: Kasus Darul Islam Aceh* (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1990).
 15. Zainal Abidin Ahmad named his book *Membentuk Negara Islam* (Jakarta: Widjaya, 1956). However, in the same book, he made a statement that the Pancasila-based state might also be called an Islamic state if Muslims wanted to call it such. See his book, particularly pp. 13–14.
 16. Mohammad Natsir, *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs; An Address Originally Made before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs with Subsequent Elucidatory Additions* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Dept. of Far Eastern Studies Cornell University, 1954), pp. 3–4. In the Indonesian version of the speech, Natsir used the term “*negara Islam*” (Islamic state) for both “Islamic nation” and “Muslim state”. See Mohammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta 2* (Jakarta: Pustaka Pendis, n.d.), pp. 61–80.
 17. Mohamad Roem, “Tidak Ada Negara Islam”. First published in *Panji Masyarakat*, No. 386, 1983. Republished in Nurcholish Madjid and Mohamad Roem, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Djambatan, 2000), p. 2.
 18. On Natsir’s account on Pakistan as an ideal model of Islamic state, see his *Some Observations*, and on Zainal Abidin’s account, see his *Membentuk Negara Islam*, p. 18; on Sjafruddin’s rejection of Pakistan as a model, see Ajip Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut Kepada Allah Swt.: Sebuah Biografi* (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), p. 142.
 19. Mohammad Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Jakarta: DDII, 2000), p. 22. Natsir was impressed by the status of the Queen of England as the head of the Church.
 20. Abu Hanifah, *Kedudukan Agama dalam Negara-Negara Modern dan Merdeka* (Jogjakarta: Kementerian Agama R.I., 1948), p. 20.
 21. “Anggaran Dasar, Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Tafsir Azas, Program Masyumi,” Jakarta, Masyumi, 1953, Pasal II. A.
 22. Ibid. Pasal II. B.
 23. See *Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI), 28 Mei 1945–22 Agustus 1945*, 3rd ed. (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1995).
 24. Catholic University of America. *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed. Vol. 13 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2002), p. 866.

25. Frank Bealey and Allan G. Johnson, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science: A User's Guide to Its Terms* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), entry "theocracy", p. 320.
26. Abdullah Saeed, "The Official Ulema and Religious Legitimacy of the Modern Nation State", in *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 17.
27. Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islamic Government* (Rome: European Islamic Cultural Centre, 1983).
28. They pointed out some examples, such as: appointing the Queen as Head of the Anglican Church in the case of England, and allowing special chaplains in the Congress, and in the Armed Forces, in the case of the United States.
29. It should be noted here that the exponents of Model 1 hardly spoke of *shari'ah* as an immutable canon of law, as is often practised by fundamentalists. *Shari'ah* is simply a law which is, like other laws in the world, subject to change. *Shari'ah* is not entirely a divine product. It is partly divine and partly human. The source of *shari'ah* — the Qur'an — is divine, but its implementation was purely based on human interpretation and understanding of historical context. Rasjidi recalled the principle of jurisprudence which says "the law depends on its cause" (*al-hukmu yaduru ma'a illatihi wujudan wa 'adaman*), which means that any article of Islamic Law was subject to its beneficence to human beings (see Mohamad Rasjidi. *Keutamaan Hukum Islam* [n.d.], p. 27).
30. For further elaboration on this issue, see Qamar-ud-Din Khan, *The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyyah* (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1973).
31. Qur'an, 2:30.
32. Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara*, p. 11.
33. P. J. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State* (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 36.
34. Such as *dawlah umawiyah* and *dawlah 'abbasiyah*, which respectively mean the Umayyad and the Abbasid turns.
35. Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 4.
36. Rozikin Daman, *Hukum Tata Negara: Suatu Pengantar* (Jakarta: Grafindo Persada, 1993), p. 1.
37. However, as Geertz explains, there are other meanings of the word such as "palace", "capital", and "town". But, these were all used in different contexts. See Geertz, *Negara*, p. 4.
38. Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara*, p. 11.
39. It is interesting to note that in his youth, Natsir wrote several articles on Mu'tazilah, besides other Muslim philosophers such as al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd. See, for instance, "Rasionalisme dalam Islam dan Reaksi Atasnya: Aliran Paham Mu'tazilah dan Ahlissunnah", in *Capita Selecta I*, pp. 177–205. Natsir's rationalism, I think, is rooted in his liberal reading of classical Islamic civilization.

40. So important did they consider the existence of the state that they supported the classical Islamic view that the establishment of state is a public obligation (*fard kifayah*), and, in fact it “almost becomes *fard ‘ain* which is obligatory on every individual Muslim”. Mohammad Natsir, *Agama dan Negara dalam Perspektif Islam* (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 2001), p. 64.
41. The word “secularism” was introduced by George Jacob Holyoake (1817–1906) in the mid-nineteenth century. It was used specifically in the political realm and originally meant a separation of religion and politics. However, as the word was subsequently used by various disciplines, its meaning became extremely vague.
42. The usages and elaborations of these terms in the Muslim world can be read in Aziz Azmeh, *al-‘Almaniyyah min Manzur al-Mukhtalaf* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahdah al-‘Arabiyah, 1992); Mohammed Arkoun, *Al-‘Almanah wa al-Din: al-Islam, al-Masihiyah, al-Gharb*, 2nd ed. (London: Dar al-Saqi, 1993); Muhammad ‘Imarah, *Al-Islam wa al-‘Urubah wa al-‘Almaniyyah* (Beirut: Dar al-Wahdah, 1984); Azzam Tamimi, *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East* (London: Hurst & Co., 2000); and Scott Morrison, “Almaniya, Laiklik and Democracy in Egypt and Turkey”, prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, 29 August–2 September 2001.
43. Natsir, *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara*, p. 62.
44. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam*, p. 88.
45. Merle C. Ricklefs’ interview with Rasjidi on 7 September 1977.
46. Quoted in C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Five Essays* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 223.
47. Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, 1945–1965* (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1987), p. 362. For more detail on the history and early role of this ministry, see Deliar Noer, *Administration of Islam in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1978).
48. B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 106.
49. Merle C. Ricklefs’ interview with Mohammad Natsir, 14 August 1977.
50. Abu Hanifah, *Kedudukan Agama dalam Negara-Negara Modern dan Merdeka* (Jogjakarta: Kementerian Agama R.I., 1948), p. 19.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
52. As Boland and Noer state, there was quite strong rejection of the ministry from both “secular” Muslims and non-Muslims. While the “secular” Muslims regarded it as too expensive for the new Republic, the non-Muslims, especially the Christians, saw it as the outpost of an Islamic State. See Noer, *Administration of Islam*, p. 14; Boland, *The Struggle*, p. 106.
53. Mohamad Saleh Suaidy, “Tjita2 Negara Islam”, *Suara Partai Masyumi* 9, no. 4–5/6 (1954): 6–7.
54. See, for example, Vol. 9, no. 4–5/6 (1954).

55. Natsir repeatedly emphasized that Pancasila did not contradict Islamic teachings. See, for instance, his article, "Apakah Pantjasila dengan al-Qur'an Bertentangan Satu Sama Lain?", *Suara Partai Masyumi* 9, no. 4-5/6 (1954): 3-5.
56. There were three ideological blocs in the Konstituante: Pancasila, Islam, and the Social-Economy. Strangely, the communists (PKI) did not support the social-economic bloc, as some of the small communist parties did (e.g. Acoma). Instead, they supported the Pancasila bloc. This was obviously driven by the intention to fight the Islamic bloc.
57. Mohammad Natsir, *Agama dan Negara dalam Perspektif Islam* (Jakarta: Media Da'wah, 2001), p. 215.
58. Feith considered PNI (secular) and the Catholic Party (religious) to be hostile to "liberalism", which means they do not wholeheartedly accept liberal democracy. Masyumi, on the other hand, was very open and unreserved in supporting liberal democratic system. See Feith's book, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 38-39.
59. Zainal Abidin Ahmad, *Islam dan Parlemenarisme*, 3rd ed. (Jakarta: Antara, 1952), pp. 16-19.
60. *And ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs (of moment). Then, when thou hast Taken a decision put thy trust in Allah. For Allah loves those who put their trust (in Him) (Ali Imran, 159); O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the Last Day: That is best, and most suitable for final determination (al-Nisa:59).*
61. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam*, p. 41.
62. Qur'an, 3:159; 42:38.
63. Idham Chalid, *Islam dan Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Jakarta: Api Islam, 1965), pp. 47-53.
64. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam*, p. 73.
65. Ibid. The Prophet said: *Lan tajtami'a ummati 'ala dalalatin fa 'alaykum bi al-jama'ah fa inna yadullahi 'ala al-jama'ah* (My community shall not agree upon misguidance. Therefore, you must stay with the congregation, and Allah's hand is over the congregation).
66. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam*, p. 248.
67. Ibid., p. 250; see also Ahmad, *Islam dan Parlemenarisme*, p. 52.
68. Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 165.
69. According to Noer, the collapse of Sjarifuddin's cabinet was because Masyumi left the coalition with Sjarifuddin, while the collapse of Ali's cabinet was because of NU's pressure (see Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 186 and p. 258).
70. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, *Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan)* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), p. 226.

71. Ibid., p. 226.
72. For the personal confession of the three exponents in the rebellion, see respectively, Ajip Rosidi, *Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut Kepada Allah Swt: Sebuah Biografi* (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986); Ajip Rosidi, *M. Natsir: Sebuah Biografi* (Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka, 1990); and Badruzzaman Busyairi, *Boerhanoeddin Harahap: Pilar Demokrasi* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1989).
73. I.N. Subagiyo, *Jusuf Wibisono, Karang di Tengah Gelombang* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1980), p. 233. Sukiman's and Wibisono's reaction can also be read as the imminent conflict between Java and non-Java.
74. Idham Chalid, *Islam dan Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Jakarta: Api Islam, 1965), p. 58.
75. Ibid., p. 59.
76. Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 378.
77. See their works, J.A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper, 1962); A. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957); R.A. Dahl, *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
78. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam*, p. 29.
79. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, *Ekonomi dan Keuangan: Makna Ekonomi Islam* (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), p. 116.
80. Parts II and III of "Program Perjuangan Masyumi" state that "economy of the state should be based on guided economy. Production and distribution of goods are maintained according to a certain plan and widely based on the people's welfare." Sjafruddin systematically wrote serial articles about the guided economy in *Suara Masyumi* in July and August 1954. See *Suara Masyumi*, 10, 20 July 1954, and 1, 10, 20 August 1954. The term "guided economy" was perhaps taken from B. de Jouvenel's book, *l'Economie Dirigée*, which was published in 1948.
81. It had been introduced in 1952, when Masyumi issued its Program Perjuangan. Meanwhile Soekarno's Guided Democracy was only introduced in 1960.
82. Qur'an, 7:96.
83. Merle C. Ricklefs' interview with Sjafruddin on 3 August 1977.
84. For more details on the revivalist views of Islamic economy, particularly on *riba*, see Abdullah Saeed, *Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and Its Contemporary Interpretation* (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1996).
85. Prawiranegara, *Ekonomi dan Keuangan*, pp. 264–65.
86. Deliar Noer, "Pendahuluan", in Prawiranegara, *Ekonomi dan Keuangan*, p. xxix.
87. That is the verse of al-Baqarah:275, which says *Those who swallow usury cannot rise up save as he ariseth whom the devil hath prostrated by (his) touch. That is because they say: Trade is just like usury; whereas Allah permitteth trading and forbiddeth usury.*

88. Prawiranegara, *Ekonomi dan Keuangan*, p. 283.
89. Qur'an, 3:130.
90. Prawiranegara, *Ekonomi dan Keuangan*, p. 286.
91. Ibid., p. 408.
92. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 154.
93. Prawiranegara, *Ekonomi dan Keuangan*, p. 45.
94. Ibid., pp. 21–22.
95. Ibid., p. 59.
96. Ibid., p. 57.
97. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, p. 176.
98. Mahendra, *Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme*, p. 223.
99. Natsir, *Agama dan Negara*, p. 89.
100. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, p. 45.
101. The verse is in al-Ma'idah (9:51) *O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors: They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them. Verily Allah guideth not a people unjust.*
102. Natsir, *Agama dan Negara*, p. 56. See also Mohammad Natsir, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia* (Bandung: Peladjar dan Bulan Sabit, 1969), pp. 183–90.
103. It is interesting to note that Natsir's first published article was his response to A.C. Christoffel, a Dutch evangelist who wrote negatively on Prophet Muhammad. In this article, Natsir rebutted the evangelist and criticized the Christians who in his view often misunderstood Islam. The article can now be read in Natsir's book, *Kebudayaan Islam dalam Perspektif Sejarah: Kumpulan Karangan* (Jakarta: Girmukti Pasaka, 1988), pp. 3–32.
104. Masyumi joined the Sjarifuddin cabinet after the reshuffle on 11 November 1947, but on 22 January 1948, Masyumi ministers left the cabinet. See Susan Finch and Daniel S. Lev, *Republic of Indonesia Cabinets, 1945–1965* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Dept. of Asian Studies Cornell University, 1965), pp. 10–14.
105. Noer, *Partai Islam*, p. 182. Before independence, Natsir had written an article about Amir Sjarifuddin in which he attacked Sjarifuddin's personal character as a Christian. The article was entitled "Ma Tukhfi Suduruhum..." It is now in his book, *Islam dan Kristen di Indonesia*.
106. As mentioned earlier, after the reshuffle, Masyumi joined the Sjarifuddin cabinet but only for two months.
107. Jacques Leclerc, "Amir Sjarifuddin, Between the State and the Revolution". in Angus McIntyre, *Indonesian Political Biography: In Search of Cross-Cultural Understanding* (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1993), p. 22.
108. The interpersonal relationship of the exponents of Model 1 with non-Muslims is also very favourable. Sjafruddin, for instance, was known to have been close

- with non-Muslims and was admired among the Catholic community. Abu Hanifah was very close with Amir Sjarifuddin. Mohamad Roem was known to have had very wide friendship with non-Muslim national leaders. In short, at the individual level, it seemed that there was no problem of interpersonal-relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims.
109. For Natsir's positive account on non-Muslims, see his *Agama dan Negara*, pp. 55–59; for Zainal Abidin's account see, his *Membentuk Negara Islam*, particularly, pp. 62–67.
 110. Or it is like the distinction of citizen or non-citizen (WNI, Warga Negara Indonesia) and foreign citizen (WNA, Warga Negara Asing), or Indonesian citizen by birth (WNI Keturunan, *Warga Negara Indonesia Keturunan*). These are all for administrative purposes.
 111. Ahmad, *Membentuk Negara Islam*, p. 65. This view totally differs from the classical theory (al-Mawardi for instance), which does not allow non-Muslims to become members of the military.
 112. *Ibid.*, p. 64. Unlike Natsir and several other exponents of Model 1, Zainal Abidin Ahmad does not consider the prime minister (*perdana menteri*) to be the head of state. Therefore, he argues, it is allowed in Islam.
 113. In the liberal democratic states, the political rights of women have become an important part of the principles of equality and civil rights. In the United States, for instance, the political rights of women have been fully acknowledged since 1920, in Norway since 1921, in the Netherlands since 1922, in France since 1944, and in Italy, Japan, and Venezuela since 1946. See Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Jerry Goldman, *The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America*, 6th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), p. 244.
 114. Mohamad Roem, *Bunga Rampai dari Sejarah 3* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1983), p. 53.
 115. *Gema Islam*, no. 29. th. II, 1 April 1963, republished in Hamka, *Tanja Jawab I* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1967), p. 63.
 116. The complete correspondence between the two leaders from different generations can be seen in Nurcholish Madjid and Mohamad Roem, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Djambatan, 2000).
 117. Further discussion on the religious renewal movement and the rejection of the idea of an Islamic state is given in Chapters 4 and 5.
 118. Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

MODEL 2

Religious Democratic State

We have seen that Model 1 failed to become an alternative model of an ideal government in Indonesia. The model's vision of the state-religion relationship is not applicable to the Indonesian pluralist community. Mohammad Natsir's and Zainal Abidin Ahmad's view of equality and of minority political rights is not conducive to a democratic state, which requires complete equality for all citizens. Model 1 is likely to be suitable only for a Muslim majority with a homogeneous understanding of Islam, and with a minority which is ready to live with such an understanding. In reality, such a condition is obviously difficult, if not impossible, to find.

The next two models which I will discuss in this chapter and the next are immediate responses to the prevailing failed model. Both models agree on the importance of equality as the basic principle of political pluralism. However, both differ in their view of the relationship between religion and the state. While one suggests the crucial role of the state in determining people's religious life, the other proposes that the state be neutral. The two models, which I call the "Religious Democratic State" (RDS) and the "Liberal Democratic State" (LDS), emerged at the same time, yet they developed dynamically on different trajectories. While the former was dominant in the Soeharto era and was widely welcomed by most Muslims, the latter remains limited to intellectual discourse, particularly among the younger Muslim generation.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODEL

Generally speaking, Model 2 is an attempt by the younger generation of *santri* Muslims to justify the model of polity built by the New Order regime. The word “justify” is perhaps not entirely appropriate, since it has a negative connotation. However, it is not entirely inaccurate since many of the exponents of Model 2 were directly or indirectly supporting Soeharto in his project to build a new government. As we will soon see, many exponents of Model 2 joined him in building the country.

Since the very beginning of his rule, Soeharto was concerned with how to consolidate the ideologically fragmented national elements. After the destruction of communism and the crumbling of Soekarno in 1967, national consolidation was easier. Military factions were united under one command, while political parties were fully controlled. Political ideologies, particularly nationalism, communism, and Islamism, were not given a chance to develop, and instead, Soeharto initiated the creation of a new national ideology.¹

Pancasila, that new ideology, was not actually new and was not invented by Soeharto. It had existed since the time of independence. It had also been used by the nationalists to counter imported ideologies such as Islamism, communism, and liberalism. However, in Soeharto's hands, Pancasila was reinvigorated and redesigned in order to unite the people. Soeharto considered Pancasila to be an important ideology, not only because of its role as a glue for varying national elements, but also as the identity of the Indonesian state. Inheriting old controversies, Soeharto knew the identity of the state remained crucial. He did not want to have Indonesia called a secular state, or a theocratic one.² With Pancasila, he believed, the country would simply become “religious”, since Pancasila encapsulates the people's religious aspirations.

For some Muslims, Model 2 is perhaps an irony; for one thing, it was backed by Soeharto, a man who had been condemned for his mismanagement of the country. However, we have to distinguish between the model as it was intended by Soeharto, and the model as a theoretical construction set by Muslims in the context of the political reality they faced. As Soeharto's creation, the model might not be free from his pragmatic political interests, but as a construction of reality, it can be accepted as an “objective” fact, since it is desired by many Indonesian Muslims. In any case, the emergence of the model was strongly driven by the socio-political situation. The political transition from Soekarno to Soeharto not only meant the shift of political order from the old to the new (hence the terms “Old Order” and

“New Order”), but also the generational shift between the old and new *santri* Muslims. Entering the 1970s, the young Muslim generation began to emerge and to create a new political atmosphere. Most of them were educated in traditional Islamic institutions and some of them continued their studies in Western universities. Their knowledge of secular sciences was often as good as their knowledge of religion.

Determined by such a setting and other factors, the new Muslim generation “was less concerned about old issues, about the schism between Orthodoxy and Modernism, or about the difficulties of living within an increasingly multireligious society”.³ Instead, they were more determined to face a new life, with a more open and liberal mind towards religious doctrines, and less suspicious of their fellow citizens of other religions. Perhaps because the communist threat had decreased and ideological tensions were generally absent, the new Muslim generation was more concerned with pragmatic issues such as modernization, development, and democratization. With this entire shift, it does not necessarily mean that they were less committed to religion than their elders. As a matter of fact, most of them were religious intellectuals and many of them respected religious figures.

The exponents of Model 2 belong mostly to the new Muslim generation that came on to the political stage during the early 1970s. Genealogically, they came from a *santri* background and a great number of them are descendants or relatives of the Model 1 exponents from both Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). However, unlike their forefathers, they are less concerned with ideological affiliation. Most of them are religious intellectuals who are affiliated with major Islamic organizations. The new *santri* generation was later differentiated into two groups in terms of their attitudes towards the issue of religion-state relationship. The first generally sees the importance of the role of religion in the state, and the second considers it to be of less importance. While the former inspired the birth of Model 2, the latter inspired Model 3.

During the early period of the New Order era, Model 2 was supported by Muslim leaders who were ready to work with Soeharto, either as his allies in the cabinet, or as the political opposition in parliament. Mohammad Sjafaat Mintaredja (b. 1921) and Abdul Mukti Ali (1923–2004) were examples of the allies. They served as Minister of Social and Minister of Religious Affairs respectively. Mintaredja was born in Bogor and educated at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He was the founder of the Muslim Student Association (HMI, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) and its first chairman (1947–50). Mintaredja was also noted for his role as chairman of Parmusi, an Islamic party created by the New Order regime. Mukti Ali

was an eminent scholar who was appointed as Minister for Religion in the first development cabinet. He was born in Cepu, Central Java. His early education was completed in an Islamic boarding school near his hometown and he continued his higher education at the University of Karachi in Pakistan, and the McGill University in Canada, both in Islamic Studies. His name is often associated with the project of interreligious dialogue. He was also known for his role as the mentor of the Islamic reform movement (*pembaruan Islam*) which emerged during the early 1970s.

Lukman Harun (1934–99) and Djarnawi Hadikusumo (d. 1993) were examples of the opposition. Both were the first leaders of Parmusi, with Hadikusumo as general chairman and Harun as secretary general. Parmusi was an Islamic party designed to be the substitute of the old Masyumi. However, right from its formation, it was unable to free itself from the influence of Soeharto who continuously tried to keep it under his control. When the party held its first congress and elected Mohammad Roem, a distinguished Masyumi leader, Soeharto refused to acknowledge his appointment, and instead installed Mintaredja, as the leader of a new generation of Muslims.

Lukman Harun was born in Limbanang, a small village in West Sumatra. He was educated in the Muhammadiyah school in his hometown. He continued his higher education at the National University in Jakarta, majoring in political science. After graduation, Harun was involved in various Islamic organizations. During the early 1960s, he chaired the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), an international Islamic organization which involved his travelling to many countries. His international reputation began to spread, particularly through his chairing of the Committee of Islamic Solidarity (KSI, Komite Solidaritas Islam). Through this organization he established contacts with other Muslim leaders, including Yasser Arafat and Muamar Qadafi.

In its course, Model 2 has been much favoured by Muhammadiyah leaders. They have contributed greatly to formulating the model. Muhammad Amien Rais (b. 1944) and Ahmad Syafii Maarif (b. 1935), for example, are two Muhammadiyah leaders who can be considered thinkers of the model. Both have served as chairmen of the organization: Rais from 1995 to 2000, and Maarif from 2000 to 2005.

Rais was educated at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He obtained his Master's degree from the University of Notre Dame and doctoral degree from the University of Chicago, in the United States, both in political science. Since 1998, he has been regarded as the motivator of reformation for his role in removing Soeharto from power. In the same year, he founded a political party, Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), a vehicle that brought him

to become chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). In 2004, he joined the race for the presidential chair, but failed.

Maarif was born in Sampur Kudus, West Sumatra. He studied at the Muallimin School in Lintau and graduated in 1953. He continued his studies in the Teacher Training Institute (IKIP, Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan), Yogyakarta, and then pursued his postgraduate degrees in the United States, first in Ohio (M.A.) and then in Chicago (Ph.D.), both in history.

Other Muhammadiyah leaders such as Kuntowijoyo (1943–2005) and Muhammad Dawam Rahardjo (b. 1942) can likewise be categorized as supporters of Model 2. In many of their writings, they emphasize the importance of having a religious basis for democracy. Kuntowijoyo was born in Yogyakarta. He studied in Klaten and Surakarta, and completed his BA degree at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He then continued his postgraduate studies in the United States, majoring in history, first at the University of Connecticut (MA), and then at Columbia University (Ph.D.). Kuntowijoyo was a prolific author. Although he is a historian, most of his well-known books are literary works.⁴ Two of his books, *Identitas Politik Umat Islam* (Political Identity of the Muslim community, 1997) and *Paradigma Islam: Interpretasi untuk Aksi* (Islamic Paradigm: Interpretation for Action, 1991) are important sources for analysing his religio-political thoughts.

M. Dawam Rahardjo was born in Solo. Like Kuntowijoyo, he studied at Gadjah Mada University in economics and then pursued his career as a banker for several years at the Bank of America. Although he was educated and trained in economics and business, Dawam's concern went beyond those disciplines. He is a student of philosophy and history. In December 1983, he established the Foundation of Study of Philosophy and Religion (LSAF, Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat), and five years later, founded a scholarly journal called *Ulumul Qur'an*.

Several proponents of Model 2 come from an NU background. NU leaders have a unique position regarding the issue of state-religion relationship. In the past, particularly during the early years of independence, NU's political standpoint was quite plain as it — together with other members of Islamic political parties — supported Model 1. However, during the New Order era, particularly after the 1980s, NU's political standpoint became quite versatile, mainly because it has very diverse members, ranging from conservatives to liberals. A large number of NU leaders live at *pesantrens* in remote villages. Only a small number of them participates in urban political

discourse. This explains why the writing tradition among NU members is not as strong as in Muhammadiyah. Observers used to make the judgment that NU had generally been accommodationist (or at worst, opportunist) towards the state. This was particularly so during the time of Soekarno, when its leaders were very close to him. The case was quite different during the Soeharto era, as the organization had been marginalized. Only during the 1980s, when Abdurrahman Wahid took over the NU leadership, was the organization accommodative towards the state.

Abdurrahman Wahid himself was critical of the New Order regime, despite his agreement with some of Soeharto's policies. As a matter of fact, Wahid is hardly to be considered an exponent of Model 2, simply because he, as we can judge from his writings, is a staunch critic of the religious model of the state. In addition, he has also been recognized as an important defender of liberal values, including those of secularism.⁵ However, NU is greater than Abdurrahman Wahid. As I have mentioned above, this organization has a diverse membership, ranging from conservatives to liberals. Still, many observers have claimed that most NU members are best described as moderate. Several *kyais* such as Achmad Siddiq tried to put himself in this moderate position or, in his own term, the *tawassut* position.⁶ Similar to Siddiq's position are the *ulama* who are less involved in Indonesian practical politics, such as Sahal Mahfudh and Ali Yafie.

Achmad Siddiq (1926–91) was born in Jember, East Java, in a *kyai* family. His father was a great *kyai* in Jember, and his older brother, Machfoezh Siddiq, was a prominent religious scholar who had served as chairman of NU (1937–42). During the 1950s, Achmad Siddiq became a legislative member and since the 1970s, worked in the Department of Religion until he gained the position of Head of the East Java Branch Office (Kanwil Jatim). In 1984, he was selected as the general chairman of NU, a position he held for two periods. He was noted for his contribution to making NU an independent organization which was not tied to a single political party. This major change which he made with Abdurrahman Wahid was later known as the "return to NU Khittah".⁷

Sahal Mahfudh (b. 1937) is the current general chairman of NU. He originally came from Pati, Central Java, a home of many *pesantrens*. He himself has his own *pesantren*, which he inherited from his father. Mahfudh was educated in traditional *pesantren*, but later went to Mecca, where he studied the advanced Islamic sciences. Since the 1980s, he has been chairman of NU, and in 1999 was elected as general chairman. Meanwhile, Ali Yafie (b. 1928) is an eminent NU leader known for his expertise in Islamic jurisprudence. He was born in Donggala, Central Sulawesi and

began his professional career in the Religious Court in Ujung Pandang, but later concentrated more on academic life. In 1965 he became Dean of the Faculty of Ushuluddin in IAIN Ujung Pandang, a position he held until 1971. He served as NU chairman several times, and when Siddiq passed away in 1991, he was selected as general chairman, a position he held for only several months, following his conflict with Abdurrahman Wahid. Mahfudh and Yafie are among the few NU *kyais* who express their ideas in articles and books.

A small number of the exponents of Model 2 are independent intellectuals, that is, those who are not closely attached to either Muhammadiyah or NU. Munawir Sjadzali (1925–2004) and Adi Sasono (b. 1943) are among them. Both have served as Minister; the former, as Minister for Religion in the Soeharto era, and the latter, as Minister for Cooperatives in B.J. Habibie's cabinet. Sjadzali was born in Klaten, Central Java. He was educated in Solo and completed his advanced studies at Mamba al-'Ulum in the same city. He gained his B.A. from Exeter University, England, in international relations, and obtained his M.A. degree from Georgetown University, the United States, in political science. Before serving as Minister, he was the ambassador in Kuwait. Adi Sasono was born in Pekalongan with a strong *santri* background as his grandfather, Mohammad Roem, was an eminent Masyumi leader. He graduated from the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) in civil engineering and was an activist of HMI while he was a student in Bandung. Like Dawam Rahardjo, Sasono is concerned with economic as well as Islamic issues.

During the New Order period, these intellectuals directly or indirectly supported Model 2. In their own way, the Pancasila state was justified as an ideal model for Indonesian Muslims. For them, the old Muslim ambition to change Pancasila as the basis of the state was no longer relevant. It was time, they argued, to focus more on development and political stability rather than old ideological tensions.

FOUNDATION OF THE MODEL

The very foundation of Model 2 consists of two premises: the acceptance of Pancasila as the basis of the state and the rejection of secularism. Pancasila had been a contentious concept among Indonesian Muslims. It was often perceived to be un-Islamic or even anti-Islam. Their rejection of Pancasila as the state philosophy was mainly based on this suspicion. Model 2 aims to change such an antagonistic attitude towards Pancasila. It argues that Pancasila is intrinsically good. It does not contradict Islam, and, in fact, all

of its *silas* (principles) are compatible with Islamic doctrines. Nevertheless, Muslim acceptance of Pancasila was not easy. As I will demonstrate soon, there were various factors behind their acceptance of it.

The second premise that is the rejection of secularism, comes out of the Muslim conviction that Indonesia is a religious country whose people highly esteem — or obsessed with — religious values. No organization can guarantee the application of such values better than the state. Secularism has always been depicted as an enemy of religion. The rejection of it is thus a necessary prerequisite for Muslims to build a religious democratic state.

Justifying Pancasila

Unlike their elders, the exponents of Model 2 accept Pancasila as the final basis of the Indonesian state. There is a complex political background that drove Muslims of this generation to accept Pancasila. One of the most important factors was Soeharto's policy towards religions. From the outset, Soeharto wanted Pancasila to be the only foundation of the state. In the beginning, there was some resistance from Muslims, but as there was not much choice, they gradually adjusted to the situation. This accommodative attitude increased significantly when Soeharto proposed Pancasila to be the only basis (*asas tunggal*).⁸

Muslims responded differently to the idea of *asas tunggal*. Some of them were cautious as to whether the acceptance of *asas tunggal* would violate their religious creed. Others accepted it, though with much deliberation. The first Islamic organization that accepted Pancasila was Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). NU's acceptance of *asas tunggal* stunned many people, not only because it was often regarded as a conservative organization, but also because its relationship with the government was in a problematic state. Since Soeharto gained political power in 1967, NU had practically no place in his government. The only place that was dominated by NU members, that is, the Department of Religion, was subsequently taken over and handed it to the modernists or to those with no affiliation to NU. Soeharto did this to neutralize NU's power in the government.⁹ During Soekarno's time, particularly during the period of Guided Democracy, NU enjoyed the privilege of being one of the most important elements in Soekarno's Nasakom.¹⁰

It was in the atmosphere of Soeharto's antagonist attitude that NU astonishingly accepted Pancasila. However, NU had legitimate reasons for doing so; one of which was the internal conflict within the NU body. After the 1982 general election, NU members broke up into two big blocs: those

who wanted the organization to withdraw from practical politics, and those who refused to do so.¹¹ After several debates, the former finally won the battle through a national congress in Situbondo in 1984. A declaration known as “return to the original position” (*kembali ke khittah*) was announced. It stated that NU would leave the arena of practical politics and concentrate more on being a purely religious organization (*jam’iyyah diniyyah*). Hence, NU would not oblige its members to follow or become a member of one particular party, but said they were free to choose any available political party. This appeal was directly aimed at discrediting the PPP — a party where NU members were mostly affiliated — and also to give a sign to GOLKAR (Functional Group, or Golongan Karya) to open its door to NU support.¹²

The most important figures behind the acceptance of *asas tunggal* were Abdurrahman Wahid and Achmad Siddiq. Wahid was known as a charismatic and controversial leader. He is the son of Wachid Hasyim, one of the staunch proponents of Model 1, and is the grandson of the cofounder of NU, Hasyim Asy’ari. Wahid studied in Cairo and Baghdad and had a wide network of contacts with Muslim modernists as well as secular figures in Jakarta. Although he held many criticisms of the Pancasila state, he also played the major role in convincing NU members that Pancasila was not contradictory to Islam.¹³ At the Situbondo national congress, Siddiq and Wahid were appointed chairmen. Siddiq was chairman of the *suriyah* (advisory board) and Wahid was chairman of the *tanfiziyyah* (executive board).

Like Wahid, Siddiq believes there is no contradiction between Islam and Pancasila. He bases his view on three arguments. First, he regards Islam as a religion that teaches moderation or what he calls *tawassut* (midway). The most essential doctrine in Islam, viz., *tauhid*, is a clear example of *tawassut*, as it is midway between polytheism and atheism.¹⁴ In this respect, the acceptance of Pancasila is likewise an expression of the *tawassut* position, since its rejection is tantamount to taking an extreme side. Second, Siddiq refers to the Qur’an, particularly Chapter Al ‘Imran:64, in which God commands us to uphold the equitable proposition (*kalimah sawa*). In a highly pluralist community such as Indonesia, such an equitable proposition is found in Pancasila. Hence, he argues, the acceptance of *asas tunggal* is not only defensible, but also desirable.¹⁵ Third, Siddiq sets a legal analogy (*qiyas*) rooted in Islamic jurisprudence whereby Pancasila — which had been used as the basis of the state for forty years — was like a fruit eaten every day by Muslims. Thus, it is strange and illogical to question whether or not the fruit they ate was lawful.¹⁶ With this analogy, Siddiq clearly wants to say

that Muslims' questioning of Pancasila is irrelevant. To appeal to his fellow members of NU, Siddiq states:

Pancasila and Islam can go together side-by-side and complement each other. The two are not in contradiction and should not be put into contradiction. There is no need to choose one of the two and throw away the other... Islam is a revealed religion while Pancasila is the result of human thinking... NU accepts Pancasila not because of political considerations but rather because of considerations of Islamic law.¹⁷

Siddiq's role in justifying the compatibility of Islam and Pancasila is extremely important for NU members. It is not so much his explanation that is important for them, but his charismatic figure. In a paternalistic community such as NU, one's position and charisma are crucial. Siddiq is chairman of *suriyah* and he is religiously more credible than anybody else in the organization.

Unlike NU, Muhammadiyah accepted *asas tunggal* with greater reluctance. There were several leaders and members of this organization who refused to accept Pancasila as the only basis of Indonesian state. Malik Ahmad, a Vice-Chairman of the organization, for instance, preferred to see Muhammadiyah dissolved rather than accept it.¹⁸ This was totally understandable as Muhammadiyah is a modernist organization whose emotional tie to Masyumi was quite strong. Thus, some of the Muhammadiyah leaders considered Pancasila a secular ideology that might harm the Muslim creed. Several internal meetings regarding this issue always ended in deadlock. A solution was sought by Fahmy Khatib, one of the respected leaders, by appealing to Soeharto to make an exception for Muhammadiyah. On 6 August 1983, accompanied by other leaders, Fahmy visited Soeharto. The following is part of his conversation with the President as recorded by Lukman Harun, another Muhammadiyah leader:¹⁹

Fahmy: "Sir, I am also from Muhammadiyah, begging your help concerning *asas tunggal*"

Soeharto: "Everybody must accept it, anyway."

Fahmy: "But, it is difficult for an Islamic organization [like Muhammadiyah], Sir."

Soeharto: "I know, but you can put Islam in the [section] of Objectives or other sections."

The meeting with Soeharto was the culmination of numerous attempts by Muhammadiyah leaders. Earlier, before Fahmy's meeting with Soeharto, other leaders such as the chairman, A.R. Fachruddin, Lukman Harun,

and Ismail Suny had appealed to government officials, including the Minister for Religion, Munawir Sjadzali, the Minister of People's Welfare, Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, and the Cabinet Secretary, Murdiono, that Muhammadiyah might be excepted from *asas tunggal*.²⁰ But all those officers gave the same answer — that there would be no negotiation on *asas tunggal*, and the only person who could change it was the president.

Faced with such a deadlock, Muhammadiyah had no choice but to accept it. And, after several internal meetings, the organization finally accepted it. The declaration of its acceptance was then announced at Muhammadiyah's forty-first national congress in Surakarta on 7–11 December 1985. Soeharto, who attended the congress, gave his speech and expressed his contentment by saying that he was part of Muhammadiyah.²¹ Since that congress, Muhammadiyah has no longer questioned the legitimacy of Pancasila. In fact, what we can witness thereafter is a wave of endorsement by its leaders that *asas tunggal* is the best platform for Indonesians, and a Pancasila state is the best model of polity for them.

Ahmad Syafii Maarif is among those intellectuals who consider Pancasila to be intrinsically good. As a normative concept, Pancasila is not contradictory with Islam; in fact, all its principles are acceptable to Islam.²² He refers to Achmad Siddiq, the leader of NU, who said that Indonesia with Pancasila is the final form of state for Muslims.²³ Pancasila, Maarif goes on to say, has been proven in the course of its history to be the saviour against the potential danger of disintegration.²⁴ He does not deny that Pancasila has been viewed negatively by Muslims, due to its strong association with Soeharto. But Maarif implores Muslims to distinguish between Pancasila as a philosophical concept, and Pancasila as a political ideology that was (ab)used by the New Order regime. He believes that as a philosophical concept, Pancasila is a lofty source of guidance. The good of Pancasila, he says, is that it has a brief formulation, but comprises all major aspects of human life. "It is the highest innovation that has ever been created by the founders of this country."²⁵

Among the Muhammadiyah leaders and perhaps among all Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia, Kuntowijoyo is probably the most articulate Muslim leader in justifying Pancasila for Islam. He dedicates some of his writings to explain this crucial problem. He argues that Pancasila is the "objectification" of Islam. By "objectification" he means a scientific method to seek a middle path so that one would not fall into extremity. He defines it as "looking at something objectively", that is, treating an object as it is and not as it is wanted.²⁶ He views Pancasila as an objectification of all religions in Indonesia. All principles in Pancasila represent the main

principles of those religions. Therefore, Pancasila is the objectification of Islam. He writes:

Pancasila is not a secular concept, but neither is it a religion. As an ideology, Pancasila is an objectification of religions. This means that objective elements in all religions exist in Pancasila... We argue that *Pancasila is an objectification of Islam*. The essence of Islam and that of Pancasila do not contradict, although its historical existence may be debated particularly to serve a particular social interest. However, it must be emphasized that Islam is a religion and Pancasila is an ideology. Pancasila will not become a religion and religions will not become ideologies.²⁷

The issue that Pancasila would replace the status of religion was widely popular among Indonesian Muslims during the first half of the 1980s. As a matter of fact, this anxiety had little ground, since Soeharto himself had stated recurrently that Pancasila would never replace religion and would never become religion.²⁸

As we can see, in the hands of the exponents of Model 2, Pancasila has been reinterpreted in such a way that it becomes a political concept with a strong religious content. In other words, it is no longer “secular” as the Model 1 exponents previously tried to envisage. More importantly, Pancasila is also regarded as being more viable in accommodating democracy than Islamic ideology. For one thing, it has transcended religious and ideological borders. As intellectuals who have experienced the tradition of Western democracy, the exponents of Model 2 are fully aware that democracy cannot be built on Islamic ideology, since it will automatically exclude the participation of other religious communities. Pancasila, they argue, is more feasible to democracy without itself harming Islamic fundamental values.

Rejection of Secularism

The exponents of Model 2 understand secularism generally to be both a philosophical and political doctrine in which the separation of religious and worldly domains prevails. It could be said that all exponents of Model 2 reject secularism. Their basic argument is that Islam does not acknowledge such a separation. Inspired by some Middle Eastern Muslim reformists, they develop the notion that Islam is religion and the state (*din wa dawlah*).²⁹ Amien Rais, for instance, believes that the Islamic doctrine of unification (of religion and politics) has its roots in the Qur'an, particularly Chapter al-An'am:162, which states that the life and after-life of Muslims belong only to God. The verse, Rais argues, clearly rejects the compartmentalization of Muslim thinking into worldly and non-worldly life.³⁰ He writes:

Secularization has no place in Islam, because as a religion of revelation, Islam does not acknowledge a strict dichotomy between the worldly life and the afterlife, between the profane and the sacred, between the immanent and the transcendent. The universality and transcendental-ity of Islam for Muslims are an important doctrine that cannot be negotiated.³¹

For Rais, secularism, in whatever form, is bad. He holds the view that there is no difference between “secularization” and “secularism”. Even if there is such a difference it is actually artificial, since in the end “secularization is an ideology, that is the ideology of secularizationism”.³² Quoting Muhammad al-Bahi, an Egyptian intellectual, Rais distinguishes two kinds of secularism: moderate secularism and radical secularism. The former “considers religion as a private matter that only deals with the spiritual aspect of human beings and is therefore not allowed to interfere in public matters such as politics and other worldly issues”. The latter attacks religion because it is considered the enemy of progress.³³ Both moderate secularism and radical secularism, according to Rais, have no place in Islam.³⁴

Another argument in Rais’s objection to secularism is the fact that secularism is increasingly losing its social ground. Referring to the current findings of social science, Rais argues that the world is not becoming more secular — as was predicted by eminent sociologists such as Max Weber and Emile Durkheim — but rather it is becoming more religious. The global resurgence of religions is strong evidence that the theory of secularization is untenable. This fact, Rais argues, conforms with what Islam has admonished.³⁵

For Maarif, the danger of Western secularism is that it has relied too much on human reason. In his view, secularism is “a pattern by which all worldly affairs are entirely granted to human reason without relating it with moral transcendence”.³⁶ In his writings, Maarif emphasizes the philosophical meaning of secularism more than its political dimensions. For him, secularism is fundamentally contradictory to all religions and not only to Islam. He gives an example of how the way of thinking of secular man tends to ignore transcendental religious values, because religion is considered to be irrational. Even worse than this, Maarif argues, since secular man considers human reason to be the measure of all things, moral standards would then become relative.³⁷

An important argument is set out by M. Dawam Rahardjo, who perceives secularism to be not only anti-religion, but to be potentially also anti-democracy and anti-human rights. He points out how secularism

in France and the United States has violated the democratic values and basic rights of religious people. Rahardjo points to the case of the headscarf in France as a violation of democratic values. "How could you claim democracy, while prohibiting people from what they wear?"³⁸ The same case can be found in the United States, when the state forbids schools from teaching religions. According to Rahardjo, this is fundamentally against the basic human right to know about one's religion. He argues that teaching religion in public schools is part of the state's obligations. When I asked him what version of religious teachings could be taught to students, he simply answered "a liberal one, it should be a liberal one".³⁹ By "liberal one" he means a non-restrictive policy in teaching particular doctrines of religion.

The exponents of Model 2 are often hesitant in assuming liberal democracy where secularism is inherently embedded. As a procedural concept, they have no problems with Western democracy. For them, democratic mechanisms such as general elections, the parliamentary system, presidential institution, and people's sovereignty, are matters that do not need further debate. What becomes the main problem in liberal democracy, they argue, is the character of Western liberalism, which tends to be secular. Secularization — that is, the separation of religion and the state — however it is understood, is against the very teaching of Islam. Hence, the acceptance of liberal democracy, they argue, greatly depends on how far can Muslims determine the state-religion relationship.

STATE-RELIGION RELATIONSHIP

With the two foundations, Model 2 outlines two things. First, disapproving the concept of the Islamic state previously subscribed to by exponents of Model 1; and second, endorsing the state's establishment of religion. Throughout their writings, speeches and interviews, the exponents of Model 2 keep campaigning for these two bases. As we will see soon, they develop their arguments to reject the idea of the Islamic state as a consequence of accepting Pancasila as the only political basis for the Indonesian state. Likewise, to assure themselves that the Pancasila state would not become a secular state, they support every policy and bill that aim at endorsing the public role of religion. Various controversial legal drafts such as the Marriage Bill, Religious Judicature Bill, and National Educational System Bill, are all supported by the exponents of Model 2. They believe that only in this way can the state be prevented from becoming secular.

Rejection of the Islamic State

The concept of the Islamic state was never openly criticized by the proponents of Model 1. Even the “liberal” intellectuals such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Mohammad Roem were cautious in their criticism of this concept. Mohammad Roem launched his very measured criticism only late in the 1980s, in a response to Amien Rais’s statement about the issue.⁴⁰ During the 1950s, criticism against the Islamic state mostly came from the *abangan* Muslims who were affiliated with non-Islamic parties. Before 1970, it was unimaginable for a *santri* leader to criticize this concept since it would damage his or her credentials. Besides that, almost all *santri* Muslims were affiliated with Islamic political parties whose ultimate aim was to establish an Islamic state (or more accurately, a state based on Islam). In contrast to this, for the exponents of Model 2, the rejection of the Islamic state has become an essential article of their acceptance of a pluralist basis for the Pancasila state.

The rejection of the concept of the Islamic state began in the early period of the New Order regime. One of the earliest Muslim critics of the concept was Muhammad Sjafaat Mintaredja. His criticism of this concept can be found in his writings published in the early 1970s.⁴¹ Mintaredja argued that it is unlikely that Indonesian Muslims would establish an Islamic state, not only because Indonesia is a pluralist country in which its Constitution does not allow them to do so, but also because the idea of the Islamic state is theologically untenable. His view was that the Qur’an and the *hadith* — the two most authoritative sources of Islam — do not speak of the concept, nor does the Qur’an request Muslims to establish a particular model of polity.⁴² Mintaredja deplored the political strategy of Masyumi which overly emphasized the ideology and thus ignored more important aspects directly felt by Muslims, including the problems of economy and well-being.⁴³ Economy, he believed, is no less important than ideology.

Mintaredja’s criticism of the Islamic state is part of the Islamic reformist campaign that had started in the late 1960s. Although Nurcholish Madjid did not speak specifically about the Islamic state, he is well known for his role as a staunch critic of Islamic ideology. His severe criticism of Islamic political parties and his well-known slogan “Islam Yes, Partai Islam No” was an indirect criticism of the predominant discourse on the Islamic state at the time.⁴⁴ However, the most conspicuous and forthright criticism of the concept actually only began during the early 1980s, when more and more Muslim intellectuals came to the political fore.

The most responsible figure for directing this debate was Amien Rais. The shift began in November 1982 when an Islamic magazine, *Panji Masyarakat*, published its interview with Rais. Shortly after the interview was published with the provocative title “The Islamic State Does Not Exist”,⁴⁵ the issue spread throughout the nation. Responses then came swiftly from the *Panji Masyarakat* readership. The “letters from readers” section of the magazine was filled for weeks with both supportive and critical comments about the interview. According to M. Syafii Anwar, the editor of the magazine, the edition which reported the interview was quickly sold out and many people contacted the magazine office to ask for more copies.⁴⁶ One of the most important responses was the article written by Mohammad Roem — a leader of Masyumi and one of the eminent exponents of Model 1 — published in February 1983.⁴⁷ Surprisingly, Roem supported Rais’s statement, although his argument was made quite carefully. This is most probably because Roem did not want to offend his Masyumi friends.⁴⁸

In turn, Roem’s article unexpectedly drew responses from many Muslims, most probably because the article shocked them, as Roem was known to be an eminent Masyumi leader who, during the 1950s, used to struggle for the idea of an Islamic state. One of the most important responses came from Nurcholish Madjid, who was then a Ph.D. student at the University of Chicago. Madjid sent Roem a long personal letter, expressing his compliments and thanks to Roem for writing such an inspiring article. Roem soon replied to Madjid’s letter, and for six months the two intellectuals from different generations established a correspondence, discussing current issues of Islam in Indonesia. Several years later, their letters were published and became an important source for Islamic political discourse in contemporary Indonesia.⁴⁹ It is important to note here that the figures involved in this correspondence, Roem, Rais, and Madjid, each represented a different figure of the models of polity I discuss in this dissertation.

In the interview, Rais stated that the aim of nation building was to bring about welfare and a just life. Islam does not specifically mention what such welfare and a just life are, or how they should be maintained. The Qur’an and the *hadith* only give a guideline while the details are left freely to human beings. He wrote:

I do not believe that the notion of Islamic State or *negara Islam* exists in the Qur’an or in the Sunnah. Therefore, there is no desideratum in Islam to establish an Islamic state. What is important is that as long as a state practices [sic] Islamic ethics, social justice, and has established an egalitarian society which is far from exploitation of man by man or group by another group, then it is, according to Islam, a good state.⁵⁰

Rais criticized countries that use Islam as their philosophy, but are not, in fact, good states. He pointed out as an example how Saudi Arabia claims to have an Islamic government, but portrays a negative image of Islam. In fact, the monarchy system that it has adopted, Rais argued, contradicts the very basis of Islamic political system.⁵¹ Thus, for Rais, the Islamic state does not rest on name, but rather on how it can comply with justice, equality, and prosperity.

Rais' open rejection of the Islamic state was very important for the development of Islamic political discourse in Indonesia. This is not only because he was the leader of Muhammadiyah, the second biggest Islamic organization, but also because he was often regarded as a Muslim activist of the Masyumi mould.⁵² Rais's breakthrough had paved the way for other Muslim intellectuals and leaders to go in the same direction. Thus, subsequent to him, we see Munawir Sjadzali come on stage with the same tone. Older than most Muslim intellectuals of his generation, Sjadzali became involved in the Islamic intellectual discourse quite late. This was mainly due to his position as state officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Only after he was appointed as Minister for Religion did he become more intensely involved in Islamic issues.

Sjadzali's criticism of the concept of the Islamic state had actually begun in 1950, when, under the pseudonym Ibnu Amatillah, he wrote a brochure on the question of an Islamic basis for state.⁵³ At that time, however, he only questioned the concept without frankly rejecting it. His more serious criticism and objection to the concept of the Islamic state came only in the mid-1980s, when new Muslim intellectuals, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, and Amien Rais, were already playing major roles. At about the same time, Sjadzali was appointed Minister for Religion. For this purpose, he wrote several articles and one book, which has now become his major work.⁵⁴ Like Rais, Sjadzali argued that the Qur'an does not specifically ask Muslims to build a particular form of government. There are many things in this world that do not have to be solved by religion. Islamic jurists have divided human issues into what is called *mu'amalah* (worldly activities) and *ibadah* (pure devotion). While in *ibadah*, Muslims are required to stick to religious doctrines, in *mu'amalah*, they are given flexibility and freedom to do what they think to be good. Political matters, Sjadzali argued, is part of *mu'amalah*.⁵⁵

Sjadzali criticized Muslims who override the history of Islam by imagining the early life of Islam, particularly in the time of the Prophet and the first four caliphs, to be an ideal model which every Muslims should emulate. He severely criticized the Pakistani thinker, Abul A'la Mawdudi,

for his overly positive depictions of the early Muslim political community. Sjadzali wrote:

With due respect to Abul A'la Mawdudi as a persistent Islamic fighter and also such a productive writer, the author has to admit that his basic thinking on Islamic political system have [sic] quite a few discordances and contradictions. In observing [the] political life of the Islamic ummah during the era of the al-Khulafa al-Rashidun, Mawdudi was like a man watching Mount Merapi from a sixth floor room of the Ambarukmo Hotel in Yogyakarta. Indeed, from that spot the Merapi looks very beautiful, especially on a clear morning. But, the author is not satisfied with looking at the Merapi from a distance only, let us go north toward the vulcanological observation post, where the view is not as beautiful as from Ambarukmo Hotel. From that post, the steep slopes are clearly visible, and sometimes there is the smell of sulfur.⁵⁶

Sjadzali wanted to argue that too much idealization of the early experience of Muslim politics is extremely dangerous. For one thing, politics, wherever and whenever it is, is not free from intrigue and self-interest. How could we say that the early life of Islamic politics was a good example if we know that conflicts and wars were part of the daily life of the Prophet and that the last three of the “guided caliphs” were brutally killed? These factors, Sjadzali argued, are only to assure us that the early Muslims were no more than “*political animals*, as we can find in every stage of history. They were not *super human*.”⁵⁷

It could be said that criticisms by the new Muslim generation against the concept of the Islamic state have become the “icebreaker” of intellectual stagnancy, which had been pervasive since Masyumi’s domination of Islamic political discourse in Indonesia. As Madjid said, Rais’s statement and Roem’s positive response was the missing link in a chain of Islamic political thought.⁵⁸ Since Masyumi was banned and its leaders tended to be more exclusive, *santri* Muslims were simplistically branded as supporters of *negara Islam*. However, with the upsurge of the new *santri* generation born from Masyumi families, such branding was gradually diminishing. Seen from the religious-political point of view, this stride was important, particularly in relieving the Muslim psychological burden in rebuilding their relationship with the state.

The Unification of State and Religion

Like their elders, the exponents of Model 2 believe that in order to avoid secularism, the state must be involved (but not necessarily interfering) in

religious matters of the people. State involvement is important since the application of religious doctrines would not be perfectly accomplished without the protection and supervision of the state. On this ground they see the significant role played by governmental institutions such as the Department of Religion (Depag), the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia), the Islamic Court (Pengadilan Agama), and other state-sponsored Islamic institutions. For them, the establishment of the Depag or the role of the MUI is not a mere political concession in the wake of Muslim disappointment regarding their defeat in several constitutional debates, but is also aimed at keeping the state “religious”.

During the New Order era and even up to now, the exponents of Model 2 have been consistent in endorsing the role of religion in the state. They ask: If not the state, who is going to protect religion from secularization? It is for this reason that they subsequently supported the process of “officialization”. What I mean by “officialization” is the making of laws or regulations in favour of religious interests. Throughout the New Order era, exponents of Model 2 proposed and endorsed several Bills which generally favoured Muslims. This is where the dilemma is to be found. Muslim endorsement of religious bills, which they consider as anticipating secularism, have been challenged by other members of the religious community. It is ironic since the biggest challenge does not actually come from the secularists, but from non-Muslim minorities, which the exponents of Model 2 consider an important part of the model.

Marriage Law

Apart from the issue of *dasar negara* (state basis), Marriage Law was perhaps the most controversial bill in the history of law making in Indonesia. The bill was initially submitted to the parliament on 30 August 1973. However, it was challenged by Muslims inside and outside the parliament. In Parliament, it was objected to by the PPP (the only Islamic party), while outside Parliament, it was protested by a number of Islamic organizations and Muslim scholars.⁵⁹ Muslim objection was mainly based on concern for the potential dangers in the bill, such as replacing religious marriage laws with secular ones.⁶⁰ Their protest against this bill was intense. As reported by *Tempo*, the campaign against the bill was carried out in mosques, radio, and newspapers.⁶¹ Demonstrations against the bill were often conducted in Parliament and in public squares.⁶² The climax of Muslim protests occurred on 4 October 1973 when protesters

took over the seats of Parliament, which caused an interruption to the meeting.⁶³

In spite of those protests, on 22 December 1973 the bill was finally passed by Parliament and was signed several weeks later by the President. It later became known as the Marriage Law of 1974. But the content of the Law had by now changed radically. It seems that Parliament and the government had listened to the Muslim protests and that they finally accepted their demands.⁶⁴ Those who became angry and disappointed were now the Christians, who had previously supported the original draft. Some of them now accused the Marriage Law 1974 as having become partisan and having been deliberately modified to accommodate the Muslims. They also asserted that the Law was an indication of "the rise of Islamic groups to implement the Jakarta Charter".⁶⁵ Thus, as *Tempo* aptly wrote, something unique had happened: "the bill which was regarded as against the Muslim community has now become a law against the Christian community".⁶⁶

For the exponents of Model 2 themselves, the Marriage Bill was actually a dilemma. They were eventually divided in facing this issue. Those who served as state bureaucrats tended to accept the bill, with the consequence that they accepted the secular system of marriage. Meanwhile those who were outside the government tended to reject it, simply because they did not want to have a secular law in their life. Mintaredja and Mukti Ali were among the Muslim leaders who accepted the bill. Mintaredja, who was then the Minister of Social Affairs, stated that the bill was "the best product of thought and it does not contradict Islam".⁶⁷ But it soon became clear that both Mintaredja's and Ali's acceptance were given under pressure because of their difficult position as government officers. In an interview twenty years later, Mukti Ali stated that although he was the one who presented the bill to Parliament, he did it under "high pressure".⁶⁸

The case of the Marriage Bill is interesting in that it shows how Muslims in general rejected the government proposal, which was fully supported by the Christians, regarding the secularization of marriage laws.⁶⁹ For them, marriage is a sacred matter that must be regulated by religion and not merely an issue administered by the state. By ignoring Muslim scholars and dismissing Islamic marriage laws, the state is behaving like a secular state, and, therefore, it must be defied. Model 2's opposition to the proposal was clear proof that they rejected secularism.

Nevertheless, the bill which later became the "Islamized" Marriage Law has its own dilemma for supporters of Model 2. On the one hand, with their commitment to the principle of a religious state, the exponents of Model 2 rejected the process of secularization attempted by the state.

But on the other, their proposal to include Islamic laws in state legislation stimulated suspicion from non-Muslims, who considered it a kind of Islamization. It was quite evident that Muslim rejection of secularism was not supported by other religious communities, which seemed to prefer the secular basis rather than the religious one. Certainly, for non-Muslims, the Christians in particular, secularism was not a major problem.⁷⁰ For them, the Marriage Bill which made no mention of religion was much better than the Marriage Law which later became so “Islamic”.

Religious Judicature

Religious judicature is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. It has existed since colonial times. Officially, it was established by the colonial government in 1882, and was limited to two islands only, Java and Madura. But after independence, the demand for the religious judicature increased, and soon spread to other islands.⁷¹ Religious judicature deals only with matters which in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) are called *ahwal shakhsiyyah*, namely matters related to family and personal affairs such as marriage (*kawin*), divorce (*cerai*), reconciliation (*rujuk*), inheritance (*warisan*), custody (*hadanah*), and gifts (*wakaf/hibah*). Matters related to trade, land laws, and criminal offences are not managed by the religious judicature, but rather by national law (*hukum nasional*).

In spite of its long existence, religious judicature is a sensitive issue when it is brought to the political-constitutional level. This happened in 1988, when the government submitted the Religious Judicature Bill (RUU-PA, Rancangan Undang-Undang Peradilan Agama). Various responses abruptly aroused much heat on the Indonesian political stage. The Christians and secularists were the most active groups attacking the bill. They considered it a kind of Islamization and as discrimination against non-Muslim minorities. Meanwhile, for Muslims, it was only a confirmation of what already existed. With the official legislation, they argued, the position of the Islamic court would be more manageable.⁷² Only after Parliament finally passed the bill on 20 December 1989, did the protests end.⁷³

The exponents of Model 2 were among those who supported the bill. Munawir Sjadzali himself was the man behind the success of the proposal. When Muslim protests against the bill increased unmanageably, Sjadzali — then Minister for Religion — was sent by the President to Parliament, where he explained, among other things, that the bill had not been abruptly proposed, but was rather part of the implementation of the fourth part of the five-year plan (Pelita, or Pembangunan Lima Tahun),

pursuant to Law No 14, 1970. Among other bills that were scheduled to be discussed, the Religious Judicature Bill was the last bill.⁷⁴ Therefore, Sjadzali argued, the reaction against the bill was unsound.⁷⁵ Apart from this official justification, Sjadzali himself believed that the bill was an important issue for Indonesia as a Pancasila state. He regretted that the Christians and other critics opposed the bill, arguing that they misinterpreted the bill in such a way that it would make Indonesia an Islamic state. For Sjadzali, the bill had nothing to do with the issue of the Jakarta Charter; neither was it meant to Islamize the state. It was simply a consequence of the Pancasila state which wanted to accommodate the religious interests of its people.

The Christians responded seriously to this bill. Their writings published in various media severely attacked it, arguing that it could become a menace to the unitary state of Indonesia. The Catholic magazine, *Hidup*, in almost every issue, launched a harsh criticism against the bill.⁷⁶ Franz Magnis Suseno, an eminent Catholic priest, considered the religious judicature as “an institution that can corrupt the authority of the state”, and that, therefore, the government should cancel the bill.⁷⁷

The exponents of Model 2 considered that most Christians and critics in general had misunderstood the problem. The bill, as already explained by Sjadzali, was never intended to Islamize the state, neither was it meant to challenge the existing judicial system as Magnis Suseno had asserted. Ismail Suny, a renowned legal scholar from Muhammadiyah, considered the existence of the religious court as a reflection of the Indonesian state, which is neither fully secular nor theocratic. He argued that the status of religious judicature would not become a competitor to the national legal system, but in fact would become an integral part of it and subject to it.⁷⁸ He referred to the legal principle *lex generalis*, *lex specialis* as an argument that the two judicial institutions would not be contradictory.⁷⁹

For the exponents of Model 2, having a special religious institution in the state is not an exclusive right for Muslims. They suggested that members of other religious communities could also have a similar Act and might propose to the Parliament what they needed. Thus, Christians, Hindus, or Buddhists could have their own religious judicature if they wanted.⁸⁰ Although this may seem to be incongruous, for the exponents of Model 2, it was a serious proposal. For them, one of the functions of the state is to cater to the needs of the citizens, including their religious interests.

Teaching Religion at Public Schools

As far as the religion-state relationship is concerned, teaching religion at schools has always been a divisive issue. In the United States, it is still being debated in spite of the fact that the U.S. Constitution specifically mentions its proscription.⁸¹ In Indonesia, although Muslims are the majority, teaching religion at schools is still problematic. The National Educational System Bill (known as SPN or Sisdiknas) has been proposed at least thrice in Parliament, and each time the issue was raised, heated reactions erupted. First, in 1950 it came with Law No. 4/1950, then in 1989, with Law No. 2/1989, and finally, in 2003, with Law No. 20/2003.

What is meant by “school” here is general schools (*sekolah umum*), which are administered by the Department of Education. Schools that are administered by the Department of Religion are not disputed since religious education has always been an important part of their curriculum. Indonesia has two educational systems. One is under the administration of the Department of Education and the other is under the administration of the Department of Religion. The issue of teaching religion at schools has to do with the public schools under the former department and not the latter.

The exponents of Model 2 considered religious education at school a non-negotiable issue. The state, they argued, is responsible for regulating and supervising its implementation. Without the involvement of the state, people will consider it unnecessary, and schools will neglect it. The main reason for their support of teaching religion at school was the view that religious education is an essential and determining factor for the morality of future generations of the nation. Religious education has been perceived not only as a spiritual need, but also as a keeper of students’ morality. Another reason was that religious education is a symbol of resistance against secularism. They reasoned that by having it Indonesia would be different from secular states. Lukman Harun, a well-known Muhammadiyah leader, considered the National Educational System Bill crucial, simply because education is not a personal matter, but has become the state’s responsibility and thus only the state has the right to regulate it.⁸² Harun further suggested that in order for schools to provide religious education, the state must issue a law by which they are bound. Thus, any school which violates it must be charged with the maximum penalty.⁸³ For Harun, the section on religious education is crucial in guaranteeing that Indonesia would not be a secular state. Without religious education, he argued, the Indonesian education system would be no different from that of Western secular countries.⁸⁴

When the same bill was resubmitted in 2003, the exponents of Model 2 again came to the fore to defend it. There was huge protest against the bill, but it not only came from the Christians and secularists like it used to, but also from the younger Muslim generation.⁸⁵ Amien Rais, then chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), considered the bill to be reasonable enough and democratic. When he was asked about the controversial Chapter 5, Section 12, he answered that "honestly I say that the Section is in line with the spirit of religious tolerance, the spirit of Pancasila ideology, and the spirit of democracy".⁸⁶ The same response was given by A. Malik Fadjar, a Muhammadiyah leader who became Minister for Education in Megawati's Cabinet.⁸⁷ Like many Muhammadiyah leaders, Fadjar was supportive of the idea of religious teaching in schools and considered it to be one of the important goals of national education. He argued that education has two pivotal missions: the intellectual and the moral. The most important element of moral building is religion. The proposal for religious teaching in the national educational system is thus to fulfil this goal.⁸⁸

The main problem with the issue of religious teaching in Indonesia appears not so much to be the necessity of having legislation for religious education as such. It seems that most Indonesians, be they Muslims or non-Muslims, agree that teaching religion in schools is important. As a Pancasila state which does not recognize a "wall of separation", teaching religion in schools is reasonable and desirable. What is problematic, and thus becomes the point of dispute, are the details of how such a law will be implemented. For instance, what is meant by "religion"? How is it to be taught? Who is going to teach it? In the 2003 bill, for example, it is mentioned that "religion" means the five "official religions", namely: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. This means other minority religions, despite having large numbers of adherents, such as Confucianism, are not recognized. The same problem can be found in Chapter 5, Section 12, regarding the religious status of the teacher: whether the teacher of a particular religion has to be a follower of that particular religion, and, if so, whether he or she should be of the same religious school of thought (*madhhab*) as his or her students.⁸⁹

The exponents of Model 2 seemed to be not so much troubled by all those questions. As we can see from Amien Rais's answer, despite many responses and dissatisfactions, he appealed to all people to accept what Parliament had decided, although crucial chapters in the bill remain undecided. Thus, it would not be surprising if in five or ten years' time, teaching religion in schools will once again become a controversial issue in the country.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND PLURALISM

Pluralism is a relatively new notion. In the West, the adoption of the concept goes back to the era of the Renaissance, when people started to realize that they were not living in a single homogeneous community. Judaism and Islam had been in Europe for centuries and new faiths had been growing widely as a consequence of the Protestant Reformation. The basic idea of this concept was that one can live together in harmony and respect among people from other religions. Although it seems simple, the consequences of the concept have never been easy for any religious community to practise. First, pluralism requires religious adherents to acknowledge the possibility of truth in other religions. This is mainly to satisfy the principle of equality among religions, without which any negotiation to seek common ground cannot be achieved. Moreover, the concept also requires freedom for any members of religions or sects to believe in their creeds and to follow practices based on their religious doctrines. This means that there would be no dominant religion or sect. Since it must be assumed that all religions and beliefs contain truth, it becomes inappropriate for any member of a particular religion to convert others to his or her religion.

For the exponents of Model 2, religious pluralism is an important notion that must be adopted and developed. For one thing, it complies with the principles of the religious democratic state that they tried to build. Religious pluralism does not only imply the significance of religion at the social level, but also at the political level. This means that the concept would not only play a role in creating a harmonious religious life, but would also be taken as a foundation to counter secularism that threatens the life of modern men. The exponents of Model 2 realized that not all Muslims could agree with this concept, mainly because of the fact that it does not originate from Islam, and some of its consequences might be considered to be against “Islamic doctrines”. However, they considered that such an objection is generally based on Muslim misunderstanding of the concept. If understood properly, they argued, religious pluralism would be completely congenial with Islam.

The most respected Muslim scholar in developing the discourse on religious pluralism in Indonesia is Abdul Mukti Ali, a distinguished scholar who served as Minister for Religion in Soeharto’s first cabinet. Mukti Ali was one of the *santri* Muslims who became Soeharto’s ally in the government as he supported Soeharto’s agenda of national reconciliation and development. For this purpose, he set up a project of dialogue among religious communities in the country. He believed that religious dialogue should be started with

religious leaders. Thus, in 1972, he initiated the Forum for Inter-Religious Consultation (Musyawarah Antar Umat Beragama), which comprised leaders from various religious bodies in Indonesia, such as the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia), the Council of Bishops of Indonesia (PWGI, Persatuan Wali Gereja Indonesia), the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI, Dewan Gereja Indonesia), the Masters of Indonesian Buddhists (WALUBI, Perwalian Umat Budha Indonesia), and the Association of Indonesian Hindu Dharma (PHDI, Persatuan Hindu Dharma Indonesia). The main objective of this forum, as Mukti Ali explained, was “to propagate inter-religious tolerance”.⁹⁰

The main task of the project of religious dialogue in Indonesia, according to Mukti Ali, is to assure Muslims that dialogue is important and that it does not infringe upon their religious creed. It has been a common view among Muslims that intensive communication and friendship with non-Muslims can be detrimental to the very basis of one's religion, as one of the Qur'anic verses suggests that Muslims should take a strict attitude towards them (*ashidda 'ala al-kuffar*). Many Muslims consider Christians simply as *kuffar* (infidels), in spite of the fact that other verse of the Qur'an calls them “the people of the book” (*ahl al-kitab*).⁹¹ Apart from this theological ground, contemporary Muslim attitudes towards non-Muslims, particularly Christians, have been much determined by the social-political situation during the early 1970s, where the issue of Christianization was widespread among the Muslim community. However, after more than three decades of effort, religious pluralism in Indonesia has developed significantly. Cooperation between religious adherents has been increasing and the intellectual forums which focus on this specific purpose have been quite overwhelming.⁹²

What is important to note here is that Muslim views of other religions and faiths are increasingly changing in a positive direction. More importantly, this positive response does not only come from the modernist intellectuals who have dominated Islamic political discourse since the time of independence, but also from the traditionalists. The traditionalist Muslims represented by NU have produced a new generation of *ulama* who are more moderate and open-minded. I have already mentioned such NU leaders as Abdurrahman Wahid and Achmad Siddiq, whose religious-political views are quite liberal. Hasyim Muzadi is another NU member who has been considered to be progressive.⁹³ In 2001, he was nominated as general chairman of the organization. He has not been a prolific writer, but his activities as a Muslim leader have gone beyond the organization he leads. He established dialogues and contacts with other

religious leaders and has been invited to speak in churches and temples several times. In a book based on his interviews, he explains his view on pluralism as follows:

Pluralism in its various forms is something natural, and is not something we should try to avoid. It is a reflection of a social reality, which is a *given*, or part of *sunnatullah* (God's law), which illustrates how human beings are created multifariously and differently from each other. There is no power that can negate or neutralize the reality of pluralism. Everybody is no doubt aware that between himself and other people, or between his own group and other groups, or between his nation and other nations, there tends to be differences, as there are similarities, belonging to the same species as well as being fellow creations of God.⁹⁴

This tangible reality, according to Muzadi, is the most powerful argument which cannot be rebutted by any other argumentation. It is for this reason, he argued, that the Qur'an fully endorses the idea of pluralism. He pointed out several verses such as 30:22 and 49:13,⁹⁵ as an Islamic basis of pluralism.

Tolerant behaviour and strong arguments developed by Muslim leaders regarding the idea of pluralism are very important, mainly because they are the religious authorities whose opinions are generally heard by their fellow Muslims.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Classical Islamic sources have been contested by both Muslim conservatives and Muslim liberals to justify their respective views on women. While the former would look for verses or traditions (*hadith*) which can support their view on the subordinate status of women, the latter look for ones which support their views on women's emancipation and equality. Classical sources seem to have become a swollen wellspring for Muslims to justify their different views. It is thus futile to theologically argue on the status of woman in Islam, since Islamic classical sources provide materials for both points of views.

The exponents of Model 2 do not depart from particular texts in looking at the status of woman, but they directly carry on a rendition that the spirit and the basic principle of Islam are favourable to the rights of woman. A religion which highly respects human dignity must naturally be respectful of the dignity of woman; and the most important aspect of respecting woman is considering her rights and status. From this basic assumption, they develop their argument that the whole message of the Qur'an is fundamentally

against discrimination against woman.⁹⁶ This does not necessarily mean that they are unaware of verses that appear to be discriminative against woman, such as the verses on inheritance, witness, and the status of woman in general. All these verses, they suggest, must be read contextually in the spirit of the age.⁹⁷

Contextualization is an important term for the exponents of Model 2 in dealing with Islamic classical sources, as they believe that those sources, particularly the Qur'an, were handed down as a response to certain conditions at a specific time. On the other hand, Islam is a religion that claims to provide guidance for all times and in all places (*salih li kulli zaman wa makan*). Thus, it is natural that those sources need reinterpretation so that they can comply with changing and different situations. Sahal Mahfudh, a leading NU scholar, argues that our need for contextualization of the Qur'an is mainly due to the fact that times are always changing while revelation has stopped.⁹⁸

The man who is mainly responsible for the idea of contextualization with regard to the issue of women's rights in Indonesia is the aforementioned Munawir Sjadzali. He uses the terms "reactualization" and "contextualization" respectively, but the former was much more popular than the latter and almost exclusively associated with his name.⁹⁹ What he means by "reactualization" is an attempt to review and rethink primary Islamic sources in order to give a new understanding which is more current and more compatible to the spirit of the age. Munawir considers that Muslim understanding of the Qur'an must be kept in line with the circumstances in which one lives, otherwise "Islam will be a serious hindrance to progress and development".¹⁰⁰ One of the Qur'anic verses which needs reactualization, according to Sjadzali, is the verse regarding inheritance. This verse clearly states that a woman is entitled to only half of what is inherited by man. Sjadzali considers this formula unjust, particularly with regard to the Indonesian context. He sees that the formula strongly bears the bias of the locality in which Islam was revealed. Thus the verse cannot be read literally, but it must rather be read in line with the situation and the context in which Muslims live. In one of his books, Sjadzali explains why he specifically wants to reactualize this verse:

In the issue of distribution of inheritance, the Qur'an, Chapter al-Nisa, verse 11, clearly states that the entitlement of the son is double that of the daughter. But this formula has been much discounted by Indonesian Muslims, directly or indirectly. I became aware of this when I was serving as Minister of Religion... As a Minister of Religion, I received reports from many Islamic judges (*hakim agama*) in various regions, including those from the regions steeped in Islamic tradition such as South Sulawesi and

South Kalimantan, of increasing departure from such Qur'anic regulation. The Islamic judges observed that often, when a Muslim died and his inheritors consulted them on Islamic *faraid*, the inheritors then would refuse to apply it and would go instead to the State Court (*pengadilan negeri*) to apply for another law which was obviously different from *faraid*... Then there have also been practices by a number of Muslims who took a pre-emptive step, by distributing their wealth as *hibah* (gift) to their children before they die. By doing so, when they die, there will be no more wealth to be distributed. In this latter case, there is certainly no departure from the Qur'an. But, is it the appropriate spirit for religious observation? Could such an action be categorized as a trick (*helah*) or even as playing with religion?¹⁰¹

Thus, reactualization of the inheritance verse, for Sjadzali, is not only aimed at defending the rights of women, but also to save the Qur'an from Muslims who do not feel comfortable with some of its contents.

Another example of a verse that needs to be contextualized is the verse on women's status, which states "men are *superior* over woman" (*al-rijalu qawwamuna 'ala al-nisa'*).¹⁰² This verse has been (over)used to justify the ineligibility of women to become political leaders. When the issue of a female president arose on the Indonesian political stage in 1999, following Megawati Soekarnoputri's nomination as a presidential candidate, this verse was often quoted by conservative Muslims to discredit her. Most of the exponents of Model 2 did not support Megawati for president either. However, they did it not because they were inspired by the Qur'anic doctrine such as the verse above, but merely because they did not trust Megawati's capability to rule the country. Thus, they never used the verse to discredit her.¹⁰³ For them, the verse above had nothing to do with politics, let alone prohibiting a woman from becoming president. Most of the exponents of Model 2 tend to choose a liberal interpretation in dealing with such a verse. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, for example, prefers Muhammad Asad's (1900–92) rendition; he interprets the word "*qawwamuna*" as "*those who are responsible or those who are protecting*". Thus, in that Qur'anic verse, man is not positioned as superior to woman, but as an equal of a couple that has responsibility for his family. This interpretation, Maarif argues, is clearly more positive with regard to the status of women than the Muslim conservatives' understanding.¹⁰⁴

As a model that assumes democracy to be one of its main pillars, the positive attitude of Model 2 towards women's rights is not surprising. Even Model 1, which seems to be conservative on several political issues, had a positive vision of woman's rights (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the

advocacy of women's rights does not mean that they totally support feminist movements. As a matter of fact, some of the radical feminists — who support lesbianism for example — are never tolerated, simply because they are considered as being against Islam.¹⁰⁵ The foundation of the democracy of Model 2 allows its adherents to support the feminist movement, but its religious foundation has limited their support in order to exclude certain radical elements.

ECONOMIC JUSTICE

For most exponents of Model 2, Pancasila is not only a political concept; it is also an economic one. As it is an ideal for the basis of state, Pancasila is also good to be the basis for an alternative economic system. In general, however, the exponents of Model 2 do not like to use the term “Pancasila economy”, since it has been notoriously associated with Soeharto's obsession with the *Pancasilazation* of the country. However, as a theoretical concept, the Pancasila economy is widely accepted. The term “Pancasila economy” was first introduced by Emil Salim in an article he wrote for *Kompas* in 1966 and in another for *Prisma* in 1979.¹⁰⁶ However, the concept was not much known until Mubyarto, a professor of economics in Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, reintroduced it. In 1981, in a series of articles and later in a book, he elaborated on the Pancasila economy, which soon drew response from intellectuals and economists.¹⁰⁷ Although the Pancasila economy was not adopted as a state policy, Mubyarto continued campaigning for this idea. In 2002, he founded the Centre for the Study of Pancasila Economy (PUSTEP, Pusat Studi Ekonomi Pancasila) and became its first chairman himself.

The “Pancasila economy” is an economic system based on Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution (UUD 45). From Pancasila, the system takes the fourth principle on social justice, and from the Constitution, it takes Section 33, Articles 1, 2, and 3 on economic democracy.¹⁰⁸ Emil Salim describes it as an economic system that can be compared to a swinging pendulum that moves rightwards (towards capitalism) and leftwards (towards socialism), and Pancasila economy stands exactly in the middle.¹⁰⁹ Mubyarto further explains this concept by adding some criteria, among which are: (i) that economy must be driven by social and moral impetus; (ii) that egalitarianism is based on principles of humanism; (iii) that the priority is directed towards a strong national economy; (iv) that cooperation (*koperasi*) is the foundation of economy; and (v) that there should be a guarantee of social and economic justice.¹¹⁰ Mubyarto's conception of Pancasila economy,

according to Mohammad Sadli, a senior Indonesian economist, is slightly different from Emil Salim's in that the latter is still considering the market an important factor, while the former puts much emphasis on people's economic activities.¹¹¹

Although the exponents of Model 2 do not use the term "Pancasila economy", they all agree that an economic system which bears the spirit and values of Pancasila is ideal. For them, the most important thing is not the name, but how the system can improve the economic life of Indonesians. The meeting point between the Model 2 economic vision and the Pancasila economy is that both reject the dominating systems of capitalism and socialism. Capitalism, they argue, has a serious defect in that it creates, among other things, inequality and an extreme gap between the rich and the poor. Socialism, on the other hand, has a negative influence for, among other things, proposing a totalitarian system which represses individual creativity.¹¹² Nevertheless, they acknowledge that parts of both systems are positive, and that the ideal is to adopt selectively those positive aspects. Hence, they developed a new alternative economy.

M. Dawam Rahardjo calls that kind of alternative economy "Indonesian Economic System" (SPI, Sistem Perekonomian Indonesia), which can be compared with the idea of Social Market Economy (SME) developed in Germany. In the national context and, particularly for Muslims, SPI is a combination of the Pancasila Economic System (SEP, Sistem Ekonomi Pancasila) and the Islamic Economic System (SEI, Sistem Ekonomi Islam).¹¹³ SPI is based on the economic reality in Indonesia where the gap between the rich and the poor, as well as between the major capital owners (*conglomerates*) and the small-scale businessmen, is prevalent. In spite of adopting Pancasila in politics, the Indonesian economic system is actually dominated by Western capitalism. Since Soeharto appointed several technocrats from the University of Indonesia and particularly a group known as the "Berkeley Mafia",¹¹⁴ the Indonesian economic system is more capitalistic than it is Pancasilaist.¹¹⁵

One factor that differentiates the economic model developed by the exponents of Model 2 from that of the liberal economic system is its strong affirmation of the people. This is why this system is often called the "people's economy" (*ekonomi kerakyatan*). The support of the people means the creation of particular regulations which favour people's interests. The market must not be given free rein as the liberal economists suggest; but it has to be orientated maximally to keep maximum benefit for the people. Dawam Rahardjo draws an example of how Germany with its SME system

is able to attain progress as well as well-being for its people. The Pancasila economy or people's economy must protect the market from "interest groups that can deteriorate market and social balance".¹¹⁶ In other words, the role of the "visible hand" is absolutely important.

Among the exponents of Model 2 who tirelessly support the idea of a people's economy, Adi Sasono is perhaps the most consistent. He has long been known as an activist in a non-government organization which focuses on social empowerment. He wrote many articles as well as books, particularly with his friend Sritua Arief (an NGO activist) about the people's economy. For him, the people's economy is the solution for the economic problems prevailing in Indonesia. He disagrees with some observers who say that the state's policy set in the pro-people economy often distorts the market. Instead, he argues that there is no such policy which distorts the market:

Could such a policy distort market forces? Distortion occurs when a player misinterprets market indications. When it is time to buy, the player sells, and [when] it is time to sell, the player buys. Distortion is not a result of a policy, however bad the policy. Distortion is caused by a lack of openness (*ketidakterbukaan*). Any policy which is made and maintained in secrecy, will result in distortion. It happens because the flow of information is asymmetric; some know and others are kept in the dark. Consequently, certain players are able to gain the optimal profit and others are not. Thus, the problem does not lie in the nature of the policy, but in the question [of] whether or not all players have an equal opportunity to access the information.¹¹⁷

When he served as Minister for Cooperatives, Sasono was implementing the principle of the "people's economy" by issuing popular policies, such as distribution of assets of big businessmen (conglomerates) to units of the cooperatives. Unfortunately, as Arief Budiman later criticized him, Sasono's pro-people policies had really distorted the market.¹¹⁸

The "people's" economic system, like many other alternative economic system, seems to be very fascinating for intellectual discourse, but is hardly so when it is put into reality. It is ironic to see that even Soeharto himself refused Mubarto's proposal of the Pancasila economy and was instead more convinced to adopt the liberal economy proposed by his economic advisers. It seemed that Soeharto was listening to Mahbub ul-Haq, a Pakistani economist who was often quoted by the New Order bureaucrats, who argued that an alternative economy which is obsessed with taking the positive aspects of capitalism and socialism will in the end only be "combining the worst elements of capitalism and socialism".¹¹⁹

LIMITS OF THE MODEL

As we can see, Model 2 is founded on two basic foundations: political pluralism of Pancasila and the rejection of secularism. The former, on the one hand, implies that the model would accept Pancasila as the only basis of the state. The acceptance of Pancasila was mainly based on the conviction that all principles (*silas*) in Pancasila are intrinsically good and not contradictory to Islamic values. It also implies that the model would reject the idea of the Islamic state. Since the very idea of the Islamic state is to prioritize one religion over another (whatever the priority is), it is, therefore, important to rule out this idea from any Muslim political agenda. The latter, on the other hand, implies that the model should be based on the principle of state establishment of religion. In practice, this principle is implemented by the regulation and laws promulgated by the state.

Despite being a sophisticated theory, Model 2, however, faces difficulties when it is put into practical politics. The exponents of Model 2 seem to be confused on how to define the religion-state relationship with regard to the concept of political pluralism. On the one hand, they fully agree and are ready to go hand in hand with other religious communities in building a religious democratic state. On the other, they tend to consider that the adoption of certain religious values by the state does not need the consensus of other religious communities. Thus, the legislation of the Marriage Law in 1974 and legislation of Religious Judicature in 1989 were, in their opinion, something that Muslims are entitled to, despite the strong opposition from Christians and other religious communities. As we can see, the successful passing of the two laws was not due to consensus, but strongly due to the intervention of Soeharto and the military faction in Parliament, who saw good political interest in it.

The main problem with this model is how to define the role of religion in the state and how far such a role can be accommodated by the state. Most of the exponents of Model 2 consider religious legislation by the state not contradictory to the principle of pluralism, since it is part of the rights of citizen to carry out their religious doctrine. This issue would not be problematic had all the religious communities shared the same understanding of the platform used as the basis of pluralism. In the case of Indonesia, such a common perception is clearly absent. In fact, the opposite can be said. While Muslims consider that the platform should be “the unification of religion and the state”, non-Muslims, Christians particularly, consider “the separation of religion and the state” as the basis of pluralism. Thus, in spite

of Muslims' appeal to their non-Muslim colleagues to ask for their own version of the Marriage Law or Religious Judicature Law, or any other law, such an appeal would not be effective because their foundational basis is totally different.

Model 2 is indeed unique. In countries that apply political pluralism, the common platform that ties members of communities is secularization or the separation of religion and the state, and not the unification of religion and the state. Technically, secularization, in which the state is positioned as neutral, is more easily implemented, simply because each member of the community is not allowed to touch the public realm which becomes common property. Meanwhile in the platform of unification, such a space becomes the area of contestation. Yet the original ideal, as projected by the exponents of Model 2, was to find a common denominator (*kalimah sawa*), so that they could determine a state with religious values. The problem is simply that Model 2 does not tolerate secularization.

Model 2's antagonist attitude towards secularization is not limited to the religious-political field. In economics, the exponents of Model 2 also reject "secularization", which in this case means separation between the state and the market. The market is often understood as belonging to the public, the property of everyone, so in liberal economic principles, it should be left free. For Model 2, the market must not be left free since, they argue, freedom would create economic injustice. Hence, like religion, the market must come under the control of the state. Based on this basic standpoint, they found an alternative economic system, which they call the "Indonesian economic system" (Dawam Rahardjo) or the "people's economic system" (Adi Sasono). In practice, the exponents of Model 2 have never perfectly applied this alternative economic system. However, on a small scale, it has been attempted by Adi Sasono when he served as Minister for Cooperatives. Still, his attempt failed, and many critics say that his pro-people economic policies had actually damaged the market.¹²⁰

CONCLUDING REMARKS

From the discussion above, it is safe to argue that the religious democratic state was dominant during the Soeharto era. This is not only because of the fact that it had been maintained for more than thirty years by the regime, but also because it fundamentally encapsulates the religious-political aspiration of Indonesian Muslims in general. As we can see, Muslims were divided politically into various groups, and this variety could not be accommodated by an exclusive model of polity such as that of Model 1. The 1955 general

election was the most cogent evidence that Muslims did not want such a model, as the Islamic parties only obtained less than half of the votes. Model 2 is thus a kind of revision of the old failed model. Nevertheless, such a revision was done partially, as several bases that became characteristic of the old model — such as the rejection of secularism — were still defended and widely promoted. Model 2 then becomes a half-hearted model, as it contains some dilemmas and contradictions in itself, in spite of its predominant position in the religious-political life of Indonesian Muslims in general.

One of these dilemmas was the acceptance of the principle of pluralism and openness on the one hand, and the strong dependence on the state on the other. In the socio-political aspect, the dependency on the state triggered tension between Islam and communities of other religions because Muslims simply feel that they are entitled to use the state's authority to approve their demands, particularly in legal form. Hence, the paradox of Model 2. The rejection of political secularism was not fully supported by non-Muslim minorities. They prefer the principle of political secularism, which is considered more neutral with regard to the issue of the religion-state relationship in Indonesia.

In the economic sector, the dependency on the state is the immediate implication of their rejection of the economic capitalist system, which they claimed has created economic gaps and injustice. The main reason for such injustice, they argue, is that there is uncontrolled freedom in dealing with the market. The owners of capital would become increasingly richer, while those who do not have capital would always be marginalized. The alternative is to limit free competition by inviting the state to interfere (or be involved, in their own language). Hence a dilemma arises. The state's intervention aroused another problem that is even more serious, such as the distortion of the market mechanism. Consequently, the use of state as "a just agent" is not compatible with what they originally wanted. In fact, as some critics say, it often makes the situation worse. It was against all these discrepancies that the third model, the LDS model, came into existence.

Notes

1. For further elaboration on Soeharto's early policies in dealing with Indonesian politics, see R. E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
2. Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development, and Pressure for Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 126.

3. Merle C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since C.1200*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 343–44.
4. His novels and short stories, such as *Kereta Api yang Berangkat Pagi Hari* [The Train that Departs in the Morning] (1966), *Dilarang Mencintai Bunga-Bunga* [It is Forbidden to Love Flowers, 1968] and *Khutbah di Atas Bukit* [Sermon at the top of the Hill] (1976), won several literary awards in Indonesia.
5. For this reason, I consider him an exponent of Model 3.
6. Greg Barton, “Islam, Pancasila and the Middle Path of Tawassuth: The Thought of Achmad Siddiq”, in *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*, edited by Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996).
7. “*Khittah*” literally means fault lines. It refers to the establishment of NU in 1926. Thus it is also called “*Khittah 1926*”. At the 1984 NU congress, the term was used as an appeal to NU members to withdraw from politics. By this appeal, the NU leaders wanted to agitate the PPP, an Islamic party, which has been considered to be unfair to the NU members. With the *khittah*, NU members were no longer obliged to commit to one political party (PPP), but could join any other parties.
8. *Asas tunggal* is a notorious concept. It was first introduced by Soeharto at a military meeting (Rapat Pimpinan or Rapim ABRI) in March 1980. It was then raised in his official speech before the DPR session in August 1982, submitted to the parliament in the form of a draft in 1983, and finally passed by the parliament in February 1985. This concept was primarily targeted at putting all political and social organizations under the state’s control. All ideologies that became the *asas* of those organizations (such as Islamism and socialism), had to be changed into Pancasila.
9. Martin van Bruinessen, *NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru* (Yogyakarta: LKiS and Pustaka Pelajar, 1994).
10. Nasakom stands for *Nasionalisme, Agama, dan Komunisme* (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism). This concept was introduced by Soekarno in the late fifties as a response to the fierce conflict between these three ideologies. It was a fragile concept, actually, since not all elements of the ideologies were represented in it. The *Agama* element, for example, was only represented by a group of NU, ignoring other Muslims from the modernist camps, particularly Masyumi and Muhammadiyah.
11. From 1973, NU was fused to the Development and Unity Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), following the government regulation to merge all political parties into two major parties, the other major party being Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). Although NU members occupy a major segment of the party, they were not proportionally represented. Key positions such as the chairman have always been held by the modernist Muslims, the co-members as well as the rivals of NU in the party.

12. NU members were unlikely to join PDI since this party was strongly associated with secularists as well as non-Muslims.
13. I will discuss Wahid's political ideas further in Chapter 5.
14. Barton, "Islam, Pancasila and the Middle Path of Tawassuth", p. 121.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
16. Faisal Ismail, "Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and for all Muslim Organizations: An Account of Muslims' Responses", in *Studia Islamika* 3, no. 4 (1996), p. 38.
17. Quoted from Mitsuo Nakamura, "NU's Leadership Crisis and Search for Identity in the Early 1980s: From the 1979 Semarang Congress to the 1984 Situbondo Congress", in Barton and Fealy, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, p. 102.
18. Ismail, "Pancasila as the Sole Basis", p. 43.
19. Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Asas Pancasila* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1986), p. 40.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
22. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Politik: Upaya Membingkai Peradaban* (Cirebon: Pustaka Dinamika, 1999), p. 66.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
25. "Meluruskan Jalan Reformasi dengan Pancasila?", *Kompas*, 13 December 2003.
26. Kuntowijoyo, "Obyektivikasi, Agenda Reformasi Ideologi", *Kompas*, 13 July 1999; cf. Kuntowijoyo, "Obyektivikasi: Memotong Mata Rantai Dikotomi", *Kompas*, 4 March 2004.
27. Kuntowijoyo, *Identitas Politik Umat Islam* (Bandung: Mizan, 1997), pp. 85–86.
28. In NU's congress in Situbondo and Muhammadiyah's congress in Semarang, Soeharto specifically gave this statement.
29. This kind of view is common in thinkers such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mahmud Shaltut, and Fahmi Huwaydi.
30. The Qur'an; al-An'am:162: "My prayer and my rites, my living and my dying, are for God alone, the Lord of all the worlds."
31. M. Amien Rais, *Cakrawala Islam: Antara Cita dan Fakta* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), p. 126.
32. Rais, *Cakrawala Islam*, p. 29.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Mencari Autentisitas dalam Kegalaan* (Jakarta: PSAP, 2004), p. 32.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
38. Interview with M. Dawam Rahardjo, 28 January 2004.

39. Ibid.
40. I will discuss this issue below.
41. These articles were later published in two books under the titles, *Masjarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia; Renungan Pembaharuan Pemikiran* (Jakarta: Permata, 1971) and *Islam dan Politik: Islam dan Negara di Indonesia*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Septenarius, 1976).
42. Mintaredja, *Islam dan Politik*, p. 85.
43. Ibid., p. 62.
44. We will discuss Madjid's views in Chapter 5.
45. *Panji Masyarakat*, No. 376, 1 November 1982.
46. Conversation with M. Syafii Anwar, Melbourne, December 2002.
47. *Panji Masyarakat*, No. 386, 11 February 1983.
48. Most of the leading figures of Masyumi were still alive at the time. They include M. Natsir, Hamka, Zainal Abidin Ahmad, and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara.
49. Nurcholish Madjid and Mohamad Roem, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem*. 2nd rev. ed. (Jakarta: Djambatan, 2000).
50. M. Amien Rais, "Tidak Ada Negara Islam", in Madjid and Roem, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam*, pp. xxii–xxiii.
51. Rais, "Tidak Ada Negara Islam", p. xxiii.
52. In his letter, Madjid admitted that he was rather surprised by Rais's statement since he (that is, Rais) had been well known as an Islamic activist whose ideas tended to be conservative rather than liberal.
53. M. Sj. Ibnu Amatillah, *Mungkinkah Negara Indonesia Bersendikan Islam: Analyse* (Semarang: Usaha Taruna, 1950). On how he used the pseudonym, see my article, "Ibnu Amatillah itu Munawir Sjadzali", *Kompas*, 27 August 2004.
54. Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah, dan Pemikiran*, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 1990). This book has been translated into English under the title *Islam and Governmental System: Teachings, History, and Reflections* (Jakarta: INIS, 1991). One of Sjadzali's crucial moves during his service as Minister of Religion was to introduce the idea of what he calls "reactualization". By this he means an attempt to review and rethink primary Islamic sources, particularly the Qur'an, in order to give a new understanding which is more current and more compatible to the spirit of the age. Criticism of the idea of the Islamic state was part of Sjadzali's project of reactualization. For intellectual responses to his idea, see his book, *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988).
55. Ibid., p. 204.
56. Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam and Governmental System: Teachings, History, and Reflections* (Jakarta: INIS, 1991), p. 116; See also Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 170.
57. Ibid., p. 234.

58. Madjid and Roem, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam*, p. 12.
59. Among them was the MUI and HMI. For more detail, see *Tempo*'s report: "RUU Perkawinan, Aksi dan Reaksi", 8 September 1973, p. 6.
60. There are at least six problematic sections of the bill over which the pros and cons were argued. The first is Section 2, Verse 1, on the authority to legitimize the marriage; Section 3, Verse 2, on the supremacy of the general (that is, secular) court over the religious court; Section 11, Verse 2, on interreligious marriage; Section 8, Letter C, on marriage of adopted children or foster parents; Section 62 Verse, 2, on the status of adopted children; and finally Section 13, on the legitimacy of pre-marriage engagement (*pertunangan*).
61. "RUU Perkawinan, Aksi dan Reaksi", *Tempo*, 8 September 1973, p. 6.
62. "Yang Didrop dan Dirubah", *Tempo*, 15 December 1973, p. 6.
63. "Ada 'Allahu Akbar' dari Luar", *Tempo*, 6 October 1973, p. 6.
64. One of the most important points demanded by Muslims was that the bill must be subjected to Islamic marriage laws, which means that the existence of the civil registration (*pencatatan sipil*) is merely an official and supplementary procedure that does not bind.
65. "Dan Lahirlah UU itu Dengan Afdruk Kilat", *Tempo*, 29 December 1973, p. 5.
66. Ibid.
67. H.M. Rasjidi, *Kasus RUU Perkawinan dalam Hubungan Islam dan Kristen* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1974), p. 16.
68. Ali Munhanif, "Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: A Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali", *Studia Islamika* 3, no. 1 (1996), p. 111.
69. The Bill was endorsed mostly by Catholics. In Parliament, they were represented by the Catholic Party led by Harry Chan Silalahi and two brothers, Lim Bian Koen and Lim Bian Kie, also known as Sofyan and Yusuf Wanandi respectively. For further details on Catholic manoeuvres regarding this Bill, see "RUU Perkawinan, Aksi dan Reaksi", *Tempo*, 8 September 1973.
70. "Antara Negara Agama dan Negara Pancasila", *Hidup*, 12 February 1989, pp. 28–29 and 50.
71. Deliar Noer, *Administration of Islam in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1978), p. 42.
72. There were many factors behind the creation of such a Bill, among them, the need to avoid overlap and confusion in managing religious courts. Previously, there had been conflict of authority regarding this court, between the Department of Justice, the Department of Religion, and the local governments. For more on this dispute, see Noer's *Administration of Islam in Indonesia*, particularly pp. 45–49.
73. The media report of this debate can be read in Zuffran Sabrie. *Peradilan Agama dalam Wadah Negara Pancasila: Dialog tentang RUU-PA* (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1990). An academic analysis of this Bill can be read in

- Mark Cammack, "Indonesia's 1989 Religious Judicature Act: Islamization of Indonesia or Indonesianization of Islam?", *Indonesia* 63 (April 1997), pp. 143–68.
74. "Menunggu Lahirnya si Anak Bungsu", *Tempo*, 24 June 1989, p. 30.
 75. "Peradilan Agama: Kebutuhan atau Kecemasan", *Tempo*, 24 June 1989, p. 22.
 76. See, for instance, S. Widjojo's articles, "Peradilan Agama: Antara Negara Agama dan Negara Pancasila" (*Hidup*, No. 7, 12 February 1989), "Kesaktian Pancasila dalam Tantangan" (*Hidup*, No. 10, 5 March 1989), and Eko Budi S.' article, "Sebuah Inspirasi atas RUUPA: Sikap Gereja terhadap Pancasila" (*Hidup*, No. 13).
 77. Franz Magnis Suseno, "Seputar Rencana UU Peradilan Agama", *Kompas*, 16 June 1989, in Sabrie, *Peradilan Agama*, p. 34.
 78. Ismail Suny, "Sekitar RUUPA", *Suara Muhammadiyah*, No. 11/69/1989, 12/69/1989, and 13/69/1989, in Sabrie, *Peradilan Agama*, p. 122.
 79. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
 80. In the middle of the debates on the Bill, the Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia Pusat (PHDIP), an official Hindu organization, asked the government and the Parliament to issue the same law for the Hindus. See "Hindu Minta UU Peradilan Agama Sendiri", *Media Indonesia*, 4 July 1989, in Sabrie, *Peradilan Agama*, pp. 167–68.
 81. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Education issued "Guidelines on Religious Expression in Public Schools", in which one of the points is to allow teaching *about* religion in public schools, but not teaching religion in a devotional manner. This publication is a response to increasing demand of U.S. citizens to have religious expressions in public schools, including praying, and studying religious teachings.
 82. Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dalam Undang-Undang Pendidikan Nasional* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1990), p. 154.
 83. "Tanggapan Pimpinan Muhammadiyah: Banyak Hal Perlu Diperbaiki dalam RUU Pendidikan Nasional", *Kompas*, 15 July 1988. See also Lukman Harun, *Muhammadiyah dan Undang-Undang Pendidikan Nasional* (Jakarta: Penerbit Pustaka Panjimas, 1990), pp. 158–60.
 84. In an interview with Michael Vatikiotis of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (28 July 1988), Harun criticizes the Bill that does not mention religious teaching. He considers that the original draft of the Bill was very secular. In an interview with *Kompas*, Harun considers the Bill "too liberal" and far from Islamic aspiration. See *Kompas*. "Sektor Swasta Kurang Diindahkkan dalam RUU Pendidikan Nasional", 13 August 1988. A media report on the debates over the Bill can be read in Centre for Strategic and International Studies. *Kliping tentang Undang-Undang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional*, 2 vols. (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1989).
 85. I will discuss this generation in Chapter 6.
 86. "Amien: Pro Kontra RUU Sisdiknas Wajar", *Kompas*, 3 May 2003.

87. A. Malik Fadjar was born in Yogyakarta in 1939. He studied at the State Institute of Islamic Studies of Sunan Ampel, Malang, in education. He obtained his M.A. degree from the Department of Educational Research, Florida State University. Before serving as Minister, Fadjar was rector of two Muhammadiyah Universities in Malang and Surakarta.
88. A. Malik Fadjar, *Platform Reformasi Pendidikan dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia* (Pamulang, Ciputat: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1999).
89. In Law No. 20/2003, Chapter 5, Section 12, concerning students, it is stated that students "are entitled to religious teaching according to their religion and taught by teachers of the same religion".
90. Mukti Ali, "Peranan Lembaga Keagamaan dalam Modernisasi", quoted in Ali Munhanif, "Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: A Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali", *Studia Islamika* 3, no. 1 (1996), p. 107. During the first five years, the forum held several meetings and workshops, among which twenty-three involved religious dialogue in twenty-one cities, with inter-religious workshops in sixteen cities, and two international conferences.
91. The concept of "people of the book" (*ahl al-kitab*) has been distinguished from the concept of "infidels" (*al-kafirun*) in that the former are considered to be believers like Muslims, whereas the latter are simply unbelievers. Islam implores Muslims to treat members of each group differently.
92. Mention should be made of the role of Mukti Ali's students such as M. Dawam Rahardjo and Djohan Effendi, who tirelessly worked for the development of pluralism in the country. In the early 1990s, Rahardjo built the Institution of Philosophical and Religious Study (LSAF, Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat) and published a scholarly journal, *Ulumul Qur'an*, in which the issues of pluralism dominated the discourse of the journal. Meanwhile, in 2001, Effendi established ICRP (Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace), an intellectual forum concerned with religious dialogue and pluralism.
93. Since he ran for the vice-presidential candidacy in the 2004 general election, many people criticized him as a leaning conservative. However, I believe that Muzadi is generally still a progressive leader. His "conservativeness", I think, is only an expression of his disagreement with Abdurrahman Wahid, who has been an arch opponent since 2004. Every time Wahid released a religious-political statement, Muzadi responded with different view.
94. Hasyim Muzadi, *Nahdlatul Ulama di Tengah Agenda Persoalan Bangsa* (Jakarta: Logos, 1999), p. 48.
95. "And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of your languages and colours. Lo! herein indeed are portents for men of knowledge" (30:22); "O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made `you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware" (49:13).

96. They quote several Qur'anic verses for this, such as al-Taubah (9):71; al-Ahzab (33):35, al-Fath (48):55.
97. There are several verses and *hadiths* which are claimed to be against the spirit of women's egalitarianism, such as: "man is more powerful than woman" (*al-rijalu qawwamuna 'ala al-nisa*) and "Never will such a nation succeed as makes a woman their ruler."
98. Sahal Mahfudh, *Nuansa Fiqih Sosial* (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2003), p. 56.
99. The idea of reactualization was first introduced in early 1985, but it turned out to be a controversial issue in 1987 when Sjadzali presented an article in Paramadina and later published it in *Panji Masyarakat*. Sjadzali's article and its responses can now be read in his book, *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988).
100. Munawir Sjadzali, "Dari Lembah Kemiskinan", in Muhamad Wahyuni Nafis et al., *Kontekstualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), p. 97.
101. Munawir Sjadzali, "Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam", in Sjadzali, *Polemik Reaktualisasi*, pp. 2–3. See also Sjadzali, "Dari Lembah Kemiskinan", pp. 88–89.
102. Al-Nisa (4):34. Marmaduke Pikhall translates this verse as follows: "Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made one of them to excel the other, and because they spend of their property (for the support of women). So good women are the obedient, guarding in secret that which Allah hath guarded. As for those from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and banish them to beds apart, and scourge them. Then if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Lo! Allah is ever High Exalted, Great."
103. For further elaboration on the debates on this issue, see Nelly van Doorn-Harder, "The Indonesian Islamic Debate on a Woman President", *Sojourn* 17, no. 2 (2002), pp. 164–90.
104. Maarif, *Mencari Autentisitas*, p. 210.
105. Ibid., p. 211.
106. Both articles were under the title "Sistem Ekonomi Pancasila", *Kompas*, 30 June 1966, and *Prisma*, No 5, May 1979.
107. On discussion and responses to Mubyarto's view, see *Tempo*, "Ekonomi Pancasila Sebuah Perdebatan: Mengapa Ramai?", 1 August 1981.
108. Article I states: "The economy shall be organized as a common endeavour based upon the principles of the family system."; Article II states: "Sectors of production which are important for the country and affect the life of the people shall be controlled by the state." Article III states: "The land, the waters and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people."
109. Dawam Rahardjo, "Isu-Isu Kontemporer Ekonomi Pancasila", paper presented at a symposium at Pusat Studi Ekonomi Pancasila, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, April 2004.
110. Mubyarto, *Ekonomi Pancasila: Gagasan dan Kemungkinan* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1987), p. 53.

111. "Galeri Sebuah Perdebatan", *Tempo*, 1 August 1981.
112. Rais, *Cakrawala Islam*, p. 94.
113. M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Islam dan Transformasi Sosial-Ekonomi* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat, 1999), pp. 165–66.
114. Among the members of the "Berkeley Mafia" were Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Mohammad Sadli, Emil Salim, and Soebroto.
115. For further elaboration on the role of liberal technocrats who drove Indonesian economic system to liberal capitalism, see Rizal Mallarangeng, *Mendobrak Sentralisme Ekonomi: Indonesia, 1986–1992* (Jakarta: KPG, 2002).
116. Dawam Rahardjo, "Isu-isu Kontemporer Ekonomi Pancasila", paper presented at a symposium held by the Centre of Study of Pancasila Economy, Yogyakarta, 6 April 2004, <http://www.ekonomipancasila.org/artikel_28.htm> (accessed 10 August 2004). For further elaboration on Dawam's economic views, see his book *Esei-Esei Ekonomi Politik* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1983).
117. Adi Sasono, "Ekonomi Kerakyatan dalam Dinamika Perubahan", paper presented at International Conference on Network Economy: Toward a Democratization of Economy in Indonesia, Hotel Shangri-La, Jakarta, Indonesia, 6–7 December 1999.
118. Arief Budiman, "Adi Sasono dan Ekonomi Kerakyatan, Mungkinkah?", *De/R*, December 1998. In this article, Budiman criticizes Sasono for his policy to redistribute conglomerate's assets to people of the lower class. According to Budiman, this policy will certainly deteriorate the market mechanism, since the conglomerates will in their turn compensate for their "loss" in goods they produce. Thus, the price will increase and the people of the lower class will finally return the surplus to those conglomerates.
119. Mallarangeng, *Mendobrak Sentralisme Ekonomi*, p. 75.
120. As strongly demonstrated by Arief Budiman's article mentioned above.

MODEL 3

Liberal Democratic State

Model 3, which will be discussed in this chapter, is a response to various problems of the religion-state relationship that arose in Model 2. It fundamentally criticizes the hegemonic position of the state over people's religious activities and radically attempts to present a more feasible format of the religion-state relationship for Indonesia. Like Model 2, Model 3 departs from the sociological construct that Indonesia is a pluralist country and that any attempt to establish national integrity must, therefore, be in line with the principles of pluralism. For Model 2, the principle of pluralism lies in religious awareness and the importance of the role of the state in maintaining people's religions. Greatly dependent on the state, they reject the idea of secularization. For Model 3, on the other hand, the principle of pluralism lies in the separation of the role of religion and the state. Pluralism, this model argues, would not work properly if the state interferes too much in people's religious activities.

This chapter will discuss Model 3 in the light of divergences between the two models. It first examines the intellectual origins of the model and how this model is fundamentally different from the previous ones. To make the comparison and the argument consistent, I will examine the same problems addressed in the previous model, namely the perception of secularization, the problem of religion-state relationship, the attitude towards religious pluralism, and the conception of an alternative economic system.

INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF THE MODEL

In contemporary discourse on political philosophy in the West, the idea of the minimal state has been portrayed as paragon of a liberal state. Robert Nozick, the most respected thinker of this idea, believes that the less the state interferes in people's affairs, the better the state will function. The core aim of political liberalism is to give people their freedom and liberty. One of the ways to fulfil this freedom is by limiting the state's control.¹ The exponents of Model 3 think along the same lines, though with a different emphasis: a good state is one that does not interfere in people's private affairs, including that of religion. They certainly do not use the term "minimal state" or "liberal state" to denote their view of an ideal polity. However, what they think and formulate regarding the model of polity, particularly with regard to the issue of the religion-state relationship, can be considered as such. In any case, the use of "liberal state" or "liberal democratic state" is arguably less controversial than that of the "secular state", although from a religious-political perspective, these terms are equivalent.

Muslim discourse on the liberal democratic state in Indonesia has been growing increasingly since the downfall of Soeharto. The change of regime has brought in a more liberal political atmosphere where freedom of expression and speech has become normal. Various articles have appeared in newspapers and magazines addressing this particular issue.² Mostly written by members of the younger Muslim generation, these articles have a homogenous message, namely to criticize the hegemonic role of the state over the people's religious matters, and to appeal to religious communities, Muslims particularly, not to surrender their religious affairs to the state. There are two main reasons articles of this kind have emerged. Firstly, as part of the mounting criticisms and condemnations against the declining regime: while economists would criticize Soeharto's bad economic policy and legal experts would criticize his bad implementation of the law, students of religion, in turn, would criticize his policy in religious matters. Secondly, as a response to the emerging groups of Islamic fundamentalism whose agenda is to bring Islam to the state. Those articles are specifically addressed to: (i) criticize the Muslim demand for an Islamic state; (ii) criticize the Islamist agenda to revive the Jakarta Charter; and (iii) criticize the religious bills whose essence is to let the state interfere in Muslim religious life.

Certainly, Muslim discourse on the liberal democratic state did not emerge suddenly after *reformasi*. As a matter of fact, it had started since the time of independence. As far as the *santri* Muslims are concerned, it began in the early 1970s when the Islamic reform movement (*gerakan pembaruan*

Islam) emerged and dramatically changed Muslim political discourse in the country. As mentioned in Chapter 4, some Muslim reformists have a more liberal religious-political attitude than others. Nurcholish Madjid and Djohan Effendi, for instance, are among the Muslim reformists who consistently bear the spirit of Islamic liberalism and earnestly support the idea of a liberal democratic state. Although the main concern of these two reformists is not political, some of their views have directly or indirectly influenced the discourse of Islamic political thought in the country.

Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) has long been known as a Muslim reformist (*pembaru*) whose main agenda was to renew Muslim understanding of Islam. He was born in Jombang, East Java, into a strong *santri* family. His father, Abdul Madjid, was a Masyumi leader. He was educated at Darus Salam Gontor, a famous Islamic boarding school in East Java, and went on to IAIN until his graduation in 1968. During his days as a university student, Madjid was an active student. He was elected President of the Muslim Student Association (HMI, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) for two periods, the only person to have enjoyed this privilege.³ After a long journey as a student activist and having travelled to many countries, he continued his study in the United States in 1979. Studying under Fazlur Rahman, a great Pakistani scholar, Madjid took Islamic philosophy and specialized in Medieval Islamic thought. He took Ibn Taymiyyah, a thirteenth century theologian, as the subject of his study. After receiving his Ph.D. in 1984, he went back to Indonesia and continued his project of religious reform (*pembaruan agama*) by establishing Paramadina, a pluralist institution, where many people come to exchange ideas. Madjid had many books published, mainly compilations of his papers and articles. Most of them are on general Islamic issues and a few are on Islamic political thought.

Like Madjid, Djohan Effendi (b. 1939) has also been concerned with religious reformism in Indonesia. He was born in Kandangan, South Kalimantan, and was educated at the State Institute of Islamic Religion (IAIN, Institut Agama Islam Negeri), Yogyakarta. During his university years, together with M. Dawam Rahardjo and Ahmad Wahib, Effendi founded a discussion group called “Limited Group”, which was later noted as the breeding ground of the Islamic reform movement.⁴ After graduation, Effendi worked at the Department of Religion and served in various positions, including as head of Research and Development (1998–2000). During Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidential term, he was appointed State Secretary (2000–2001). In 2001, together with several Muslim leaders, he founded the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP), an institution which focuses on religious dialogue and pluralism.

During the 1980s, there were not many *santri* Muslims who had a clear position on the issue of religion-state relationship. Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940) was an exception. His views on religious-political issues were famously liberal. Wahid is the grandson of Hasyim Asy'ari, the cofounder of NU. He was born in Jombang and educated in an Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) run by his family. Later, his father sent him to the Middle East to continue his studies, first in Cairo and then Baghdad. He took Islamic Studies as well as Arts as his major. But his reading went far beyond his traditional discipline. He read philosophy, sociology, and other works. He was also addicted to movies and the performing arts. After leaving the Middle East (where he never completed his studies), he visited several European countries, an experience that apparently left a deep imprint on his intellectual life. In Jakarta, Wahid was active in various organizations. His name was widely known as he was quite a prolific writer in national newspapers and magazines.⁵ Wahid's political career began in 1984, when he was selected as chairman of NU. He launched criticisms of the regime then and backed minority rights. His political career reached its zenith in 1999, when he was appointed president of the Republic.

The three intellectuals just mentioned, Madjid, Effendi, and Wahid, have been considered liberal Muslim leaders.⁶ Their role is highly important in disseminating liberal views among Indonesian Muslims. While Madjid and Effendi influenced the younger Muslim generation in the modernist camp, Wahid's influence has been enormous among the traditionalist Muslims (NU).⁷ Madjid has been very influential, particularly among students of IAIN. As Fachry Ali notes, his significance is his ability to speak beyond the scope of his discipline, namely Arab and Islamic studies. He can discuss modern issues fluently in the light of current theories on social science.⁸

The role of IAIN in general is also crucial.⁹ Its function is not merely as an educational institution, but also as the agent of Islamic reformation in Indonesia.¹⁰ Apart from Madjid, there are two other figures who have made a great impact on IAIN and its students: Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution. Both were rector and director of Postgraduate Studies in the institute, the former in the IAIN of Yogyakarta, and the latter in the IAIN of Jakarta. Mukti Ali played a great role in modernizing the institute. He introduced an inclusive approach to the study of religions and promoted religious pluralism to all of his students. During his service as Minister of Religion, Ali sent a delegation of IAIN students to continue their studies in Western universities, particularly to McGill University in Canada. Later, this exchange project left a great impact on the development of Islamic intellectualism in the institute.

Meanwhile, Harun Nasution's role was crucial in introducing and consistently addressing the rational approach to the study of religion. He wrote several books which have become textbooks for the students at the institute.¹¹ Nasution was often seen as a controversial figure, mainly because of his idea of "rational Islam". He admired Mu'tazilah, a rational school of theology in Islam, and suggested to his students that they learn and follow the spirit of this school.¹² During his leadership as president of the institute, Nasution introduced several speculative subjects such as philosophy, Sufism, and scientific method to the study of religions.¹³ He encouraged IAIN students to study Islam in a critical manner. Like other Muslim reformists, Nasution supported the government's agenda of development and modernization and believed that it was only through modernization that the conditions of Muslims could improve.

What is significant in Madjid's, Nasution's, and Ali's role is that they have made IAIN a higher learning institution that stimulates its students to embrace "enlightened Islam" — an Islam that supports liberal values. This is specifically stated by UIN (previously IAIN) rector, Azyumardi Azra, who is himself an IAIN graduate:

As an academic institution, although IAIN provides Islamic education to its students, the Islam taught to them is that of liberal Islam. IAIN does not teach fanaticism of a particular *madhhab* or Muslim scholar, but it teaches all *madhhabs* and scholars, using a modern framework, perspective, and methodology. To achieve this, the students of IAIN are also taught other religions in a fair and objective manner, free of prejudice. The study of comparative religion is an obligatory subject for all students.¹⁴

The "enlightening" materials as well as the liberal academic environment enable IAIN students to explore various ideas freely, including those which are contradictory to the classical Islamic intellectual tradition. IAIN has a Department of Philosophy, where speculative thought is taught. The liberal environment of the institute also drives its students to express their thoughts at scholarly forums and in the mass media. In fact, as far as the mass media is concerned, IAIN students have been so prolific that no students from other universities can outnumber their contributions.¹⁵

Although educated and trained in a strong Islamic institution, IAIN students are not only concerned with religious issues. According to a survey on IAIN students' contributions in seven national newspapers from 1995–2000, social and political issues were actually more dominant than religious issues (see Table 5.1).¹⁶ Thus most writings by IAIN graduates resonate with a vision of tolerant Islam. And, most students have a constructive

TABLE 5.1
Main Topics on Which IAIN Students Wrote in Seven National Media

<i>Topics</i>	<i>Number of Articles</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Religion, Ethics, and Spirituality	49	22.07
Religion and Politics	45	20.27
Religious Pluralism and Culture	39	17.56
Religion and Social Justice	26	11.71
Islam and Modernity	20	9.00
Gender Equality	16	7.20
Civil Society	10	4.50
Religion, Human Rights, and Democracy	6	2.70
Other Writings	11	4.95
Total	222	100

Source: Jamhari and Jabali (2002).

attitude towards modern political concepts such as democracy, human rights, pluralism, and gender equality.

The writing tradition among IAIN students in the mass media actually began during Nurcholish Madjid's generation of the late 1960s. But at the time its scope was rather small. Only in the mid-1980s did the writing tradition among IAIN students proliferate significantly. Newspapers and magazines such as *Kompas*, *Merdeka*, *Media Indonesia*, *Pelita*, *Tempo*, and *Panji Masyarakat* were the main print media where IAIN students published their writings.

As far as the writing tradition among IAIN students is concerned, one name has to be mentioned, namely M. Dawam Rahardjo, who trained and encouraged IAIN students to publish their pieces in national newspapers and magazines.¹⁷ Rahardjo also responsibly involved IAIN students in the research projects he undertook. Several IAIN students, such as Fachry Ali,¹⁸ Azyumardi Azra,¹⁹ and Komaruddin Hidayat,²⁰ are prolific writers whom he had trained.

In Yogyakarta, IAIN also produced quite a large number of graduates who are committed to liberal Islamic values in Madjid's and Nasution's tradition. Several graduates of IAIN Yogyakarta are working in non-government organizations (NGOs) and are active in implementing democratization, and strengthening civil society. Some of them have established publishing houses. One of the most successful publishing houses is the one founded by the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LKiS, Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial), an Islamic NGO which is concerned with studies on Islam

and society.²¹ Above all, some graduates of Yogyakarta IAIN, such as Amin Abdullah,²² Masdar F. Masudi,²³ and Said Agiel Siradj,²⁴ are known as liberal Muslims, whose contribution to Islamic intellectual and political discourse is enormous.

Those IAIN students and, generally, the IAIN networks, have shaped a group of intellectuals displaying what Bahtiar Effendi calls a “new Islamic intellectualism”, which is different from that of the 1950s *santri* mainstream.²⁵ The new Islamic intellectualism has contributed greatly to the development of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia. As far as Islamic political thought is concerned, its exponents are more tolerant and more constructive in dealing with modern ideas. Unlike the 1950s *santri* Muslims, they are not obsessed with the religious model of the state, let alone the model of the Islamic state. As a matter of fact, what increasingly becomes their concern is how to build a more democratic and liberal model of polity. As we can judge from their writings on religious-political issues, democracy and liberalism have become the central theme in their thought.

FOUNDATION OF THE MODEL: CAN ISLAM BE SECULARIZED?

What essentially distinguishes Model 2 and Model 3 is the way of looking at, and understanding the issue of, the religion-state relationship. While the former highly esteems the role of religion in the state and thus considers the state to be the guardian of all religions, the latter believes in the importance of separating the two domains. Separation of religion and the state — or simply secularization — is perhaps not an appropriate term to use, since it is ambiguous and many people would immediately reject its application in the Islamic context. However, the proponents of Model 3 specifically use the term and defend its meaning. Indeed, secularization has become the chief question for many Muslims, first, as to whether it has any relevance for the context of Indonesian Islam, and second, whether it is possible for Islam in general to be secularized.²⁶

The exponents of Model 3 have their own answer. Nurcholish Madjid was perhaps the first Muslim intellectual from the *santri* camp who courageously defended this notorious concept. In a paper delivered on 3 January 1970, he appealed to Muslims to reconsider modern concepts such as democracy, pluralism, and secularism positively. He generally differentiated between secularization and secularism, arguing that secularization is “every form of liberating development,” and secularism is “a new closed world view which functions very much like a new religion”.²⁷ Madjid’s conception of

secularization must first of all be understood sociologically. He held the view that Indonesian Muslims have had a distorted understanding of the hierarchy of values. They no longer understand what are the transcendental and the temporal values; they are confused figuring out what is Islam and what is tradition; what is essentially metaphysical (*ukhrawi*) and what is a mere worldly matter (*dunyawī*). As a result, they confuse Islam with tradition, so that defending Islam is equivalent to defending tradition. This confusion, Madjid argued, makes Muslims unable to respond to the development of contemporary thought.²⁸ The role of secularization is thus “to know what is worldly and to distinguish it from — what Muslims conceive it as — *ukhrawi*”.²⁹

Madjid developed the idea of secularization from modern sociological discourse on religion. He acknowledged that he borrowed the term and its meaning from Talcott Parsons and Robert N. Bellah, two eminent sociologists. In Parsons’s view, secularization as a sociological concept indicates the liberation of human beings from mythological views. This does not necessarily mean the obliteration of their religious faith.³⁰ Conversely, the process of liberation was greatly inspired by religious belief. Bellah argues, for instance, that the process of liberation of mythologies in Islam is largely due to Islamic conception of *tauhid* (divine unity). *Tauhid* is a concept that requires Muslims to believe in one God by negating other gods (symbolized in the sentence “there is no god but God”). The mythologies are part of “gods” that must be eliminated.³¹ Hence, Madjid argued, “secularization is a consequence of *tauhid*”.³²

From this sociological analysis, Madjid elevated it into a political context. Since politics in his view is essentially a temporal matter which is different from religion, it is thus advisable for Muslims to make clear this very distinction. Secularization in the political context is thus to distinguish appropriately what is essentially religious and what is not. Madjid’s agenda of secularization was basically targeted to make Indonesian Muslims aware that Islam in Indonesia has developed and changed in such a way that its development has less to do with Islamic political parties. Islam has been practised extensively not only by traditional Muslims, who are generally found in rural areas, but also by “people in the higher social classes” in the urban centres. Whether or not there would be an Islamic party, Islam would still develop and Indonesian Muslims would become increasingly more Islamic. What Madjid wants to say is that Muslims have to acknowledge that the struggle to uphold Islam is not necessarily an exclusive right of an Islamic political party. In many cases, even “Islamic political parties have failed to build a positive and sympathetic image; they have an image

that is opposite (for instance, the reputation of Muslims in corruption is mounting)".³³ Eventually, Madjid came to the conclusion, which later became his famous slogan: "Islam, Yes. Islamic Party, No."

The criticism against the Islamic political party was a first step towards a more advanced step which was later developed by the younger Muslim generation. This criticism was important, particularly in discontinuing the old paradigms of Islamic political thought. As we have seen in Model 1 and also Model 2, Muslims consider religion and the state to be inseparable. Most of them held the view that only Islamic political parties could struggle for religion (that is, Islam), while considering non-Islamic parties "secular" and thus unable to make any contribution to the betterment of Islam in Indonesia. For Madjid, this view is misleading, since it was based on distorted argument. He considered all political parties to be the same, working basically for worldly purposes. However, it has to be noted here that Madjid's appeal to reject Islamic parties must not be understood as an appeal to antagonize them, but rather an appeal to Muslims to disengage from what they used to think Islamic.³⁴

Madjid's idea of "secularization" is indeed controversial.³⁵ Many Muslims rejected it not only because the term derives from the West, but also because they believe the term is incompatible with Islamic political doctrine (see Chapter 6). Nevertheless, the proponents of Model 3 consider this kind of rejection a mere problem of perception of Islamic doctrine and history. Hence, whether or not secularism is "Islamic" or "un-Islamic" is entirely a matter of subjective judgment. Said Agiel Siradj, one of the most outspoken Muslim leaders, argues that Islam and secularism (or secularization) are compatible. Secularism in the sense of a distinction between worldly and unworldly matters had been existing since the early history of Islam. He writes:

Unlike the doctrine of the church, since the very beginning Islam has tolerated secularism. In fact, it could be said that secularism is a characteristic of Islam! Life in Madinah as founded by the Prophet Muhammad is a historical witness of this. At the time, Muhammad distinguished his position as a prophet from that of a head of state. The Madinah Charter that became the foundation of government at the time does not mention Islam as a political foundation. In fact, in a *hadith*, the Prophet says: *antum a'lamu bi umuri dunyakum* (in worldly matters, you know better than I do).³⁶

For Siradj, secularism is not contradictory to Islam. In fact, it has been justified by the Prophet's saying. He argues that as a concept, secularism is acceptable, particularly when we speak about the religion-state relationship

in modern times. He states that "Islam was not designed to become a state institution."³⁷

Thirty or forty years ago it was hard to imagine any *santri* Muslims defending secularism. Secularism was often associated exclusively with non-religious people. In the early 1970s, Nurcholish Madjid was certainly alone in defending this concept, but now, three decades later, he seems to have many followers. A *santri* leader such as Siradj, who was educated in *pesantrens* and even obtained all of his academic degrees from Saudi Arabia, is an enthusiastic defender of the concept.³⁸

Masdar F. Masudi is another *santri* intellectual of the younger generation who has a positive attitude towards this concept. Like Madjid and Siradj, he appeals to Muslims to adopt the positive values of secularism, particularly with regard to the issue of religion and the state. He is fully aware that this concept has been rejected by Muslims in spite of the fact that they actually need it. In an article he wrote for *Kompas*, Masudi explains how secularization is possible in Islam. To begin with, he explains that Islam has three kinds of doctrines. First, the doctrines which are private such as belief in God, belief in angels, the hereafter, and destiny. All these beliefs, Masudi argues, are private matters. What Muslims believe about God and other metaphysical matters cannot be "made uniform" (*diseragamkan*) by the state. "In this matter," he argues, "the state not only has no rights to interfere, but also has no ability to reach it."³⁹ Second, the doctrines which are communal, such as rituals (prayer, fasting, pilgrimage). Several family laws (*ahwal al-shakhsiiyyah*) are also included in this category. As such, Masudi says that the state also has no right to interfere in, for instance, delegating the police to compel a Muslim to perform prayer or fasting. Third, the doctrines which are characteristically public such as *mu'amalah* (transaction), *jinayah* (criminal codes), and *siyasah* (politics). In this matter, the state can interfere and, in fact, has right to be regulator.⁴⁰

Using the above explanation, Masudi suggests that the separation of religion and state in Islam is possible, particularly in view of the first and second categories of Islamic doctrines. On the one hand, the state cannot by any means interfere in matters of belief and rituals of religious people. On the other hand, religion does not have the obligation to regulate what becomes the right of the state. This explanation is thus taken to criticize the model of polity set in Indonesia, which is generally supported by the exponents of Model 2. Masudi considers the existence of the Department of Religion unnecessary since religion must not be regulated by the state. Individuals must be the regulators of their religion.

Furthermore, Masudi argues that the state has no right to decide the number and form of religion people need, since belief is a matter for the individual. Here he criticizes the state's discriminative policy towards Confucianism and other minority religions such as *kebatinan* (spiritualism). He holds the view that the state has no right to issue regulations that restrict or specify the way people perform their religion, such as the regulations concerning marriage, religious court, and religious harmony. Let all these be regulated by people privately. Hence, Masudi rejects the agenda of Islamization of the state by, for instance, reviving the Jakarta Charter. As the Constitution and laws belong to the public, they should be freed from the interference of any particular religion.

Nevertheless, by all those propositions, Masudi warns that he is not stamping out the role of religion in the country. Neither does he want to marginalize the role of Islamic law (*shari'ah*). What he actually wants, he admits, is to make clear that religious law should be put properly in the context of the religion-state relationship. He writes:

In a nation state, religious law, however, must not be barred from enriching the foundation of the public law. Even the law inherited from the colonial governments who colonized us for hundreds of years, who were finally driven out of the country thanks to our martyrs, has been adopted as our own, let alone the law of a religion embraced by the majority of the population in the country... But, we all have to realize that however strong and sacred the religious law (*shari'ah*), it cannot be taken as positive law in its entirety. In the context of a nation state, a religious law including that embraced by the majority of the population, is only a raw material (*bahan mentah*) comparable to traditional law (*hukum adat*) or any other laws taken from other countries.⁴¹

In other words, if Islamic elements are to have any role in the modern state, they should run or comply with the requirements of the modern nation state. Thus, the function of religion is no longer political — or ideological — in that its public role is limited only to morality.

It must be noted here that the vindication of secularism or secularization by the thinkers discussed above is not merely a matter of imposing a Western political concept on to the Indonesian Islamic political context. Those thinkers are fully aware that the term is controversial and might not be appropriate for use in the Indonesian context. However, what concerns them is not the term as such, but how the concept could positively be applied in the context of Indonesian Islam. Unlike many Muslims who reject the concept without deliberation (such as the proponents of Model 1

and 2), the exponents of Model 3 try to accept it as a consequence of their commitment to the concept of liberal democratic state.

RELIGION-STATE RELATIONSHIP

Based on the conviction that secularization or the separation of religion and the state is possible in Islam, the exponents of Model 3 believe that the state that is ruled free of religious interference is better than the state in which religion interferes. The state is a public institution that becomes the “property” of every citizen. It thus should be neutral. Criticisms by the exponents of Model 3 of the religion-state relationship are addressed to two targets. Firstly, to the state, which still maintains Soeharto’s model of polity. Secondly, to Muslims in general, who are obsessed with “conquering” the state by whatever means so they can impose their religious agenda. Such people think that the state is the only agent that can effectively undertake and implement Islamic teachings.

In the following sections, we will see how the exponents of Model 3 deal with the issues of the religion-state relationship. I will pick up three major issues often discussed by those intellectuals, namely the issue of the Department of Religion, the officialization of religion, and the criticism of the *shari’ah* and “religious” Bills.

The Department of Religion

Since its inception, the existence of the department of religion has been a controversial issue. Historically, like the institution of the religious court (see Chapter 3), the department that regulates religious affairs has been in existence since colonial times. In the Dutch period, such an institution was called Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken (Office for Native Affairs). It was first founded in 1899 and was first chaired by Snouck Hurgronje from 1899 to 1906.⁴² During the Japanese period, the office was known as Shumubu and was chaired by the Japanese Colonel Hori from March 1942 until October 1943. In October 1943, the office was held by Hoesein Djajadiningrat. This was the first time a native Indonesian was put in charge of the office.⁴³ During the BPUPKI meetings in 1945, the status of the office was hotly debated. Some Muslim members wanted it to be transformed into a separate Ministry of Religious Affairs, but the Christians objected to this on the ground that it would only benefit Muslims. The deadlock was broken by a vote, which resulted in the defeat of the Islamic faction. However a compromise was reached whereby the office was put under the Ministry of Education.⁴⁴

After independence, the issue of a separate Ministry of Religious Affairs emerged once more. Muslim leaders seemed unhappy with the decision. On 11 November 1945, KH Abudardiri and KH Saleh Sua'idy from Banyumas submitted a proposal to form a separate Ministry of Religious Affairs to the Acting Board of the Central Indonesian National Committee (BP-KNIP, Badan Pekerja Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat), a provisional board of the people's representative council. This proposal was supported by most Muslim leaders in the BP-KNIP, and surprisingly, also by eminent secular leaders, including Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin. Without voting, the proposal was accepted, and less than two months later (3 January 1946), Soekarno issued a decree regarding the formation of the separate Ministry. Thus, in the first Sjahrir cabinet (14 November 1945 to 12 March 1946), the Ministry was installed with Mohammad Rasjidi as its Minister.⁴⁵

The changing attitude of Indonesian leaders regarding the formation of the Ministry has become a topic of study for many scholars. B.J. Boland explains that the reason Indonesian leaders — particularly the secularist ones — changed their minds was mainly that they did not want to disappoint their fellow Muslims once again. The Muslim faction had been disappointed many times in the BPUPKI meetings, and this time the secular leaders would like to make a concession by granting the Muslims their proposal. It was dangerous, they thought, if Muslims had little concern for the new republic.⁴⁶

Later, however, the formation of the Ministry was criticized by non-Muslims. They thought that the concession to Muslims was "too much".⁴⁷ The Christians were worried that the Ministry would be dominated by Muslims, who would only be concerned with Islamic issues while ignoring other religions. Even harsher than this, some of them maintained that it could turn out to be "a bulwark of Islam and an outpost for an Islamic state".⁴⁸

Criticism against the existence of the Ministry grew even more complicated after its first decade of operation. Several members of parliament complained that it was too expensive to maintain the Ministry. In addition to this, there were growing reports about corruption and the misuse of funds within the Ministry. The Ministry was accused of having mismanaged the *haji* affairs. During the Guided Democracy era, the Ministry was dominated by NU members and there was growing suspicion that they practised collusion and corruption by, among other things, issuing fabricated appointments and projects.⁴⁹ Above all, due to the lack of professionalism (many officers of the Ministry were graduates of traditional religious schools

and lacked knowledge of modern administration), the Ministry generally under-performed.⁵⁰

During the Soeharto era, apart from the persistent problems mentioned above which still exist even up to the present time, the Ministry (the name of which has been changed into "Department" and thus was abbreviated as "Depag" for Departemen Agama) was accused of having become the state's agent to fulfil the state's political agenda rather than fully serving the people's religious interests. It was often involved in the process of the state's hegemonization over the people, for example, with the policy regarding the Marriage Bill, sole basis (*asas tunggal*), and religious education in schools. The Depag was also accused of having cared only for the followers of the major religions, while neglecting religious minorities, particularly the smaller minorities such as the followers of Confucius and Kebatinan. Instead of taking care of these religions and their adherents, Depag was seen to have antagonized them by ridiculing the interests of their followers. In short, Depag had become a discriminative institution.

After the downfall of Soeharto, the demand to dissolve Depag rapidly increased. This time the demand came not only from non-Muslims and the secular nationalists, but also from *santri* Muslims. Abdurrahman Wahid was one of them.⁵¹ He blamed the department for many malpractices and equated it with "market", where people come to sell their rituals and beliefs.⁵² He argued that the main role of the Depag was supposed to be managing people's religious affairs, but even in this area, it was incapable.⁵³

In a symposium entitled "The Repositioning of the Religion-State Relationship", which was held on 5 May 2004 in Jakarta, the existence of Depag was again questioned. Two exponents of Model 3, Djohan Effendi and Masdar F. Masudi, delivered a paper and questioned the role of the Department. They held the view that the existence of Depag had to be reviewed not only because it had been underperforming, but also because it had serious implications for the religion-state relationship. Effendi particularly criticized the implication of the officialization of religion by Depag. As Depag represented only the major religions, the small religions and beliefs such as Confucianism and Ahmadiyah had no room in the institution. As a result, Depag becomes a discriminative institution.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, Masudi argued that Depag was interfering too much in people's religious matters. He criticized the state's interference in marriage, as this only made problems for people rather than helping them.⁵⁵ Principally, Masudi argued, the state is allowed to be involved only when people are unable to attend to their own business. But, "since people are able to handle their own affairs, the state would be better not to be involved".⁵⁶

Although critical, some exponents of Model 3 have attempted to empathize with the existence of Depag. They acknowledge that political reasons were strongly significant in the formation of the department. So, as long as it complies with this political target, and as long as it does not create too many problems, the existence of Depag is tolerable. Amin Abdullah for example, considers that in spite of its undesired existence, the role of Depag cannot be ignored, particularly in creating a prestigious Islamic college such as IAIN, whose role in Islamic reform movement is crucial. Many Muslim reformists such as Nurcholish Madjid and Djohan Effendi are graduates of this institution. Thus, from this point of view, the role of Depag is significant. However, Abdullah suggests that since times have changed and many people are now demanding more professional administration, the existence and the role of Depag need to be reviewed.⁵⁷

Komaruddin Hidayat, a lecturer of Jakarta-based IAIN, expressed a similar view. Since the department is still needed by most of the Indonesian people and since its existence cannot be avoided politically, it should be tolerated. However, Hidayat admits that the department certainly needs improvement. In an article he wrote for *Kompas*, he recommended that the department listen to various criticisms voiced by many people. Firstly, Depag must no longer be a sectarian institution that favours only the Muslim cause, and, in fact, only one particular group of Muslims (such as NU). Depag must be neutral and stand above all religious groups. Secondly, the department must become a “moral watch dog” institution vis-à-vis other state institutions. This means that it requires moral betterment for itself. Hidayat writes:

One strategy that the Department of Religious Affairs (Depag) should consider is how to create a program and a charismatic institution which will have the ability to morally and intellectually enlighten the public, at a time when the strength of political morality is declining. By joining forces with other departments, the Department of Religious Affairs should be able to establish an institution of education, training, and practical research from which the results can be carefully recorded into a database and applied to solve the problems of the nation. The department should not be trapped in a routine where no record of results is available, while the state funds keep pouring in.⁵⁸

Another issue that this department has to be concerned with, according to Hidayat, is the management of the *hajj* and higher education. He suggests that since the *hajj* is basically dealing with the travelling and accommodation business, it should be managed by a professional institution, such as the BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik Negara, or Government Companies). The

department should only deal with the spiritual aspects of *hajj* such as *manasik* practices and training in ritualistic procedures. The business side must be delivered to the BUMN. As such, the department is no longer capable of handling the educational problems. It is time to hand over higher Islamic education (IAIN) to the Department of Education, particularly since this institution has now been transformed into a university.⁵⁹ In other words, the main role of the department, if the Muslims still want to preserve it, should be limited to purely religious areas.

In any case, the existence of Depag is very complicated. According to Djohan Effendi, "Depag has become a state within a state, which pretends to handle many things but incapable of doing so."⁶⁰ Depag's functions, according to him, have actually been handled by other departments, such as education which has been managed by the Ministry of Education, and the registration of marriage which has been managed by the Civil Registry. Thus, Depag should best be dissolved or else be transformed into a Ministry of State.⁶¹ Above all, the problem of Depag, according to Effendi, is its status, which has been under the state's control. "Religion," Effendi argues, "should not be put under the state."⁶²

Officialization of Religion

What is meant by "officialization of religion" is a government's policy that recognizes the existence of a certain number of religions. This policy was formally set in 1965 by President Soekarno through his Presidential Decision (Penpres No. 1, 1965). This decree specifically singles out six religions as the only officially recognized religions in Indonesia, namely Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. However, on 27 January 1979, President Soeharto issued an instruction (Inpres) that ruled out Confucianism as a religion.⁶³ Thus, since that time, the state has only acknowledged five official religions. This policy has had many implications for the religion-state relationship as well as for religious freedom in Indonesia.

First, it discriminates against the minority religions which are not regarded as official religions. Apart from those five major religions, there are in Indonesia at least eleven minority religions, including Confucianism, Judaism, and the Sikh faith.⁶⁴ Some of these religions have been in the country for quite a long time and some of them are relatively new. The discrimination takes various forms. For Confucians, it occurs in the form of prohibition of their religious rituals and activities. This is not only driven by such a policy, but also by Presidential Instruction (Inpres

No. 14/1967) that specifically forbids any religious activities by Indonesian Chinese (*warga Tionghoa*). Since most of the Confucians are Indonesian Chinese, the instruction naturally oppresses them. During the Soeharto era, Confucians perhaps suffered more than any other citizens in terms of religious freedom.

The policy also discriminates against minorities in relation to equal rights as citizens, such as the right to have official documents. This happens in particular the case of entitlement to the Resident Identity Card (KTP, *Kartu Tanda Penduduk*).⁶⁵ In Indonesia, every adult citizen (above seventeen) is obliged to have an identity card, and according to the Circular Letter (*surat edaran*) from the Ministry of the Interior 1978, one has to fill in a column in the card with one of the five official religions. Many adherents of minority religions were forced to claim themselves as followers of a religion that is different from their actual religion in order to get the card. They usually chose the closest religion to their own religious tradition. Thus, the Confucians would choose Buddhism; the Jews, Christianity; and the Sikhs, Hinduism. Those who refused to choose one of those official religions, would not be given the card.

Marriage is even more complicated. The state's marriage policy forbids a marriage performed outside the five official religions. There have been several cases where the marriage of a Confucian couple has not been recognized by the state and thus they were not given a marriage certificate.⁶⁶ This has implications for their children socially and legally. Socially, the child of an unregistered marriage would be considered an "illegitimate child" (*anak haram*), who is widely despised. Legally, he or she will not get legal status, which will affect his or her legal entitlements, such as inheritance.

The policy of officialization also discriminates against minorities within the five major religions. This is mainly because the officialization tends to side with the mainstream while neglecting the non-mainstream sects. According to Azyumardi Azra, the mainstream plays a great role in selecting what is good and what is bad for people, including the determination of which sect (*madhhab*) is right and which sect is deviant (*sesat*). This privilege has a great impact on the issue of religious freedom since the religious mainstream is usually positioning itself as defender of orthodoxy against the small and splintered groups. Consequently, any sect that is considered splintered, such as Children of God and The Unitarian Church in the case of Christianity, Transcendental Meditation and the International Society for Krishna Consciousness in the case of Hinduism, or Ahmadiyah and Islam Jama'ah in the case of Islam, are all regarded as deviant and could officially be banned.⁶⁷

To make its role even more functional, the mainstream has established a special institution legitimated by the state. Other institutions outside the majority's authority are thus considered illegal. Hence, Islam has the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia), Catholicism has Indonesian Bishops' Conference (KWI, Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia), Protestantism has Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI, Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia), Hinduism has the Indonesian Hindu Council (PHDI, Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia), and Buddhism has Indonesian Buddhist Council (WALUBI, Perwakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia). The role of each institution is crucial since it becomes the only legitimate body that is acknowledged by the state. In its turn, those institutions can discriminatively decide which sect or denomination is deviant and which is not.⁶⁸

Exponents of Model 3 such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Djohan Effendi have been critical of the policy of officialization. They argue that the policy is against the principle of liberty and democracy. Above all, it is against religious freedom. Thus, there is no question that such a policy should be put to an end. Before he became president, Wahid was well known for his criticism of the state's discrimination towards Confucianism. He was well respected among the Chinese minorities as well as the Confucians. When he became president, one of his decisions was to terminate such a policy by cancelling the Inpres No. 14/1967.⁶⁹ In addition to this, Wahid also declared that Imlek, Chinese new year, would be a national holiday.⁷⁰ For Wahid, prohibiting people from claiming their religion was against the 1945 Constitution, which clearly gives freedom of religion to every citizen. As to whether or not Confucianism is a religion, Wahid went on, it is not the right of the state to decide. "It is fully the right of Confucians. If they consider it a religion, the government must accept it."⁷¹

The same argument is expressed by Effendi, who argues that a Presidential Decree cannot annihilate the Constitution, since the status of the latter is legally higher than the former. The Indonesian Constitution does not mention the number of religions, neither does it specifically name the religions that people should or should not have. In any case, the state or government cannot issue such a policy, simply because the existence of religions is older than the state. "Before the state was created," Effendi argues, "religions had existed throughout the ages. How come the state suddenly nullifies it."⁷²

For Effendi, the policy of officialization is dangerous not only because of the rights of religious minorities in general, but also because of the rights of minorities within the official religions. In Indonesia, apart from

the mainstream orthodoxy maintained by the majority Muslims, there are several other denominations (*madhhab*) such as Shi'ism and Ahmadiyah, which are often discredited by mainstream Muslims.⁷³ Religious persecution on behalf of Islamic orthodoxy is something quite common in Indonesia. Ahmadiyah followers have often been persecuted by orthodox Muslims.⁷⁴ What makes the situation even worse is the fact that an official Islamic authority such as MUI endorses the position that Ahmadiyah is a deviant sect, which consequently drives Muslims to be antagonistic towards it.⁷⁵

Against Shari'ah and "Religious" Bills

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the basic foundation of Model 3 is grounded on the assumption that the state would be better if it did not interfere in people's religious matters. The reverse is also seen as true: religion would be better if set free from the state's interference. On this basis, the proponents of Model 3 reject any proposal that provides an opportunity for the state to interfere in people's religious matters. Here we can see a significant distinction between Model 2 and Model 3. While the former supports such a proposal, the latter rejects it. Since the downfall of Soeharto, the proponents of Model 3 have been taking a critical position against proposals or Bills that would enable the state to interfere, such as the proposal for the implementation of *shari'ah*, the National Education System Bill, and the Religious Harmony Bill.

Since 1998, *shari'ah* has become a controversial issue, particularly after a number of Islamic organizations and political parties proposed amending Chapter 29 of the 1945 Constitution. In this proposal, the polemical seven words "with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law"⁷⁶ was proposed to be put after the existing words "the state is based on the sole divinity". With this addition, the proponents of the amendment hoped that *shari'ah* could be implemented in Indonesia as it would be specifically stated in the constitution. Two Islamic political parties, PPP and PBB, were behind the proposal. They submitted it to the MPR Annual Meeting in August 2002. However, after a long debate, the proposal was finally rejected.⁷⁷

The proponents of Model 3 reject the idea of amendment of Chapter 29 and generally the idea of the implementation of *shari'ah*, not only for political reasons, but also on the ground that the idea of *shari'ah* itself is against the principle of the liberal democratic state. Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, argues that the problem of the foundation of the state has become the consensus of all the national elements of Indonesia, be they Muslim or non-Muslim, secular or religious. The idea of returning the seven

words to the constitution is a great setback as they are contradictory to the character of pluralist Indonesia.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, for Masdar F. Masudi, amending Chapter 29 would not solve the problem, but would, in fact, create a problem since it would greatly impact on the state-religion relationship as well as the interreligion relationship. According to him, the wording of the existing chapter is fairly accommodating to all national elements of pluralist Indonesia. However, by adding the seven words to the Chapter, “it will only discriminate against other religions”.⁷⁹ For Masudi, *shari’ah* is a private matter in the sense that it does not need the state’s authority to force its implementation. Religious matters are an individual concern that cannot be enforced. Once it is enforced, Masudi argues, “it has lost its meaning and it is contradictory to the character of religion”.⁸⁰ The one who is responsible for the implementation of *shari’ah*, according to Masudi, is not the state, but religious leaders and the family. The state has no right to force its citizens to practise their religious teachings. In addition, the implementation of *shari’ah* would only create jealousy among non-Muslims who would want the same rights. Also “if we let this problem go, there will be conflicts between religious communities and thus it will threaten national unity”.⁸¹

A similar argument is made by Djohan Effendi, who considers Muslims’ demand for *shari’ah* illogical. His argument is that the supporters of *shari’ah* represent only a small minority. He points out the result of the last two general elections (1999 and 2004), where Islamic political parties (which supported the idea of *shari’ah*) only obtained an insignificant turnout.⁸² This is because those who reject *shari’ah* are not only the non-Muslims and the secularists (and also the *abangan*) Muslims, but also the *santri* Muslims.⁸³ Thus, from this electoral point of view, it is necessary that Chapter 29 of the Constitution be maintained as it is because it is regarded as successfully encompassing all national elements. He writes:

It is widely expected that the 1945 Constitution protects the whole population without discrimination. This state is a reward of a shared struggle, not the struggle of merely one particular group. This protection would not be possible if the Islamic *shari’ah*, as it is commonly understood by its supporters, were to be endorsed as positive law. If this were to happen, non-Muslims would not have the right to hold the highest position in this country. Non-Muslim minorities would not be equal citizens and would not have the same political rights as the Muslim majority. They would be, instead, second-class citizens with limited political rights. This would be ignoring the fact that the minorities have been present in this country since before our state was founded.⁸⁴

The same critical attitude is demonstrated by the proponents of Model 3 regarding the issue of religious bills, namely those bills that demand Islamic privilege. An example is the bill on the national education system, particularly with regard to the issue of religious education in schools.

As explained in Chapter 4, Indonesians are generally happy with the idea of teaching religion in schools. What they are concerned about are the methods and the way in which the subject has been taught. Thus, their rejection or criticism of the Bill is not targeted entirely at abandoning religious education, but rather at making it more workable within the framework of a democratic and liberal state. Hence, what they criticize are those chapters or articles that could potentially create problems for the religion-state as well as the interreligious relationship in the country. This can be seen, for example, in Chapter 13 Article 1a of the Bill regarding the religion of the teacher in relation to that of the students.

The chapter is criticized on the ground that it contains a regulation that allows the state to interfere in people's faith, and this was considered to be against the 1945 Indonesian Constitution.⁸⁵ The chapter is also criticized for using a vague term such as religion: what is it meant by "religion" in the Bill? Is it all religions in the world or just the five official religions recognized by the state? Can all religions outside the official religions be taught at school? Can a teacher who has the same religion as the students, but belongs to a different sect (*madhhab*) be allowed to teach?⁸⁶ The same case applies to Chapter 4 Article 1, regarding the main objective of national education. This article specifically states that the aim of education is mainly to shape persons to be faithful and devout to Almighty God. The proponents of Model 3 criticize the article for putting faith and devotion as the aim of education. According to them, the objective of education should be enlightening people, and not making them faithful and religiously devout. Faith and devotion are not the business of education.⁸⁷

For this and other reasons, the exponents of Model 3 prefer to have the bill cancelled. Abdurrahman Wahid appealed to Parliament to have the controversial chapters in the bill excised. This view was then officially recommended by PKB, a political party in which Wahid was the consultative chairman.⁸⁸ Unlike the proponents of Model 2, who consider teaching religion at school to be essential, the proponents of Model 3 consider it only as a secondary option. However, this does not necessarily mean that they discredit religious education. Their greater concern are the methods by which religion is taught at school. Basically, if such an education is carried out with a certain level of criticism, they would agree with it. Nurcholish Madjid, for example, considers religious education important as long as it

is taught in a critical and constructive manner. Madjid criticizes religious education which emphasizes religious symbolism too much without any critical understanding of it. He writes:

With regard to religious education, it is very important to always keep in mind that religion is a system of symbols. The challenge in implementing this concept is in understanding such a set of symbols and in finding ways to comprehend the real meaning behind them by using the knowledge obtained from the Holy Book. If we fail to understand them we will be trapped in seemingly meaningless metaphors and symbols; and we will fail to grasp the essence of the religion itself. Thus, in religious education, the choice of materials to be taught to the students and to the community in general, and the continuous careful update of these materials are of extreme importance. Of equal importance is developing the right methods in order to have the materials taught effectively, efficiently and productively. Emphasis on mere symbols without finding their meanings will only create physical or formal piety, a deceiving piety.⁸⁹

Another example is the case of the Bill of Religious Harmony, which was put forward in 2003, but later cancelled.⁹⁰ Like many other bills which emphasize the state establishment of religion, this bill gives opportunity and authority for the state to regulate people's religion. Chapter 17 Article 1, for example, includes an item whereby reinterpreting a religion differently from its mainstream interpretation in the public area is forbidden. This chapter was condemned by supporters of the liberal state, particularly the young generation,⁹¹ since it was regarded as tantamount to giving authority to the state to have the only legitimate power of interpretation of religion. In fact, religious interpretations have historically been multifarious and dynamic. There has been concern that by such a regulation the state would become more authoritarian in determining one's right to understand one's religion. It is understandable, however, that the emergence of the proposed regulation was strongly due to the concern about the growing phenomenon of religious interpretations in a liberal way. By prohibiting this through regulation, it was hoped that such "wild" interpretations could be overcome.

The exponents of Model 3 consider such a regulation to be violating people's religious rights. Komaruddin Hidayat, for example, argues that the bill would be better off cancelled.⁹² Hidayat argues that "religion is a private matter [for people] as human beings and not as citizens. Thus, religious matters should not be associated with the state. Being religious is a basic human right".⁹³ The sharpest criticism against the bill comes from young liberal Muslims, who are not happy with the idea of state interference in people's religious matters. Zuly Qodir, a writer from IAIN, considers the bill

a bad proposal both for citizens and the state. For citizens, the bill clearly restricts their freedom on the one hand. He gives as an example Chapter X, Section 15: 1, which requires that marriage should be allowed only between persons of the same religion. This regulation, Qodir argues, is tantamount to confining people's rights to determine their private arrangements as marriage is not the state's business. For the state, the bill, on the other hand, would only make the state busy with issues that are actually not their right to handle. There are many more important issues that must be handled by the state such as the problems of corruption, implementation of laws, and people's well-being.⁹⁴

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND PLURALISM

Model 2 and Model 3 can be distinguished with regard to the idea of religious freedom and pluralism by understanding two concepts often used in religious studies: "inclusivist" and "pluralist".⁹⁵ The inclusivist standpoint regards one's faith as the only completely true religion. Other faiths are not necessarily "wrong", but they are incomplete. Islam, according to this standpoint, comes to "complete" the whole teaching of religions. The inclusivists believe that the objective of all religions is ultimately the same, namely to attain the truth. Every religion has a doctrine or teaching that urges people to be good. Every religion basically urges people to respect one another, whatever their beliefs and faiths. However, the inclusivists believe that while their religion is *explicitly* true, others are only *implicitly* true. Based on this similitude, the inclusivists believe that living together with other faiths and religions is possible.

Meanwhile, the pluralist standpoint regards all religions as correct, valid, and legitimate. The pluralists believe that there is no "wrong" culture for those who own it, and so with religion; all religions are the same, having the same objectives, and venerating the same God. If there are dissimilarities in the way they perform rituals or differences in delineating the sacred and the profane, this is a reflection of different cultures. Pluralists argue that the essence of all religions is the same. Pluralist theologians such as John Hicks and Hans Küng believe that since all religions are the same, there is no point in arguing that an adherent of one religion is better, and thus, more entitled to have priority than another.⁹⁶

This distinction might explain the religious-political attitude of Indonesian Muslims. Those with an inclusive standpoint generally tend to consider their religion superior to other religions. Other religions — however true they may be — are still *less true* compared with their own religion. In the

religious-political context, this kind of attitude helps create a superior attitude by Muslims towards followers of other religions. It seems to them even more justifiable when it is related to the fact that Muslims are the majority group in the country. This is clearly reflected in Model 2, which we have discussed in the previous chapter. The will to uphold the state establishment of religion (which was implicit in various religious Bills) was a reflection of the feeling of Muslim superiority whereby Islam is seen as the best religion, besides the fact that Muslims are the majority. We cannot see this kind of attitude in Model 3, which clearly rejects any proposal to involve religion in the state. This is not only because its proponents believe that the mix of religion and politics will create many problems, but also because they do not believe that *shari'ah* is the only superior law over other religions.

It is thus understandable if most supporters of Model 3 do not tolerate any attempt to apply *shari'ah* as urged by the Islamic groups, either by amending the Jakarta Charter, or by any other legal means recommended by the Committee for the Preparation of the Implementation of *Shari'ah* (KPPSI, Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam) at the regional level.⁹⁷ The reason is not only that *shari'ah* is an ambiguous concept of which every Muslim has his or her own version, but also that by adopting it, the state would automatically marginalize other communities. The proponents of Model 3 argue that adopting *shari'ah* will only offend the principle of pluralism. In addition, the application of *shari'ah* will lead to the loss — or decrease in meaning — of religious freedom, since application of *shari'ah* means restricting the understanding of the concept of the religion to the official version acknowledged by the state. A pluralist standpoint suggests that doctrinal matters should be left to individuals and not be given to the state. Religious freedom will only be achieved in a state that applies the concept of pluralism since it treats all people equally.

The pluralist attitude is the basic foundation for a liberal state. Abdurrahman Wahid often equates pluralism with liberalism in the sense that both concepts esteem the basic rights of individuals rather than their existence as a collective group. According to Wahid, liberalism is:

a philosophy of life that values the individual's basic rights in life. It is a conviction that the law must be absolutely upheld. Liberalism demands equal treatment before the law for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic origins, cultures, or religions. In fact, it protects those who hold different opinions from the nation's mainstream. In other words, liberalism possesses values that support a high civilization. In fact, in all truthfulness it must be acknowledged that liberalism contains noble aims and the highest values that indeed are found in Pancasila.⁹⁸

Wahid's liberal and pluralist attitude is demonstrated by his conviction that, a non-Muslim, for instance, could become the president or the head of state of Indonesia, a view that triggered criticism from conservative Muslims. This kind of attitude is certainly radical if we compare it with Model 1, which clearly rejects the idea of a non-Muslim president, or even to Model 2, whose inclusive standpoint is still hesitant to embrace the idea. For Wahid, the problem is not whether a non-Muslim could be a president, but whether or not he or she has a chance to do so. The Indonesian Constitution, Wahid argues, does not specifically prohibit non-Muslims from being head of state.⁹⁹ This same point was argued by Madjid, who believed that pluralism requires a conviction that the state does not belong to a certain group of citizens, but rather to all citizens. For this reason he rejected the idea of an Islamic state, not only because of the ambiguity of the concept, but also because the concept itself reveals partisanship.

It is interesting to note here that Madjid did not only refer to the West when he discusses the issue of pluralism, but also to the early experience of Islam, particularly in the era of the Prophet Muhammad in Madinah. In his various writings, Madjid often presents Madinah as an ideal example of pluralism in Islam. In fact, quoting the American sociologist, Robert Bellah, Madjid argues that Madinah is "the best model for modern national community building that can be imagined".¹⁰⁰ Pluralism in Madinah, according to Madjid, was built on contribution from people of various religious backgrounds: Islam, Judaism, and other local beliefs in the city. They were tied together under a charter later known as the Madinah Charter. This charter, he writes:

contains thoughts which are great even in the context of modern thinking. It is in this constitution that ideas which have now become the mainstay of the modern way of life, such as religious freedom, the right of a group to maintain its own sets of beliefs, and freedom to form inter-group economic relations, were first formulated. But it is also important to emphasize that there is a collective obligation to participate in defending [the country] against enemies from outside.¹⁰¹

The reference to Madinah as the inspiring model of pluralism is important, not only because it gives more weight to arguments for Muslims to accept the idea (than if it were merely a Western concept), but also because it substantiates the historical fact that the Islamic state (or the state based on Islam) is not the model suggested by the Prophet. This latter argument is specifically expressed by Said Agiel Siradj, who firmly believes

that the idea of the Islamic state is only the empty imagination of Muslim politicians. He argues that the Madinah Constitution did not mention either Islam or the Qur'an or the *hadith* as the basis of the state.¹⁰² Rather, it emphasized the universal values of "monotheism, unity, equal rights, justice, religious freedom, defending the state, preserving tradition, peace, and protection".¹⁰³

Religious pluralism deals not only with interreligious relationships, but also with religious freedom in general. What is meant by religious freedom, as Djohan Effendi explains, is not only the freedom to choose from the official religions and sects as acknowledged by the state, but also to choose from the marginalized religions and sects, including those which are often detested by the Muslim majority, such as Ahmadiyah and Shi'ism. In a broader sense, religious freedom also incorporates the freedom to choose no religion or being free to be an atheist.¹⁰⁴ For Effendi and most of the proponents of Model 3, atheism is itself a "belief" and a "religion" that must be respected. In Indonesia, "atheism" is a taboo, mainly due to its association with communism, an ideology which was widely rejected both by the government and the Muslims. However, for Nurcholish Madjid, atheism cannot be equated with communism since there are many people who believe in atheism, but at the same time reject communism. Unlike many Muslims, Madjid regarded atheism positively, arguing that it could have a positive influence on religious reformism.¹⁰⁵

The defence of atheism by the supporters of Model 3 is important, due to the fact that this concept deals not only with "true" unbelievers, but also with what Madjid calls "polemical atheists", namely, those who are charged as atheists although in reality they are not.¹⁰⁶ Many Muslim reformists have been labelled with this kind of atheism. Such an accusation has serious consequences, ranging from excommunication to death threats.¹⁰⁷ Excommunication is certainly against the principle of religious freedom. Excommunication was common in medieval times, and there were several major Muslim philosophers and mystics such as Abu Bakr al-Razi, Ibn Rushd, Ibn 'Arabi, and al-Suhrawardi who were excommunicated for their religious views. In Indonesia, although there is no real case of excommunication, the label of being an infidel (*kafr*) or deviant (*sesat*) has often been addressed to reformists, including Madjid himself. The most recent case is that of Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a young Muslim intellectual, who in 2002 was indirectly condemned to death by a group of *ulama* for an article he wrote in *Kompas*.¹⁰⁸

ISLAM AND THE ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Islamic economy has become one of the most important issues discussed in Muslim intellectual discourse since the 1970s. Along with the emergence of the idea of Islamization of knowledge, economy became the chief agenda to be Islamized. "Islamic economy" is generally meant to be an alternative economic system which is free of interest (*riba*). *Riba* is the central theme of the Islamic economic system on which Muslim intellectuals are divided. Abdullah Saeed's study of the Islamic banking system reveals the existence of two groups of Muslims in dealing with *riba*; namely the modernists and the neo-revivalists. The modernists are those who "tend to emphasize the moral aspect of the prohibition of *riba*, and relegate the 'legal form' of *riba* as interpreted in Islamic law to a secondary position".¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile the neo-revivalist group "emphasizes the legal form of *riba* as expressed in Islamic law, and insists that the words specified in the Qur'an should be taken at their literal meaning, regardless of what was practised in the pre-Islamic period".¹¹⁰

The proponents of Model 3 can perhaps be grouped as the modernist faction in Saeed's definition. They are generally not so much concerned with the discourse on "Islamic economic system" as developed by the neo-revivalists. For them, Islam does not deal with economic details. As with political issues, Islam only gives general guidelines — often in the form of moral values — to Muslim economic activities. Madjid, for instance, keeps arguing that Islam is basically supporting the prevailing economic system in a society. As long as the system does no harm to basic principles of humanity such as exploitation and injustice, Islam would support it. Madjid points out how Prophet Muhammad followed the economic system in Arabia, which was dominated by the Persian-Byzantian economic model, including the use of its currency. The Prophet made financial contracts within such a Persian-Byzantian economic system.¹¹¹ To a certain extent, Islam supports the market economy, which means conforming to how the market works.

Based on such Islamic experience, Madjid argues that the current economic system, namely the market system with its variations, is congenial with basic principles of Islam. As long as such a system creates healthy economic activities and gives economic prosperity to all people, it can be considered "Islamic". He explains:

Although we do not subscribe to the ideology of *laissez faire laissez passer*, a form of privatization and self-reliance in economic activity with a fair distribution of rights and responsibilities to all citizens, is needed, not

only for the health and strength of the economy itself, but also for the consolidation of democracy and justice.¹¹²

By emphasizing the factor of privatization, Madjid condemns the economic system practised by Soeharto, where the state was totally hegemonic. He argues, this kind of economic system “became fertile ground for various deviations, particularly the crime of corruption, collusion between the government and the businessmen, and the practices of cronyism and nepotism”.¹¹³ This does not mean, however, that the state is entirely forbidden from economic interference. In fact, affirmative action is allowed as long as it does not create discrimination.¹¹⁴

It is fairly clear here that Madjid is advocating a liberal model of economic system, a model which is independent from the state. In retrospect, this model is essentially in contrast to Model 2, where the state is given great authority to regulate people’s economic affairs. As we have seen, Model 2’s economic model inspires the formation of the so-called “people’s economy” (which is actually the “state’s economy”). Madjid argues that well-being does not necessarily lie in “people’s economy” or that kind of “socialistic economy”, but rather in a society that applies a liberal system. Quoting a famous statement by Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen, Madjid says that “in a free society, there would be no danger of starvation”.¹¹⁵ In other words, a capitalist economy applied in the liberal states could certainly bring people to well-being. This is because the liberal system creates a culture of creativity and productivity in every aspect of human activities.¹¹⁶

Criticism against Islamic economy and support for the market economy also came from by Abdurrahman Wahid. Although not a trained economist, Wahid offers some liberal thoughts on the economy. In one of his articles about Islam and the economy, he explains his position:

the mechanism employed to achieve prosperity is not determined by format and shape. Therefore, the model of free trade competition and efficiency as followed by capitalism does not contradict Islamic view of economy. In fact, Islam promotes the notion of *fa istabiqu al-khairat* (to compete in good things), which is the core of healthy economic practices. Competition and competitiveness will increase efficiency...¹¹⁷

Wahid’s critical attitude towards Islamic economic discourse and his strong support for capitalism is demonstrated by a number of his manoeuvres when he led NU. When a great majority of Muslims supported the idea of Islamic banking by establishing the Muamalat Bank in 1991, Wahid approached the Summa Bank, a general bank owned by a Chinese conglomerate, and founded a joint-commercial bank known as NUSumma

Bank, which was operated entirely along the lines of the conventional banking system. As such, when a group of Muslims discussed the possibility of having a special Islamic capital market, Wahid approached the Papan Bank, another national bank, to go public on the stock exchange.¹¹⁸ All these steps are a reflection of Wahid's discomfort with the Islamic banking system as echoed by the neo-revivalist thinkers. For him, economy is actually a "profane" activity which religion does not need to interfere with. The role of religion is limited to moral guidance.¹¹⁹

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Historically speaking, Model 3 is not a new model of polity known in Indonesian political discourse. It has been there since the early days of independence, when the "secularist" group came to reject the idea of an Islamic state. For almost three decades this model was widely circulated only among "secularist" and non-Muslim groups. Meanwhile, *santri* Muslims were generally more accepting of the idea of a state based on religion — either Islam or religiosity in general — which was subsequently represented by Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. However, since 1970 and increasingly since the end of the 1990s, Model 3 began to attract *santri* Muslims. This model is built on the principles of the liberal state, where the state is positioned as an independent political institution. It is not dominated by religion (which is clearly seen in Model 1), nor does it dominate religion (as clearly seen in Model 2). To use a religious-political term, Model 3 is a model built on the principle of the separation of religion and the state.

Notes

1. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
2. See, for example, the following articles: Rumadi, "Agama Tanpa Negara", *Kompas*, 4 February 2000; Mun'im A Sirry, "Islam, Sekularisme, dan Negara", *Kompas*, 13 February 2002; and Hery Sucipto, "Dilema Relasi Agama dan Negara", *Media Indonesia*, 19 July 2002.
3. For more details of Madjid's account of his activities in HMI, see his article: "The Issue of Modernization among Muslims in Indonesia: From a Participant Point of View", in *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?*, edited by Gloria Davis (Athens: Ohio University, 1979).
4. On "Limited Group" and its role in the Islamic reform movement in Indonesia, see Mohammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980).

5. *Tempo* is the main Indonesian magazine that most frequently publishes Wahid's writings. His columns in this magazine have been compiled and published by *Tempo* in a book entitled *Melawan Melalui Lelucon: Kumpulan Kolom Abdurrahman Wahid di Tempo* (Jakarta: Tempo, 2000).
6. Greg Barton, "The Emergence of Neo-Modernism a Progressive, Liberal Movement of Islamic Thought in Indonesia: A Textual Study Examining the Writings of Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib and Abdurrahman Wahid, 1968-1980" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Monash University, 1995); See also Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986); Malcolm Cone, "Neo-Modern Islam in Suharto's Indonesia", *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 4, no. 2 (2002): 52-67.
7. For more details about Wahid's influence on the younger generation of NU, see Djohan Effendi's Ph.D. thesis, "Progressive Traditionalists: The Emergence of a New Discourse in Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama During the Addurrahman Wahid Era", Deakin University, 2000.
8. Fachry Ali, "Intelektual, Pengaruh Pemikiran dan Lingkungannya: Butit-Butir Catatan untuk Nurcholish Madjid", in *Dialog Keterbukaan: Artikulasi Nilai Islam dalam Wacana Sosial Politik Kontemporer*, by Nurcholish Madjid (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), p. xxxii.
9. At present there are fourteen IAINs and thirty-eight STAINs in the whole country. Since 2000, several IAINs, such as those in Jakarta (Syarif Hidayatullah) and in Yogyakarta (Sunan Kalijaga) have been transformed into universities with the acronym UIN (Universitas Islam Negeri, State Islamic University).
10. For further elaboration on the role of IAIN in Islamic reformism in Indonesia, see Abdullah Saeed, "Towards Religious Tolerance through Reform in Islamic Education: The Case of the State Institute of Islamic Studies of Indonesia", *Journal of Indonesia and the Malay World* 27 no. 79 (1999): 177-91; and also Jamhari and Fuad Jabali, *IAIN dan Modernisasi Islam di Indonesia* (Ciputat: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002).
11. One of his important books is *Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya* (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, 1979), which became a compulsory textbook for all IAIN students.
12. Saiful Muzani, "Mu'tazila Theology and the Modernization of the Indonesian Muslim Community: Intellectual Portrait of Harun Nasution", *Studia Islamika* 1, no.1 (1994).
13. Jamhari and Jabali, *IAIN dan Modernisasi Islam*, p. 43.
14. Quoted from Jamhari and Jabali, *IAIN dan Modernisasi Islam*, p. 117.
15. Conversation with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta, August 2001.
16. Jamhari and Jabali, *IAIN dan Modernisasi Islam*, p. 154.
17. Conversation with Ahmad Rivai Hassan, Jakarta, October 2001. I have often heard the same story from other IAIN graduates.

18. Fachry Ali was born in Susoh, South Aceh on 23 November 1954. He studied at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta specializing in Islamic education, and obtained his Master's degree in History from Monash University, Australia. He was an activist in several Islamic organizations, including the Association of Indonesian Islamic Student (PII) and the Student Muslim Association (HMI). His writings have been published in various journals and newspapers including *Prisma*, *Kompas*, *Tempo*, *Merdeka*, and *Panjimas*.
19. Azyumardi Azra was born in Lubuk Alung, West Sumatra, on 4 March 1955. Since 1982, he has taught at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, his alma mater. In October 1998, he was selected as rector of the university, a position he still holds. He obtained his Ph.D. from the Department of History, Columbia University. Azra is a prolific writer. He has published more than ten books in Indonesian and three books in English.
20. Komaruddin Hidayat was born in Magelang, Central Java, on 18 October 1953. He obtained his B.A. from IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. His doctorate (Ph.D.) was completed at the Middle East Technical University, Turkey (1990) in Western Philosophy. Since 1990, he has taught in his alma mater, IAIN Jakarta, and other universities. He has published several books in Indonesian.
21. We will discuss this organization later in Chapter 6.
22. Amin Abdullah was born in Pati, Central Java on 28 July 1953. He studied in an Islamic boarding school at Ponorogo and went on to IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, studying Comparative Religion (1982). He obtained his Ph.D. from the Middle East Technical University in Turkey, in Islamic Philosophy (1990). Since May 2000, he has been rector of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga.
23. Masdar F. Masudi was born in Purwokerto in 1954. Like Siradj, he comes from a traditionalist (NU) background. He studied in various *pesantrens* and obtained his B.A. from IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta (1979). He is currently the Secretary General of NU. He has published several books, among which his best work, *Agama Keadilan* (religion of justice), is on the critical assessment of the *zakat* system in Islam (1993).
24. Said Agiel Siradj was born on 3 July 1953 in Cirebon, West Java. He completed his early education in an Islamic boarding school belonging to his father, KH Agiel Siradj. He continued his advanced studies in several *pesantrens*, including Pesantren Hidayatul Mubtadi'in in Kediri, and Pesantren Krapyak, Yogyakarta. While studying at Krapyak, Siradj enrolled as a student in IAIN Yogyakarta. But before he finished, he went to Saudi Arabia, where he completed his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. Since 1994, he is one of the board chairmen of NU.
25. Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 65.
26. The question of whether Islam is secularizable has been addressed by many intellectuals, both Muslim and non-Muslim. See the following articles:

- Bernard Lewis. "Can Islam be Secularized?" republished in his book, *From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Robert Spencer, "Can Islam be Secularized and Made Compatible with the Western Pluralistic Framework?", being a chapter of his book, *Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions About the World's Fastest-Growing Faith* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002); Sadik Jalal al-Azm, "Is Islam Secularizable?", *Free Inquiry* 17, no. 4 (Fall 1997): pp. 37–39; and Azzam Tamimi, "Can Islam be Secularized?" *La Vanguardia*, republished in the Institute of Islamic Political Thought <<http://www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/secularism.htm>> (accessed 10 October 2004).
27. Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), p. 207.
 28. Ibid.
 29. Ibid.
 30. Talcott Parsons, *Theories of Society; Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), in Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan*, p. 258.
 31. Robert Neelly Bellah, *Beyond Belief; Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 151, in Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan*, p. 259.
 32. Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan*, p. 259.
 33. Ibid., p. 205.
 34. The suggestion of political secularization which was symbolized by "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No" was crucial, particularly if we relate it with the political tendency of Muslims in Indonesia. At that time, Madjid's appeal was taken antagonistically and he was even considered the one who wanted to destroy Islam. However, three decades later, Madjid's appeal seems to be attracting many people. As mentioned at the beginning of this book, Indonesian Muslims no longer consider Islamic parties the only alternative for the struggle for Islam.
 35. Madjid's view on secularization has been criticized by many intellectuals. Mohammad Rasjidi was among its staunchest critics. He argues, among other things, that Madjid has used the term arbitrarily. For more detail about Rasjidi's criticism, see his book, M. Rasjidi, *Koreksi Terhadap Drs. Nurcholis Madjid Tentang Sekularisasi* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1972). See also Madjid's rebuttal (or more appropriately, clarification of) to Rasjidi's criticism: "Sekali Lagi Tentang Sekularisasi", in his book, *Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), pp. 221–33.
 36. Said Aqiel Siradj, *Islam Kebangsaan: Fiqih Demokratik Kaum Santri* (Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 1999), p. 164.
 37. Ibid., p. 165.
 38. Muslim scholars from the NU tradition seem to be more flexible in accepting secularism. KH Nur Muhammad Iskandar al-Barsyani, chairman of the

- NU branch in Central Java, even argues for a secular state, and he prefers Indonesia to be a secular state rather than a religious one. See Salahuddin Wahid. "Negara Sekular No! Negara Islam No!", in *Syariat Islam Yes, Syariat Islam No: Dilema Piagam Jakarta dalam Amandemen UUD 1945*, by Ahmad Syafii Maarif et al. (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001), pp. 23–28.
39. Masdar F. Masudi, "Hubungan Agama dan Negara", *Kompas*, 7 August 2002.
 40. Ibid.
 41. Ibid.
 42. The "minister" of this department is rather called "advisor". After Snouck Hurgronje, the position was consecutively held by G.A.J. Hazeu (1907–13), D.A. Rinkes (1914–16), G.A.J. Hazeu (1917–20), R.A. Kern (1921–22), E. Gobece (1923), R.A. Kern (1924–26), E. Gobece (1927–37), and G.F. Pijper (1937–42). For more detail about the role of this "ministry", see H. Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda, Het Kantoor Voor Inlandsche Zaken* (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1985), pp. 102–07.
 43. B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), p. 10.
 44. Ibid., 37.
 45. Deliar Noer, *Administration of Islam in Indonesia*, Monograph Series, Cornell Indonesia Project, Cornell University (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1978), pp. 8–9. See also Azyumardi Azra, "HM Rasjidi BA: Pembentukan Kementrian Agama dalam Revolusi", in *Menteri-Menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial-Politik, Seri Khusus Inis Biografi Sosial-Politik*, by Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam (Jakarta: PPIM, 1998), p. 5.
 46. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 106.
 47. Ibid.
 48. J.W.M. Bakker, *De Godsdienstvrijheid in de Indonesische Grondwetten*, in *Het Missiewerk*, 1956, no. 4, p. 215. Quoted from Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, p. 106.
 49. Noer, *Administration of Islam*, p. 15.
 50. Ibid., p. 16.
 51. When he was president (1999–2000), Wahid, however, did not disband this department. In fact, he closed down two other departments, namely, the Department of Information and the Department of Social Services. It seems that the disbandment of Depag was more complicated than that of the other two departments, since it has heavily to do with politics; many of Wahid's supporters in NU were affiliated with the department.
 52. "Ada Apa di Kanwil Depag Jabar?", *Pikiran Rakyat*, 21 July 2004. <<http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/0704/21/10.htm>> (accessed 2 December 2004).
 53. "Gus Dur: Departemen Agama Harusnya Melayani Semua Agama", *Sinar Harapan*, 21 February 2003.
 54. "Fungsi Depag Perlu Dikaji", *Kompas*, 6 May 2004.

55. Ibid.
56. Interview with Masdar F. Masudi, Jakarta, 27 January 2004.
57. Interview with Amin Abdullah, Yogyakarta, 24 February 2004.
58. Komaruddin Hidayat, "Menimbang Misi Departemen Agama", *Kompas*, 12 July 2002.
59. Ibid.
60. Interview with Djohan Effendi, Melbourne, 18 November 2004.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Leo Suryadinata, "State and Minority Religion in Contemporary Indonesia: Recent Government Policy Towards Confucianism, Tridharma and Buddhism", in *Nation-State, Identity, and Religion in Southeast Asia*, by Tsuneo Ayabe, (Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 1998), p. 8.
64. Chandra Setiawan, "Agama Tak Perlu Pengakuan Negara", *Jawa Pos*, 25 August 2002.
65. KTP is extremely important for Indonesian citizens since it is used in almost every official document. One cannot open a bank account, for instance, if he or she fails to show the card.
66. One of the biggest issues that led to hot controversies was the marriage of Confucian couple, Budi Wijaya (Po Bing Bo) and Lanny Guito (Gwie Ay Lan) in Surabaya in 1996. The couple was married in accordance with the Confucian religion. But when they went to register their marriage, the Civil Registration Office rejected it on the basis that Confucianism was not a religion and the couple was advised to have another marriage ceremony in a Buddhist or Christian way as most of the Indonesian Chinese used to do. See Suryadinata. "State and Minority Religion", p. 18.
67. Azyumardi Azra, *Reposisi Hubungan Agama dan Negara: Merajut Hubungan Antarumat* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2002), p. 31.
68. Ibid., p. 32.
69. This decision was known as the Presidential Decision 6/2000 (Keppres No. 6 Tahun 2000).
70. "Imlek Akan Dirayakan secara Terbuka", *Kompas*, 14 January 2002.
71. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Paham Konghucu dan Agama", *Duta Masyarakat*, 29 October 2001, <<http://www.koranduta.com>> (accessed 14 June 2003).
72. Interview with Djohan Effendi, Melbourne, 18 November 2004. See also *Kompas*. "Fungsi Depag Perlu Dikaji", 6 May 2004.
73. Ibid.
74. West Java has been the most frequently targeted area, as quite a number of Ahmadiyah members live there. See, for example, "Belasan Rumah Ahmadiyah Dibakar", *Gatra*, 14 February 2003; "Dozens of Ahmadiya Homes, Mosques, Wrecked in Kuningan, W. Java", *Jakarta Post*, 24 December 2002. For a fresh report on the issue, see Merle Ricklefs, "Islam on the March", *Australian Financial Review*, 2 September 2005.

75. On 28 July 2005, MUI reissued its *fatwa* on Ahmadiyah, which spurred a series of violence in the country. Just two months after the *fatwa* was released, a brutal action took place in West Java. Hundreds of members of Ahmadiyah were savagely attacked. Their houses were burnt and their properties were looted. What was important is that most of the perpetrators acknowledged that their action was fundamentally driven by the MUI's *fatwa* that Ahmadiyah is a deviant sect of Islam. See "Aset Ahmadiyah Dilempari Batu", *Kompas*, 21 September 2005; "Ahmadiyah Mosques Destroyed in Attack", *Jakarta Post*, 21 September 2005; and "Merusak Rumah Menjarah Harta", *Gatra*, 26 September 2005.
76. The seven words in Indonesian are: *dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*.
77. "Sebagian Besar Fraksi Tolak Perubahan Pasal 29", *Kompas*, 11 August 2002.
78. "Pasal 29 UUD 1945 Diminta Tidak Diubah", *Kompas*, 8 August 2002.
79. "NU: Syariat Islam Tidak Perlu Masuk Pasal 29 UUD 1945", *Kompas*, 13 February 2002.
80. Ibid.
81. "Ditolak, Masuknya 'Tujuh Kata' Piagam Jakarta", *Kompas*, 11 August 2000.
82. In the 1955 general election, Islamic political parties that were supporting the agenda of the implementation of *shari'ah* obtained 43 per cent of the votes, but in the 1999 and 2004 general elections, Islamic parties which held the same agenda only obtained less than 20 per cent.
83. Djohan Effendi, "Agama, Apakah Sudah Gagal?", *Kompas*, 20 September 2002.
84. Ibid.
85. Particularly Chapter 28e, which states that every person is free to gain an education (*pendidikan dan pengajaran*).
86. Such as, for example, a Shi'ite or an Ahmadiyah teacher to teach Sunni students.
87. "Bom Waktu Pendidikan Nasional", *Tempo*, No. 04/XXXII/24 — 30 March 2003.
88. "Dewan Syuro PKB Rekomendasikan Pencabutan Pasal 13 Ayat 1 RUU Sisdiknas", *Kompas*, 28 May 2003.
89. Nurcholish Madjid, *Indonesia Kita* (Jakarta: Universitas Paramadina, 2004), p. 160.
90. This bill comprises twenty-one chapters dealing with among other things, the regulation of religious missionaries, foreign funding for missionary activities, religious holidays and their celebration, establishment of ritual houses, religious education, interreligious marriage, and adoption of children from different religions. The Bill was originally issued by the Department of Religion, but an officer in the department denied that this was the case. According to him,

- the Bill circulated was a “wild bill” (*RUU liar*), which was not acknowledged by the Depag. (See “Depag Tak Akui Draft RUU Kerukunan yang Beredar di Masyarakat”, *Kompas*, 4 December 2003.)
91. See, for instance, the following articles: Rumadi, “RUU KUB dan Jebakan Otoritarianisme”, *Kompas*, 13 November 2003; Zuly Qodir, “Mengkritisi RUU KUB”, *Kompas*, 13 November 2003; Mh Nurul Huda, “Mencermati RUU KUB”, *Kompas*, 29 May 2003.
 92. “Pembahasan RUU Kerukunan Beragama Tak Perlu Buru-buru”, *Kompas*, 15 November 2003.
 93. “RUU KUB Cermin Kekerdilan Negara”, *Kompas*, 13 November 2003.
 94. Qodir, “Mengkritisi RUU KUB”. We will discuss the young liberal Muslim generation in Chapter 6.
 95. There are actually three concepts, the third being “exclusivist”, that is a standpoint that regards there to be no salvation outside the church (or Islam). However, this kind of attitude does not fit either Model 2 or Model 3. It would fit perhaps certain aspects of Model 1. For further elaboration on the meaning of these terms, see Diana L. Eck, *Encountering God: A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banaras* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), particularly Chapter 7, “Is our God Listening?: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism”.
 96. John Hick, *God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion* (London: Macmillan, 1988); Hans Kung, *Christianity and the World Religions: Paths of Dialogue with Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism* (London: Collins, 1987).
 97. Having failed to propose *shari’ah* at the state level, various groups of Muslims tried to impose it at the regional levels, particularly in the areas where Islamic traditional views are still dominant, such as South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Banten.
 98. Abdurrahman Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan*, 2nd ed. (Depok: Desantara), 2001, p. 66.
 99. Abdurrahman Wahid, “Presiden dan Agama”, in *Masyarakat Versus Negara*, by Frans M. Parera and T. Jakob Koekertis (Jakarta: Kompas, 1999), p. 171.
 100. Madjid, *Indonesia Kita*, p. 71.
 101. Madjid, *Cita-Cita Politik Islam*, p. 57
 102. Siradj, *Islam Kebangsaan*, p. 210.
 103. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
 104. Interview with Djohan Effendi, Melbourne, 18 November 2004. See also “Djohan Effendi: Harus Ada Kebebasan Tidak Beragama”, in *Wajah Liberal Islam di Indonesia*, by Luthfi Assyauckanie (Jakarta: Teater Utan Kayu, 2002), pp. 135–38.
 105. Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban: Membangun Makna dan Relevansi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), p. 129.
 106. Madjid distinguishes between “philosophical atheism” (*ateisme filosofis*), “polemical atheism” (*ateisme polemis*), and “disguised atheism” (*ateisme*

terselubung). Philosophical atheism is a comprehensive doctrine that becomes the philosophical foundation of an intellectual or political movement. The communist movement can be categorized in this group. Polemical atheism is the action of labelling a person an atheist despite his rejection of such labelling. This kind of atheism, according to Madjid, is often addressed to Muslim intellectuals who are considered to have aberrated (*menyimpang*) from Islam. The third kind of atheism, disguised atheism, is an ideological attitude which surreptitiously rejects the existence of God, but openly or formally expresses belief and faith. All these kinds of atheism, according to Madjid, must be respected and no one can prohibit those who subscribe to this belief (Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, pp. 120–39).

107. Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, p. 123.
108. The case of Ulil Abshar-Abdalla is perhaps the most controversial issue regarding freedom of expression and religious freedom in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. We will discuss Abshar-Abdalla's ideas in Chapter 6.
109. Abdullah Saeed, *Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and Its Contemporary Interpretation* (Leiden, The Netherlands and New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 41.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
111. Lecture at Paramadina University, Jakarta 2000. I have listened to this view expressed by Madjid many times.
112. Madjid, *Indonesia Kita*, p. 131.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
115. *Ibid.*
116. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
117. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Islam, Moralitas dan Ekonomi", <<http://www.gusdur.net>> (accessed 12 January 2005).
118. "Misi Gus Dur Beli Papan", *Gatra*, 7 December 1998.
119. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Islam, Moralitas dan Ekonomi".

6

CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY OF THE MODELS

This chapter will discuss the current developments of Muslim political thought. It will highlight the attitude of Muslim intellectuals towards political issues in Indonesia, particularly since the post-Soeharto era. The chapter will also examine the trajectories of the models of polity discussed in the previous chapters. As I have said in Chapter 1, the history of Islamic political thinking in Indonesia is the history of moderation and progress. This process, I argue, is attested by the increasing trend of liberal political attitudes. I will divide this chapter into three main sections, reflecting the elaboration of the three models of polity. In the last three chapters I discussed the three models chronologically. In this chapter, I will address them all together within one period of time. However, before we explore these three contesting models, let me first discuss the social and political background of the post-Soeharto era.

ISLAMIC POLITICAL DISCOURSE AFTER 1998

The fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998 signified many things for the Indonesian people. In the first place, it was hoped that the resignation of the powerful man who had ruled the country for more than thirty years would

bring better political and economic conditions to the country. Politically speaking, Indonesia has indeed made significant progress, particularly if by “progress” we mean a move towards democratization. For the first time in three decades, Indonesian citizens felt free to express their political opinions, set up political parties, and openly criticize the government. Greater freedom of expression and opinion was the immediate advantage Indonesian citizens gained in this transition process to democracy. Press freedom was the first kind of freedom achieved. More than 800 newspapers and magazines were established within the first nine months of the downfall of the regime.¹ Radio and television stations were suddenly out of control in broadcasting any issues that could possibly bring up their ratings. These media played a crucial role in disseminating information, not only about political change and the agenda of *reformasi*, but also socio-cultural as well as religious-political issues in general. Intellectuals and religious leaders have eagerly used such media to air their divergent views. The mass media has now become a major arena for contesting thoughts and ideas.

The second freedom is political assembly, manifested in the formation of mass organizations and political parties. In the first six months of the political transition, no fewer than 200 mass organizations and political parties were established.² They represent various groups and factions, ranging from the conservative and puritanist to the liberal and secular groups. Freedom of assembly has enabled groups previously prohibited by Soeharto to come into existence. Various Islamic organizations and political parties are now openly supporting the implementation of *shari‘ah* and the Islamic state. The idea of reviving the Jakarta Charter, which was totally forbidden in the Soeharto era, was now legal and enthusiastically advocated in Parliament. “Wild” ideas such as the caliphate, which had never had a footing in Indonesian Islamic history (see Chapter 2), were eagerly campaigned for by some Islamic activists. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) has been on the frontline of the struggle for a pan-Islamic state since 1998.

The winds of political freedom also went to the left. Although communism was entirely forbidden and was still regarded as taboo by many Indonesians, socialist movements unhesitatingly expressed their political aspirations. The underground group, the Democratic People’s Party (PRD, Partai Rakyat Demokratik), declared itself a leftist party. Other parties whose roots can clearly be traced to the older communist (PKI) or socialist parties such as the National Labor Party (PBN, Partai Buruh Nasional), the Workers’ Solidarity Party (PSP, Partai Solidaritas Pekerja), and All Indonesia Worker Solidarity Party (PSPSI, Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia), also

joined the democratic rally. Although in the 1999 general election none of these parties gained a seat in Parliament, their emergence bears witness to positive developments within Indonesian democratization.

The development of Islamic political thought in the post-Soeharto era is strongly related to the aforementioned kinds of freedom. Freedom of assembly has enabled the emergence of organizations, study groups, and intellectual circles. Various discussion forums have been held to discuss issues which were taboo in the Soeharto era. The resurgence of Islamic puritanist groups with their radical ideas has sparked the long debate on Islam and governmental issues. The emergence of such issues is important, not only to seek "objective" truth, but also to open up criticism against ideas that some Muslims consider to be final. A free public space enables every discussant to examine whether or not their arguments are rationally and theologically well founded.

The mass media and publications in general play a crucial role in this process. The print media, particularly newspapers, have become an effective medium for addressing intellectual discourse. Major newspapers, such as *Kompas*, *Media Indonesia*, *Republika*, and *Jawa Pos*, are effective agents in disseminating ideas and conveying varying intellectual standpoints. Editors are challenged to publish various writings on religious-political issues. In the Soeharto era, it was quite common for editors to practise self-censorship in order to maintain "political stability" prompted by the New Order regime. Indonesian intellectuals in general are now more likely to publish their ideas in newspapers or magazines than in journals. The reason is that writing in a newspaper takes little time, is easier to do, and reaches a wider readership. Another reason is to gain financial reward (honorarium). With a brief column or article, a writer could get paid reasonably. This last reason has driven young writers who are financially unsound to compete in publishing their writings.³

Newspapers have effectively accommodated debates among writers. The issue of Islam and secularism, for example, has been debated several times in *Kompas*.⁴ Likewise, the issue of Islam and religious education at school has been debated for about three months in *Media Indonesia* and *Republika*.⁵ Newspapers have become an effective medium in elevating the names of writers, particularly if an issue sparks controversy. This happened to Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a young writer who suddenly became famous for his controversial article in *Kompas*. Abshar-Abdalla's article is perhaps the first case in Indonesia where a brief column gained a fiery reaction from a group of Muslim clerics. The article was charged with having insulted Islam and the author could be condemned to death. The

consequence was that Abshar-Abdalla became famous and was subsequently invited to give talks by various institutions inside and outside of Indonesia.⁶

The role of new media such as the Internet is no less significant. Websites and mailing lists are two important elements of information technology in spreading ideas. Most of the major Islamic organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Persatuan Islam, have websites from which they disseminate ideas to a broader audience. The spacious and borderless character of websites enables people to reach a wider audience and give more detailed information, which is not possible in newspapers or magazines. Members of the young Muslim generation are among the most enthusiastic users of this technology. They open discussion groups and mailing lists to establish contact and discuss ideas. Certainly, Internet users in Indonesia is still small compared with those in advanced countries, but many of them are academics and intellectuals who used to be engaged in discussion circles.⁷ Easy access to the Internet and easy reproduction of its material enable the diffusion of web-based writings to a wider audience.⁸

Apart from these factors, there is another that helps the Islamic intellectual tradition in Indonesia to develop dynamically. The generation of Muslim born in the 1960s and after are better educated than their forebears. We have to mention here the role of Soeharto, which contributed to the empowerment of education and Islamic intellectualism in general.⁹ As briefly elaborated in Chapter 5, the New Order's project of modernization and development made a positive impact on the acceleration of education of *santri* Muslims. During its rule, the New Order regime modernized the Islamic educational system, from primary school level to higher and advanced levels of education. Interdepartmental coordination, particularly between the Department of Religion and the Department of National Education, in standardizing and elevating the quality of Islamic schools was a crucial endeavour. Likewise, modernization at university level such as IAIN by improving its premises as well as its curriculum, providing scholarships, and sending its students and lecturers abroad, was a huge project that made a great impact on the future development of the Muslim society in the country.

Furthermore, foreign aid institutions have also played a crucial role. Institutions and programmes such as Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Ford Foundation, the Asia Foundation, Fulbright Program, USAid, and AusAID, have been directly or indirectly involved in providing assistance to the Indonesian Islamic community. Since the early 1970s, Friedrich Naumann

Stiftung has contributed to the programme of community development by assisting Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) in Central Java.¹⁰ Since 1997, the Asia Foundation, has initiated the programme of Islam and Civil Society, which concentrates on Islamic institutions. It has greatly assisted major Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama in conducting workshops, seminars, and other activities that promote the idea of democracy and civil society.¹¹ Many students abroad are financially sponsored by those foundations. The Fulbright Program, for example, sends dozens of students every year to the United States, while AusAID sends no fewer than 300 students each year to the best universities in Australia.¹²

All these elements contribute to the dynamic character of Islamic political discourse in the post-Soeharto era. Freedom has enabled more people to express their ideas. The focus of Islamic thought is not concentrated merely on big ideological issues such as the issue of *dasar negara* (state basis), as it was in the Soeharto era and before, but has now become more complex. In 1999, for example, Muslims hotly debated the issue of whether or not a woman could become president. This was triggered by the campaign of Megawati Soekarnoputri, leader of the secularist PDIP and the daughter of Indonesia's founding president, Soekarno. In a similar vein, in 2001, various intellectuals and writers debated in newspapers, magazines, and on television, the definition and possible role of the *shari'ah*.¹³

To discuss minor issues is no less important than major issues. To a certain extent, they are often more important. Muslims who have been supporting the idea of the Islamic state, for example, are now forced to explain their arguments on women's status, on non-Muslim rights, on *shari'ah*, on the veil, on tolerance, and so on. Arguments on particular issues very much determine the major concepts behind them. Take for example the issue of a female president. This idea was criticized by Islamic parties on the ground that Islam prohibits women from becoming political leaders. Several leaders of Islamic parties such as A.M. Saefuddin and Hamzah Haz (both were leaders of PPP) were against the idea. Their argument was that the Qur'an prohibited Muslims from having women as their leaders. Thus, when Megawati Soekarnoputri campaigned for president in 1998, they were against her possible presidency. However, their argument was obviously weak, not only because there were many religious leaders and *ulama* who supported Soekarno's daughter to rally for president, but also because Hamzah Haz did not seem to have been convinced by the theological arguments he embraced, because when Megawati was elected President in 2000, he was one of the most ambitious men

who wanted to become her deputy (vice-president). Indeed, once he was selected by the MPR, he left the theological argument aside and chose political prestige instead.

The dynamics of contemporary Islamic political thought in Indonesia reflects development and progress. If in the past (at least until the mid-1980s) the issue of the Islamic state was a central theme in Islamic political thought, at the present time, such an issue no longer creates much discussion. There is a diminishing number of Muslims who support this idea. Even the groups usually dubbed radical fundamentalists such as MMI, LJ, and FPI, declare they are no longer interested in developing the idea. Irfan Suryahadi Awwas, an Islamic activist who in the mid-1980s was jailed for his activity to establish an Islamic state, now openly declares that he and his organization, MMI, do not want to establish an Islamic state.¹⁴ The major issue they are fighting for is how to enforce the implementation of the *shari'ah* in a democratic way. This has also become the cardinal agenda of Islamic political parties since their emergence in 1998.

This switch of attitude certainly has not occurred suddenly. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the concept of the Islamic state had been debated intensively by the *santri* Muslims during the 1980s and ended with its rejection. Most intellectuals engaged in such public debate were respected leaders whose knowledge and religious credibility are unquestionable. It seems clear that their views of the religion-state relationship were generally very influential among Indonesian Muslims. It is here that we see the importance of argument. The conclusive arguments demonstrated by intellectuals and religious leaders seem to have convinced Muslims that the Islamic state is not a concept that has absolute truth. Islamic arguments that are developed within the spirit of the age seem to be more convincing for Muslims than those arguments which are based on literal understanding.

The development of arguments is not limited to the issue of the Islamic state. Other issues such as democracy, pluralism, secularism, gender equality, civil society, and freedom, have also significantly developed. Islamic political discourse is no longer dominated by certain intellectual groups backed by the state (as happened in the New Order era when secular intellectuals enjoyed great privilege). All Islamic elements, liberal, moderate, and radical, have equal opportunity and right to claim their share of the debate. What matters most here is not whether an idea is supported by the state, but whether or not an argument is able to convince people of its truth. The more people are attracted by an idea, the more it has a chance to have a foothold in practical political reality.

THE RESURGENCE AND DECLINE OF MODEL 1

Since the 1980s, the discourse on the Islamic state has lost ground. The overwhelming criticisms by both the proponents of Model 2 and Model 3 have made the idea of *negara* Islam increasingly unpopular. Nevertheless, there are always Muslims who are obsessed with, and ready to, revive the idea. Throughout history, the idea of the Islamic state was closely related to Masyumi, whose spirit did not completely die out, despite the party being closed down in 1960. Mohammad Natsir, the chairman of Masyumi and the one who contributed greatly to characterizing the party, founded an Islamic institution where he could concentrate on his Islamic mission and teaching. His institution, Indonesian Islamic Missionary Council (DDII, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia), promotes ideas initially developed in Masyumi. It is in this institution that the spirit and ideals of Masyumi are continuously maintained.

During the New Order era, DDII took a passive stance towards political issues. Its leaders were more concerned with training and teaching, and with activities to counter what they believed was a project of Christianization led by Christian missionaries. DDII was also concerned with the Islamic mission, religious sermons, and training in secular campuses. It cooperated with the Saudi Arabian government and was entrusted with the responsibility of distributing Saudi donations to Islamic organizations in Indonesia. DDII was also translating and publishing books written by Muslim puritans such as Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'la Mawdudi. During the 1980s, DDII was the crucial agent in disseminating puritanist ideas that came from the Middle East. Almost all radical figures who emerged later in the post-Soeharto era had links directly or indirectly with DDII.¹⁵ Abdullah Sungkar, the JI leader, for instance, was a chairman of the Central Java branch of the DDII; Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, was one of the DDII's most successful preachers; and Tamsil Linrung, a man who was captured in the Philippines for carrying explosives, was also a leader of DDII. Some founders of Islamic political parties such as Deliar Noer and Yusril Ihza Mahendra also have a close relation with this institution, particularly with its founder Mohammad Natsir.

Generally, the new supporters of Model 1 can be found in Islamic political parties. In the 1999 general election, there were eleven Islamic parties, among which four claimed to be the carrier of the spirit and ideals of Masyumi.¹⁶ They wanted to revive the spirit of old Islamic parties (of the 1950s), particularly with regard to the agenda of bringing Islam into the state. Although they did not use the jargon of the Islamic state as

their seniors did in the 1950s, they all agreed that as the majority group, Muslims in Indonesia must have a proportional role. What they meant by “proportional” is the greater role of Islam in the state and government.

As I have said, since the 1980s, the discourse on the Islamic state has lost ground. The main concern of Muslims now is how to maximize their Islamic demand in accordance with the rule of law and the Constitution. What they mean by Constitution is a democratic way to revive the Jakarta Charter. It could be said that the *raison d'être* of the Islamic parties in the post-Soeharto era was to push the idea of the Jakarta Charter. Prior to 1999, all Muslim leaders were very optimistic and confident that Islamic parties would unite to win the general election. At the time, no one imagined that their parties, as later proven, would be defeated.¹⁷ Just as in 1955, Muslim optimism failed to be justified.

ISLAMIC PARTIES AND THE JAKARTA CHARTER

Founding an Islamic party is perhaps the most crucial idea born in the post-Soeharto era. It has greatly occupied *santri* Muslims, who questioned whether establishing an Islamic party was a necessary and politically strategic step. This was justifiable since the idea of an Islamic party was despised by the Soeharto regime and was suspected by the secularists. “Islamic party” refers to a party which formally adopts Islam as its ideological basis and pursues Muslim interests as its main goal. The idea of an Islamic party was often associated with Islamic radical groups. This is not entirely the case since there were also several moderate Muslim intellectuals supporting the idea. Deliar Noer and Yusril Ihza Mahendra, for instance, are two Muslim intellectuals of this kind. Both supported the idea of Islamic parties and even set up and chaired one such party.

Deliar Noer is a prolific Muslim scholar from North Sumatra. Raised and educated in a strong religious environment, he studied political science at the National University in Jakarta and then continued his postgraduate studies at Cornell University, in the United States. Before going to Cornell, Noer was chairman of the Muslim Student Association (HMI, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) and was very close to political leaders, particularly Mohammad Hatta and Mohammad Natsir. It was because of their recommendation that Noer pursued his studies at Cornell.¹⁸ Noer's Ph.D. dissertation, “The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia”, became his masterpiece and is highly acclaimed in academic circles. On his return to Indonesia, Noer taught at several universities and was then appointed rector of the Teacher Training Institute (IKIP, Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu

Pendidikan), Jakarta. His criticism of the Soeharto government resulted in his dismissal from the institute. He was highly suspected by the regime and was prohibited from teaching in any university in Indonesia. He then went to Australia to teach at Griffith University in Queensland. In 1987, he came back to his home country and focused on writing books and articles, with limited access to university teaching. After the fall of Soeharto, together with some other anti-Soeharto activists, he founded the Islamic Community Party (PUI, Partai Umat Islam), an Islamic party which he claimed would struggle for Muslims' political interests.

Like Noer, Yusril Ihza Mahendra is a Muslim intellectual who used to be very close to Masyumi leaders, particularly Mohammad Natsir. He was born in Belitung, a small island near Sumatra, into a strong religious family. His father was chairman of the local branch of Masyumi during the 1950s. On finishing school, he went to Jakarta to pursue his studies at the University of Indonesia. He specialized in law, but was strongly interested in history and philosophy. He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Science in Malaysia, writing on fundamentalism and modernism amongst Islamic movements in Indonesia and Pakistan. On his return to Indonesia, Mahendra went back to his alma mater and taught at the Faculty of Law. While teaching, Mahendra routinely wrote articles in national magazines and newspapers. From 1995, he became a writer of Soeharto's speeches and was the one who drafted the speech for Soeharto's resignation in 1998. Unlike Noer, Mahendra took an accommodative stance with the regime. He accepted Pancasila as the basis of the state. After Soeharto's resignation, however, he went back to his religious habitat, attempting to revive Masyumi, an old party which was banned by Soekarno. Backed by former Masyumi leaders, Mahendra was appointed chairman of PBB in 1998.

Noer's and Mahendra's role in defending the Islamic political party is crucial, mainly because they deliberately took an opposite stance from liberal Muslim intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid. They painstakingly argue, and respond to calls, for the legitimacy of an Islamic party. Their support of the idea is important, first, because they both come from *santri* background and have a strong tie with Masyumi and the modernist Islamic movement in general. Second, they are respected scholars with an international reputation, particularly Deliar Noer. Third, both are prolific writers who have been concerned with Islam and political issues since their youth. Fourth, they have been sympathetic to the radical organizations that have increasingly emerged during the post-Soeharto era. While Noer was a member of the steering committee of the Majelis Mujahidin, led by Abu Bakar Baashir, Mahendra is known for his

closeness to several fundamentalist leaders such as Ahmad Sumargono¹⁹ and Abdul Qodir Djaelani.²⁰ Both Noer's and Mahendra's roles are crucial in countering the idea that the Islamic political party is often associated with Muslim political activism that lacks an intellectual foundation.

How do they justify the Islamic political party? In an article he wrote for *Ummat* magazine, Noer explains why he founded an Islamic political party. First of all, he criticizes intellectuals who often distinguish between what is widely known as "cultural Islam" and "political Islam" and argues that it is more appropriate to develop the former rather than the latter in the Indonesian context. Noer refers to liberal Muslims such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, whose writings often emphasize the importance of cultural Islam, while discouraging its political aspects.²¹ According to Noer, this distinction and the way those intellectuals prefer one to the other are misguided, for four reasons: First, theoretically the distinction is untenable since culture is also included in political aspects. Noer argues that Islam as a cultural force also includes politics, which cannot easily be separated. Many legal and ethical doctrines of Islam cannot be upheld perfectly in society unless there is involvement by the political authority. Second, historically, the cultural and political aspects of Islam were unified in Sarekat Islam, the first Islamic movement in Indonesia. This movement was set up to uphold both the cultural and political interests of Indonesian Muslims. Third, distinguishing between "cultural Islam" and "political Islam" is nothing more than a colonialist agenda, inspired by C. Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch adviser, who distinguished Islam into "ritual" and "political" Islam. Like those liberal Muslims, Hurgronje argued that while the "ritual Islam" is acceptable, "political Islam" must be rejected. Fourth, the Prophet Muhammad never distinguished between religion and politics. Like many Islamists, Noer argues that the separation of religion and politics is against the exemplary model (*sunnah*) of the Prophet.²² With all these reasons, Noer concludes that to establish the Islamic political party is not a foreign idea, and is, in fact, theologically and historically advisable.

Noer's arguments are common to those who support the idea of the unification of religion and the state. Islam and the state cannot be separated; in fact, both have to be unified in order that all aspects of Islam can be completely implemented. They all believe that there is no guarantee that Islamic teachings and values will be applied except through the state. The Islamic party is designed to achieve this goal, and since democracy allows people to create an Islamic party, there is nothing wrong in Muslims creating one.

Democracy is an important reason often mentioned by Muslims to justify the formation of an Islamic party in Indonesia. By doing so they want to emphasize that creating an Islamic party is constitutionally justifiable. Mahendra specifically addresses this point by arguing that prohibiting Muslims from creating an Islamic party is against democracy and tantamount to behaving like the Soeharto's authoritarian regime. He explains:

Religion based parties are legitimate and constitutional as far as they do not aspire to contradict the foundation of the state and are not contradictory to democracy. The phobia over religious parties by associating them with national disintegration is a concept inherited from the New Order regime. Historically, there is no evidence that such parties have shown any tendency — let alone committed — rebellion with disintegration as their ultimate objective. During political campaigns leading to the 1955 general election, Masyumi and PNI were able to share a soccer stadium peacefully, but when all parties were forced to have one single basis (*asas tunggal*) in the New Order era, they would often fight with each other.²³

Mahendra indeed admires Masyumi, and he wants PBB, the party that he leads, to become the heir to — and to struggle for — Masyumi's ideals.

Mahendra is perhaps the most moderate figure, not to say, the most pragmatic one, among all Muslim leaders who support the idea of an Islamic party. Although known to be close to the "fundamentalist" circle, he was often involved in intellectual discussions held by liberal Muslims. In the early 1990s, he published several articles in *Ulumul Qur'an*, a journal that echoed liberal Islamic ideas in Indonesia. His support for Islamic parties was largely due to his emotional ties with Masyumi leaders. Apart from his father, who was the chairman of the local branch of Masyumi, he was strongly influenced by Masyumi leaders in Jakarta. Three of them, Mohammad Natsir, Osman Raliby, and Mohammad Rasjidi, had a great influence on him and were helpful for his education. It was because of their kindness that he has a wide social and political network.²⁴ For these reasons, Mahendra could not refuse when senior Masyumi leaders and other DDII members appointed him leader of PBB.²⁵ Nevertheless, this does not mean that he led PBB for that pragmatic reason alone. If we study his writings, and particularly his Ph.D. dissertation, it seems clear that he greatly admired Masyumi. In his view, Masyumi is a progressive and "liberal" Islamic party, despite its adoption of Islam as the platform of the party. He considers Masyumi totally different from Jama'at Islami of Abul A'la Mawdudi. The latter, he argues, is a fundamentalist party whose ultimate goal is to create a theocratic state.²⁶

It was Mahendra's moderate attitude that distinguishes him from other supporters of the Islamic party, particularly those who were affiliated with radical organizations such as MMI, FPI, and HTI. The application of *shari'ah* was the main aim of all Islamic parties that arose in the post-Soeharto era. Practically speaking, *shari'ah* is a direct derivation from the Jakarta Charter, a document that has become the perpetual inspiration for Muslims throughout the modern history of Indonesia. During the 1950s, there was no serious debate about what the Jakarta Charter really is and what it mainly contains. At the time, all *santri* Muslims seemed to agree unanimously that the Jakarta Charter meant the application of *shari'ah* for Muslims, as the seven words in it indicate. No one was interested in the definition of *shari'ah*. The serious discussion of what the content of the Jakarta Charter was and what *shari'ah* really means has only emerged recently. There has been strong disagreement over this issue, not only between the secularist and the Islamist factions, but also among the *santri* Muslims themselves. In fact, among the supporters of Islamic parties, there has never been a conclusive understanding about the issue.

Deliar Noer and Yusril Ihza Mahendra have their own conception about *shari'ah* which is different from their Islamist colleagues such as Abu Bakar Baashir, the leader of Jama'ah Islamiyah, or Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad. While most of the radical leaders interpret *shari'ah* literally, that is to say, as it was practised in the time of the Prophet, Noer and Mahendra consider it an open notion for interpretation. In fact, the application of *shari'ah* cannot be implemented instantly. It depends on the people's readiness and should be enforced only gradually. The priority of *shari'ah* application, according to Noer, is not the criminal laws as many radical Muslims suggest, but the regulations that affect social betterment, such as eradication of poverty and improving education.²⁷ For Mahendra, on the other hand, *shari'ah* can be applied without specifically calling it so. What he means is that *shari'ah* codes can be inserted into the national law and thus become positive law. Whether or not it is named *shari'ah* is not important. When he was Minister of Justice, Mahendra suggested the need to take Islamic law as one of the sources of legal reform in Indonesia.²⁸

Noer's and Mahendra's views of *shari'ah* are actually closer to those of the liberal Muslim intellectuals than to the views of their colleagues who support the Jakarta Charter. However, while the liberal intellectuals mostly avoid the politicization of *shari'ah* (including its implementation), Noer and Mahendra fully support it. For them, *shari'ah* is a cardinal doctrine that must be implemented by Muslims. The ultimate aim of the Islamic political party is to uphold *shari'ah* and have it implemented in the state.

THE DECLINE OF ISLAMIC PARTIES

Prior to the 1999 general election, no one could estimate the power of Islamic parties. All Muslim leaders were very optimistic about victory in the election. An Islamic party targeted 35 per cent of votes, other Islamic parties targeted 40 per cent and 45 per cent, so if all that Islamic optimism was pooled they would have collected more than 100 per cent of the votes.²⁹ The question of how strong the Islamic parties were and how justified their optimism would be, was only answered after the 1999 general election, when the Muslims found that Islamic parties were dramatically defeated. Out of twelve Islamic parties³⁰ that participated in the election, only PPP, a party established during the Soeharto era, gained a reasonable percentage of votes (10.7 per cent). The others gained less than 2 per cent, which meant that they could not take part in the next general election.³¹ Even if all votes for Islamic parties were combined, they did not receive 20 per cent. This was clearly a dramatic decrease compared with the 1955 general election, when all the Islamic parties combined gained 43 per cent of the vote.

With the defeat of Islamic parties in the 1999 general election, the hope to Islamize the state through the Jakarta Charter became irrelevant. What would they do in the Parliament with only 15 per cent of the political power? However, this reality did not weaken the Muslim leaders' spirit in fighting for their ideal of an Islamic state. With such a small number, Islamic parties tried to pool their strength, demanding — yet again — the Jakarta Charter. This occurred at the MPR Annual Meeting in 2002. There were likely two main reasons for the Islamic parties obstinately demanding the Jakarta Charter, despite their small number. Firstly, the attempt to satisfy their constituents who voted for them merely because of the Islamic agenda they offered. This step was important at least to keep their loyalty to the parties. Secondly, they hoped that political cooperation between the Islamic groups could be established again as had been the case in the 1999 Special Session of MPR, when they could race against the secularist powers (PDIP and GOLKAR) to elect a president. In that session, a caucus called Poros Tengah (Central Axis), which comprised all Islamic parties plus PKB and PAN, successfully prevented Megawati, a secularist candidate, from becoming president.

They hoped that they would be able to repeat their historical glory in the 2002 MPR Annual Meeting. And the first task to achieve such glory was to establish a caucus and to appeal to Muslims to exert pressure on the members of parliament. One thing that was ignored by most of these Muslims leaders was the fact that the political situation was no longer the

same. Hamzah Haz, who opposed Megawati, now became her deputy (vice-president), Abdurrahman Wahid, who was an important part of the caucus, was now the most alienated person in it, and Amien Rais, who successfully led the caucus, had now become chairman of MPR. In general, people who had undergone the process of democratization in the last four years since 1998 were maturing. They were no longer easily tempted by ideological campaigns.

For all these reasons, it was revealed that one of the most important decisions made at the 2002 MPR Annual Meeting was the rejection of a proposed amendment to Chapter 29, requested by Islamic parties. It was suggested that this chapter should include the seven words previously contained in the Jakarta Charter. In the session, only two Islamic parties eagerly proposed the amendment, that is, PPP and PBB.³² In fact, the chairman of PPP, Hamzah Haz, began to hesitate and seemed to have no desire to support the proposal of his party.³³ Other Islamic parties, such as the Justice Party (PK, Partai Keadilan), chose a different way by joining a reformation faction, a moderate faction led by Amien Rais' PAN. PK and PAN later put another proposal for the amendment which was more neutral (I will discuss this below). Meanwhile, PKB, which in 1999 sided with Poros Tengah in impeding Megawati, now joined PDIP and GOLKAR to reject the idea of an amendment to Chapter 29.³⁴ The lack of support in the Parliament was made worse by the fact that major Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah also objected to the proposal.³⁵

The objection to the Islamic proposal at the 2002 MPR Annual Meeting was a crucial moment in the political history of Indonesian Islam. This was not merely because of the defeat of the Islamic parties, but also the way and the circumstances in which they were defeated. Retrospectively, in the constitutional debates between 1957 and 1959, all Islamic parties and organizations unanimously supported the Islamic proposal to return the Jakarta Charter to the Constitution. Forty-three years later, the map of support had radically changed. Now, not only did the secular nationalists reject the proposal, but also major Islamic organizations outside the Parliament refused to support the proposal. Even an Islamic party such as PK was not interested in the magical "seven words", but instead sought an alternative formulation more suitable for the current social-political condition of the country. These developments indicate the decline of an Islamic agenda in the centre of political power. In other words, the defeat of Islamic parties at the 2002 MPR Annual Meeting could be seen as the demise of Model 1, a model that the younger generation of Masyumi tried to revive.

THE DOMINANCE OF MODEL 2

The 2002 MPR Annual Meeting not only revealed the demise of Model 1, but also the ascension of Model 2. In retrospect, Model 2 is the model that bridges the two dominant political orientations during the first two decades of Indonesian independence — the secularist and the Islamist. It is built on the conviction that religion and the state have a unique relationship, which cannot be separated entirely, but which also cannot be totally unified. During the post-Soeharto era, PAN represents this spirit. Although the party is “secular” in the sense that it does not adopt a specific religion (Islam) as its basic platform, it is a party with strong support from the Muslim community. Not only was this party founded and chaired by Amien Rais, one of the leading proponents of Model 2, but also the political basis of the party is Muhammadiyah, the second biggest Islamic organization in the country. PAN was designed by its founders as an open and moderate party that could accommodate the religious values in Indonesia. Apart from Muslim leaders, this party was also cofounded by several non-Muslim figures such as Christianto Wibisono, K. Sindhunata, Th. Sumartana, Bungaran Saragih, I. Ketut Danawir, and Bara Hasibuan.

At the 2002 MPR Annual Meeting, PAN did not side with the Islamic faction in supporting the amendment to Chapter 29, nor with the secular factions led by GOLKAR and PDIP in refusing the idea of the amendment. Rather, it suggested an alternative, proposing an amendment that bore the spirit of religious pluralism. This step was part of PAN’s consistency in following a moderate path. It did not want to appear to be supporting the Islamic parties as well as supporting the secular ones. From the outset, Muslim leaders who were involved in creating PAN were not so interested in the idea of an Islamic party. Amien Rais rejected the position of chairman of PBB offered to him on the ground that this party was too narrow for him as it was based on Islam. Interestingly, most of the proponents of Model 2 whom we discussed in Chapter 4 are the members — or at least supporters — of PAN, most notably, Kuntowijoyo and Ahmad Syafii Maarif.

PAN is certainly not the only party that supports Model 2. On a theoretical level, Model 2 can be supported by anybody and any organization. Several supporters of this model are, in fact, found outside political parties. Religious organizations that believe in the importance of religion’s role in the state tend to favour this model. As far as Islamic political thought is concerned, the existence of Model 2 is accentuated with the rejection of the formalization of Islam in the state. This can be seen in how the

supporters of this model, having rejected the idea of the Islamic state (see Chapter 4), rejected the idea of the Islamic party. In addition, they also rejected the formalization of Islamic law (*shari'ah*), which is itself a consequence of their objection to the Jakarta Charter.

OPPOSING THE IDEA OF ISLAMIC PARTY

The proponents of Model 2's objection to the Islamic party is based on a similar argument to their rejection of the idea of the Islamic state. Political matters should be treated rationally and objectively, while religion is a non-rational and subjective matter. A political party that declares itself to have a particular basis of religion is a party that limits itself to particular values subjective to it. Parties with a religious basis tend to limit themselves to the ideology they embrace. As the religious ideology is mostly closed and exclusive, the political agenda it bears is most likely exclusive.

Proponents of Model 2, such as Amien Rais and Kuntowijoyo, consider that politics is better carried out rationally, mainly because the character of politics is dynamic and changeable, something that is contradictory to the nature of religion. For Rais, the main aim of a political party is to seek benefit for as many people as possible, and, therefore, it has to be built on the spirit of openness and inclusiveness. He says:

A political party, in my opinion, is a tool for *mu'amalah ma'a al-nas* (dealing with people), a tool to cooperate with other servants of God and fellow human beings. So, in political matters, cooperating with people from other religions in order to establish a just and prosperous society based on mutual respect, is something highly recommended by Islam. In the Madinah Charter, I think the Prophet [Muhammad] made a point of accommodating the Jewish and Christian minorities.³⁶

Rais's argument above is clearly meant to justify PAN, a political party that was founded on the spirit of cooperation among religious adherents. For him, establishing an open party where all national elements are involved is much better than having an Islamic party which is limited to a group of people. This is the main reason he refused the chairmanship of PBB offered to him.

For Kuntowijoyo, the idea of the Islamic party no longer deserves support, particularly because it was proven to have failed in bringing national betterment and prosperity. The will to establish the Islamic party in the post-Soeharto era was strongly driven by emotional ties to revive

the old Islamic parties.³⁷ Like Rais, Kuntowijoyo supports an inclusive and open party, rather than the one that takes religion as its basis, simply because politics is a rational matter and party politics would be better if it is dealt with rationally. He grounds his objection to the Islamic party on several reasons:

First, religion has many dimensions while politics only has one; to render religion political therefore means massively reducing the meaning of religion. Second, the management of government is merely rational, technical, and objective; Muslims should return to the *Khittah* 1926 or to become active in high politics. Third, Muslims must be in the frontline of history in building a rational political system. Let there be no shrinking in the role of Muslims. Muslims are not passengers, but drivers. Our final conclusion is that, there are more disadvantages than advantages in the establishment of the Islamic political party.³⁸

The above advice is addressed generally to all Muslim leaders, and specifically to leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah. For Kuntowijoyo, NU leaders who have been obsessed with establishing the Islamic political party would be better going back to the *Khittah* 1926 where they declared they would not be involved in politics. Similarly, to Muhammadiyah, Kuntowijoyo warns that the organization should consider the concept of “high politics”, that is, a political way that focuses more on substance than on form.³⁹

OPPOSING THE JAKARTA CHARTER

As I have mentioned, the proposal to bring the Jakarta Charter back into the Constitution was highly objected to by various parties and organizations, not only non-Muslims and secular groups, but also the *santri* community. Supporters of Model 2 were among those who objected to the proposal of an amendment to Chapter 29 of the Indonesian Constitution, where the spirit of the Jakarta Charter is located. Their argument was not only that the seven words had been a controversial issue, but also that its formulation was not congenial to the ideals of a religious-pluralist state. The Jakarta Charter only emphasizes Muslims’ religious rights, but ignores the rights of other religions.

In Parliament, apart from the secular parties, the objection to the Jakarta Charter was supported by Muslim-based parties such as PAN and PKB. PAN, in this case, took a more moderate position than PKB in the sense that it sought a middle path towards the issue. Meanwhile, PKB totally agreed with the secular parties in refusing any amendment to

Chapter 29. As a pluralist party chaired by a leading figure of Model 2, PAN tried to bridge the two political forces in Parliament. This attempt was made by accepting the idea of the amendment, but rejecting the controversial wording (seven words). For PAN, the wording does not reflect the plurality of religion, and it must, therefore, be modified so as to comply with the religious-cultural condition of Indonesia. Hence, PAN proposed a new wording that is believed to have reflected the religious-cultural condition of the Indonesian people, that is "the state is based on the sole divinity, with the obligation for adherents of all religions to practise their respective religions".⁴⁰ This proposal was later also supported by the Justice Party (PK), which considers the alternative embodiment of the Madinah Charter.⁴¹

PK's support of PAN's proposal is interesting to observe. Although it is an Islamic party, PK refused to join PPP and PBB in supporting the Jakarta Charter. The decision seemed to be based on pragmatic and political reasons rather than ideology. Since entering Parliament, PK chose to work with PAN to launch its political agenda. Both of these parties, PAN and PK, later formed a political faction known as the "Reformation Faction", which was more concerned with the *reformasi* agenda such as a clean government and people's welfare, rather than an ideological programme. PK's pragmatic and non-ideological attitude was a great step forward as far as the history of the Islamic political party in Indonesia is concerned. Throughout history, Islamic parties in Indonesia had always been associated with ideological struggles. The emergence of Islamic parties immediately after the downfall of Soeharto was very much triggered by an intention to revive such a struggle. However, PK seemed to have decided to remove itself from that tradition.

Although the alternative proposal to the amendment was later rejected as it lacked parliamentary support, the attempt to propose such an alternative amendment is noteworthy. It primarily reflects two issues: first, it stresses the conviction of the importance of religious pluralism and the importance of inviting all religious elements to be involved in the state. Second, it stresses the significance of religion's role in the state. With the alternative charter, PAN and PK wanted to say that the Indonesian Constitution does not give enough guarantees for religion to have a role. Only by giving a constitutional statement would Indonesian Muslims feel secure.

One thing that must be noted here is that the alternative proposal strongly bears the spirit of pluralist Islam. Hidayat Nurwahid, who then chaired PK(S), considered the alternative proposal a reflection of the Madinah Charter. In contemporary Islamic political discourse in Indonesia, the term "Madinah Charter" (*piagam Madinah*) is widely used by those in the circle of the Islamic renewal movement (*gerakan pembaruan pemikiran Islam*).

Intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Djohan Effendi often pointed to the Madinah Charter as a genuine document of Islam that highly stresses religious pluralism. Those behind the puritanist Islamic movement had rarely used this term, and, in fact, had been allergic to using this document, not only because they felt that to advocate such a pluralist doctrine would contradict their exclusive attitude, but also because they did not want to be associated with the renewalist figures they had been condemning.⁴² PK(S), a political party which has been considered “puritanist”, tries to escape from this paradox. They adopt the term “Piagam Madinah” as a sign that they are ready to become an inclusive party.⁴³ Seen from the perspective of Islamic political thought, the adoption is a progressive step, not only because of their readiness to fuse with liberal Islamic political discourse, but also because of their courage in leaving strongly ideological Islamic parties such as PPP and PBB.

TURNING MODERATE

Apart from PKS’s moderate attitude, the new Indonesian political stage presents a fact that is often ignored by many observers, that is, PAN as a pluralist party is moving towards a more religious tone and is much more intensive in accommodating Muslim aspirations than any other elements in the party. Thus, PAN has greatly changed since its formation. In the beginning, as I have mentioned, this party was designed to become an inclusive party. Apart from Muslim leaders, there were several secularist and non-Muslim leaders involved in the establishment of the party. PAN continued in this manner until early 2001, when an internal conflict regarding the platform of the party took place.⁴⁴ Several secularist and non-Muslim leaders seceded from the party as the more religious figures came to dominate the position of chairman.⁴⁵ Hence, the party began to stress its “religious” character rather than its “secularity”. The alternative proposal at the 2002 MPR Annual Meeting has to be understood against this background of PAN’s changing character. This further indicates that PAN still considers the issue of religion to be important and the party clearly refuses to be characterized in any way as a completely secular party.

There were two figures who greatly influenced the character change of PK(S) and PAN. First, Hidayat Nurwahid, the leader of PK(S), and second, A.M. Fatwa, the leader of PAN. Nurwahid, born in Klaten in 1960, was from a strong Muhammadiyah family. He studied at Gontor, East Java, and then went to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic sciences at the Islamic University of Madinah. He wrote a dissertation on the Sufi movement in

Indonesia. After returning to Indonesia, Nurwahid was involved in various Islamic activities. Apart from Muhammadiyah, he was also active in other organizations. He founded Yayasan Haramain, an institution that focuses on education and Islamic training. His closeness to Muslim activists in various campuses brought him to the world of *pergerakan* (movement) and politics. In 1998, he cofounded PK, and two years later, chaired the organization. Under his administration, PK (which then changed into PKS), improved significantly. Not only was he successful in changing the image of the party to a “modern and clean party”, but he also brought it from the bottom of the electoral threshold to the big seven, overwhelming PBB.

A.M. Fatwa is a Muslim activist who has long been participating in politics. He was born in 1939 in Bone, South Sulawesi. After finishing school, he went to Jakarta and studied at IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah. At IAIN, he was highly active in the student movement and in 1957 was appointed chairman of the HMI branch of Ciputat. During the 1980s, Fatwa was known as an outspoken preacher. His speeches were often attended by many Muslims. When Soeharto imposed the *asas tunggal*, Fatwa was among those who rejected it and then joined the Petisi 50, a group of politicians and intellectuals who aimed at opposing the regime. Following the Tanjung Priok riot in 1984, Fatwa and several other Muslim leaders were detained and sentenced to jail for eighteen years. He was given an amnesty by President Habibie in 1999. Since coming out from prison, Fatwa has returned to his old professions, giving speeches and writings articles. As a Muhammadiyah member, he was drawn to join the then newly established party, PAN. At the beginning, he was not so active, but subsequently he dominated the party and has had a strong influence over its ideological direction.

Both Nurwahid and Fatwa were associated with each other not only because of their Muhammadiyah background, but also because of their strong “Islamist” attitude. Fatwa, as mentioned above, was detained by Soeharto for his strong opposition towards Pancasila. Nurwahid was also a staunch opponent of Pancasila. When he was a student in Saudi Arabia, he mobilized Indonesian students there to stand against the Indonesian embassy for the country’s introduction of the *asas tunggal* policy.⁴⁶ However, both Fatwa’s and Nurwahid’s “Islamist” attitude is greatly diminishing in the Post-Soeharto era.

There are several factors why they became more moderate. First of all, the main enemy, the Soeharto regime, against which they were fighting, had collapsed. Pancasila was no longer an issue and, more importantly, Islamic activism in a radical manner was an anathema to the majority of Muslims since it would be quickly associated with terrorism. Secondly,

their involvement in society (through *da'wah* and mass organization), drives them to choose more pragmatic and rational ways in dealing with political reformation. The more they are involved in social and political reality, the more they feel that there is no quick panacea for complex problems. Only by way of gradual reform could they change the country, and it means that they have to take a pragmatic course, by means of, among other things, establishing or joining political parties.

Involvement in political reality can make an individual or a party change. The case of Hidayat Nurwahid and his PK(S) in general is perhaps the clearest case in point. In the 1999 general election, PK performed with a very strong exclusivist Islamic nuance. Like many other Islamic parties, its chief campaign was an ideological Islam such as the application of *shari'ah* and how to make the state more Islamic. Indonesian Muslims, however, seemed not to have had enough desire for this agenda, for as it turned out, many of them did not vote for PK. In fact, in the 1999 general election, PK only obtained 1.7 per cent of the votes.

Given this fact, PK was transformed into PKS in 2003. But this was actually not a mere change in name. PKS changed their campaign strategy, from promoting an exclusivist Islamic programme to advertising more pragmatic universal issues such as clean government, anti-violence, and anti-corruption. In fact, they tried hard to avoid Islamic ideological jargon. The result was surprising. In 2004, the party succeeded in increasing their vote almost five times to 7.3 per cent. Many have argued that the success of PK(S) was not due to their Islamic image, but rather due to the change of their non-ideological campaign strategy.⁴⁷

THE TRAJECTORY OF MODEL 3

The declining popularity of Islamic parties or Islamic political ideology in general is a result of a long process of internal secularization brought about by Muslim reformists. As elaborated in Chapter 5, apart from the secularization agenda set by the New Order regime, Muslim intellectuals and leaders have also played a crucial role in "secularization from within". In this regard, credit must specifically be given to liberal Muslim intellectuals who have been in the frontline of such a secularization process. Liberal intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid have tirelessly promoted the inclusive and pluralist views of religious-political issues. Their position as religious figures, leaders of Islamic organizations, scholars with an international reputation, has made them strongly authoritative for many Indonesian Muslims.

Since the post-Soeharto era, Wahid and Madjid were very much engaged in politics. As I have mentioned elsewhere, Wahid established a political party and reached the climax of his political career by becoming the Indonesian president (2000–2001). Madjid, on the other hand, played a significant role in accelerating the downfall of Soeharto. He was one of the key leaders who designed the steps for Soeharto's peaceful resignation.⁴⁸ On the eve of the 2004 general election, several groups implored him to run as a presidential candidate. After much hesitation, he finally accepted the request, yet he seemed not to take it seriously. Both Wahid's and Madjid's roles in practical politics have become a point of criticism from many people, particularly Wahid, who was considered to have failed as president. In fact, many of Wahid's policies and political manoeuvres were considered as being against his long-standing views on democracy and pluralism. Madjid, on the other hand, was criticized for his acceptance of the presidential candidacy, particularly when he accepted the offer from PKS, an Islamic party he used to criticize.

Nevertheless, apart from their involvement in practical politics and their respective failures, Wahid's and Madjid's roles have been significant. Their actual roles are naturally not in their positions as political leaders, but rather as thinkers and religious figures. It was in these roles that they have been a great influence and inspiration for Indonesian Muslims in general or for the younger Muslim generation in particular. The emergence of young liberal Muslims is much determined by their liberal views and not by their role in politics. While Wahid has been greatly responsible for influencing the young generation of NU, Madjid has been influential among the modernist groups, particularly HMI and Muhammadiyah.

In the following sections, we will see how new Islamic organizations are strongly influenced by Wahid's and Madjid's liberal ideas. First of all, I will highlight the rise of those liberal organizations, and then I will discuss the main political ideas dealt with by young liberal Muslims who are mostly affiliated with those organizations.

THE RISE OF YOUNG LIBERAL MUSLIMS

Since the very beginning, the character of the Islamic reform movement in Indonesia has been communitarian; that is to say, the movement has always taken place in groups and organizations. Thawalib, Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Parmi, and Persis are all mass organizations that have carried out the Islamic reform agenda. Islamic thought in Indonesia is not driven by an individual, but by an organization or group. This

communitarian character has endured until the present time. In important centres of learning such as Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Malang, and Bandung, Islamic organizations with a progressive tone have emerged sporadically. Some of them have a national influence and some others are limited to the local populace. I will discuss three Islamic organizations that have emerged during the last two decades. These organizations represent three important cities in Indonesia: Yogyakarta, Malang, and Jakarta.

LKiS, Yogyakarta

The Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LKiS, Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial) was originally a discussion group of Muslim students in Yogyakarta. It was founded in the 1980s, but formally launched as a non-government organization in September 1993. Most LKiS members come from an NU background and have studied Islam and social sciences at major universities in Yogyakarta, particularly at the State Institute of Islamic Religion (IAIN) and Gajah Mada University (UGM). They often held discussions on various issues, ranging from classical Islam to the challenge of modernity, and the problem of authoritarian regimes.

Apart from discussion groups, LKiS also published a weekly leaflet called *al-Ikhtilaf* (Disagreement), which covered Islamic issues seen from a pluralist point of view. This leaflet was distributed to Friday prayer congregations and was aimed at countering the fundamentalist groups that used to distribute leaflets of a different tone. Up to 2005, LKiS printed around 45,000 copies of the leaflet and distributed them to mosques in twenty-five regions in Java, Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, and South Kalimantan. The organization also conducted workshops, made film documentaries, and produced radio talk shows.⁴⁹ But its most significant activity, which has made it famous nationwide, is the book publication division it runs. Since its establishment, this division has daringly translated and published controversial books, mostly written by controversial Muslim scholars such as Mohammed Arkoun, Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Asghar Ali Engineer, and Hassan Hanafi.⁵⁰

LKiS's books are cheap, which make them affordable for university students. The focus on controversial books and authors has created a special image for this publishing house as the defender of liberal Islamic ideas. In fact, LKiS has paid for its indulgence in publication by a fall in its image in other activities. Many would now consider this organization merely a publishing house. This image is not totally wrong, as its most significant contribution is the dissemination of liberal Islamic ideas through books.

LKiS's crucial role is its function in providing alternative reading for the young Muslim generation. In the midst of an overwhelming number of puritanist books supplied by radical and conservative groups, LKiS' existence becomes extremely important. Jadul Maula, one of the founders of this institute, holds the view that there is a wide misconception among many Indonesian Muslims about the Arab world, in that they consider it mainly as the source of Islamic radical or conservative thinking. To counter this mistaken image, Maula translated and published Arabic books written by contemporary liberal Muslims.⁵¹ It could be said that the diffusion of contemporary Arab thought in its liberal tone is very much due to the role played by LKiS.

Resist, Malang

Resist (Centre for Religious and Social Studies) is a study group rather than a mass organization. It was founded in Malang by Muslim students, mainly from a Muhammadiyah background, on 16 July 1999. Malang is a medium-sized city in East Java with about eleven universities and thirty-five colleges. The biggest universities are Brawijaya University, State University of Malang, State Islamic University of Malang, and the Muhammadiyah University of Malang. Most of the members of Resist come from these four major universities. Like LKiS for the NU community in Yogyakarta, Resist was established as an intellectual medium (*wadah*) for Muhammadiyah activists in Malang. Like LKiS in the context of NU, the birth of Resist was a response by young Muhammadiyah activists to counter the puritanist tendency in Muhammadiyah.

The organization has four main programmes: (i) translating and publishing selected books, particularly those books which are critical of conservative and puritanist ideas; (ii) research on social and religious issues; (iii) routine seminars and discussions about any issues regarding Islam and social changes; (iv) workshops and empowerment of the young Muslim generation. Speculative and philosophical issues are of major concern to this organization, and in this regard, the role of Amin Abdullah, a prominent liberal Muslim and a rector of Yogyakarta IAIN (see Chapter 5), is outstanding. One of the Resist members describes what "rationality" means for the organization:

Resist places reason in a highly respected position. This is why this organization supports ideas such as religious pluralism, Islamic liberalism, democracy, secularization in public life. All these things are intended to value human beings and humanity in general, since Resist believes that

appreciating humanity necessarily means paying God the highest esteem. Thus, Resist's motto in this context is: 'to defend the interest of human being in the service of God'.⁵²

Several members of Resist such as Pradana Boy and Hery Sucipto are prolific writers and have been publishing their ideas in the local and national media. Boy is a lecturer at Muhammadiyah University of Malang and was an ardent activist of Muhammadiyah from a young age. Hery Sucipto is a graduate of the Egyptian al-Azhar and a prolific writer in local newspapers.

JIL, Jakarta

The Liberal Islam Network (JIL, Jaringan Islam Liberal) is a loose organization which does not have a formal membership. It was established to accommodate liberal Islamic trends that have been flourishing in the country for the last two decades.⁵³ I was personally involved in bringing it into existence and was responsible for promulgating the network widely through the Internet. Although the birthday of JIL is 8 March 2001, the history of this network did not start on this particular date.⁵⁴ There had been a long attempt to build such a network, involving several discussion groups held by young Muslim intellectuals at IAIN Jakarta and Paramadina.⁵⁵ The increasing reputation of JIL was largely due to the planned programme of Islam and Civil Society run by the Utan Kayu Community (Komunitas Utan Kayu, also known as Teater Utan Kayu, TUK), an organized community founded and led by Goenawan Mohamad, a renowned poet and essayist. This community runs research projects, book publication, a radio station, art performances, and discussion forums. It also publishes a magazine and a journal. The programme of Islam and Civil Society was a joint programme between TUK and the Asia Foundation, and was conducted by Ulil Abshar-Abdalla,⁵⁶ one of the programme directors of TUK.

JIL takes advantage of the facilities provided by TUK's project of Islam and Civil Society. It uses TUK's radio station, 68H Radio, to broadcast a weekly programme of selected interviews on Islamic issues, and also uses Goenawan Mohamad's credibility to build a media syndication, where the network publishes various articles in one full page of *Jawa Pos* newspaper and its local newspaper syndication. In addition, JIL also runs workshops and a serial discussion at campuses and public venues. Since 2002, JIL has faced a growing challenge from radical and conservative Islamic groups, partly due to an article written by Abshar-Abdalla in *Kompas*, where he, among other things, appealed to Muslims to depart totally from conservative Islamic

thinking. However, the most daring statement he made in the article was his view that there is no such thing as God's law. What he means is that *shari'ah* is ultimately a product of human history. This particular view was later used by a group of Muslim clerics in Bandung as the ground for issuing a *fatwa* of death indirectly addressed to him.⁵⁷

JIL's role is crucial not only in promoting liberal Islamic ideas, but also in influencing the moderate Muslim mainstream in the country. In the midst of pessimistic views regarding the silent majority of moderate Muslims, JIL's presence has fostered hope, particularly for non-Muslims — both in and outside the country — who have been cautious after witnessing the growing number of radical Islamic groups and acts of terrorism. The significant role of JIL is actually not due to its determination to face radicalism, but its tireless effort to bridge all liberal and progressive elements of Islam in various organizations and movements in the country. JIL's ideal is to extend and strengthen liberal Islamic networks all over Indonesia, as the organization believes that no enlightenment is possible without a strong basis of support from society.

LIBERAL ISLAMIC IDEAS

The organizations above and other similar organizations are homes from which liberal ideas are disseminated. Various issues of political concepts such as democracy, liberalism, pluralism, the idea of progress, gender equality, freedom and civil society, are enthusiastically discussed. Intellectual think-tanks and young writers become the agents of change and the spread of ideas to a wider audience. Some of them articulate their thoughts in the mass media and others in discussion forums and books. In the following paragraphs, we will explore main ideas discussed by writers and thinkers affiliated with the above organizations.

Liberal Democracy and Secularism

Most Indonesian Muslims understand democracy to be popular sovereignty and legitimacy; they believe democracy to be a system where through fair election people can choose their leader and representatives. By way of democracy, too, those representatives can determine and enact laws and regulations.⁵⁸ This kind of democracy is generally called majoritarian democracy or majoritarianism, since the majority becomes the only measurement for assuming political authority. As I have elaborated in Chapter 3, this kind of understanding was widely circulated among Muslims

in the early years of independence. Their acceptance of democracy and general election was strongly driven by this majoritarian understanding. In their perception, elections are of utmost importance, and once they won them, they would take over Parliament and then change the laws and constitution, including changing the basis of state (from Pancasila to Islam), and applying *shari'ah* (through the Jakarta Charter). This kind of understanding of democracy has continuously prodded them into thinking that *shari'ah* could be implemented in Indonesia.

This understanding of democracy has been criticized by the younger generation of Muslim writers. Saiful Mujani,⁵⁹ an IAIN graduate and a Ph.D. holder from the Ohio State University, the United States, considers that majoritarian democracy will only create a discriminative society which could finally do away with pluralism and freedom. He argues that democracy which only considers legitimacy through "majority-ness" will only bring an authoritarian and dictatorial system (often called "tyranny of majority"). He points to the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Islamic Republic of Iran was constituted by a majority of the Iranian people and Khomeini's leadership was widely supported by most of them. However, this kind of democracy, Mujani argues, is not a *real* democracy since it ignores pluralism and civil liberties. Hence, majoritarianism alone is insufficient to be taken as a standard of democracy, as he further argues:

At this stage I would say that democracy is not only majoritarianism, but also pluralism and tolerance. Generally, the jargon has two facets: political participation and civil liberty. Civil liberty is related to pluralism, equality, and tolerance among various components of society: religion, ethnicity, social class, etc.⁶⁰

For Mujani, civil liberty is more important than majoritarianism, since it is a guarantee that a democracy will be truly and beneficially applied.

By emphasizing the principle of civil liberty, Mujani rejects the formula that the winner of election should dominate Parliament and thus change the laws and Constitution. Thus, if an Islamic party were to win an election with a high majority, it should not indiscriminately apply Islamic law (*shari'ah*), as this is against the principle of pluralism. *Shari'ah* cannot be applied hastily because there are minorities who would not agree with its application. *Shari'ah* that is practised on the majoritarian ground (such as in Aceh), according to Mujani, violates democracy and the system thus cannot be called democracy.

The discussion on the relationship between Islam and democracy in Indonesia in the post-Soeharto era is strongly shaped by the role of the

Islamic political party on the national political stage. This is mainly because the main agenda of Islamic political parties is to change the Constitution, and changing the Constitution, for them, is a logical consequence of the democratic process, as they understand democracy to be the majority rule. There is a concern that with their majoritarian understanding they would use democracy to Islamize the country. In the Indonesian religious-political setting, Islamization means returning the Jakarta Charter to the Constitution. However, for Hamid Basyaib,⁶¹ one of the leading members of JIL, the problem is not whether the Islamic parties have the right to propose their political agenda, but what and how exactly that agenda is. For example, if they propose *shari'ah*, that is fine, but what kind of *shari'ah* do they propose? Also, if the contents of the *shari'ah* are against democracy and human rights, it must then be rejected. In other words, the process of democratization should not stop at the general election, but, more importantly, in Parliament and other political institutions.⁶²

What becomes the concern of young Muslim liberals is not whether the Islamic parties will win the election, but how the democratic system built in Indonesia can have a firm ground in society. Democracy will have not much meaning if it does not have a firm ground in society. Hence, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla considers the need to expand the social basis of democracy, since without such a basis, it will lack support.⁶³ This basis is extremely important since the quality of democracy depends greatly on how society understands democratic values.⁶⁴ Democracy is not only a mere installation of the system, but it is also a matter of civic culture.

Abshar-Abdalla and Mujani consider it to be of great importance for Muslims to secularize themselves as a first step in developing proper democratic values. By secularizing the Muslim community, Abshar-Abdalla means "not to deprive them from communal values circulating in their life, but to educate them so that they would know their position vis-à-vis the public sphere called 'the state'".⁶⁵ Meanwhile, for Mujani, secularization of society is needed to support the secular or liberal democratic state, as he puts it clearly:

For me, a secular state is also a matter of culture. And as an institution, a secular state needs a certain culture from the community, that is the culture of secular politics. But, ironically, I see that multiculturalism is growing in a secular state rather than in a religious state.⁶⁶

In other words, a genuine democracy cannot be founded on particular religious values or on a particular civic culture that is basically not pluralist.

If Muslims want to carry out (secular) liberal democracy, the civic culture that they want to build should also be a secular one. Hence, the secularization of society is inevitably needed.

Religious Pluralism

The theme “religious pluralism” has been discussed since the 1970s by the Muslim reformists. As elaborated in Chapter 4, religious pluralism was a key theme in the discourse on Islamic reformism at the time. The main reformist leader of the time, Mukti Ali, was an expert on comparative religion and an active intellectual in pluralism discourse. At that time, the theme of pluralism was needed because the New Order regime wanted to build a new pluralist society based on religious cooperation. Meanwhile, in the post-Soeharto era, the issue of pluralism emerged for several reasons: first, it was a reflection of communal conflicts that spread in the early periods of the post-Soeharto era. Most of those communal conflicts that beset regions such as Ambon, Poso, and Lombok, were caused by religious intolerance. Second, it was a response to the intensity of religious spirit of Indonesian Muslims. The rise of Islamic political parties and radical organizations inspired progressive Muslims to readdress the issue of religious pluralism and tolerance. Third, pluralism was part of the democratic condition. If Indonesian Muslims were serious about welcoming democracy, they were required to take on the principle of pluralism, as it is one of the important aspects of democracy.

One of the most crucial issues regarding the relationship between Islam and pluralism is the wide perception among Muslims that Islam is the best religion, the *truest*, and the most comprehensive, while other religions are false and incomplete. This kind of image is deeply rooted in the awareness of Indonesian Muslims, as it is partly confirmed by theological arguments continuously spread by radical Muslims. It has been common knowledge that the main sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the *hadith*, contain passages which, if read literally, would produce an intolerant and anti-pluralist attitude. Qur'anic verses such as “Verily, the religion with Allah is Islam”,⁶⁷ are widely understood as statements of the superiority of Islam over other religions. Likewise, various *hadiths* that promote hatred against Jews and Christians are fundamental sources of Muslim intolerance.

Like their liberal seniors, young liberal Muslims consider the main sources of Islam, such as the Qur'an and the *hadith* as having limitations in describing religious relations since they were formed within certain socio-historical loci, which were highly coloured by conflict of culture and civilization. Thus, Qur'anic verses or *hadiths* that contain intolerant

teachings must be understood in such an historical context. They argue that every time one finds difficulties in Islamic theological sources, it must be referred to the basic principle of Islam, since Islam, like all religions, is urging peace and tolerance. In other words, the intolerant doctrines of Islam must be reinterpreted, if not entirely discarded.

Apart from that, the young Muslim generation argue that there are in the Qur'an many more verses that indicate tolerance rather than intolerance. Budhy Munawar-Rachman,⁶⁸ one of the most prominent figures among young liberal Muslims, lists quite a number of Qur'anic verses that support the idea of tolerance and pluralism. He argues that such verses clearly represent the basic spirit of Islam and are more relevant for the modern life of Muslims. He writes:

Thus, what is needed now with regard to understanding inter-religious pluralism is a view that all believers, whoever they are and whatever their religion is, are equal before God, because our God is The Only God... From the Islamic theological point of view, this should not be a problem. The Qur'an states that the salvation in the hereafter depends solely on whether one believes in God and in the hereafter, and is committed to doing good deeds. And the core of religious teachings is actually these three fundamental things. This is clearly stated in the Qur'an, in al-Baqarah and al-Ma'idah (Q.S. 2:62 and 5:69).⁶⁹

Salvation is a central theme in the Islamic discourse on pluralism. As I have elaborated in Chapter 5, Muslims' attitudes towards salvation have affected their general attitude towards other religions.

A pluralist attitude, that is a standpoint that regards salvation as existing in all religions, has become a mainstream view among the liberal Muslim generation, as is stated clearly in their writings. For instance, Sukidi Mulyadi,⁷⁰ an IAIN graduate and a young member of Muhammadiyah, considers the "pluralist" theology a promising philosophical basis for the future of interreligious relationship. This attitude has transcended the exclusivist theology embraced by the fundamentalists or the inclusivist theology embraced by the modernists. He writes:

The epistemological foundation of pluralist theology is that it believes that every religion has its own truth and way of salvation. Thus, claims of possessing the only valid way to the truth and to salvation (exclusive theology); that the others need to complement and substantiate their way to the truth and to salvation (inclusive theology), must be abandoned, to give way to pluralist theology that values the plurality of religions.⁷¹

The pluralist attitude, whether it is stated by Munawar-Rachman or by Mulyadi, is not entirely based on Islamic theology, but a synthesis of liberal interpretation of classical Islamic theology and modern theories developed in religious studies in the West. As members of Paramadina, both young scholars are strongly influenced by Nurcholish Madjid. In fact, in this particular case, both of them have gone beyond their mentor.

At a more practical level, pluralist theology is applied when dealing with problematic issues in the interreligious field. This is demonstrated, for instance, in the case of intermarriage. It could be said that most of the young liberal Muslim intellectuals agree with the idea of intermarriage, both between male Muslims and female non-Muslims and vice versa, and between what is called *ahl al-kitab* and non-*ahl al-kitab*.⁷² In Paramadina, intermarriage ceremonies have often been performed. This kind of demonstrative action is essentially to show that Muslims do not actually have a problem with pluralism; they can interact with other religions, including through intermarriage.

Freedom and Civil Liberties

Liberal democracy provides civil liberty and freedom for all citizens. Freedom here does not only mean political freedom, but also freedom to express and carry out one's beliefs and rights. The young Muslim generation generally supports the ideas of freedom and liberalism and they believe that the core of liberal democracy is the opportunity for people to express and carry out their beliefs. Freedom has always been a problem when it is discussed in the context of religion. This is true not only because religions have limited idioms, but also because they have regulations and laws that could harm some values of freedom.

Muslim intellectuals in the early days of independence, such as Mohammad Natsir, clearly stated that democracy and freedom in Islam are not absolute. Natsir argues that, unlike the concepts in the West, there are many aspects of Islam that do not comply with freedom and there are many things in Islam that cannot be discussed democratically (see Chapter 3). The young Muslim generation, however, has a different view. For them, there is nothing in democracy that is impossible to discuss; everything can be discussed and decided in Parliament as long as it does not harm the basic principle of democracy.

Ulil Abshar-Abdalla clearly stresses this point. He considers that the state is able to regulate anything, even those which are regarded taboo in religion. He points to the examples of liquor, prostitution, and gambling (examples

that were specifically addressed by Natsir as things that cannot be discussed democratically), as problems that must be brought quickly to Parliament and be seriously discussed. For decades, these problems were neglected and avoided despite the fact that they had become serious social problems. He argues that the *fatwas* of religious clerics to close down brothels do not stop prostitution, but, in fact, triggered the expansion of such activities into wider public spaces.⁷³ By closing such brothels, sex workers are now increasingly spreading out in indefinite places, and their impact is worse than if they were concentrated in one particular place. The same thing happens in the case of gambling and liquor, which have been discouraged (if not banned), but are not given alternative places. Thus, Abshar-Abdalla suggests that it would be better that sex localization be rebuilt and that gambling and liquor be regulated. For him, the solution is not banning, but rather regulating.⁷⁴

What is interesting in Abshar-Abdalla's argument is that the issues that were religiously considered final (*qat'i*) can actually be discussed and relativized in the context of political life. Prostitution, gambling, and liquor can still be considered *haram* (religiously forbidden), but the activity to have them must not be nullified, as it contradicts the nature of human beings. In a discussion in Jakarta, Abshar-Abdalla expressed his admiration of the secular system (that is, the secular state), "because the secular state can accommodate the energy of piety (*kesalehan*) and the energy of impiety (*kemaksiatan*) all together".⁷⁵ Prostitution, gambling, and liquor are certainly perennial problems which often become a hindrance for Muslims in embracing the democratic system where freedom and civil liberty are highly guaranteed.

Other issues such as homosexuality have also been problematic in Muslim relations with democracy and civil liberty. While there is a growing incidence of same-sex marriages in the Christian world,⁷⁶ in the Muslim community, this issue remains an anathema and is highly controversial. There is almost no religious leader who dares to give his or her support for this issue clearly. However, for young liberal Muslims, homosexuality is a problem that has to be reconsidered and not condemned. Like prostitution, they argue, the practice of homosexuality must not be treated unfairly. *Syir'ah*, a bi-weekly magazine published by the young generation of NU, ran a story on various homosexual practices in Islamic boarding schools (*pesantrens*) and appealed to Muslim leaders to find solutions to the problem and not just to condemn it. Interestingly, *Syir'ah's* report on homosexuality is generally very sympathetic and positive.⁷⁷

Among the sympathetic attitudes and among those who argue for the issue of homosexuality, the argument presented by Jadul Maula is perhaps the most tenable and firmly grounded on Islamic scriptural tradition. Maula

has carried out research on the issue by referring to classical Arabic books. He found that this issue is not entirely new and that there is much room for Muslims to argue on the legality of the issue. In a discussion at TUK, Jakarta, he argued that if the core problem of homosexuality is anal intercourse, what must be studied is then whether or not “anal intercourse” is forbidden in Islam. He explained that Muslim jurists (*fuqaha*) have differed among themselves in dealing with this issue. Many of them said it is forbidden and some of them thought otherwise. Al-Syafi‘i, one of the founders of the Four Jurisprudential School of Islamic Thought, according to Maula, considered anal intercourse a legal activity (*mubah*) as long as it is done with one’s wife. The reason for its legitimacy is marriage, because, according to a Qur’anic verse, a husband is free to have sex in any way he wants with his wife.⁷⁸ Thus, if the core of marriage is intercourse and it can be carried out in any manner, then homosexual marriage is acceptable.⁷⁹

Furthermore, Maula has another argument he considers to be more important and relevant to the classical argument in *fiqh*, and in men’s modern life. In the classical *fiqh* books, the main reason for heterosexual marriage is to avoid losing a generation. If homosexual marriage is allowed, the *fuqaha* argue, the population of the world will gradually diminish and the human race will become extinct. Maula has a good argument against this view:

Now, the problems of world population are causing extreme concern. If homosexuals were to be allowed to marry among themselves, each of them could be father or mother, and then they would adopt a child, say for instance, every family would adopt three abandoned children whom the state could not look after, there would be *maslahah ‘ammah* (public good). This is also part of *maqasid al-shari’ah* (divine goal). If this were to be made possible, it could solve the problems of textual deadlock (*batas nas*).⁸⁰

For Maula, the problem of homosexuality, like many other modern problems, is not a problem we have to get rid of, let alone condemn. There should be courage from religious leaders to take on this issue wisely.

The quest for theological arguments for modern problems is certainly a brave step taken by young liberal Muslims. In the past, Muslim reformists would usually stop dealing with issues they considered to be final (*qat’i*). But for young liberal Muslims, the designation of legal status as legitimate (*halal*) or illegitimate (*haram*) by *fuqaha* did not come directly from the main text (the Qur’an), but rather through a logical process (*istinbat*) and consideration of the socio-cultural context of society. Thus, a great scholar such as al-Syafi‘i, for example, had the “old opinion” (*qawl qadim*) and the

“new opinion” (*qawl jadid*). In other words, the process of legal enactment is never final, since it has to consider the time-space context where Muslims live. Law is somehow a reflection of a society.

This kind of attitude is clearly seen, for instance, in how the young liberal Muslims supported the issue of “female *imam*”. In March 2005, Muslims were shocked by the performing of Friday prayer led by Amina Wadud, a Muslim scholar from the United States.⁸¹ The issue of female *imam* in Indonesia was directly raised by this controversial case. It is a common and long-standing view among Muslims that women cannot lead prayer (*salah*) either for men, or for mixed gender audiences. However, the young liberal Muslim intellectuals argue that such an opinion is actually not based on a firm theological argument, since if we look at the main Islamic sources carefully, particularly the *hadiths*, we will find that the female *imam* is theologically legitimate. This is clearly stated by Husein Muhammad,⁸² a young Muslim cleric (*kyai*) who leads a big *pesantren* in West Java. Based on some research he did on the topic, he found that there are some *hadiths* that prohibit women from becoming an *imam*, but there are also several *hadiths* that suggest otherwise. Interestingly, according to Husein Muhammad, the status of *hadiths* that support the female *imam* is more valid than the *hadiths* that prohibit it.⁸³ When asked why the weak *hadiths* are more common among Muslims, he answers that it has to do with politics. The Islam which is introduced to Muslims, he argues, is “political Islam”, that is, Islam which is set by the political interests of rulers and religious politicians.⁸⁴

Husein Muhammad has been known as a religious cleric rather than as an activist. He has mastered Arabic language and classical Arabic books. His book *Fiqh Perempuan* (Women’s Jurisprudence) is an attempt to find a theological underpinning for issues that are claimed to have contributed to discrimination against women. Apart from the issue of the female *imam*, Husein Muhammad also discusses female genitals (*aurat*), *jilbab*, marriage, and the political role of women, which are all answered with positive and tenable theological arguments.

Husein Muhammad’s liberal attitude in dealing with the issue of Islam and women is indeed audacious. So far, gender issues in Indonesia are often dealt with by secular feminists or by campus-based liberal intellectuals, but Husein Muhammad is a *kyai* and is much involved in *pesantren* where the conservative *kitab kuning* (classic Arabic books) dominate. Most of the *kitab kuning* are conservative and have discriminative views on women.⁸⁵ Husein Muhammad is certainly not alone. In East Java, several young *kyais* are also quite familiar with liberal views, and their religious-political attitudes can be compared with those of their liberal counterparts in Jakarta.⁸⁶

In May 2005, Indonesian Muslims were outraged by news from Malang, East Java. A religious teacher and a leader of *pesantren* named Muhammad Yusman Roy was reported to have performed prayer (*salah*) in bilingual and mixed languages, sometimes in Arabic and Indonesian, and sometimes in Javanese. He had done this since 2002. This activity soon attracted many people and sent shockwaves throughout the Muslim community. To calm the situation, MUI issued a *fatwa* that Roy's prayer was deviant (*sesat*), and due to pressure from many Islamic groups, Roy was finally arrested by the police. Many Muslims considered Roy as having deviated as they believe that Islam prohibits prayer carried out in any language other than Arabic. This wave of anger and condemnation later attracted reaction and backlash, not from the secularists, who used to be very concerned with the issue of freedom and human rights, but from liberal *santri* Muslims, who sympathized with Roy's cause. They condemned the arrest of Roy as an act against freedom and human rights. On 13 May, a group of Muslims released their statement to the press, asking the police to release the man and asking the MUI to invalidate its *fatwa*.⁸⁷ Moreover, those *santri* Muslims expressed their theological defence of Roy's prayer. They searched within classical Islamic sources to justify that what Roy had done was theologically valid, and what the police and MUI had done was totally wrong and unacceptable.

JIL pursued an active campaign by publishing articles and doing interviews with several religious leaders. Djohan Effendi, a senior liberal Muslim, was interviewed expressing his concern about religious freedom in the country. He fully supported Roy's activity and condemned the police for making a hasty judgment. A writer named Tedi Kholiludin wrote an article which was later published in the JIL media syndicate.⁸⁸ He explained the historical and theological status of the problem, referring to the classical debate on the issue. He argued that the problem has been debated by Muslim scholars (*ulama*) since the early formation of Islam. Abu Hanifah, one of the greatest *imams* in the legal Islamic school, permitted prayer in non-Arabic. As a non-Arab (he is an Iranian), Abu Hanifah knows how difficult it was for non-Arabs to perform prayer meaningfully. He thus argued that prayer can be performed in any language.

Kholiludin also put forward a historical argument regarding prayer. He said that *salah* is not really an original creation of the Muslims. It is rather a "creative imitation" by the Arabs. Such a ritual had been common among the Syrian people, and even the term *selota* (from which the term *salah* derived) was widely used in the Orthodox Christian Church in Syria. Thus, Kholiludin argued, the technicality of *salah* is actually a matter of culture and not a definitive theological matter (*masalah yang qat'i*). Finally,

he concluded that prayer is strongly related to the will of the Arabs to dominate foreign culture (*‘ajam*), and not, as it is commonly understood, a purely theological matter.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

From the above discussion, we can conclude that the current development of Islamic political thought is fundamentally characterized by pragmatism and the spirit of political moderation. The post-Soeharto era has been partly coloured by the emergence of Islamic radical groups, but apart from the ephemeral character of this phenomenon, from the perspective of religious-political thought, those groups have become relatively moderate. Political issues that they discussed, for example, is no longer about the Islamic state or separation from the republic. As a matter of fact, they instead rejected such an idea by emphasizing their commitment to the NKRI.⁸⁹

The emergence of the radical Islamic groups, as many observers have argued, is not significantly due to ideological thinking, but rather to the weakness of the government and the complex political situation of the transitional state.⁹⁰ Islamic parties, whose ideas can be considered categorically the incarnation of Model 1, are also becoming more pragmatic. Their defeats in the last two general elections and the poor support from major Islamic organizations have forced the leaders of those parties to rethink their strategy and political standpoint. If those Islamic ideological parties can really be considered the successor of Model 1, it is very unlikely that this model has any future in the country.

Moderation and pragmatism are also seen in Model 2, which is now set in a radically different political situation. In the past, the dominance of this model was highly supported by the Soeharto regime. At the present time, it is challenged by two extreme poles of Islamic political discourse. On the one hand, it is challenged by the radical Islamic groups which are still playing the issue of the Jakarta Charter. On the other hand, it is increasingly challenged by young liberal Muslims, who want a strictly secular-liberal state. The position taken by proponents is the middle path. In practical politics, this position is represented by PAN, whose leaders are mainly the proponents of Model 2.

Meanwhile, Model 3 has developed quite significantly, particularly due to the rise of young liberal Muslims over the last two decades. Having a better religious education and a better chance to interact with modern ideas, the young generation of liberal Muslims have confidently developed religious-political issues. If their seniors were discussing major issues such as

state ideology and modernization, the young generation is generally more concerned with practical ideas such as human rights, freedom of thought, gender issues, and religious pluralism.

Notes

1. Up to April 1999, the Department of Information had issued 852 licences for publications (SIUPP, Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers). This number is considerably large compared with the Soeharto era. During the thirty-two years of his rule, only 321 SIUPP were issued, which were actually a replacement of various media he banned. See Candra Gautama, *Pers Indonesia Pasca Soeharto: Setelah Tekanan Penguasa Melemah* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan, 1999), p. 2.
2. Soon after the new General Election Committee (KPU, Komite Pemilihan Umum) was formed, about 160 political parties enrolled with the KPU. But due to administrative requirements, only forty-eight parties were accepted. Outside political parties, mass organizations, based on religious activism or for other purposes, were sporadically founded.
3. A prolific young writer told me quite frankly that he had to write as many articles as possible in order to feed himself and cover tuition fees. He acknowledged that there were times when his different articles were published in three different newspapers the same day.
4. At least twice *Kompas* published a series of articles debating the issue of Islam and secularism: first, from May–July 1997, and second, from May–July 1999. Among the writers involved in these debates were Kuntowijoyo, Ahmad Sumargono, Denny JA, Roeslan Abdulgani, Rumadi, Effendi Gazali, Amich Alhumami, and Hajriyanto Y. Thohari. A complete report of the debates can be read in Denny JA et al., *Negara Sekuler: Sebuah Polemik* (Jakarta: Putra Berdikari Bangsa, 2000).
5. This was part of the controversial debates around the National Education System Bill (known as Rancangan Undang-Undang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional, RUU Sisdiknas). After a long debate, the bill was finally promulgated on 11 June 2003.
6. Abshar-Abdalla told me that as soon as his article sparked controversy and was followed by a death threat, he received many invitations from various discussion groups and seminars, both local and international. He was frequently invited by various institutions in the United States as well as in Europe.
7. See Ferry Astika Saputra., “Internet Development in Indonesia: A Preview and Perception”, paper presented at the Computer and Network Centre, Saga University. Its digital version can be read at <<http://www.cc.saga-u.ac.jp>> (accessed 21 May 2005); see also Chee Meng Loh, “Internet Development in Asia”, paper submitted for the Internet Society (Isoc), Montreal, Canada, 24–28 June 1996. Its digital version can be read at <<http://www.isoc.org>> (accessed 21 May 2005).

8. Several mosque activists (*remaja masjid*) in Jakarta and Yogyakarta told me that many articles published on Islamic websites are printed and distributed in the form of bulletins or brochures. Some of them are distributed as Friday Bulletin (*Buletin Jum'at*) circulated during Friday prayer congregation.
9. Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 119–20.
10. Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, a foundation allied with the German Liberal Party, was among the first foreign aid agencies that helped the Indonesian Muslim community. In the early 1970s, this institution funded the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES, Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial) based in Jakarta, to run a pilot project focusing on raising the potential of Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) in Central Java. Naumann Stiftung also funded various social activities concerned with national development and modernization.
11. The Asia Foundation's involvement in empowering the Indonesian Muslim community actually commenced in 1975. However, the focus on Islam only took place in 1997, when it founded a separate division called Islam and Civil Society. This programme funded various activities run by Islamic organizations.
12. In 2005, the Australian government decided to double the number to 600 students every year. See "\$100m Student Plan for SBY", *The Australian*, 4 April 2005; "Tragedy Draws Indonesia Closer: PM", *The Age*, 4 April 2005; "New Era in Bilateral Relationship", *The Star*, 10 April 2005.
13. This issue was sparked by the shocking event that took place in Ambon, where Laskar Jihad, a radical Islamic group, implemented *shari'ah* to one of its members by stoning him to death for his crime of adultery. See "Keikhlasan Abdullah Dihukum Rajam", *Republika*, 10 May 2001; "Ja'far Umar Thalib: Hukum Rajam di Ambon, Penegakan Syariat Islam", *Kompas*, 17 May 2001.
14. "Mujahidin Tak Ingin Dirikan Negara Islam", *Kompas*, 6 August 2000; "Tak Lagi Negara Islam", *Panjimas*, 9–16 August 2000; "Syariah Islam, Bukan Negara Islam", *Tekad*, 40, 7–13 August 2000.
15. Robert W. Hefner, "Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics", *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (September 2002), pp. 754–65; Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia", *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002), pp. 117–54; ICG Report, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates", *International Crisis Group* (11 December, 2002).
16. They are the New Masyumi Party (PMB, Partai Masyumi Baru), the Masyumi Indonesian Islamic Political Party (PPIM, Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi), the Star and Moon Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang), and the Muslim Party (PUI, Partai Umat Islam). The last two parties are led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Deliar Noer respectively.

17. Eep Saefulloh Fatah, "Partai Semangka, Mangga, dan Mentimun", in *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?: Perjalanan Politik Islam dari Prapemilu '99 Sampai Pemilihan Presiden*, edited by Hamid Basyaib and Hamid Abidin (Jakarta: Alvabet, 1999), p. 132.
18. George McT. Kahin, "Deliar Noer's Educational Background and His Ties with Hatta and Natsir", in *Begawan Politik: Deliar Noer 75 Tahun*, edited by Panitia 75 Tahun Deliar Noer (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbitan Buku 75 Tahun Prof. Dr. Deliar Noer, 2001), pp. 101–07.
19. Ahmad Sumargono is chairman of the Indonesian Committee for World Muslim Solidarity (KISDI, Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam), an Islamic organization that focuses on issues in the Muslim world. Sumargono has been considered puritanist, and he proudly calls himself "fundamentalist". He wrote many articles and a book translated into English with the title *I Am a Fundamentalist: An Ideological Reflection on the Challenges Facing the Muslims of Indonesia* (Jakarta: Khairul Bayaan Press, 2002).
20. Abdul Qodir Djaelani (b. 1938) is a Muslim preacher who had been imprisoned by the Soeharto regime for eighteen years. He was known as the furious preacher, appealing to Indonesian Muslims to reject Pancasila and to embrace Islamic ideology fully. In 1984, he was accused of having been involved in the bloody riot in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. He was released from prison in 1993. In 1999, he joined PBB only to find that this party, under the leadership of a moderate Yusril Ihza Mahendra, was not "hard" enough for him, so he seceded from the party and set off a conflict with its chairman.
21. When I interviewed him at his house, he repeated this point and singled out the liberal Muslim intellectuals as being responsible for having confused Muslim minds, particularly on religious-political issues. Interview with Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 4 February 2004.
22. Deliar Noer, "Islam dan Politik", in *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?*, pp. 8–11.
23. "Partai Islam yang Rasional: Wawancara Yusril Ihza Mahendra", in *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?* p. 53.
24. Yudi Pramuko, *Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Sang Bintang Cemerlang: Perjuangan Menegakkan Sistem dan Akhlak Berpolitik* (Jakarta: Putera Berdikari Bangsa, 2000); Abd Rohim Ghazali, *Yusril Ihza Mahendra: Sosok Politisi Muda Muslim* (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 1999).
25. The original candidate for the post of PBB chairman was Amien Rais, whilst Mahendra was meant to become general secretary. However, since Rais refused to join the party on the ground that it was too small for him (as it is based on Islam), Mahendra was thus appointed the chairman.
26. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, *Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan)*. (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999).
27. "Penegakan Syariat Tak Harus Bentuk Negara", *Kompas*, 12 August 2003.

28. "Yusril Janji Transformasikan Syariat Islam dalam Hukum Positif", *Kompas*, 8 September 2003; "Dimasukkannya Syariat Islam tidak Boleh Langgar Prinsip KUHP", *Kompas*, 16 April 2002.
29. Eep Saefulloh Fatah, "Partai Semangka, Mangga, dan Mentimun", in *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?*, p. 132.
30. Or seventeen parties if we also include those parties that take "Islam and Pancasila" as their philosophical basis.
31. With the exception of PBB; although this party got 1.9 per cent of the votes, it got more than 2 per cent of the seats (thirteen seats). The law stated that a party must reach a specified threshold in order to participate in the next general election (2004). Specifically, it must attain 2 per cent of the seats in the DPR (ten seats) or 3 per cent of the seats in the provincial and district assemblies distributed in half of the provinces and half of the districts in Indonesia.
32. "F-PPP dan F-PBB Tetap Ingin 'Tujuh Kata' Masuk di Amendemen UUD", *Media Indonesia*, 14 June 2002; "PBB tidak Akan Surut Perjuangkan Piagam Jakarta", *Kompas*, 25 August 2003; "Hamzah Haz: PPP Tetap Perjuangkan Piagam Jakarta", *Kompas*, 27 November 2000.
33. "Hizbut Tahrir: Haz Plin Plan Soal Piagam Jakarta", *Media Indonesia*, 7 August 2002.
34. "PKB Tidak Dukung Piagam Jakarta Masuk Amandemen UUD 1945", *Kompas*, 18 July 2002.
35. "Ormas Islam Utama, tidak Kehendaki Piagam Jakarta", *Kompas*, 7 April 2002; "Sebagian Besar Kiai NU Minta Pasal 29 tidak Diubah", *Media Indonesia*, 27 July 2002; "NU-Muhammadiyah: Tak Perlu Dilakukan Formalisasi Agama", *Media Indonesia*, 8 August 2002.
36. "Era Baru Butuh Wahana Baru, Wawancara Dr. M. Amien Rais", in *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?*, p. 60.
37. Kuntowijoyo, "Agama Berdimensi Banyak, Politik Berdimensi Tunggal", in *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?*, p. 4.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
39. The term "high politics" was introduced, and often used, by Amien Rais. The term was specifically meant to leave Muhammadiyah members free to join any political parties available. For Kuntowijoyo, "high politics" in Muhammadiyah is similar with the Khittah 1926 in NU.
40. In Indonesian, it says: "Negara berdasarkan Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa dengan kewajiban melaksanakan ajaran agama bagi masing-masing pemeluknya."
41. "Dr HM Hidayat Nur Wahid, MA: PKS Solusi Permasalahan Bangsa", *Tokoh Indonesia*, 13 September 2003, <<http://www.tokohindonesia.com>> (accessed 17 May 2005).
42. One of the PKS leaders, Daud Rasyid, is the staunchest critic of the Islamic jargon developed by Nurcholish Madjid. He considered Madjid to have been mistaken in understanding Piagam Madinah. In PKS, he represents the radical

- wing of the party. He wrote a book criticizing the renewalist movement: *'Pembaruan' Islam dan Orientalisme dalam Sorotan* (Jakarta: Usamah Press, 1993).
43. According to Nur Mahmudi Ismail, chairman of PK before Hidayat Nurwahid, there is a growing number of non-Muslims in Papua and Maluku who deliberately joined PK. Discussion with Nur Mahmudi Ismail, Melbourne, 26 September 2003.
 44. Faisal Basri and most of the non-Muslim leaders rejected the proposal submitted by A.M. Fatwa that the platform of the party should be changed from "pluralist and open" to "belief and piety" (*iman dan taqwa*).
 45. Among those who seceded from the party were Faisal Basri, Bara Hasibuan, Goenawan Mohammad, Sindhunata, and Toety Herati. See "Faisal Basri Keluar dari PAN", *Kompas*, 16 January 2001; "Sekjen PAN Sayangkan Keputusan Faisal Basri", *Kompas*, 17 January 2001.
 46. "Dr HM Hidayat Nur Wahid", *Tokoh Indonesia*.
 47. See Merle C. Ricklefs, "Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore's Giant Neighbour", public lecture organized by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, Asian Civilizations Museum (23 September 2004), p. 8; cf. Saiful Mujani, "Fenomena PKS", *Jawapos*, 4 April 2004.
 48. On Madjid's role in the final days of Soeharto's rule, see Marcus Mietzner, "Nationalism and Islamic Politics: Political Islam in the Post-Suharto Era", in *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, edited by Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), pp. 173–99.
 49. LKiS website <<http://www.lkis.or.id>> (accessed 8 May 2005).
 50. Mohtar Mas'oed, S. Rizal Panggabean, and Muhammad Najib Azca, "Social Resources for Civility and Participation: The Case of Yogyakarta, Indonesia", in *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia*, edited by Robert W. Hefner (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), p. 130.
 51. Conversation with Jadul Maula, Jakarta, 27 September 2001.
 52. Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), "Workshop Jaringan Kampus", Jakarta, 28 February–1 March 2005, p. 149.
 53. There is a growing number of books, articles, and theses on JIL, both in English and Indonesian. For English books and articles see for instance, Nicolaus Teguh Budi Harjanto, "Islam and Liberalism in Contemporary Indonesia: The Political Ideas of Jaringan Islam Liberal" (Master's Thesis, Ohio University, 2003); Virginia Matheson Hooker, "Developing Islamic Argument for Change through 'Liberal Islam'", in *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium, Iseas Series on Islam*, edited by Amin Saikal and Virginia Matheson Hooker (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004); and Linda Christanty, "Is There a Rainbow in Islam?", *Latitudes*, vol. 30, July 2003.

54. 8 March is the date I created a mailing list in Yahoogroups. At the beginning, this mailing list had about seventy members, mostly young Indonesian Muslim activists. Most of them are researchers, lecturers, and writers. But soon, the membership increased and expanded also to non-Muslims as well as some Indonesianists. Several leading scholars such as Daniel S. Lev, R. William Liddle, Robert W. Hefner, and Martin van Bruinessen, have been members. In 2008, the members on the mailing list reached more than 1,000.
55. For a more elaborate account on the background of JIL, see Harjanto. *Islam and Liberalism in Contemporary Indonesia*.
56. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla was born in Pati, Central Java, on 11 January 1967 into a strong *santri* family. His father is a great *kyai* (Muslim cleric) who runs a major *pesantren* in Pati. He studied at various *pesantren* among which is Pesantren Mathali'ul Falah, Kajen, managed by A. Sahal Mahfudz, the chairman of NU. In the mid-1980s, he went to Jakarta to further his studies. He enrolled at the College of Arabic and Islamic Sciences (LIPIA, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab), an institution run by the Saudi government. He dropped out from the college and instead enrolled in the Advanced School of Philosophy (STF, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat) Driyarkara, a Christian college. In 2005, he went to the United States to study at Boston University, majoring in Religious Studies.
57. On the controversy of Abshar-Abdalla's death *fatwa*, see "Tafsir Agama Pemicu Fatwa", *Gatra*, 21 December 2002; "Ulil dan Fatwa Mati", *Pikiran Rakyat*, 20 January 2003; "Ulil Abshar-Abdalla Diadukan ke Mabes Polri", *Sinar Harapan*, 18 December 2002; "FUUI Tuntut Polisi Bongkar Jaringan Islam Liberal", *Tempo*, 18 December 2002.
58. Masykuri Abdullah, *Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy (1966–1993)* (Hamburg: Abera, 1997).
59. Saiful Mujani, born in Serang, Banten, on 8 August 1962, was from a very religious family. He studied medical science at the University of Tarumanegara but then switched to Islamic philosophy at IAIN Jakarta. He was an active student and one of the leading students who initiated a discussion group at his campus. He continued his postgraduate studies at the Ohio State University, in the United States, taking political science as his major. He is now working at the Freedom Institute, Jakarta.
60. "Sebuah Teologi untuk Negara Modern", in *Wajah Liberal Islam di Indonesia, Seri Islam Liberal*, edited by Luthfi Assyaukanie (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal, 2002), p. 268.
61. Hamid Basyaib, born in Teluk Betung, Lampung, on 3 July 1962, was from a religious family of Arab descent. He studied law at the Indonesian Islamic University in Yogyakarta and was active in the Islamic student movement. He has been prolific in translating books and writing various articles and columns in Indonesian journals and newspapers. He has worked as an editor for an Islamic magazine in Jakarta and then as a researcher in different institutions.

- Since 2002, he has been one of the leading voices of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL).
62. "Sebuah Teologi untuk Negara Modern", in *Wajah Liberal Islam*, p. 236.
 63. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, "The Politics of Islam in a Democratizing Indonesia", paper presented in a joint conference sponsored by Usindo and the Asia Foundation, Washington D.C., 7 February 2002.
 64. Saiful Mujani, "Religious Democrats: Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2003), p. 6.
 65. "Sebuah Teologi untuk Negara Modern", in *Wajah Liberal Islam*, p. 242.
 66. *Ibid.*, p. 284.
 67. The Qur'an 3:19, *Inna al-dina 'inda Allahi al-Islam*.
 68. Budhy Munawar-Rachman was born in Jakarta on 22 June 1963. He was educated in As-Syafiiyah Islamic University and Driyarkara School of Philosophy, both in Jakarta. He was an editor in a prestigious Islamic journal, *Ulumul Qur'an*, and was a manager of Islamic studies at the Paramadina Foundation, Jakarta. He wrote various articles in Indonesian journals and newspapers. His main concern has been Islam and the problem of religious pluralism.
 69. Budhy Munawar-Rachman, "Basis Teologi Persaudaraan Antar-Agama", in *Wajah Liberal Islam*, p. 53.
 70. Sukidi Mulyadi was born in Sragen, Central Java, on 2 August 1976. He was educated in an Islamic school at Yogyakarta. He continued his studies at the State Institute of Islamic Religion (IAIN, Institut Agama Islam Negeri), Jakarta, specializing in Islamic law. On his completion of his studies at IAIN, he joined the Paramadina Foundation, where he discovered liberal Islamic ideas. He wrote various articles on Islam, particularly about the problem of pluralism and interreligious dialogue. In 2004, he entered Harvard Divinity School, Harvard University, to pursue his doctoral degree.
 71. Sukidi, *Teologi Inklusif Cak Nur*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2001), pp. xli–xlii.
 72. In the classical Islamic term, *ahl al-kitab* is limited to Jews and Christians. Other religions such as Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism are not considered *ahl al-kitab*.
 73. Discussion with Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, 3 February 2004.
 74. Discussion with Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, 6 June 2004.
 75. "Islam Liberal versus Islam Literal", *Tempo*, 25 November 2001.
 76. The issue is, of course, still being debated among Christian communities, but the fact that there is a growing number of cases of religious recognition to same-sex marriage proves that the Christian world has begun to think seriously about the issue. On the religious debates on the issue, see for instance, Andrew Sullivan. *Same-Sex Marriage, Pro and Con: A Reader* (New York:

- Vintage Books, 2004); Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum, *Same-Sex Marriage: The Moral and Legal Debate*, 2nd ed. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2004); Kenneth McIntosh and Marsha McIntosh, *When Religion and Politics Mix: How Matters of Faith Influence Political Policies, Religion and Modern Culture* (Philadelphia: Mason Crest Publishers, 2005).
77. "Dari New York hingga Jeddah", *Syir'ah*, 20 July 2003.
 78. That is Chapter al-Baqarah (2:223): "Your wives are as a field unto you; so approach your field when or how ye will; but do some good act for your souls beforehand; and fear God. And know that ye are to meet Him (in the Hereafter), and give (these) good tidings to those who believe."
 79. "Bedah Pemikiran Adonis", transcript of discussion presented by M. Jadul Maula and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Teater Utan Kayu, 26 February 2004.
 80. Ibid.
 81. "Muslim Group is Urging Women to Lead Prayers", *New York Times*, 18 March 2005; "Muslims Cry 'Blasphemy' as a Woman Leads Prayers", *The Age*, 20 March 2005; "Her Turn to Pray", *Time*, 28 March 2005.
 82. Husein Muhammad was born in Cirebon, West Java, on 9 May 1953. He was raised in a strong religious environment. Educated in various *pesantren* in Java, he then went on to the Institute of Qur'anic Sciences in Jakarta. In 1980, he went to al-Azhar, Cairo, to study Islamic sciences. After returning to his country, he ran *pesantren* Dar al-Tauhid, in Cirebon. While teaching at *pesantren*, he is actively engaged in various Islamic discussion groups and became one of the leading figures in Rahima and Puan Amal Hayati, two Jakarta-based NGOs that concentrate on gender issues.
 83. Husein Muhammad, *Fiqh Perempuan: Refleksi Kiai atas Wacana Agama dan Gender* (Yogyakarta: LKiS and Rahima, 2002), pp. 32–34.
 84. Wawancara JIL, "KH Husein Muhammad: Perempuan Boleh Mengimami Laki-Laki", 9 May 2005, <www.islamlib.com> (accessed 23 August 2005).
 85. For further elaboration on the character of *kitab kuning*, see Martin van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren, dan Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 1995).
 86. Among those young "liberal" *kyai*, to mention only one, is Imam Nakha'i, a teacher and manager of a *pesantren* in Situbondo. He underwent all his educational life in *pesantren* specializing in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). In his circle, he is dubbed "peculiar kyai" (*kyai nyleneh*) as he often gives unusual religious opinions. For more information on his biography, see "Imam Nakha'i: Mujtahid Muda dari Situbondo", *Syir'ah*, December 2004, pp. 34–36.
 87. "Gus Dur dan Sejumlah LSM tolak Kriminalisasi Shalat Dwibahasa", *Republika Online*, 13 May 2005.
 88. Tedi Kholiludin, "Salat Bilingual, Haruskah Menjadi Kontroversi?", *Jawa Pos*, 16 May 2005.

89. NKRI stands for Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (United State of Indonesian Republic). Among the radical groups which often use this jargon is FPI and Laskar Jihad.
90. See, for example, Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia", *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (2002): 117–54; and Robert W. Hefner, "Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics", *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (September 2002): 754–65.

CONCLUSION

The history of thought is an elusive area to write about. It has many holes where writers are trapped into making generalizations or simplifications. However, generalizations and simplifications are sometimes necessary in giving an intelligible picture of the complex phenomenon of human thought. There is, however, a danger that it tends to give a distorted version of human history. Various books on Islamic thought fall into this trap through generalizing or simplifying its complexity into various ideological categories such as “modernist”, “traditionalist”, “revivalist”, “neo-modernist”, and so on. There is a certain element of truth in these categories, but the history of thought is not a mere history of ideology. As Karl Mannheim argues, political thought will not adequately be understood without an appreciation of the role of utopia.¹ It is disappointing that many studies on Islamic thought in Indonesia heavily emphasize political ideologies without due consideration of Muslim utopia.

This study is an attempt to fill this gap by addressing Islamic political thought in terms of the role of utopia. Utopia has played a great role in determining political discourse in the country. Since the very beginning of the era of national resurgence (*era kebangkitan nasional* or *nahdah* in the Arab context), Indonesian Muslims have been daunted by the ideal model of polity. The model of polity, as Macpherson argues, is the most practical idea of utopia.² This study has examined Muslim models of polity in Indonesia since independence. It has found three dominant models

that reflect Muslims' political understanding and attitudes towards various religious-political issues. These three models have played a crucial role in developing Islamic political thinking in contemporary Indonesia. Various arguments and explanations about major ideas such as democracy, pluralism, liberalism, freedom, and gender equality, cannot be properly understood without an exploration of Muslim conceptualization of a model of polity; a utopia.

The idea for this study was inspired by the current condition of Indonesian Muslims, who are increasingly more pragmatic and less dogmatic in their political stance. The study particularly refers to the defeat of Islamic political parties in the last two general elections and the events that surrounded them. In 1999, seventeen Islamic parties joined the general election and only one party obtained a considerable percentage of votes — which was PPP, which obtained 10.7 per cent; another two parties obtained 1.9 per cent (PBB) and 1.7 per cent (PK) respectively. In 2002, several Islamic groups demanded the return of the Jakarta Charter, a controversial political document, to the Constitution. This proposal was later submitted to the MPR Annual Meeting by two Islamic parties, PPP and PBB, who were to find it being rejected by most of the MPR members. Interestingly, the objection came not only from the political parties in Parliament, but also from the majority of Islamic organizations. In 2004, five Islamic political parties joined the democratic contest. Again, none of them gained even 10 per cent of the votes. PPP obtained merely 8.1 per cent, while PKS and PBB received 7.3 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively.

The failure of Islamic political parties is a good example of how a model of polity, a utopia, is forsaken when its philosophical foundation can no longer be maintained. What I mean by "philosophical foundation" is a set of arguments where theories, agendas, aims, and behaviour of a party are grounded. The Islamic state was a utopia for most *santri* Muslims during the 1950s. Its philosophical foundation was a conviction that Islam, unique among religions, had a comprehensive system of life, which could manage the complex problems of modernity. Practically, however, this model failed to work, not only because the political stage did not provide sufficient room for it to grow, but also because its precepts had been seriously challenged. The rise of the contesting models (that is, Model 2 and Model 3) advocated by the new *santri* generation bears witness that the Muslim utopia is not *sui generis*, deriving from one source. Like the character of thought and ideology themselves, utopia is changing and depends very much on how strongly its philosophical ground can sustain it.

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN INDONESIA

Certainly, the weakness of a philosophical foundation is not the only reason the Islamic model of polity (as represented in Model 1) has failed. In this study, I have observed various factors: political secularization by the New Order regime, the role of mass media, education, mass organizations, foreign funding agencies, and the role of intellectuals. Intellectuals and religious leaders play a unique role here. As authorities on religion and knowledge for such a paternalistic community as Indonesia, intellectuals and religious leaders enjoy an illustrious status. Their views and words are respected by many of their Muslim followers. Their influence is not limited to theological issues, but also to wider aspects of religious-political life. Through the mass media and other public forums, their views are disseminated and reach wide audiences.

Religious leaders and intellectuals in Indonesia are highly familiar with modern ideas, as Robert W. Hefner has succinctly argued: "nowhere in the Muslim world have Muslim intellectuals engaged the ideas of democracy, civil society, pluralism, and the rule of law with a vigor and confidence equal to that of Indonesian Muslims".³ Certainly, this is not a recent phenomenon. Since the very beginning of Islamic reformism, Islamic intellectual discourse in Indonesia has been characterized by the volition to catch up with modern ideas. Tjokroaminoto, one of the early Muslim reformists, was highly eloquent in discussing modern concepts. He wrote a book on socialism long before Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser, the Egyptian ruler, set the foundation of "Arab socialism". In Egypt and in the Arab world in general, modern ideas were often discussed in secular and non-Muslim circles. Early Arab reformists who eloquently discussed modern ideas, such as Shibli Shumayyil (d. 1917), Farah Antun (d. 1922), Jurji Zaydan (d. 1914), Ya'qub Sarruf (d. 1917), Nicola Haddad (d. 1954), and Salama Musa (d. 1958), were all Christians. Intellectual Muslims rarely spoke about modern ideas. Even if there were Muslim leaders who spoke about those ideas, they would have been severely challenged and immediately excommunicated.⁴ Excommunication and even the death threat have been common in Egypt and the Middle East in general.

This distinguishes the character of Islamic thought in both regions. In Indonesia, Islamic thought has a strong social foundation. This is mainly because it has always had a communitarian character. Since independence, Indonesian people have established many organizations

where they can discuss and spread ideas. Tjokroaminoto needed to join SI to socialize his political ideas. Likewise, Ahmad Dachlan needed to build Muhammadiyah to spread his reformist teachings. While ideas in Indonesia have always had a strong foundation in society, in the Middle East this has been significantly absent. There are hardly any Islamic reformists or intellectuals there who have disseminated their thoughts through an organization.⁵ Instead, books and mosques are the common medium for them to engage with their fellow Muslims. It is true that the book is crucial in influencing people; however it has limitations in that it requires a strong community of dedicated book readers. As in other parts of the Muslim world, reading habits in Egypt are extremely low. Meanwhile, the mosque also has its limitations, in spite of the fact that it has played a significant role in enriching the Islamic “public sphere”. However, like a market, but unlike an organization, people come and go to the mosque. After all, we cannot expect modern ideas to be freely discussed in this kind of venue.

The communitarian character of Islamic thought in Indonesia also explains why, for example, the distribution of Islamic reformist ideas in this country flows proceeds smoothly to the people. Needless to say, some have raised objections, but they have rarely led to excommunication, violence, or death threats to their proponents. In Egypt, death threats are common and are often addressed to those reformists who do not affiliate with any mass organization. In Indonesia, on the other hand, Muslim leaders are often chairmen of major organizations with a huge following. During the 1980s, Abdurrahman Wahid launched various controversial ideas (the controversy of which could be compared with that caused by Egyptian intellectuals such as Faraj Fouda, Fuad Zakariyya, and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who have all received death threats), but he was reasonably safe. No one dared to challenge him seriously. His position as the leader of NU, an organization that has about forty million members (more than half the Egyptian population), as the son and grandson of charismatic Muslim leaders, and as a scholar with high authority on Islam (he studied in Cairo and Baghdad), makes him almost “infallible”. He could say almost anything about religion that he wanted to.

Even if there was a death threat — as there had been addressed indirectly to a young Muslim intellectual, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla — such a threat was not taken seriously; and, in fact, became a sort of boomerang. Abshar-Abdalla’s case proved that the death threat for an idea is not something common and not deeply rooted in the Indonesian intellectual tradition. Soon after the *fatwa* was launched, hundreds of sympathizers and supporters

came to him and many leaders of major Islamic organizations expressed their compassion.⁶ In Indonesia, the trend for controversial issues seems to run differently from that in the Middle East, where the death threat is often supported by many Muslims (take the case of Salman Rushdie in Iran, or the murdered Faraj Fouda in Egypt, for example). Precisely as stated by a writer: “the more JIL [that is, Islamic liberal movement] was condemned and attacked in a peaceful way, the more it could bring its discourse (typically limited to a highly educated circle) to a wider audience”.⁷ Liberal Muslim leaders in Indonesia are generally more confident about, and freer in expressing their religious-political ideas than their Muslim counterparts in the Middle East.

MUSLIM DISCOURSE ON DEMOCRATIC STATE

Throughout this study, I have demonstrated how Muslim leaders and intellectuals in Indonesia have expressed their religious-political ideas. Before independence, they were generally occupied with issues that could become the unifying force for the archipelagic nation. The founding leaders mainly debated issues such as communism, nationalism, and Islamism. After independence, when the nation state was already established, the most challenging issue faced by Muslims was how to create an ideal system of polity. The first debate on the basic platform of the state (*dasar negara*) at the BPUPKI meetings was a reflection of the divergent views on the ideal model for independent Indonesia. Some wanted Islam to be the basis of the state, while others wanted it to be Pancasila or any non-Islamic platforms. Historians often distinguish them into two general categories: the “secular” and the “Islamic” nationalists.

While the secular nationalists were mostly non-Muslims or of *abangan* background, the Islamic nationalists were those who came from a *santri* background. Most works that appeared before the downfall of Soeharto based their argument on this very theory: the idea of the secular state was closely related to the secular nationalists, whereas the *santri* Muslims tended to favour the idea of the Islamic state. It was almost impossible, according to this argument, that secular ideas could grow out of a *santri* milieu. However, this theory has failed to explain the dynamic development within the Muslim community. As I have shown throughout this study, the *santri* Muslim community is not homogeneous. Contrary to many claims, *santri* Muslims are no longer necessarily against the idea of the secular state. In this study, I have demonstrated that the idea of the secular state (in the sense that it is not a theocratic one) is increasingly supported by *santri* Muslims.

Something that was anathema for the *santri* Muslims in the 1950s is now favoured and supported by their younger generation.

Since the 1970s, *santri* Muslims could not actually be categorized on the basis of *aliran* theory as it was formulated by Geertz and other American Indonesianists of the 1960s. The political imagination of *santri* Muslims is no longer homogeneous. As this study has revealed, there are at least three main models of polity that have been conceptualized and discussed by *santri* Muslims. These models of polity reflect not only the dynamics within the *santri* community, but also the progressivity in contemporary Islamic political discourse. Studying models of polity in Indonesia helps us to understand how Muslims in this country respond to the major political concepts that have mostly originated from the West. The history of modern Islamic reformism is the history of Muslims' responses to Western ideas; to democracy, pluralism, freedom, human rights, and gender equality. The three models of polity that I have discussed throughout this study have provided a synoptical sketch of Muslim responses to these ideas (see Table 7.1).

The first model (IDS, Islamic Democratic State) is a Muslim political imagination of an ideal government and state. Suggested particularly by Mohammad Natsir, one of the most influential Indonesian Muslim thinkers, IDS was designed to be a model that could bridge the Western political system and Islamic political ideals. Since the early days of independence, Muslim leaders were aware that democracy is the best possible system of polity. They similarly believed that democracy is not entirely "foreign" — that there is a historical and theological basis for democracy within Islamic societies. Zainal Abidin Ahmad, the most important theorist of this model, demonstrated the existence of democratic practices in the early days of Islam. He argued that Islam is congenial to democratic values, and in fact the very term "democracy" has an Islamic equivalence, that is, *shura*.

The proponents of the IDS model were those Muslim leaders who were highly respectful of democratic values and were willing to have democracy implemented in their country. Nevertheless, their understanding of democracy was generally majoritarian in the sense that democracy is understood fundamentally as majority rule. This understanding has crucially determined their religious-political attitudes in general. Firstly, they believed that because Muslims are the majority, it is, therefore, necessary for them to have the predominant role and position in the state and government. Secondly, they believed that only by way of democracy, and more specifically, the general election, could they change the laws and Constitution. Their

TABLE 7.1
Five Main Issues According to the Three Models

<i>Issues</i>	<i>Islamic Democratic State</i>	<i>Religious Democratic State</i>	<i>Liberal Democratic State</i>
Religion and the State			
Basis of State	Islam	Pancasila	Pancasila
Department of Religious Affairs	Support	Support proportionally	No
MUI	Support	Support locally	No
<i>Shari'ah</i> application (the Jakarta Charter)	Support	Yes at regional levels	No
Religious teaching in schools	Support	Support	No
Bill of Religious Harmony	Support	Partly Support	No
Religious Formalism			
Islamic parties	Strongly support	Moderately support	No
Islamic financial system	Strongly support	Moderately support	No
Freedom			
Freedom of thought	Subject to Islam	Subject to religious values	Unbounded
Freedom of expression	Support within Islamic doctrine	Support within religious doctrine	Unbounded
Freedom of belief	Partly Support	Support	Fully Support
Interreligious Relations			
Citizenship	Exclusive	Inclusive	Pluralist
Non-Muslim leadership	No	No	Yes
Marriage	Strictly No	Subject to Islamic doctrine	Doctrine is interpretable
Gender Issues			
Political leadership	Yes	Yes	Yes

enthusiasm in welcoming the 1955 general election was primarily driven by this conviction and an optimism about winning the election. Thirdly, this kind of majoritarian understanding pushed them to propose confidently the idea of the Islamic state and to put the Islamic laws (*shari'ah*) into practice. The argument was fairly clear: the majority of people within Indonesia are Muslims.

However, as a model, the IDS has generally failed, not due to the success of the “secular nationalists” in undermining its foundation, but because the general election — the very agenda of IDS proponents and the only legitimate measure for majorityness — did not support its claim. As explained in Chapter 1, all Islamic parties that generally supported the IDS model failed to win the 1955 general election. Consequently, the claim of having a majority was disproved. The failure in this general election was then followed by the sociological fact that it was increasingly difficult to unite Muslims under one ideological flag. The worsening tension between the “traditionalist” (represented by NU) and the “modernist” (represented by Masyumi) camps, particularly during the final years of the Soekarno regime, ruined their hopes of realizing the IDS model. The future of this model came to an end as soon as the political regime changed and the new Muslim generation came into existence. Instead of carrying on their forefathers’ ideals, the new *santri* generation started to criticize them and, in fact, supported Soeharto’s agenda of political secularization.

The second model of polity imagined by Indonesian Muslims came out of the failure of the old model and as a response to the emergence of the New Order regime. As explained in Chapter 4, this model was an attempt to modify Muslim religious-political views by taking the socio-political situation into consideration. It departs from Model 1 because of the conviction that Indonesia is a pluralist nation, not only in terms of religion, but also in terms of beliefs and ideologies. It is, therefore, impossible to suppress all those pluralities into one Islamic ideology. Unlike their predecessors, the proponents of the Religious Democratic State (RDS) model completely accepted Pancasila as the basis of state. Furthermore, they also tried to give Pancasila a religious character by stating that it was not a secular ideology. This model considers religion crucial in political and governmental life. The consequence is that they believe religious aspirations must be conceived by the state. In the religious-political sense, the model supports the idea of “state establishment of religion”, that is, the state has the right to regulate and be involved in people’s religious matters. In practice, this formula was implemented by reviving religious institutions — such as the Department of Religion — and by promoting religious bills.

Until the downfall of Soeharto in 1998, the dominant model of polity in Muslim political discourse in Indonesia was Model 2. By the collapse of the regime, however, the basic foundation of the model had been strongly challenged. Nevertheless, the challenge to Model 2 went beyond the condemnation of the declining regime. More fundamentally, it departed from the firm argument that the state has no right to intervene in people's religious matters. The main argument addressed by the critics of Model 2 was that the state which intervenes too deeply in people's religious matters tends to violate the values of democracy, particularly, freedom and human rights. Therefore, it would arguably be much better to separate religion from the state.

The separation of religion and the state through giving freedom to every citizen to pursue his or her religious affairs privately is the crux of secularization. The third model (LDS, Liberal Democratic State) is based entirely on this very idea of political secularization. However, "secularization" is a controversial term. Thus, the proponents of the third model have been trying to justify and defend the idea that secularization is plausible for the Muslim community. They all believe that the separation of religion and the state is a basic foundation for the existence of freedom and civil rights, particularly with regard to religious life. This attitude is generally expressed by objecting to any attempt to bring religion closer to the state or make it subordinate to the state. Since the post-Soeharto era, the proponents of Model 3 have firmly rejected the application of *shari'ah*, both at the central and local levels, resisting religious bills (such as RUU, KUB, and RUU Sisdiknas), and objecting to the politicization of religion.

LIBERAL ISLAM FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Model 3, with its belief in the separation of religion and the state, has certainly not become the dominant trend of Islamic political thought in Indonesia. But the fact that this idea has been increasingly attracting many Muslims, particularly the youth, indicates progress. Forty or fifty years earlier, ideas such as liberal democracy, religious pluralism, and secularism, were a *bête noire* for many Muslims. Efforts to unify Western political thought with the religious-political context in Indonesia were often challenged by *santri* Muslims, who believed that the Islamic political system inherited from the past was superior to the modern Western one. Secularization, which during the 1970s was condemned, is now becoming a central theme in the current political debates among the younger generation of *santri* Muslims.

This growth and expansion of support for democracy, liberalism, and secularism, provides clear evidence against the Gelnerian view of “Islamic exceptionalism” regarding the trend of the secularization process in the world.⁸ This phenomenon is also challenging the thesis of the American political scientist, Samuel Huntington, that the future of the world will be characterized by a clash of civilizations, notably between Islam and the West. As a matter of fact, there is a growing number of Muslims in Indonesia referring to Western modernity as a model of progress and prosperity. Using liberal Islamic arguments, Muslim intellectuals prove that there is no conflict or clash between Islam and modernity as produced by Western civilization. What seems to be the case is that there is not a clash between Islam and the West, but rather a clash between liberal and fundamentalist blocs within Islamic civilization.⁹

Furthermore, the growing number of progressive and liberal Muslims in Indonesia is substantially refining Harry J. Benda’s thesis which argues that the history of Indonesia is the expansion of *santri* civilization.¹⁰ It is true that Indonesian history is strongly characterized by the extension of *santri* civilization, but it is certainly not the *santri* that Benda founded in the 1950s, who were strongly determined by Islamic ideology and highly suspicious of modernity. The *santris* who have now emerged are liberal and progressive, and value democracy, pluralism, and liberalism. The ascendancy of Abdurrahman Wahid as president is concrete evidence of Benda’s thesis of the extension of *santri* civilization, but it also proves the emergence of a new kind of *santri*, which had perhaps never been imagined by Benda. As such, *santri* who still keep the spirit and image of the 1950s Islam, as represented by PBB and other Islamic ideological parties, are increasingly losing ground. Thus, Benda’s thesis should perhaps be revised into: “the history of Indonesia is the expansion of liberal and progressive *santri* civilization”.

To put emphasis on the liberal *santri* Muslims is certainly not to ignore the resurgence of radical Islamic groups in the country. It is true that radical Islamic movements are sporadically more violent, but as Ricklefs rightly argues, the radical Islamic movements had no prospect of winning political power in the country, not only because “the forces of tolerant, liberal, pluralistic Islam are strongly institutionalized, well led, the source of some of the most progressive thinking in the Islamic world, able to operate free of official repression and widely supported by the populace”,¹¹ but also because the *santri* Muslims themselves are now firmly standing in the frontline in fighting the radical and conservative understanding of Islam. The greatest challenge to radical Islam is now no longer coming from the secularists (as in the 1950s), but from within the progressive *santri* who are strongly rooted

and fluent in Islamic intellectual tradition.

The defeat of Islamic political parties and the rise of new Islamic civil societies promoted by the younger Muslim generation give hope that democracy will grow in Indonesia. There is hope for liberal democracy to stand firmly in the world's largest Muslim country. Democracy, as Almond and Verba argue, will not grow without democratic social capital,¹² and the biggest social capital in Indonesia are the Muslims. Democracy is not something instilled from above, but has to grow from amongst the people. Only a liberal civic culture can accommodate and support liberal-democratic values. And, this means that the future of liberal democracy in Indonesia is very much determined by the role of liberal Islam there.

Notes

1. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1991).
2. C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
3. Robert W. Hefner, "Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era", in *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia*, edited by Adam Schwarz and Johnathan Paris (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 49.
4. This happened, for example, to 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, Qassim Amin, and to some extent, Muhammad Abduh. While 'Abd al-Raziq's and Amin's ideas were considered blasphemous by many Egyptian clerics, Abduh's rationalistic approach to Islam was condemned by *ulama*.
5. We cannot consider Wahabism (in Saudi Arabia) and Ikhwan al-Muslimin (in Egypt) as Islamic organizations that bear the mission of Islamic reformism in the liberal sense. As a matter of fact, they are both against the spirit of *nahdah* and enlightenment set by al-Tahtawi and other Egyptian liberal reformists.
6. Abshar-Abdalla told me that he received many calls from prominent Muslim leaders, among whom were Ahmad Syafii Maarif, chairman of Muhammadiyah, and K.H. Ahmad Sahal Mahfudz, chairman of NU. Abdurrahman Wahid even wrote a column supporting his cause: "Ulil dan Liberalismenya", in *Gusdur Net*, 28 January 2003, <<http://www.gusdur.net>> (accessed 20 February 2005).
7. Mohamad Ihsan Alief, "Political Islam and Democracy: A Closer Look at the Liberal Muslims", *Asia Program Special Report*, No. 110 (April 2003), p. 17.
8. Ernest Gelner, a towering social scientist, believes that Islam is a great exception in relation to the secularization that besets all religions of the world. He states: "To say that secularization prevails in Islam is not contentious. It is simply false." Ernest Gelner, *Postmodernism, Reason, and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 5.

9. Robert W. Hefner, "Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization", *Sociology of Religion*, Special Issue vol. 62 no. 4 (2001), p. 493.
10. Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation* (The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958), p. 14.
11. Merle C. Ricklefs, "Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore's Giant Neighbour", public lecture organized by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, at the Asian Civilizations Museum, 23 September 2004, pp. 8–9.
12. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture; Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 1963.

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